Crash at Reagan National Airport, DC. Helicopter crash into airliner.

[dtuuri]

The chart for the visual says "MT VERNON VISUAL Rwy 1", just like the chart for the ILS says "ILS or LOC Rwy 1". Both charts are for Rwy 1 but like all approaches you can do a circle, if the chart doesn't say Circle to Land not authorized. Just like you wouldn't stay on the localizer to circle to Rwy 33 from the ILS to Rwy 1 you won't stay over the river when you circle to Rwy 33 from the Visual to Rwy 1.
The circling radius for a Category B (91-120 knots) is 1.5 miles, for a Category C (121-140 knots) it's 1.7 miles, and for a Category D (141-165 knots) it's 2.3 miles. So for the RJ doing the visual to 33 they were legal to be about 2 miles from the airport during the circle. This definitely means that they weren't required to stay over the river while doing the circle to Rwy 33.

Mt. Vernon isn't an IFR approach. Course guidance is via the river to the airport. There are no circling minimums nor obstacle protections. Altitudes are recommended, not minimums. There is no published missed approach procedure, those are treated as VFR go-arounds. So, it becomes a matter of discipline, do you follow the instructions or do your own thing? My first trip up that river to land on 33 was under the guidance of a retired F-100 National Guard pilot who had flown in there numerous times. Paul Tibbetts signed my paycheck. Those guys knew a little about discipline. I was warned of the helicopters and the need to stay over water. Not saying @Larry in TN isn't right about how things are done today, just saying this accident doesn't happen if these aircraft were nose to nose over the water.

 

[Rick A]

A bit more context of the communications going on early in the flight and just before impact.

The voice transcripts introduce INT-3 (I presume an observer in the back?). INT-3 seemed to be helpful in looking out for towers, etc.. while traveling southbound down the river. Was he/she wearing NVG's too? If viewing out the right side, seems INT-3 was missing in action and not aware the priority threats were inbound from the southeast.

 

[JimLAFB]

The RJ gets no blame, still? For the record, I'm not blaming anybody who died. They all thought they were doing the right thing, but the system set them up for failure. Take the RJ for instance. They were cleared for the "charted" Mount Vernon Visual approach to the airport. The crumb line depicted bends around land projections into the river, so as to stay over the water. The written instructions say to "follow the river to the airport". It's been that way for the past 50 years. But somewhere along the way, it was deemed to disregard the printed word and follow I-295 instead, effectively coming out of left field and left of the helo's field of vision under goggles. See here:
View attachment 143588

Here's the crumb line they were cleared to follow:
View attachment 143589

Had they stayed over the water, their landing lights would have lit up the helo's cockpit like it was daytime. But then they'd have to tip their wings to line up with runway 33 below 500 AGL, a no-no in these times. Fifty years ago, we weren't as fussy.

Weren't they on the Mont Vernon to RWY 1 and broke it off for a visual to 33. They weren't obligated to nav the Mount Vernon.

 

[Lindberg]

Thanks for the post of the relevant transcript.

He also told her to go left since she was too far out in the river. She did not take any action to correct the flight path, but continued to climb right.

The were well off the helicopter route, and he knew it.

I had a student last week flying the pattern and landing on his own for the first time. On one pattern, he overshot final and was slow to get back to the centerline, looking to intercept it at the threshold. I told him three times to fix it. If he'd botched the landing, drug a wingtip, or ground looped, who would be responsible?

 

[AquaLand]

Mt. Vernon isn't an IFR approach.

Like all visual approaches, the MTV1 is an IFR procedure conducted in visual conditions. The MTV1 is published as an instrument approach procedure (IAP) in the TERPS along with all of the other IAPs for DCA. Thus I'm skeptical of your claim that the MTV1 “isn’t an IFR approach."

 

[FlightmechH3]

The voice transcripts introduce INT-3 (I presume an observer in the back?). INT-3 seemed to be helpful in looking out for towers, etc.. while traveling southbound down the river. Was he/she wearing NVG's too? If viewing out the right side, seems INT-3 was missing in action and not aware the priority threats were inbound from the southeast.

-3 was the crew chief, sitting left. I'm assuming he was on NODs. I only had mine on when we were out away from any light clutter.

 

[Larry in TN]

They were well off the helicopter route, and he knew it.

