Crash at Reagan National Airport, DC. Helicopter crash into airliner.

Piperonca said:
Could not agree more. My theory is that Army got away with those routes so long because their pax were high ranking people who liked their V.I.P. transport and weren't shy about telling FAA to quit griping. As far as the altimeter error 'smoking gun', I call that a red herring. Collective Army action/inaction and FAA action/inaction caused the accident. The Board will subdivide it further, I'm confident. The only innocents are those young skaters, the families, and the flight crew aboard the doomed airliner.
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One thing that surprised me was they did an altimeter test after the accident and found three UH-60Ls with altimeters off between 80-130ft. Honestly, I don’t recall a single time my altimeter was outside the Army standard of +-70ft of field elevation. Even if that check was done airborne, without external stores, instrument error isn’t that much.

For Lobach to be 100ft high, she would have to have had an altimeter at the far end of tolerance (70ft) on the ground and at the far end of airborne airspeed error (30ft) of around 100 KIAS. I think she simply had the wrong altimeter setting. Backing it up with the RADALT would’ve solved that problem.
 
Velocity173 said:
IP. In a stands eval (APART), the IP is always briefed as the PIC (PC). An SP is always an IP as well. Generally a SP is an IE as well. This CW2 was just an IP though and her (Lobach) instrument eval of the APART would been done by an IE.

Now if he were in the back doing IP duties evaluating the crew up front, then they won’t be able to log PC. Must have access to flight controls. It’s a briefed position though and in this case, I guarantee the IP was briefed as PC.
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APART?
SP?
IE?

Little help?
 
Still reading stupid comments online about how this was intentional. Even people (non aviation) just in disbelief as to why Lobach didn’t see the RJ. My dad even called me a couple nights ago. “How did she not see the airliner?”

The closest I ever had to a midair in the Army was at Rucker, flying at night, and under NVGs. I won’t go into all the details but is was a situation with two stage fields (Brown & Stinson) with overlapping down winds. I was on a right downwind doing an EP (SE fail) and my buddy was on a right downwind at the other stage field also doing SE fail. He had strayed outside of the maximum distance (2KM) allowed on downwind and was in direct conflict with us. Just as tower begins to transmit to us “Crusader33, is that other Black Hawk on downwind a factor for you?” I see the other aircraft off the nose and maybe a couple hundred feet. In a split second, I yank up so hard on the collective that I severely droop the Nr, I look down through the chin bubble and in a flash I can clearly see the cockpit of the other aircraft go below us. My buddy goes up internal freq “Who did I almost hit at Brown!?” I thought we missed by around 70-80ft. He thought it was no more than 50ft.

Now, how does that happen? A breakdown in CRM. My scan was focused inside doing the EP. My student and I were still responsible for see and avoid but under NVGs, the other aircraft was being “drowned out” by the lights of the town (Elba) behind them. When you’re not incorporating unaided with your scan, “green” flashing lights with little movement on the windscreen can easily be mistaken for city lights. All it takes is cockpit distraction, poor scan, someone not adhering to rules / procedures and you have a disaster. In my case, an alert tower controller broke the chain and probably saved all of us.

I the DCA accident, I would’ve liked to have seen the tower controller more proactive. A better traffic call for PAT25 with a traffic call to the RJ as well. Even though visual was being applied, a last minute safety alert to PAT25. The accident still rests squarely on the shoulders of PAT25 but more attention to detail from tower could’ve made all the difference.
 
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donjohnston said:
APART?
SP?
IE?

Little help?
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Annual proficiency and readiness training. You do a NVG / instrument eval once a year. Lobach was undergoing her NVG stands ride.

SP is standardization pilot. Basically a senior IP who evaluates other IPs and in some cases, manages unit training / commander’s task list.

IE is instrument examiner. This is an IP/SP that is also qualified to teach and evaluate instruments.
 
