Epic E1000 CFIT Steamboat 13 Feb 26

Denver Center handles SBS airport Does center monitor notams or is that strictly the pilot obligation? Other words does center even know if some far away instrument approach is usable or out of service?

Talking uncontrolled airports or after hours tower airports.
 
Last edited:
What does the terrain feature of the Garmin system show while performing this approach?
 
Yup! No one has ever made a mistake in a Cessna 150. Damn wealthy people are the problem
nah. Just MORE of a problem.
I can tell you for sure that the USN would not come looking for me the way they went for JFK Jr....who also waited for his InLaw...and that Aspen crash (thanks 339RP) was sentinel. "Doesn't matter sir that you have two stars, your survival is at stake. You can relieve me but we are very very busy and we ARE landing at an AFB, sir."
 
What does the terrain feature of the Garmin system show while performing this approach?
I tried this numerous times in the GTNXi trainer (I know it's not the G1000). I could not get the TAWS to give a warning while coupled to the approach. The red in the terrain did not show up until maybe 10 secs before "impact." If you're zoomed out at all on the 750, it's barely noticeable.

WDCHK 3.png
 
Last edited:
I ran this a few more times in the trainers, this time using a GDU1060 with the GTN, which looks and behaves a little more like a G1000Nxi. Again, the red terrain in the "MFD" view didn't show up until about 7 seconds, or ~1700 horizontal feet (0.28nm) prior to impact at the 145 kts groundspeed flown in the accident sequence. The GTN and "MFD" had to be zoomed into about 2nm or less to really notice it. On auto zoom, it was zoomed back out to (correction:) 3nm, which really doesn't resolve the red terrain well amongst everything else on the map.

Again, no TAWS warning in the trainer. I tried to get TAWS to activate just descending through the same waypoints, but in ENR mode (no approach selected) and couldn't get it to do so on the same glidepath, though I still hit the terrain. I was only able to get TAWS to activate by being a few hundred feet low with no approach loaded.

Take these results with a major grain of salt - using a G1000 and who knows how everything was configured on the accident aircraft could be incredibly different. There's no other way to really see how this would have looked without either spending money to fly it and risking a collision, or getting an official simulation run using any known information from the accident aircraft.

But the results of these experiments show how the collision might not necessarily be obvious by instruments alone.

Here's what the first indications of the red terrain looked like, albeit slightly above glidepath (and at a lower speed - I did it slowly to make sure I captured it in a screenshot), GTN zoomed into 1 mile:

1771800320913.png

(Edit) this is what it looked like, everything at full speed - "MFD" on the GDU manually zoomed to 1nm, and the GTN on auto zoom at 3nm:

1771801733577.png

With only 7 seconds until a notional impact, this is really hard to see and make any useful reaction.
 
Last edited:
fwiw, during my last bfr the cfi did something like this scenario. He put me under the hood and started vectoring me around. Eventually he vectored me toward the top of a ridge just like this. I was in my new plane with dual Dynon HDX screens, GTN 650xi, tablet with Avare and 496. I noticed something wasn't right but took a moment to realize we were headed toward terrain. It was a helpful lesson. I was surprised at how insidious it was.
 
Last edited:
This accident has certainly caused me to plan extreme caution with +V approaches.

One item I'll add to my SOP for these approaches is to "pre-fly" the ForeFlight 3D preview of flight path... I used to think of these 3D views as "fluff", but not any more:
View attachment 150108
... and here's the 3D animation:
Same here…!

Foreflight 3D review is great!

However it is better to not select a minimum otherwise it will not show the approach potentially flying into terrain (since the 3D will stay at MDA).
 
fwiw, during my last bfr the cfi did something like this scenario. He put me under the hood and started vectoring me around. Eventually he vectored me toward the top of a ridge just like this. I was in my new plane with dual Dynon HDX screens, GTN 650xi, tablet with Avare and 496. I noticed something wasn't right but took a moment to realize we were headed toward terrain. It was a helpful lesson. I was surprised at how insidious it was.
Did the GTN say anything about the terrain? Did you have the Dynon syn viz turned on?
 
Same here…!

Foreflight 3D review is great!

