Crash at Reagan National Airport, DC. Helicopter crash into airliner.

Not if the chopper pilots weren't looking out. And the rj pilots didn't know to look that way.
 
Mikey52 said:
Not if the chopper pilots weren't looking out. And the rj pilots didn't know to look that way.
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Especially since there was another aircraft on final for 1. My suspicion is the helo crew had the wrong a/c in sight.

Edit:

Lots of speculation up thread about the lady pilot being resistant to input from the IP. I think it’s much more likely she was annoyed by the controller pestering her about traffic she had in sight and was clearly avoiding.
 
luvflyin said:
The ‘knee jerk’ in these PAT scenarios was not a reply of in sight. It was just simply ‘request visual separation’ without having seen traffic.
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That's exactly what it looks like they were doing. You hear the same thing from every PAT flight on LiveATC prior to the accident. They were requesting visual separation so that the controller would not delay them to provide separation.

There was an incident at SFO not long ago where the pilot refused visual separation and got vectored around so much while they were trying to build a hole for him that he was on the verge of minimum fuel and diverting to his alternate.
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Lufthansa, IIRC. It was a European airline in any case. It wasn't visual separation that the flight couldn't accept, it was a visual approach at night. It would have been a company restriction that the pilots were required follow.

In that case, SFO was running the closely spaced visual approaches to 28L and 28R which requires pairing flights with the training flight having the leading flight in sight. If the trailing aircraft can not get the leading aircraft in sight, they will be broken out and resequenced.

To issue an ILS clearance they must protect the airspace on both runways. Traffic volume was such that doing so would have created a situation where they had one too many flights lined up for the other runway.

dtuuri said:
Yeah, but if the RJ were over the river don't you think they'd have been seen?
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If they did, they would have seen them going around due to an unstable approach.

As I said, I've been training on this procedure in both the CRJ and 737 and have flown it in the CRJ. The CRJ crew flew it as they had been trained to fly it and how the DCA controllers expected them to fly it. It was a very commonly used procedure.
 
hindsight2020 said:
"Those people are dead because I wasn't the RJ CA flying that visual" is the most main character syndrome, POA bird-pellet to this accident I've read so far. Between that and the manosphere/red-pill adjacent commentary about the helo crew demographics, you folks are something else. I <3 POA. :rofl:
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haha 100%.

Also, military aviation isn't the rest of the military. We have "no rank in the cockpit". This is an important mindset difference, since in a 2 person crew, you have to execute as a pair in combat.....there isn't time for "sir or ma'am" this and that. I fly with newly winged students all the time, who are like 15 years and 3 pay grades junior to me. I'm my callsign, and we leave the formalities at the ladder up to the cockpit. So nit picking the evaluator's demeanor, or some random utterance of the PF, is reading far too deep IMO. Maybe the "oh fine" was self depreciating, like "ok yeah I guess I'll unf*** myself again". I know I've said dumb stuff on the ICS since I started flying the family model of my plane. Hell, I even said dumb stuff as a single seat guy who didn't know to turn the ICS off, watching my tapes in the debrief :P This is all to say we all entirely lack context here.
 
Larry in TN said:
If they did, they would have seen them going around due to an unstable approach.
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You said the above in response to this:
dtuuri said:
Yeah, but if the RJ were over the river don't you think they'd have been seen?
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Here's a video from across the river with the landing lights of the RJ shining on the side of the helicopter and towards the camera miles away. Had the RJ been flying up the river rather than across it, these lights would be in the helicopter's windshield — but even a lot closer. So, doing things how I was taught gets you a go-around, worst case; your teachings get you killed:
 
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The rank differences have nothing to do with the accident. I have no doubt the IP would’ve used the same verbiage (minus ma’am) to a CW2 sitting next to him. Professional courtesy has nothing to do with the problem here. The problem was the lack of “be explicit, offer assistance and exchange mission information.”

Rank in the Army is not a factor taken into consideration in cockpit ADM. There are still clear lines of authority and the buck stops at the PC. No different than any other service. PCs and Air Mission Commanders are selected based on experience and not rank. It’s a briefed position in writing prior to departure.