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One thing I didn’t see in the report is what seat the crew chief was in. On check rides, I used to like having them in the seat behind the person being evaluated. They’re generally consumed with aircraft control and aren’t scanning as much. Plus if they’re not very experienced, they’re not going to be scanning as much anyway. So if Lobach was in the left, would like to have seen the CE seated behind her.
 
Piperonca said:
Could not agree more. My theory is that Army got away with those routes so long because their pax were high ranking people who liked their V.I.P. transport and weren't shy about telling FAA to quit griping. As far as the altimeter error 'smoking gun', I call that a red herring. Collective Army action/inaction and FAA action/inaction caused the accident. The Board will subdivide it further, I'm confident. The only innocents are those young skaters, the families, and the flight crew aboard the doomed airliner.
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This is the correct answer. Then adding NVG's in a light polluted environment, a training flight with a low-time pilot.

Overdue recipe for disaster.
 
Velocity173 said:
I the DCA accident, I would’ve liked to have seen the tower controller more proactive. A better traffic call for PAT25 with a traffic call to the RJ as well. Even though visual was being applied, a last minute safety alert to PAT25. The accident still rests squarely on the shoulders of PAT25 but more attention to detail from tower could’ve made all the difference.
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That is where I still am disappointed with ATC's role in this incident. At no point in time was the CRJ ever advised of the Blackhawk, or being on visible separation from it. Once the Blackhawk was given VS, the controller seems to have completely removed it from their priority. They didn't validate the Blackhawk had visual with the correct traffic. They didn't observe that it was not giving way to the CRJ, and that the two aircraft were on a collision path. There was no traffic warning, nothing.
 
midwestpa24 said:
….At no point in time was the CRJ ever advised of the Blackhawk, or being on visible separation from it. Once the Blackhawk was given VS, the controller seems to have completely removed it from their priority. …
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This is something the Opposing Bases guys discussed in their episode on the incident earlier this year.

The relevant documentation is in 7110.65 7-2-1 (a) 2, iirc.
 
Ed Haywood said:
Which is where ATC being undermanned becomes a factor.
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Which is where ATC not having proper technology becomes a factor. This could be automated, up to and including issuing warnings on frequency. And should be.
People are always the weakest link.
 
Like many accidents, this is a classic swiss cheese scenario. Multiple factors lined up to create conditions where this happened:

- Poor route design with no margin for cumulative error
- Cumulative error due to sloppy piloting and poor instrument calibration
- Relying on visual separation in conditions where visual separation is not reliable (NVD in light polluted environment)
- Undermanned ATC reducing ability to monitor, recognize hazards, and intervene

Everyone wants to point to one thing, but it's not just one thing, it's several things in combination.

However, if you wanted to identify the most blameworthy thing, I'd argue it is the route design. That was just dumb.
 
Kenny Phillips said:
Which is where ATC not having proper technology becomes a factor. This could be automated, up to and including issuing warnings on frequency. And should be.
People are always the weakest link.
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Yeah ok, better tech is always good, but it wasn't necessary. Just following their normal procedure of having separate controllers for helicopter and airplane traffic may well have prevented this. The helo controller went home early, leaving one guy to handle both. In the words of the NTSB, staffing levels were "not normal for the time of day and volume of traffic." That's such an obvious issue that I'm surprised it does not get more attention.
 
Velocity173 said:
One thing that surprised me was they did an altimeter test after the accident and found three UH-60Ls with altimeters off between 80-130ft. Honestly, I don’t recall a single time my altimeter was outside the Army standard of +-70ft of field elevation. Even if that check was done airborne, without external stores, instrument error isn’t that much.

For Lobach to be 100ft high, she would have to have had an altimeter at the far end of tolerance (70ft) on the ground and at the far end of airborne airspeed error (30ft) of around 100 KIAS. I think she simply had the wrong altimeter setting. Backing it up with the RADALT would’ve solved that problem.
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Check out the altitude plots in the docket and tell me what you think.
 