However it is better to not select a minimum otherwise it will not show the approach potentially flying into terrain (since the 3D will stay at MDA).
Just to clarify... on the G1000:
-- "Minimums" is simply a number (set when loading the approach or explicitly with TMR/REF) that gets verbalized upon reaching that set minimum altitude -- the GFC700 autopilot does not react to this number in any way
-- ALTS is the selected altitude for climb or descent level off
-- at least for ILS and LPV "real" glideslopes/glidepaths, once the GS/GP is captured... then any ALTS is ignored (and is usually set to the Missed Hold Altitude)
-- I believe that a +V advisory glidepath will also ignore any ALTS (needs to be verified IRL)
-- my SOP for a non-precision approach is to press the ALT Hold button on the autopilot upon reaching MDA+50'

Therefore for this RNAV Z 32 approach... I expect that once the "advisory" GP has been captured, even if the Minimums and selected Altitude (ALTS) are set (e.g. at 9100'), they will be ignored and the autopilot (and flight director) will continue down the advisory glidepath... unless the pilot presses ALT Hold (or disengages the autopilot).
 
Throughout this and other forums, most pilots don't seem to be able to answer these questions.

- What is the proper interpretation of the NA at night notes, exactly what is restricted at night on this procedure? Is it legal to fly this procedure at night?
- When a VDP is not charted on a straight in approach as with this approach, what is the significance?
- What is the significance of the profile note “Visual Segment – Obstacles”?
- Is +V intended to be used below the MDA? Are there any obstacle avoidance guarantees?
- when you should leave the MDA for a circle to land?
- What angle and distance may the PAPI be visible to provide vertical guidance protection, could it be expected to be visible on the FAC for this approach? Where do you find the answer?
- Will TAWS provide an alert on this approach if you follow +V below the MDA?
 
Never used Firelight's "Hazard Advisor" feature until a recent trip out west. Pictured is the beginning of a small deviation south of course to obtain more terrain clearance from the mountain clearly displayed at 1 o'clock. IMO, it's an excellent addition to Foreflight's features when flying in proximity to mountains.
Hazard Advisor.PNG
 
It appears that this procedure was originally designed to support category C. The maximum VDA for category C straight in is 3.77 degrees. The VDA is not published on the FAA charts when the profile note "Visual Segment - Obstacles" is charted. The Jeppesen charts include the VDA and TCH and most WAAS systems provide the +V. A later revision removed category C. The "Circling RWY 32 NA" at night was probably based on the category C circling area limits of 3.3 NM. Removing the category C probably could have eliminated the "Circling RWY 32 NA at night" note as category B only requires 2.1 NM and is not limited on the RNAV (GPS)-E.
 
What is the proper interpretation of the NA at night notes, exactly what is restricted at night on this procedure? Is it legal to fly this procedure at night?

The procedure notes dealing with night operations are "Rwy 32 Straight-in minimums NA at night" and "Circling Rwy 32 NA at night". This means Rwy 32 is not usable at night. It does not mean that circling to Rwy 14 can't be used. So the procedure is legal to fly at night to CTL on Rwy 14. The other note limits where you can circle to runways 14 -32, that is "Circling NA northeast of Rwy 14-32". That would require RH traffic to circle to Rwy 14. If circling to Rwy 14 was also NA at night, the note would have been simpler and just worded as "Procedure NA at night". As long as there is one valid option for the approach at night, "Procedure NA at night" is not used.
 
When a VDP is not charted on a straight in approach as with this approach, what is the significance?

A VDP is charted on an RNAV (GPS) approach with a straight-in option anytime the 20 to 1 visual segment is clear of obstacles. A 3 degree glidepath is 19.08 to 1. Jeppesen charts the note 34:1 is not clear if there are obstacles in the visual segment that penetrate the 34 to 1 surface. The FAA charts include the stipple if the 34 to 1 is clear. Both chart a VDP if the 20 to 1 is clear, so lacking a VDP implies following a 3 degree slope may be problematic. All the procedure designer guarantees is that at the MDA, it will be at least 250 feet above the highest obstacle between the FAF and MAP. Pilots must be visual below the MDA to avoid any obstacles and meet the requirements of 91.175(c).
 
The procedure notes dealing with night operations are "Rwy 32 Straight-in minimums NA at night" and "Circling Rwy 32 NA at night".

What is the function of the term "minimums" in the first note? How would the procedure differ if it said "Rwy 32 Straight-in NA at night" instead?
 