Now, that doesn’t mean that if I was used to addressing my BDE CDR as “sir”, I would magically flip a switch in my head and not address him as such while flying. Also doesn’t mean I couldn't eliminate that when it matters. There’s “sir, go ahead and turn right to 270” and there’s “break right!” Two different things that require two different responses. Same goes for crew chiefs in the back. They give instructions to the pilots all the time and they’re the lowest ranking member of the crew. Adding a “sir” or in the case of WOs “Mr (name)” to it isn’t that hard. If that doesn’t happen? Oh well, not a big deal either. Not like they’re going to get a dressing-down after the flight by the PC.
 
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Velocity173 said:
The rank differences have nothing to do with the accident. I have no doubt the IP would’ve used the same verbiage (minus ma’am) to a CW2 sitting next to them. Professional courtesy has nothing to do with the problem here. The problem was the lack of “be explicit, offer assistance and exchange mission information.”

Rank in the Army is not a factor taken into consideration in cockpit ADM. There are still clear lines of authority and the buck stops at the PC. No different than any other service. PCs and Air Mission Commanders are selected based on experience and not rank. It’s a briefed position in writing prior to departure.

Now, that doesn’t mean that if I’m used to addressing my BDE CDR as “sir”, I’m going to magically flip a switch in my head and not address him as such while flying. Also doesn’t mean I can’t eliminate that when it matters. There’s “sir, go ahead and turn right to 270” and there’s “break right!” Two different things that require two different responses. Same goes for crew chiefs in the back. They give instructions to the pilots all the time and they’re the lowest ranking member of the crew. Adding a “sir” or in the case of WOs “Mr (name)” to it isn’t that hard. If that doesn’t happen? Oh well, not a big deal either. Not like they’re going to get a dressing-down after the flight by the PC.
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This is correct. I had a close call during a hoist evolution that the pilot in the right seat was getting qualified. He was a former Army H60 driver and was lacking confidence in himself while hovering over a 95ft cutter.

We were doing an indirect hoist with a basket with a trailing (lower trailing to the ship's crew, then back off). I lowered the basket to the deck then we backed off. Then it was time to hover back over the deck to pick it up. He was not listening to my commands (forward and right 40, forward and right 20, etc), and decided to start flying away while the basket was on deck. I started to yell over hotmike to get back over the ship to no avail.

I had two options: shear the hoist cable or yank up the hoist cable. I yanked it because the shear took a second or two to activate besides fumbling with the cover switch with safety wire.

At that point we were flying away at 40kts with 70ft of hoist cable out, with the basket, and 100ft of trailine (that was still on deck).

When the pilot says "go on hot mike, conn me in" the aircraft becomes mine at that point. I have the best view while the pilot’s visibility is very limited (left skew about 30-20 deg during deployment and the ship running about 20 kts). This is THE hard and fast rule that the flight mech controls the flight at this point. It doesn't matter if an 0-5 is at the controls. Sometimes during a night rescue during hurricane force winds, the pilot doesn't even see the ship for most of the hoist.

Crew coordination between every person on the helo is extremely important because one split-second hestitation could be life and death.
 
dtuuri said:
Had the RJ been flying up the river rather than across it, these lights would be in the helicopter's windshield — but even a lot closer. So, doing things how I was taught gets you a go-around, worst case; your teachings get you killed
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That is indeed some twisted logic.

Let me summarize your theory. Had the CRJ flight crew flown an improper, unexpected, unsafe, and untrained approach path, the Blackhawk flight crew might have seen the CRJ and maneuvered to avoid? Did I miss anything?
 
AquaLand said:
That is indeed some twisted logic.

Let me summarize your theory. Had the CRJ flight crew flown an improper, unexpected, unsafe, and untrained approach path, the Blackhawk flight crew might have seen the CRJ and maneuvered to avoid? Did I miss anything?
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A bunch. Here's another picture:

DCA RJ Helo collision.jpg​
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You've got PAT 25 (top left) pointed down river at five planes on the "Mount Vernon Visual Runway 1" and one RJ sneaking up on it from left field, out of its field of view. Why is it considered to be on the same flight path? Whoever decided coming in from that angle was necessary should have designed a uniquely different approach, say, the charted "I-295 Visual Runway 33" approach. That's why I don't blame the participants; they had a bad system set up for them.
 
dtuuri said:
You said the above in response to this:

Here's a video from across the river with the landing lights of the RJ shining on the side of the helicopter and towards the camera miles away. Had the RJ been flying up the river rather than across it, these lights would be in the helicopter's windshield — but even a lot closer. So, doing things how I was taught gets you a go-around, worst case; your teachings get you killed:
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Well both aircraft ended up in the water.
 
dtuuri said:
That's why I don't blame the participants; they had a bad system set up for them.
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We've been back and forth on this in this thread since the accident. Your position is a bit of an outlier with which the NTSB is unlikely to agree. That's okay, though. We don't have to agree.