As the NTSB stated in a press conference shortly after the accident, the helicopter route has no defined width.

just saying this accident doesn't happen if these aircraft were nose to nose over the water.

None of the airliners would ever land from such an approach because it would violate their stabilized approach criteria.

The title of the procedure is "MT VERNON VISUAL Rwy 1". When the local controller told them to circle runway 33 they were no longer of the "MT VERNON VISUAL Rwy 1". They were on a visual approach to runway 33.

 

[geezer]

About 65 years ago, a DC 3 from Norfolk did the Mount Vernon and transitioned to the 33, staying over the river, as dtouri describes. He got too slow for the sharp banked turn, and stalled into the river. Most of the survivors were rescued by members of the sailing club that I was a member of.

I personally knew the pilot, and he considered that version of an approach to 33 as unsafe, predicting that sooner or later, someone was going into the river. He had been flying that approach for years. That crash may been why the practice became flying over the land a quarter of a mile to the east, so less than spectacularly skilled pilots were not challenged to the edge of their abilities.

 

[Bacho]

saying this accident doesn't happen if these aircraft were nose to nose over the water.

What if the helicopter driver is not looking out the window?

 

[Ed Haywood]

What if the helicopter driver is not looking out the window?

Flying at 200 AGL, pretty sure at least one of them is looking out the window.

 

[geezer]

They should have been below 200 feet, that is the hard ceiling of the route, never exceed.

My observation from over 1000 hours in the last decade sailing on that part of the Potomac, they fly at about 50 to 100 feet They climb when they approach the Wilson bridge to get safe clearance crossing it.

I started racing there in 1959, when I was just getting started with my flying game. I used the aviation weather briefer for my pre race planning.

 

[Ed Haywood]

My observation from over 1000 hours in the last decade sailing on that part of the Potomac, they fly at about 50 to 100 feet

How about at night?

 

[geezer]

I have been sailing on the Potomac at midnight.

I have been on the Wilson bridge at night, and seen a helicopter climb to clear the bridge.

On 295, I have seen helicopters pass below me, at night.

As a pilot, I practice a full scan even when driving, and notice more than vehicular traffic

 

[FlightmechH3]

I used NVG's for SAR and drug interdiction operations for many night flights.

There are pros and cons using them. The biggest cons are that you have no depth perception and city lights wash things out. A moonless night over the ocean with a starry field shows the horizon break line. A survivor with a flashlight can stand out 20 miles away. Example: I saw a faint glow that would appear and disappear over the ocean, so I had the pilots head towards it (I thought it was a mile away). 10 miles later we found the sailboat. A guy was smoking a cigarette on deck.

I noticed that NVG's have become a crutch and are being used in the wrong application during flights. Around DC? Insanity.

 

[Velocity173]

Excellent critique on the accident with transcript before the accident itself. Good explanation at 19+00 of the rank structure. Only thing I disagree with is the assessment of the IP. While he did well to establish a good crew climate, he did poorly on air crew coordination.

 

[Piperonca]

I noticed that NVG's have become a crutch and are being used in the wrong application during flights. Around DC? Insanity.

Asking the experts here--wouldn't somebody flying a route at night want to be on goggles at 200 AGL, metro enviornment or not? My experience was in ancient times, using PVS-5 full faceplate, so I don't know s***.

Also, identifying specific traffic among a cluster using 'lights' is provably nuts.

 

[Ed Haywood]

Apparently the NTSB head ripped the FAA a new one. The tower staff had identified the risk with Helo Route 4 but were told no change was possible. That's pretty ugly.

 

[Velocity173]

The altitude on route 4 keeps being brought up. That route was never designed to be used simultaneously with a 33 arrival. Reason being, ATC needs 500 ft vertical sep. The controller never would have anllowed PAT to continue without visual. With visual, that altitude isn’t valid either because they can maneuver as necessary in order to maintain visual separation. Doesn’t necessarily mean they’re going below traffic.

Yes, it would be a good idea to just restrict route 4 with 33 arrivals. Don’t use visual sep day or night with a 33 arrival vs route 4 helo. Keep them at Haims Pt. I’d say this though, anytime you’re in busy airspace and visual is being used there’s a chance of miss identifying aircraft. Also, those 8 other cities that have helo routes, ALL of them could result in the same type of accident. Look at O’hare. One wrong turn on that route and they’re in the middle of final. To eliminate those routes would be completely impractical.