Ed Haywood said:
However, if you wanted to identify the most blameworthy thing, I'd argue it is the route design. That was just dumb.
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If it were up to me, Route 4 would still exist on the charts. It is a useful and essential route of egress from DC for 12th AB’s national security mission. Route 4 no longer exists because it was politically necessary to do something big and fast in response to the 1/29 accident.

I’ve yet to see any testimony or documents that indicate the design of Route 4 was intended to accommodate concurrent operations with 15 departures or 33 arrivals. In fact, interviews and hearing testimony has provided examples of when 12th AB aircraft were issued holds at Hains Pt or “golf balls” to deconflict Route 4 and 15/33 ops. IOW, DCA ATC knows how to deconflict 15/33 and Route 4 traffic. During the hearing, Army was asked if they could do their DC route training flights during off hours. The CO responded that, while inconvenient, the 12th AB is resourced to do that.

In the U.S. NAS, there are tens of thousands of points where planned routes intersect, but with the explicit understanding that you can’t put two aircraft at the same point at the same time. The fact that a route is planned does not ensure separation.

IMO, the primary cause of this accident was ATC’s failure to execute it’s primary mission; i.e., “the primary purpose of the ATC system is to prevent a collision involving aircraft operating in the system (7110.65).” In this accident, ATC delegated that responsibility.
 
AquaLand said:
If it were up to me, Route 4 would still exist on the charts. It is a useful and essential route of egress from DC for 12th AB’s national security mission. Route 4 no longer exists because it was politically necessary to do something big and fast in response to the 1/29 accident.

I’ve yet to see any testimony or documents that indicate the design of Route 4 was intended to accommodate concurrent operations with 15 departures or 33 arrivals. In fact, interviews and hearing testimony has provided examples of when 12th AB aircraft were issued holds at Hains Pt or “golf balls” to deconflict Route 4 and 15/33 ops. IOW, DCA ATC knows how to deconflict 15/33 and Route 4 traffic. During the hearing, Army was asked if they could do their DC route training flights during off hours. The CO responded that, while inconvenient, the 12th AB is resourced to do that.

In the U.S. NAS, there are tens of thousands of points where planned routes intersect, but with the explicit understanding that you can’t put two aircraft at the same point at the same time. The fact that a route is planned does not ensure separation.

IMO, the primary cause of this accident was ATC’s failure to execute it’s primary mission; i.e., “the primary purpose of the ATC system is to prevent a collision involving aircraft operating in the system (7110.65).” In this accident, ATC delegated that responsibility.
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I'm in about 90% agreement, but I'd put a fair bit of blame on the helo pilots as well. They clearly did not have the jet in sight when they requested visual separation. It was obviously just a common thing to request that and be granted it. I'm sure they thought they were "helping the controller out" by relieving him of having to provide separation, in addition to helping themselves not be held. They assumed they'd see it in plenty of time, or not be anywhere close, like hundreds of times before. Complacency and normalization of deviance on the part of both ATC and the Army pilots.
 
flyingcheesehead said:
The backup, of course, should be greater separation of the routes, especially with the number of potential conflicts that we've found after the fact.
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The backup is ATC applied separation, either radar or procedural. If ATC is providing separation then there's no reason for visual separation. The purpose of visual separation is to provide relief to the standards required by ATC provided separation. If you're arguing that visual separation should not be used then that's an idea that we can discuss.

Albany Tom said:
I thought some were hanging on to the idea that the route itself was OK, and that visual separation was just added as an extra to the already OK vertical separation for the route.
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That is clearly not the case. Published routes intersect throughout the national airspace system. There is nothing unusual about that. When aircraft will by going through those intersections at similar times, separation must be applied. ATC can provide that separation through radar or procedural separation. In some airspace, visual separation is also an option. That requires the aircraft accepting the visual separation to see the other aircraft and to maneuver as necessary to avoid a conflict.

If the helicopter did not request visual separation, which requires that he have them in sight, the controller would have applied procedural separation by holding the helicopter north of the runway 33 final approach course.

