- Joined
- Sep 25, 2019
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- 829
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- Lancaster, Pennsylvania
- Display Name
- Rick A
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- KLNS
Juan Browne says sun glare right down the runway was also a factor...
AC 90-23H (recently revised) still has the 3-rotor-diamater-avoidance guidance. For the B407, that would be 105 ft. The N94 runway is 60 ft wide.
Despite them "talking" they both weren't listening and processing situational awareness.
Very possible, but I'm not so sure. From what little we can see it also looks a lot like he's landing and then getting lifted and pulled over by the rotor wash.I speculate he was in the "go" phase of a go-around or a touch and go. Did he realize something wasn't right and was trying to get out of there? We might never know.
Everything I learned about the danger of flying close to helicopters came from a helicopter pilot.We can talk through the blame game all day but its clear how this is all going to play out. The NTSB will cite both the 150 and the helicopter pilot as partially as fault, the estate of the 150 pilot will sue the state police for creating a safety hazard (regardless of warranted or not), there will then be a settlement out of court for an undisclosed amount, and a year later everyone will forget about the accident. Its tragic but accidents happen.
When I was learning to fly it was at a small airfield in Connecticut that had a single 1800' strip with a flight school, a helicopter school, and a skydiving operation all using that small runway at the same time on the weekends. One of the first things I was taught was to never takeoff or land if there was a helicopter with its blades turning next to the runway without being in direct contact with that helicopter to ensure they were on the ground and would keep their blades flat and not producing lift or turbulence until after you were well away from them.
In this particular accident it appears that both the 150 pilot as well as the helicopter pilot did not recognize the potential safety issue and neither took steps to mitigate it. Like most accidents, it would have only taken one thing in the accident chain to go different in order to prevent this accident. We can argue over who had what right of way all day but both could have prevented the crash.
But if you watch the 8/20 NTSB briefing, the IIC stressed that the witnessed maintenance required context, which the NTSB doesn’t yet have. Was the witness even a person with aviation knowledge? The C150 pilot could have simply been performing pre-flight activities.I just saw a clip where someone in a NTSB hat was saying that there were witnesses stating the pilot was doing maintenance on their plane before the accident.
Except that is not how the Probable Cause process works. There will be "singular" cause with contributing circumstances, or they were unable to determine the cause. No 50/50 splits. And based on what the NTSB IIC stated this morning of the unusual flight path of the 150 while circling the airport, and the unusual approach to the runway prior to the collision, the 150 may simply have hit the 407 on his own. Who knows at this point. But it was implied they had watched additional video than what is currently in the public domain. Now the civil side sure and bound to happen regardless what the probable cause.The NTSB will cite both the 150 and the helicopter pilot as partially as fault,
A lot of airports and cities have restrictions where helicopters can operate which can limit where they can operate.why can't they do it somewhere other than a runway that is in use?
Actually, I do not believe they can place any limits on operations not touching the airport surface. That's the FAA domain. A helicopter hovering is not touching the airport surface.A lot of airports and cities have restrictions where helicopters can operate which can limit where they can operate.
While the airspace is the FAA domain, you'll find at the state or municipal levels the FAA grants leeway for them to manage that helicopter traffic and especially in the terminal areas. My local airport where helicopters are very frequent are restricted to specific departure and approach paths, where they can hover taxi vs wheel taxi, and also prohibits training flights. So when the local operators need to train they go down the road to the next airport who has a dedicated helicopter training area. This airport may have had the same given the other aircraft and development close to the airport?Actually, I do not believe they can place any limits on operations not touching the airport surface. That's the FAA domain. A helicopter hovering is not touching the airport surface.
My home field (F95) doesn’t allow Ospreys to hover anywhere near paved surfaces. They have to do that outside the airport fence. Helicopters can do whatever they want.While the airspace is the FAA domain, you'll find at the state or municipal levels the FAA grants leeway for them to manage that helicopter traffic and especially in the terminal areas. My local airport where helicopters are very frequent are restricted to specific departure and approach paths, where they can hover taxi vs wheel taxi, and also prohibits training flights. So when the local operators need to train they go down the road to the next airport who has a dedicated helicopter training area. This airport may have had the same given the other aircraft and development close to the airport?