 

[FlightmechH3]

Asking the experts here--wouldn't somebody flying a route at night want to be on goggles at 200 AGL, metro enviornment or not? My experience was in ancient times, using PVS-5 full faceplate, so I don't know s***.

Also, identifying specific traffic among a cluster using 'lights' is provably nuts.

Flying at all in that environment is crazy. 200ft? Nuts

 

[dtuuri]

Weren't they on the Mont Vernon to RWY 1 and broke it off for a visual to 33. They weren't obligated to nav the Mount Vernon.

Well by the same logic, coming in from the northwest on the River Visual RWY 19 you could abandon the river and enter a right downwind over the Pentagon if they ask you to switch to runway 22 early enough.

 

[dtuuri]

Like all visual approaches, the MTV1 is an IFR procedure conducted in visual conditions. The MTV1 is published as an instrument approach procedure (IAP) in the TERPS along with all of the other IAPs for DCA. Thus I'm skeptical of your claim that the MTV1 “isn’t an IFR approach."

See AIM paragraph 5-4-24.h.

 

[JimLAFB]

Well by the same logic, coming in from the northwest on the River Visual RWY 19 you could abandon the river and enter a right downwind over the Pentagon if they ask you to switch to runway 22 early enough.

I don't get that geometry as I would break off early to a base to 22, cognizant of the P56. But they could put you in a position to fly over the Pentagon if they cleared you the GPS15. I don't know of a restricted area over the Pentagon. Local ATC might have their own restrictions. If I'm on a published visual to one runway and they clear me for a visual to a different runway I'm not flying the published any more. I'm setting up for a stable approach to my new runway.

 

[dtuuri]

The title of the procedure is "MT VERNON VISUAL Rwy 1". When the local controller told them to circle runway 33 they were no longer of the "MT VERNON VISUAL Rwy 1". They were on a visual approach to runway 33.

I don't remember any such distinction other than changing of the runway. Besides, one of the justifications for a CVFP is noise abatement. Routinely switching to an ordinary visual would seem to fly in the face of the specific reason for having such an approach in the first place.

 

[dtuuri]

About 65 years ago, a DC 3 from Norfolk did the Mount Vernon and transitioned to the 33, staying over the river, as dtouri describes. He got too slow for the sharp banked turn, and stalled into the river. Most of the survivors were rescued by members of the sailing club that I was a member of.

I personally knew the pilot, and he considered that version of an approach to 33 as unsafe, predicting that sooner or later, someone was going into the river. He had been flying that approach for years. That crash may been why the practice became flying over the land a quarter of a mile to the east, so less than spectacularly skilled pilots were not challenged to the edge of their abilities.

Interesting story, but my first experience was 15 years or so later and everybody still flew up the river hugging the east bank. I never heard of any crashes, and we all looked forward to the challenge. On the other hand, coming in the other way and switching to runway 22 one night made me assert myself and tell the captain to go around. Turning and descending below 200 feet without the runway lights in sight was more than I could stand.

 

[dtuuri]

What if the helicopter driver is not looking out the window?

Hopefully the other crew is. Good point, though. There was a stiff ~20 kt. breeze from the west for this copter so even though the track was 193° they must have had quite a crab to the right. Combined with +/-22°of night vision goggle field view they probably couldn't see the RJ east of the river at all.

 

[Velocity173]

Hopefully the other crew is. Good point, though. There was a stiff ~20 kt. breeze from the west for this copter so even though the track was 193° they must have had quite a crab to the right. Combined with +/-22°of night vision goggle field view they probably couldn't see the RJ east of the river at all.

Never thought about that but yeah, the nose would be canted pretty far to the right. Lobach was probably zeroed in on the one o’clock looking for traffic inbound to rwy 1. All the time having a difficult time maintaining altitude within standards.

 

[dtuuri]

Never thought about that but yeah, the nose would be canted pretty far to the right. Lobach was probably zeroed in on the one o’clock looking for traffic inbound to rwy 1. All the time having a difficult time maintaining altitude within standards.

You mean 11 o'clock?

 

[Velocity173]

You mean 11 o'clock?