The CRJ did exactly what they were trained to do, what the controller expected them to do, and what the PAT crews should have been familiar with.

The way I see it, the key issue is that a crew (or pilot) should not accept, never mind request, visual separation unless they can confirm that they have the correct traffic in sight, can keep it in sight, and can maneuver to avoid the risk of a collision. From the latest NTSB information, it appears that requesting visual separation without seeing, or even making a serious attempt to see, the other traffic was SOP for that unit.

A few other things have come out but they only had a marginal chance of preventing the accident. The Local controller did not point at the helicopter to the CRJ crew but it would have been difficult for them to see them while making their left turn to final. Additionally, the helicopter position was combined with the Local position which increased the controller's workload but having them split was also unlikely to change the outcome as the helicopter would have still required visual separation without seeing them.
 
Larry in TN said:
From the latest NTSB information, it appears that requesting visual separation without seeing, or even making a serious attempt to see, the other traffic was SOP for that unit.
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Great insight about "in sight."
 
Larry in TN said:
We've been back and forth on this in this thread since the accident. Your position is a bit of an outlier with which the NTSB is unlikely to agree. That's okay, though. We don't have to agree.

The CRJ did exactly what they were trained to do, what the controller expected them to do, and what the PAT crews should have been familiar with.

The way I see it, the key issue is that a crew (or pilot) should not accept, never mind request, visual separation unless they can confirm that they have the correct traffic in sight, can keep it in sight, and can maneuver to avoid the risk of a collision. From the latest NTSB information, it appears that requesting visual separation without seeing, or even making a serious attempt to see, the other traffic was SOP for that unit.

A few other things have come out but they only had a marginal chance of preventing the accident. The Local controller did not point at the helicopter to the CRJ crew but it would have been difficult for them to see them while making their left turn to final. Additionally, the helicopter position was combined with the Local position which increased the controller's workload but having them split was also unlikely to change the outcome as the helicopter would have still required visual separation without seeing them.
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“…From the latest NTSB information, it appears that requesting visual separation without seeing, or even making a serious attempt to see, the other traffic was SOP for that unit...”

This is the first I’ve heard that the NTSB has brought this up, but I haven’t been following things daily. The cavalier attitude toward it, and indiscriminate use of, is IMO probable cause.
 
dtuuri said:
You've got PAT 25 (top left) pointed down river at five planes on the "Mount Vernon Visual Runway 1" and one RJ sneaking up on it from left field, out of its field of view. Why is it considered to be on the same flight path? Whoever decided coming in from that angle was necessary should have designed a uniquely different approach, say, the charted "I-295 Visual Runway 33" approach.
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“Coming in from that angle” is the consequence of an aircraft aligning with the extended centerline of runway 33 when approaching from the south. There can be no other angle if an aircraft expects to land on 33. As for the “RJ sneaking up,” ATC informed PAT25 of the CRJ landing 33 two minutes prior to the collision. There was no “sneaking.”

A good perspective of the accident aircrafts’ relative positions is provided in the NTSB’s History of Flight Performance Study (Exhibit 13-A) in the docket. Fig. 17 shows that, for the last 4 miles between the aircraft, the CRJ was pointing or nearly pointing the Blackhawk. Fig. 18, at 1 mile and 15 seconds before impact, shows the CRJ directly pointing the Blackhawk, with the CRJ at about the 11 o’clock of the Blackhawk. At no time from when PAT25 initially said traffic in sight to the collision was the CRJ outside of the Blackhawk’s field of view.

As for the need for a new "I-295 Visual Runway 33" approach,” what would this new approach do differently from the existing circle/visual 33 approach or the existing RNAV 33 approach?
 
AquaLand said:
“Coming in from that angle” is the consequence of an aircraft aligning with the extended centerline of runway 33 when approaching from the south. There can be no other angle if an aircraft expects to land on 33. As for the “RJ sneaking up,” ATC informed PAT25 of the CRJ landing 33 two minutes prior to the collision. There was no “sneaking.”