It appears that this procedure was originally designed to support category C. The maximum VDA for category C straight in is 3.77 degrees. The VDA is not published on the FAA charts when the profile note "Visual Segment - Obstacles" is charted. The Jeppesen charts include the VDA and TCH and most WAAS systems provide the +V. A later revision removed category C. The "Circling RWY 32 NA" at night was probably based on the category C circling area limits of 3.3 NM. Removing the category C probably could have eliminated the "Circling RWY 32 NA at night" note as category B only requires 2.1 NM and is not limited on the RNAV (GPS)-E.
The part I’m still having trouble understanding is why someone would even want to fly this approach over the RNAV-E. The Z approach is advertised as a straight-in, but to remain safely clear of the mountain, it’s nearly as steep as the E. There’s nothing that says you can’t fly a straight-in on the E, anyway, it’s just up to whether you can remain stable and maybe meet company op specs, where applicable.

But back to the Z, the advertised straight-in falls well short of safety. I get that maybe it started out life with category C availability. But as we can see, what it’s sold as doesn’t match reality as there’s no safe way to begin a stable glidepath below MDA from WDCHK, even with the 91.175 requirements net. It has to start well after.
 
What is the significance of the profile note “Visual Segment – Obstacles”?

This note is extremely important. It is not generated by the procedure designer. It comes from the Flight test report. Flight Test attempts to fly the procedure using the VDA (+V) with a one dot fly up indication. If they have to maneuver to safely avoid obstacles, they include this in their report and the chart profile note is added. The FAA chart also removes the VDA and TCH from their chart, but Jeppesen includes them in the profile view. One might reword the note “Visual Segment – Obstacles” to something more dramatic to get the point across, for example "Flying the +V below the MDA will take you to the scene of the accident". If this note doesn't alert the pilot to the hazard of using the +V below the MDA, nothing will.
 
What is the function of the term "minimums" in the first note? How would the procedure differ if it said "Rwy 32 Straight-in NA at night" instead?
I don't think in this case it would matter. The wording of the notes is specified in 8260.19K. All possible variations of the notes are not listed. This is from a portion of the notes guidance:

Restriction of night minimums. When night minimums are not authorized or are
higher than day minimums, a restriction must be entered in the “Notes” section to deny night
minimums or to specify increased night minimums.
 
What is the significance of the profile note “Visual Segment – Obstacles”?

This note is extremely important. It is not generated by the procedure designer. It comes from the Flight test report. Flight Test attempts to fly the procedure using the VDA (+V) with a one dot fly up indication. If they have to maneuver to safely avoid obstacles, they include this in their report and the chart profile note is added. The FAA chart also removes the VDA and TCH from their chart, but Jeppesen includes them in the profile view. One might reword the note “Visual Segment – Obstacles” to something more dramatic to get the point across, for example "Flying the +V below the MDA will take you to the scene of the accident". If this note doesn't alert the pilot to the hazard of using the +V below the MDA, nothing will.
I would argue that there is little or no descent below the MDA prior to the mountain that is safe at all, and that WDCHK was created to sell a straight-in that met the vertical constraint of the design, even if it could never safely be met. This is the case regardless of the +V capability of the navigation unit.
 
The part I’m still having trouble understanding is why someone would even want to fly this approach over the RNAV-E. The Z approach is advertised as a straight-in, but to remain safely clear of the mountain, it’s nearly as steep as the E. There’s nothing that says you can’t fly a straight-in on the E, anyway, it’s just up to whether you can remain stable and maybe meet company op specs, where applicable.

But back to the Z, the advertised straight-in falls well short of safety. I get that maybe it started out life with category C availability. But as we can see, what it’s sold as doesn’t match reality as there’s no safe way to begin a stable glidepath below MDA from WDCHK, even with the 91.175 requirements net. It has to start well after.
The procedure could be safely flown during the day, but one would have to visually avoid the mountain. The visibility to see the airport at WDCHK would require at least 6.3 SM and if not, one needs to remain at the MDA until the 91.175(c) requirements are met. It would certainly be a steep descent and where it was beyond the capability for a straight-in, circling in the pattern would be an option.
 