Kenny Phillips said:
Which is where ATC not having proper technology becomes a factor. This could be automated, up to and including issuing warnings on frequency
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ATC has collision predicting software. You often hear it in the background during ATC transmissions providing an alert about properly separated aircraft. The problem with software predicting is it doesn't know what each aircraft is going to do, it only knows what it is doing. IIRC, the DCA controller received a collision alert on the helicopter and CRJ, at which time he asked for confirmation that the helicopter had the CRJ in sight and instructed them to pass behind.
 
Larry in TN said:
The backup is ATC applied separation, either radar or procedural. If ATC is providing separation then there's no reason for visual separation. The purpose of visual separation is to provide relief to the standards required by ATC provided separation. If you're arguing that visual separation should not be used then that's an idea that we can discuss.


That is clearly not the case. Published routes intersect throughout the national airspace system. There is nothing unusual about that. When aircraft will by going through those intersections at similar times, separation must be applied. ATC can provide that separation through radar or procedural separation. In some airspace, visual separation is also an option. That requires the aircraft accepting the visual separation to see the other aircraft and to maneuver as necessary to avoid a conflict.

If the helicopter did not request visual separation, which requires that he have them in sight, the controller would have applied procedural separation by holding the helicopter north of the runway 33 final approach course.


ATC has collision predicting software. You often hear it in the background during ATC transmissions providing an alert about properly separated aircraft. The problem with software predicting is it doesn't know what each aircraft is going to do, it only knows what it is doing. IIRC, the DCA controller received a collision alert on the helicopter and CRJ, at which time he asked for confirmation that the helicopter had the CRJ in sight and instructed them to pass behind.
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Yep, and that software only alerts the controller. So you can use the old Everyone turn right 15° trick, if a controller can't intervene.
I understand why the FAA wants well-proven hardware and software for critical systems (having worked for the DoD) but some of this stuff was used, in one form or another, decades ago.
 
Kenny Phillips said:
Yep, and that software only alerts the controller
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My point was that it frequently alerts for properly separated aircraft that are not in danger of colliding.

Having an automated system which frequently overrides controller transmissions to issue control instructions that are not needed will not result in a safer system.
 
Jim K said:
I'm in about 90% agreement, but I'd put a fair bit of blame on the helo pilots as well. They clearly did not have the jet in sight when they requested visual separation. It was obviously just a common thing to request that and be granted it. I'm sure they thought they were "helping the controller out" by relieving him of having to provide separation, in addition to helping themselves not be held. They assumed they'd see it in plenty of time, or not be anywhere close, like hundreds of times before. Complacency and normalization of deviance on the part of both ATC and the Army pilots.
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To clarify, I said primary cause, not sole cause. I agree that the Army broadly and the PAT25 flight crew specifically shares culpability.

One of the data points that I looked forward to reviewing was what the PAT25 pilots said within the cockpit about the CRJ. With the CVR transcript now released, I was shocked to learn that there was no discussion by the PAT25 pilots about the CRJ.

During the hearings, Army uttered a few disturbing statements. When asked if prior to 1/29, did the flight crews include DCA aircraft landing paths with respect to intended flight routes in their mission threat briefing, the answer was no. They do now. When further queried about 12th AB pilot knowledge about DCA flight paths, the CW5 offered something about the “ILS 33” and “straight-in approaches to 33.” As another example, he said that he’s heard about the Mount Vernon approach and assumes that means the approach has something to do with aircraft flying by Mount Vernon. Mind blown!
 
AquaLand said:
If it were up to me, Route 4 would still exist on the charts. It is a useful and essential route of egress from DC for 12th AB’s national security mission. Route 4 no longer exists because it was politically necessary to do something big and fast in response to the 1/29 accident.

I’ve yet to see any testimony or documents that indicate the design of Route 4 was intended to accommodate concurrent operations with 15 departures or 33 arrivals. In fact, interviews and hearing testimony has provided examples of when 12th AB aircraft were issued holds at Hains Pt or “golf balls” to deconflict Route 4 and 15/33 ops. IOW, DCA ATC knows how to deconflict 15/33 and Route 4 traffic. During the hearing, Army was asked if they could do their DC route training flights during off hours. The CO responded that, while inconvenient, the 12th AB is resourced to do that.