I think the RJ was between the 10-11 o’clock. That would make the inbounds to rwy 1 at the 1-2 o’clock. I think that’s why she was turning right towards the end. I think she was trying to pass behind traffic on rwy 1. Don’t think she had any clue that anyone was coming in from the left to rwy 33.

 

[Larry in TN]

I don't remember any such distinction other than changing of the runway

"Bluestreak 5342, at the Wilson bridge [???] change [???] 33, runway 33 cleared to land"

The MOUNT VERNON VISUAL Rwy 1 does not serve runway 33. A CRJ can not fly up the river and land on 33 while maintaining stabilized approach criteria. The controller told them to "change" and gave them a point at which they should change. At that point, they were no longer flying the MOUNT VERNON VISUAL Rwy 1. They changed to a visual runway 33.

 

[AquaLand]

Combined with +/-22°of night vision goggle field view they probably couldn't see the RJ east of the river at all.

You do realize that the NVGs are mounted to a helmet, which is mounted to a human head, which is mounted on a human neck, which allows the entire assembly to turn left and right? Pretty common activity for pilots, this turning of the head.

Regardless of the crab angle, the CRJ should never have been outside of the available field of view for the PAT25 flight crew.

 

[Jeff767]

As the NTSB stated in a press conference shortly after the accident, the helicopter route has no defined width.


None of the airliners would ever land from such an approach because it would violate their stabilized approach criteria.

The title of the procedure is "MT VERNON VISUAL Rwy 1". When the local controller told them to circle runway 33 they were no longer of the "MT VERNON VISUAL Rwy 1". They were on a visual approach to runway 33.

Charted visual approach procedures are allowed to not meet stabilized approach criteria. A example is the Park Visual 31 n LGA.

 

[Velocity173]

The white phosphor NVGs they were using have a FOV of 40 degrees (+-2).

 

[Bill]

I started racing there in 1959, when I was just getting started with my flying game. I used the aviation weather briefer for my pre race planning.

@geezer , what do you race? I club race a Flying Scot on a local lake here.

 

[dtuuri]

The MOUNT VERNON VISUAL Rwy 1 does not serve runway 33.

The instructions could have said "Follow the Potomac River to Runway 1," but it doesn't. It says "...to the airport." Runway 33 is on the airport.

 

[dtuuri]

Regardless of the crab angle, the CRJ should never have been outside of the available field of view for the PAT25 flight crew.

Then the accident shouldn't have happened, but it did. It wouldn't have happened if the RJ flew up the east side of the Potomac. It would have been the biggest brightest light ahead.

 

[Larry in TN]

Charted visual approach procedures are allowed to not meet stabilized approach criteria. A example is the Park Visual 31 n LGA.

But part 121 pilots are not.

The instructions could have said "Follow the Potomac River to Runway 1," but it doesn't. It says "...to the airport." Runway 33 is on the airport.

And it says Runway 1 in the title.

No matter how pedantic, an analysis of the procedure is not going to find a restriction which prevents the procedure as flown by the CRJ. The procedure can be broken off to complete a visual approach to other runways.

 

[AquaLand]

Then the accident shouldn't have happened, but it did.

On that point, we agree.

In midair collision accidents the NTSB does modeling to depict how one aircraft appears over time in the windscreen of the other aircraft. Has anyone found this data and associated analysis in the docket?

 

[dtuuri]

And it says Runway 1 in the title.

No matter how pedantic, an analysis of the procedure is not going to find a restriction which prevents the procedure as flown by the CRJ. The procedure can be broken off to complete a visual approach to other runways.

If you can't accept that the route to the "airport" is via the Potomac while the chart markings clearly avoid flight over land, then I guess you're right. Dead right on January 29th.

 

[FlightmechH3]

The NY Times had an interesting write up about her on August 1st.

Bottom line: she was not a good pilot

 

[geezer]

Bill

Thread drift...In 1959 I was racing on a Lightning.
More recently on many other cruising boats, Catalina 22, Benneteau 30, and several others.
About 5 years ago, on a borrowed Lightning, volunteering for the Special Olympics program, we won a silver medal.
I cruised on the Potomac in my Macgregor 22 many times, slept aboard in Smoots cove and behind the sandbar south of Jones point. Both of those places have automatic wakeup at 6 AM, when the KDCA started their day.