Adding to my discussion on the meaning of the note "Visual Segment - Obstacles", this is what the 5−4−5. Instrument Approach Procedure (IAP) Charts says in sections i and k.:

i. A visual segment obstruction evaluation is accomplished during procedure design on all IAPs. Obstacles (both lighted and unlighted) are allowed to penetrate the visual segment obstacle identification surfaces. Identified obstacle penetrations may cause restrictions to instrument approach operations which may include an increased approach visibility requirement, not publishing a VDP, and/or prohibiting night instrument operations to the runway. There is no implicit obstacle protection from the MDA/DA to the touchdown point. Accordingly, it is the responsibility of the pilot to visually acquire and avoid obstacles below the MDA/DA during transition to landing.

k. Vertical Descent Angle (VDA). FAA policy is to publish a VDA/TCH on all nonprecision approaches except those published in conjunction with vertically guided minimums (i.e., ILS or LOC RWY XX) or no-FAF procedures without a step-down fix (i.e., on−airport VOR or NDB). A VDA does not guarantee obstacle protection below the MDA in the visual segment. The presence of a VDA does not change any nonprecision approach requirements.
1. Obstacles may penetrate the obstacle identification surface below the MDA in the visual segment of an IAP that has a published VDA/TCH. When the VDA/TCH is not authorized due to an obstacle penetration that would require a pilot to deviate from the VDA between MDA and touchdown, the VDA/TCH will be replaced with the note “Visual Segment- Obstacles” in the profile view of the IAP (See FIG 5−4−14). Accordingly, pilots are advised to carefully review approach procedures to identify where the optimum stabilized descent to landing can be initiated. Pilots that follow the previously published descent angle, provided by the RNAV system, below the MDA on procedures with this note may encounter obstacles in the visual segment. Pilots must visually avoid any obstacles below the MDA.
(a) VDA/TCH data is furnished by FAA on the official source document for publication on IAP charts and for coding in the navigation database unless, as noted previously, replaced by the note “Visual Segment – Obstacles.”
(b) Commercial chart providers and navigation systems may publish or calculate a VDA/TCH even when the FAA does not provide such data. Pilots are cautioned that they are responsible for obstacle avoidance in the visual segment regardless of the presence or absence of a VDA/TCH and associated navigation system advisory vertical guidance.
 
Is +V intended to be used below the MDA? Are there any obstacle avoidance guarantees?

+V or the VDA is not intended to be used below the MDA, all flight below the MDA must visually avoid all obstacles. There are no obstacle avoidance guarantees if following the +V below the MDA. This is from FAA-H-8083-16B Instrument Procedures Handbook, Chapter 4.

Vertical Navigation

One of the advantages of some GPS and multi-sensor FMS RNAV avionics is the advisory VNAV capability. Traditionally, the only way to get vertical path information during an approach was to use a ground-based precision NAVAID. Modern RNAV avionics can display an electronic vertical path that provides a constant-rate descent to minimums.

Since these systems are advisory and not primary guidance, the pilot must continuously ensure the aircraft remains at or above any published altitude constraint, including stepdown fix altitudes, using the primary barometric altimeter. The pilots, aircraft, and operator must be approved to use advisory VNAV inside the FAF on an instrument approach.

VNAV information appears on selected conventional nonprecision, GPS, and RNAV approaches (see “Types of Approaches” later in this chapter). It normally consists of two fixes (the FAF and the landing runway threshold), a FAF crossing altitude, a vertical descent angle (VDA), and may provide a visual descent point (VDP) [Figure 4-11A].

The VDA provides the pilot with advisory information not previously available on nonprecision approaches. It provides a means for the pilot to establish a stabilized descent from the FAF or step-down fix to the MDA. Stabilized descent is a key factor in the reduction of controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) incidents. However, pilots should be aware that the published angle is for information only − it is strictly advisory in nature. There is no implicit additional obstacle protection below the MDA. Pilots must still respect any published stepdown fixes and the published MDA unless the visual cues stated 14 CFR §91.175 are present, and they can visually acquire andavoid both lit and unlit obstacles once below the MDA. The presence of a VDA does not guarantee obstacle protection in the visual segment and does not change any of therequirements for flying a nonprecision approach.
 
Adding to my discussion on the meaning of the note "Visual Segment - Obstacles", this is what the 5−4−5. Instrument Approach Procedure (IAP) Charts says in sections i and k.:
I covered this in the earlier disclaimer that there’s a lot of “knowledge” one has to have to avoid the gotchas on instrument approaches. I’ve always been conscious of the +V limitation.

However, this approach design seems pretty egregious, with or without +V (and it seems the people who flight tested it would agree). This is especially so at night.

As I said before, it’s entirely possible to visually acquire the runway, begin a descent, and barely clear the top of the mountain without ever knowing how close you came to hitting it. All just to claim a straight-in.
 
When you should leave the MDA for a circle to land?