In the U.S. NAS, there are tens of thousands of points where planned routes intersect, but with the explicit understanding that you can’t put two aircraft at the same point at the same time. The fact that a route is planned does not ensure separation.

IMO, the primary cause of this accident was ATC’s failure to execute it’s primary mission; i.e., “the primary purpose of the ATC system is to prevent a collision involving aircraft operating in the system (7110.65).” In this accident, ATC delegated that responsibility.
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In a national emergency, such as happened on 9/11, with civilians grounded, there isn't a need for any of the routes.
 
Mikey52 said:
In a national emergency, such as happened on 9/11, with civilians grounded, there isn't a need for any of the routes.
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Civilians might not always be grounded. Let's say there was an asteroid. Morgan Freeman would probably keep the airlines running until he found out if Robert Duvall had blown it up.
 
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Direct quote from a retired military aviator:

I saw the transcript that the last thing that pilot said before killing everyone was "Ok. Fine." as the IP was trying coax her back on course. Holy ****. I've been sorrowful but now I'm just ****ed. I've never heard "Ok. Fine" in the cockpit. It gives me chills.

It's quite clear that Lobach was not a good pilot and was arrogant by being corrected by a lesser officer during a flight. If anyone wants to defend her, please step up to the plate.
 
FlightmechH3 said:
It's quite clear that Lobach was not a good pilot and was arrogant by being corrected by a lesser officer during a flight. If anyone wants to defend her, please step up to the plate.
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Perhaps quite clear to you and a few others but I don’t find a two-word utterance in the cockpit to be compelling evidence of pilot quality. If you wanted to cite a more substantial event, you might note the pilot’s incorrect turn at Cabin John that was corrected by the IP.

As to the claim that PAT25’s altitude was “all over the place,” what is an acceptable altitude tolerance in a UH-60L in those flight conditions? (night, low-altitude, gusty winds, NVGs).

I note that the criticisms of Lobach’s performance conveniently excise the PIC from the discussion. As the PIC, the IP/CW2 was ultimately responsible for the safe conduct of the flight.
 
AquaLand said:
Perhaps quite clear to you and a few others but I don’t find a two-word utterance in the cockpit to be compelling evidence of pilot quality. If you wanted to cite a more substantial event, you might note the pilot’s incorrect turn at Cabin John that was corrected by the IP.

As to the claim that PAT25’s altitude was “all over the place,” what is an acceptable altitude tolerance in a UH-60L in those flight conditions? (night, low-altitude, gusty winds, NVGs).

I note that the criticisms of Lobach’s performance conveniently excise the PIC from the discussion. As the PIC, the IP/CW2 was ultimately responsible for the safe conduct of the flight.
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Why don't you blame the Crew Chief sitting in the back while you are at it? Lobach had the controls, was way behind the 8-ball, and froze up when the IP was telling her to move left. A stray cat would take better direction than she did.
 
AquaLand said:
Perhaps quite clear to you and a few others but I don’t find a two-word utterance in the cockpit to be compelling evidence of pilot quality. If you wanted to cite a more substantial event, you might note the pilot’s incorrect turn at Cabin John that was corrected by the IP.

As to the claim that PAT25’s altitude was “all over the place,” what is an acceptable altitude tolerance in a UH-60L in those flight conditions? (night, low-altitude, gusty winds, NVGs).

I note that the criticisms of Lobach’s performance conveniently excise the PIC from the discussion. As the PIC, the IP/CW2 was ultimately responsible for the safe conduct of the flight.
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+-100 for “ideal conditions.” It’s a bit gray but I’d also say she didn’t “maintain ground track with minimum drift.” Night, NVG and low altitude aren’t specifically listed as conditions less than ideal. They’re expected to maintain standards during those conditions.