But one can feel the wake of a ~2K lb. C172 when doing turns around a point. Gonna guess a helicopter, even a light one, in ground effect, would be making a mini downburst.Not to make light of the issue but a 407 operating at less than 5000 pounds is much different then a Blackhawk at 20K or a Chinook at 45-50K…I doubt the Board will find it a factor…guess we will wait a year and see. Maybe I am wrong…
Don't quite follow what you mean by "downburst," but the strength of rotorwash is related to the chordwise width of the blade and aircraft weight as mentioned above. And hover rotorwash in ground effect is not as strong as in an out of ground effect hover as the ground affects the outflow and especially on an unimproved surface such as the grass median. And having worked under the turning rotor of a 407 and others in both conditions, I can attest to that. And if the IIC comments hold up on the unusual pattern work and unstable approach by the 150, this could simply be the 407 was in the wrong place at the wrong time especially if the 150 pilot had the setting sun in his eyes and lost track of the helicopter.Gonna guess a helicopter, even a light one, in ground effect, would be making a mini downburst.
S-61
Again, comparing 20,000+ lb aircraft to a <6000 lb aircraft (407) is moot. The questions I've seen being raised is the time frame of when the 407 settled into its hover vs the time the 150 entered its approach. There has also been discussion on if the 407 had flown down the runway center line out of ground effect prior its hover which would create a different scenario for the 150. Regardless, per the IIC they had multiple videos of the 150 approach and collision which should provide the timing and possible effects of the 407 on the 150.
Again, comparing 20,000+ lb aircraft to a <6000 lb aircraft (407) is moot.
As soon as I saw this in the news my first thought was the LEO pilots did nothing wrong per regulations but probably profoundly stupid and caused the accident.I'm surprised this hasn't happened at CJR. A bunch of clowns in some sort of law enforcement mission keep parcticing ops just off the runway in a nook in the trees that obscures them from traffic operating on the runway and no CTAF calls. These things can still throw substantial downwash even if technically off the runway. Perhaps the pilot hit that and overcorrected.
Actually, I do not believe they can place any limits on operations not touching the airport surface. That's the FAA domain. A helicopter hovering is not touching the airport surface.
Due to my bias towards LEO pilots from 30 years of observation.
...almost like the job may have a predisposition to attract a certain personality trait? Combine it with uncompetitive pay in non-coastal metro jurisdictions and a culture of tribalism, and well....*insert 3 wise monkeys here*and heard the tail end of the State Police helicopter transmission informing ATC that a Mooney just passed very close beneath him, and he was going to follow me. WTH?
You are very accurate with your comment. Truth...almost like the job may have a predisposition to attract a certain personality trait? Combine it with uncompetitive pay in non-coastal metro jurisdictions and a culture of tribalism, and well....*insert 3 wise monkeys here*
Yes. Both the videos show forward flight wake turbulence from the helicopters which is a different dynamic than rotorwash effects from a stationary hover in ground effect. However, if certain comments are true that the 407 flew down the runway center line 1 minute prior to their established hover in the infield, then it could be the 150 was affected that wake vortex vs the rotorwash from the subsequent hover. Which would be no different than if the 150 was landing behind any other larger aircraft vs any fault of helicopter hover rotorwash as its been stated the 150 was unstable/LOC well before the helicopter's hover position.Is comparing a 10,000 lb. PC-12 to a 1600 lb. C-150 also moot?
ADS-B data shows the B407 flying down the runway centerline.However, if certain comments are true that the 407 flew down the runway center line 1 minute prior to their established hover in the infield...
When you follow another aircraft on landing, it is your responsibility to wait for that aircraft to clear the runway and no longer present a hazard.
Does that data also show the time interval between the 407 and 150 and their respective altitudes when they crossed the threshold?ADS-B data shows the B407 flying down the runway centerline.
Unfortunately, the last ADS-B data tag for the C150 at 2251:01Z is with the aircraft on an assumed base leg for runway 28. In another aviation forum, a poster extrapolates from this last data tag and estimates that the C150 entered the landing zone on runway 28 about 30 seconds after the B407.Does that data also show the time interval between the 407 and 150 and their respective altitudes when they crossed the threshold?
So if the 150 was say at a typical approach elevation or about 30-40 ft above the wake vortex of the 407 at the threshold and in its "unusual" nose down approach attitude, he may have well run into that vortex, which caused the un-stabilized flight movements as noted by the NTSB IIC. And well before where the helicopter hovered off to the right awaiting his landing or go-around??that the C150 entered the landing zone on runway 28 about 30 seconds after the B407.