You should remain at the circling MDA until inside the circling area and keeping the airport in sight except while it is blocked due to turns. In this case, the circling MDA is 9100 feet and the circling area for a category B aircraft is to the southwest side of runway 14-32 using right traffic and remain within 2.1 NM radius/parallel until "the aircraft is continuously in a position from which a descent to a landing on the intended runway can be made at a normal rate of descent using normal maneuvers". This would have been safe to circle to land on runway 14. Winds were reported calm at the time. A descent beginning at WDCHK would be well outside the safe circling area. Maneuvering in the pattern at a little over twice the pattern altitude would not be difficult for most category B aircraft. If needed to lose more altitude, more than one time around the pattern would be an available option. The broken or scattered layer of clouds could have prevented continuous visual contact with the airport, in which case the missed approach procedure should have been followed.
 
Look at this another way: let’s say an airport in flat land at sea level had a 1600’ tall tower 3 miles from the end of the runway. Would you feel safe starting down below a 2220’ MDA two miles prior to passing over it?

If not, then why even bother with creating an MDA that exists prior? The entire point of creating an MDA that far out is to allow an airplane to begin a descent below if certain conditions are met. But any descent prior could be considered dangerously close to that tower. Instead, you could just as easily create a 2000’ MDA at the tower, which would be a lot safer, but would be steeper and run afoul of the straight-in designation criteria. The design had intent, it was a choice to make it a straight-in on paper.

And none of this absolves a pilot of falling into the knowledge trap. But it certainly doesn’t make it easier not to.

Per your last post - exactly, we should leave the MDA when we’re within the circling radius. So there’s no good reason to have the MDA feasibly extend 5.5nm out on paper, just to be called a straight-in for administrative purposes. No reason. This should be a circling-only approach (but the RNAV-E is arguably more suitable due to terrain clearance and alignment).
 
What angle and distance may the PAPI be visible to provide vertical guidance protection, could it be expected to be visible on the FAC for this approach? Where do you find the answer?

The AIM provides guidance that the standard PAPI area is +/- 10 degrees of the runway C/L and 3.4 NM from the threshold. It also refers pilots to the Chart Supplement for variations. The procedure FAC is not aligned with the runway C/L by 17.12 degrees, so in general it would not be usable for a straight in on this procedure. The AFD entry has this note: "RWY 32 PAPI baffled; vis lmtd to 5.5 degs left of cntrln due to high trrn." The runway note also says the PAPI GA 4.0 degrees TCH 40 with a displace threshold of 600'. So following the PAPI on this procedure until aligned within 5.5 degrees of the runway C/L would not be available.
 
I covered this in the earlier disclaimer that there’s a lot of “knowledge” one has to have to avoid the gotchas on instrument approaches. I’ve always been conscious of the +V limitation.

However, this approach design seems pretty egregious, with or without +V (and it seems the people who flight tested it would agree). This is especially so at night.

As I said before, it’s entirely possible to visually acquire the runway, begin a descent, and barely clear the top of the mountain without ever knowing how close you came to hitting it. All just to claim a straight-in.

It is safe if flown during the day. It is not just "especially so at night", straight in is prohibited at night. The pilot appears to have been flying the straight in at night. The procedure appears to be on its way to being cancelled with the current NOTAM. I agree the RNAV (GPS)-E would have been a better option. I was pointing out what pilots need to know but so frequently don't know regarding flying these type approaches. So I offered questions and answers with references to educate those who were open to education and reading this forum thread. There are probably about a hundred procedures in the NAS that have the note "Visual Segment - Obstacles". One other that I am familiar with is at N23 RNAV (GPS) Rwy 7, the VDA also passes through a ridge line and is guaranteed to result in a crash if you follow the VDA.
 
If not, then why even bother with creating an MDA that exists prior? The entire point of creating an MDA that far out is to allow an airplane to begin a descent below if certain conditions are met. But any descent prior could be considered dangerously close to that tower. Instead, you could just as easily create a 2000’ MDA at the tower, which would be a lot safer, but would be steeper and run afoul of the straight-in designation criteria. The design had intent, it was a choice to make it a straight-in on paper.
Yes, and those conditions include the visibility required in order to see obstacles. I think the real point is that instrument pilots need to learn that there is no implicit obstacle clearance below the MDA. A VDA and Garmin's +V adaptation of the VDA doesn't change that. Sure, we can make this - and more benign approaches - safer, but there' also a downside to making approaches unusable. Perhaps more of a caution than the current one is in order?
1771875160126.png
 
Throughout this and other forums, most pilots don't seem to be able to answer these questions.