A good perspective of the accident aircrafts’ relative positions is provided in the NTSB’s History of Flight Performance Study (Exhibit 13-A) in the docket. Fig. 17 shows that, for the last 4 miles between the aircraft, the CRJ was pointing or nearly pointing the Blackhawk. Fig. 18, at 1 mile and 15 seconds before impact, shows the CRJ directly pointing the Blackhawk, with the CRJ at about the 11 o’clock of the Blackhawk. At no time from when PAT25 initially said traffic in sight to the collision was the CRJ outside of the Blackhawk’s field of view.

As for the need for a new "I-295 Visual Runway 33" approach,” what would this new approach do differently from the existing circle/visual 33 approach or the existing RNAV 33 approach?
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Is there a link to the Docket?
 
Ed Haywood said:
How does one do this at night? And how does the controller know they have the correct traffic in sight?
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They don't... And there's no backup. That's why I think this is not a good procedure to allow when there's 70ish lives on the line.

MauleSkinner said:
Same question for daytime.
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It's much easier to identify aircraft type and airline during the day. At night, everyone is a light.
 
MauleSkinner said:
Same question for daytime.
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Agreed in principle, but at least you can see the aircraft size, type, and orientation to match the controller's description. At night, you're looking at a moving set of lights in a sea of other lights. That's a pretty big leap of faith to bet hundreds of lives on.

I'd argue the most obvious fix in hindsight would have been to prohibit visual separation at night between these two routes.
 
Ed Haywood said:
Agreed in principle, but at least you can see the aircraft size, type, and orientation to match the controller's description. At night, you're looking at a moving set of lights in a sea of other lights. That's a pretty big leap of faith to bet hundreds of lives on.

I'd argue the most obvious fix in hindsight would have been to prohibit visual separation at night between these two routes.
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Except that the consensus seems that it’s not the lack of ability to identify the correct aircraft, but the lack of intent.
 
AquaLand said:
As for the need for a new "I-295 Visual Runway 33" approach,” what would this new approach do differently from the existing circle/visual 33 approach or the existing RNAV 33 approach?
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It would change the focus of attention from down the Potomac River to the interstate highway east of the river. Looking at the field of vision study in the docket, there are only 22° left of center allowed by those NVGs. When I imagine looking through a visual pipe like that at five airplanes over the river, I can see why they may have thought they had the called traffic in sight.
 
Ed Haywood said:
How does one do this at night? And how does the controller know they have the correct traffic in sight?
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It can be difficult and, when it is, the crew should not report it in sight. If the pilot(s) can not see him, or keep him in sight, he should immediately notify ATC so that ATC can provide separation.

See AIM 4-4-14 Visual Separation
 
FlightmechH3 said:
This is correct. I had a close call during a hoist evolution that the pilot in the right seat was getting qualified. He was a former Army H60 driver and was lacking confidence in himself while hovering over a 95ft cutter.

We were doing an indirect hoist with a basket with a trailing (lower trailing to the ship's crew, then back off). I lowered the basket to the deck then we backed off. Then it was time to hover back over the deck to pick it up. He was not listening to my commands (forward and right 40, forward and right 20, etc), and decided to start flying away while the basket was on deck. I started to yell over hotmike to get back over the ship to no avail.

I had two options: shear the hoist cable or yank up the hoist cable. I yanked it because the shear took a second or two to activate besides fumbling with the cover switch with safety wire.

At that point we were flying away at 40kts with 70ft of hoist cable out, with the basket, and 100ft of trailine (that was still on deck).

When the pilot says "go on hot mike, conn me in" the aircraft becomes mine at that point. I have the best view while the pilot’s visibility is very limited (left skew about 30-20 deg during deployment and the ship running about 20 kts). This is THE hard and fast rule that the flight mech controls the flight at this point. It doesn't matter if an 0-5 is at the controls. Sometimes during a night rescue during hurricane force winds, the pilot doesn't even see the ship for most of the hoist.

Crew coordination between every person on the helo is extremely important because one split-second hestitation could be life and death.
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Bro,

I'd love to trade stories some day...
 
Larry in TN said:
It can be difficult and, when it is, the crew should not report it in sight. If the pilot(s) can not see him, or keep him in sight, he should immediately notify ATC so that ATC can provide separation.

See AIM 4-4-14 Visual Separation
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I (crewmember in back) have had traffic called by ATC that my pilots did not see due to other tasks. They responded to ATC "Traffic in sight" based on my calls over ICS based on the fact I had a visual and if the traffic was an immediate threat or not. Might be based on their perception of my experience and ability, but none the less, as @Velocity173 said, (and I'm gonna mess it up because I don't have the matrix in front of me, but he'll know what I mean..) I offered assistance and cross monitored my pilots and their workload. I am not above taking it further by recommending course deviations to alleviate conflicts. I have a vote even though I'm riding in the back, and I'm not afraid to exercise it.
 