Now, I would relax the standards for high winds but in a busy chunk of airspace like this, now way I’d let it get that far out of hand.
 
Still haven’t heard anything about HUD use. Not sure if they even have it but commanders usually require it. Has both baro and RADALT so no need to look inside.
 
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Everyone has forgotten that the problem really, is that the general staff, who all live out by Ft. Belvoir, need to be told they just have to drive to work. A privileged class. Hey no kidding, an entitlement that must needs to "go away". Rotorcraft and fixed wing in a small space are just not compatible.

There, I said it.
 
AquaLand said:
I don’t find a two-word utterance in the cockpit to be compelling evidence of pilot quality.
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In the military, there are certain phrases/replies that are simply unacceptable. If I had a Coxswain under instruction on one of my boats speak to a certified Coxswain like this, there would be disciplinary action. "Okay, Fine" smacks of arrogance and an open disagreement with the order you have been given. Replies like "Roger" "Copy" "Acknowledged" "WILCO" "Yes, sir" "On It" "Got it" "Altering Course" are one and two-word utterances that would have been much more reasonable and acceptable.

Just my opinion. I've always believed that military customs and courtesies are much more strict in the DoD than in the Coast Guard...but "Okay, Fine." isn't going to work in any service, I'd imagine. Hell, in my Navy days I was counseled on two different occasions regarding phrasing. Once for saying "Aye Aye, Petty Officer" in that using the rank term was seen as disrespectful and similarly for greeting a Marine O-3 "Good morning, Captain" as opposed to "Good morning, sir."
 
bbchien said:
Everyone has forgotten that the problem really, is that the general staff, who all live out by Ft. Belvoir, need to be told they just have to drive to work. A privileged class. Hey no kidding, an entitlement that must needs to "go away". Rotorcraft and fixed wing in a small space are just not compatible.

There, I said it.
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I know there's some folks that keep coming back to this. Not saying you're wrong. But my understanding is that these helo routes exist around several Class B airspaces. Boston is nearest to me and I know NYC has them as well. So does it really matter who the customer is rather than looking at why those routes exist so close to busy airports?
 
bbchien said:
Everyone has forgotten that the problem really, is that the general staff, who all live out by Ft. Belvoir, need to be told they just have to drive to work. A privileged class. Hey no kidding, an entitlement that must needs to "go away". Rotorcraft and fixed wing in a small space are just not compatible.

There, I said it.
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Agree 100%, but it's almost impossible to get rid of an entitlement when they are used to it. Elected officials are also using this taxi service and they will not give up this little benefit.
 
KE5BM said:
"Okay, Fine." isn't going to work in any service, I'd imagine.
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Sounds almost petulant. I never heard anything like that in my Army flying career, but I'm of an earlier generation. Combined with the wandering around she did, and earlier checkride failures, it's not a pilot I would want in the cockpit with me.
 
Piperonca said:
Sounds almost petulant. I never heard anything like that in my Army flying career, but I'm of an earlier generation. Combined with the wandering around she did, and earlier checkride failures, it's not a pilot I would want in the cockpit with me.
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Ward Carrol posted a video yesterday saying the warrant officer check pilot was being way too deferential to the Captain flying. And that, "Okay Fiiinnnee," reply from her should have been check ride over. But, it looks like he deleted it. Or at least I can't find it now on his page.
 
Nick D said:
Ward Carrol posted a video yesterday saying the warrant officer check pilot was being way too deferential to the Captain flying. And that, "Okay Fiiinnnee," reply from her should have been check ride over. But, it looks like he deleted it. Or at least I can't find it now on his page.
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The "okay fine" reads more to me like task saturation than anything. I remember during instrument training there were times that if my cfii had asked me my name, I would've replied "uh-huh". It's on the instructor to recognize that the student is loaded up. Now maybe he was afraid to take control, but the one thing we know for sure is that he asked for the visual separation. Plenty of blame to go around here.
 
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