- What is the proper interpretation of the NA at night notes, exactly what is restricted at night on this procedure? Is it legal to fly this procedure at night?
- When a VDP is not charted on a straight in approach as with this approach, what is the significance?
- What is the significance of the profile note “Visual Segment – Obstacles”?
- Is +V intended to be used below the MDA? Are there any obstacle avoidance guarantees?
- when you should leave the MDA for a circle to land?
- What angle and distance may the PAPI be visible to provide vertical guidance protection, could it be expected to be visible on the FAC for this approach? Where do you find the answer?
- Will TAWS provide an alert on this approach if you follow +V below the MDA?
Good set of questions, John. Lately I've been doing a quiz for IPCs and I plan to include a few +V and 34:1 obstacle questions in the next iteration.
 
Yes, and those conditions include the visibility required in order to see obstacles. I think the real point is that instrument pilots need to learn that there is no implicit obstacle clearance below the MDA. A VDA and Garmin's +V adaptation of the VDA doesn't change that. Sure, we can make this - and more benign approaches - safer, but there' also a downside to making approaches unusable. Perhaps more of a caution than the current one is in order?
View attachment 150192
So back to an earlier point - at what altitude above is it safe to cross that ridge?
 
So back to an earlier point - at what altitude above is it safe to cross that ridge?
The altitude where you can see you are not going to hit it. Just like less nefarious obstacles. That's why it's NA at night PAPI helps since it provides obstacle clearance and you won't see the PAPI lights unless above the blocking obstacles. That's not just an instrument thing; it applies to VFR flight as well.
 
The altitude where you can see you are not going to hit it. Just like less nefarious obstacles. That's why it's NA at night PAPI helps since it provides obstacle clearance and you won't see the PAPI lights unless above the blocking obstacles. That's not just an instrument thing; it applies to VFR flight as well.
Per the chart supplement, the PAPI aren’t useable on the azimuth of the Z approach. The PAPI are still shown on the approach chart inset diagram (ostensibly for general circling, or once established on final), but this important tidbit isn’t noted on the chart itself.

But my point is the MDA and correlated waypoint seem to be tailored to fit a certain glidepath angle, rather than fit a safe profile. There isn’t a continuous, stable, normal (whatever semantics one decides to use) descent angle that safely passes the ridge until much closer, hence there’s no real need for an MDA that far out - day, night, etc. It seems to be set up to allow a named criteria but passes a lot of risk onto the pilot without being very specific. Think about all the mental math or seat of the pants flying a pilot has to do to safely pass that ridge on the visual segment.

Ultimately, the effective, safe angle is a lot higher than what’s published, but it’s very much at your own risk.
 
Remember seeing Rocky Mountain Airways Dash 7 make approaches into SBS.
They flew right down the Yampa river downtown Steamboat.

Epic Busted Waypoint Altitude Before Steamboat Springs Crash ...IMG_0539.jpeg
Rocky Mountain Airways historically operated de Havilland Dash 7 aircraft into Steamboat Springs (Bob Adams Field) using a private, specialized Microwave Landing System (MLS) approach. This tailored, steep-gradient approach allowed the airline to fly into the mountain-surrounded airport before modern GPS approaches.
 
But my point is the MDA and correlated waypoint seem to be tailored to fit a certain glidepath angle, rather than fit a safe profile. There isn’t a continuous, stable, normal (whatever semantics one decides to use) descent angle that safely passes the ridge until much closer, hence there’s no real need for an MDA that far out - day, night, etc. It seems to be set up to allow a named criteria but passes a lot of risk onto the pilot without being very specific. Think about all the mental math or seat of the pants flying a pilot has to do to safely pass that ridge on the visual segment.
granted I’m not doing mental math, but just looking at the chart it would appear that if you saw the runway at WDCHK, altering course to the right to intercept the extended centerline would give you a pretty clear descent path for a normal, stable descent. What am I missing?
 
Did the GTN say anything about the terrain? Did you have the Dynon syn viz turned on?
Good questions. It's been a while but I think the first thing I noticed was the entire screen on the 650 was yellow. I asked myself why's the screen yellow. Dynon syn viz is on but I think it was the 650 that clued me in first.

I believe both the Dynon and the 650 will alert but I could be wrong. I think the 650 alert is a pop up. I think the Dynon is audible. I need to confirm once I get my plane back...
 
Back
Top