Flymy47 said:
I am not above taking it further by recommending course deviations to alleviate conflicts. I have a vote even though I'm riding in the back, and I'm not afraid to exercise it.
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That's because you flew with a good crew.
Plenty of bad crews (here and abroad) where that would be considered unacceptable, unfortunately.
A heli crew smashed into an island 8 years ago because the back crew didn't feel like they had the authority to tell the pilots to change course immediately.
 
AV8R_87 said:
That's because you flew with a good crew.
Plenty of bad crews (here and abroad) where that would be considered unacceptable, unfortunately.
A heli crew smashed into an island 8 years ago because the back crew didn't feel like they had the authority to tell the pilots to change course immediately.
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I've flown with bad crews too. Shenanigans have been had after shutdown on the ramp. Bottom line, you have to be assertive.
 
dtouri9, this is not 50 years ago. The airspace rules have changed.

Please publish the current chart for a circle to land, runway 33, so we can see just how close to the river the airliner was REQUIRED to be.

I have spent hundreds of hours on sailboats on this part of the Potomac river, and have never seen an airliner over the river to land on 33 except as they crossed it, wings nearly level.

The RNAV 33 approach is over land from NADSE to IDTEK, where their turn toward the river and runway is started.

I am not aware of a published circle to land at 33, but you may.
 
geezer said:
dtouri9, this is not 50 years ago. The airspace rules have changed.

Please publish the current chart for a circle to land, runway 33, so we can see just how close to the river the airliner was REQUIRED to be.

I have spent hundreds of hours on sailboats on this part of the Potomac river, and have never seen an airliner over the river to land on 33 except as they crossed it, wings nearly level.

The RNAV 33 approach is over land from NADSE to IDTEK, where their turn toward the river and runway is started.

I am not aware of a published circle to land at 33, but you may.
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We're not talking about "circling" approaches, this a horse of a different color — a "Charted Visual Approach" as described in AIM 5-4-24. These have been around a long time at various places like Kennedy, La Guardia and Washington, DC. "Circling" is an IFR procedure with obstacle protection based on the turn radius at the different approach speed categories. It is also loosely applied in ATC jargon to aircraft landing under a visual approach after making a partial IFR approach to another runway.

This approach, the Mount Vernon Visual, has been essentially unchanged for 50 years that I know of. It allows, like all the rest, for more aircraft to use the primary runway (runway 1) in a given amount of time. ATC can squeeze in more landings when pilots are in control of the separation. Then they stretched it to include runway 33 without changing the course depiction. In my day, long before 9/11, landing on 33 via the Mount Vernon Visual was the approach expected when flying a general aviation aircraft under Part 91 or 135 and landing to the north. Sometime later, it seems, they stretched it even more — all the way to I-295, still without changing the depicted course and instructions to "Follow the Potomac River to the airport." Well, the rubber band broke. :(

IFR circling limits would be wider than the river, but I'm guessing not as far as I-295. Of course, traffic protection would be much stricter under IFR.
 
The chart for the visual says "MT VERNON VISUAL Rwy 1", just like the chart for the ILS says "ILS or LOC Rwy 1". Both charts are for Rwy 1 but like all approaches you can do a circle, if the chart doesn't say Circle to Land not authorized. Just like you wouldn't stay on the localizer to circle to Rwy 33 from the ILS to Rwy 1 you won't stay over the river when you circle to Rwy 33 from the Visual to Rwy 1.
The circling radius for a Category B (91-120 knots) is 1.5 miles, for a Category C (121-140 knots) it's 1.7 miles, and for a Category D (141-165 knots) it's 2.3 miles. So for the RJ doing the visual to 33 they were legal to be about 2 miles from the airport during the circle. This definitely means that they weren't required to stay over the river while doing the circle to Rwy 33.
 
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A bit more context of the communications going on early in the flight and just before impact. She cut him off mid-sentence when he told her to come down three times.
 

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Thanks for the post of the relevant transcript.

He also told her to go left since she was too far out in the river. She did not take any action to correct the flight path, but continued to climb right.

They were well off the helicopter route, and he knew it.
 
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