Air India 787 Crashes in Western India

X3 Skier said:
Latest guess I’ve seen (not mine as I don’t have one)is fuel starvation caused by vapor lock. Estimating a flow of ~70000 lbs/hr total is one helluva vapor lock.
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Do the people making these suggestions have any example of any jet or anything else kerosine/diesel powered vapor locking?

Nonsense IMO
 
hindsight2020 said:
Just found out about another Boeing easter egg: TCMA. I have a few space aliens in mind.
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Yeah I was just reading about TCMA. Can't validate if its true, but another automation that "what could possibly go wrong". From my understanding, basically its a safety. If the thrust levers are at idle but the engine isn't, it assumes the FADEC has lost control and it either idles or shuts the engine down to avoid a runaway engine. But what if the computer thinks the levers are at idle and they are not. From what I read, this happened on another 787 that was taxiing?
 
midwestpa24 said:
Yeah I was just reading about TCMA. Can't validate if its true, but another automation that "what could possibly go wrong". From my understanding, basically its a safety. If the thrust levers are at idle but the engine isn't, it assumes the FADEC has lost control and it either idles or shuts the engine down to avoid a runaway engine. But what if the computer thinks the levers are at idle and they are not. From what I read, this happened on another 787 that was taxiing?
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yeah ANA 78, but the bulletin dealt with "abrupt" thrust reverser command, making HAL think it was a runaway engine condition on the ground due to the transient delay between performance and selection.

But, the hypothetical airborne failure mode is supposed to be impossible since the logic requires ground mode. Essentially the WOW switch acts as the arming mechanism for the logic. The problem is, if HAL thinks they're still on the ground (faulty WOW indication), and for whatever reason an idle throttle position signal indication (regardless of cause, swiss cheese type of thing) is encountered, the otherwise expected condition of accelerating flight and high N2 condition on liftoff/climb could trigger TCMA logic and shut down the engines on you. oooof.

I can see the optics of that mode not going well for Boeing, if another "software easter egg" finds its way to the causal column of a loss of thrust accident. The transhumanists will not be pleased.
 
Bacho said:
Do the people making these suggestions have any example of any jet or anything else kerosine/diesel powered vapor locking?
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The references I've read on the fuel system were more on the pneumatic or air related side vs vapor. Perhaps someone intermixed the terms even though they mean different things? Regardless, there are some looking at the possibility of a fuel flow issue similar to the BA 777 in the late 2000s except not ice related.
 
X3 Skier said:
Latest guess I’ve seen (not mine as I don’t have one)is fuel starvation caused by vapor lock. Estimating a flow of ~70000 lbs/hr total is one helluva vapor lock.
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'Guess' is a good description. This idea was promulgated by internet video producer 'Captain Steeeve.' His previous videos regarding the crash are cringeworthy, particularly his hyperventilating drama about the RAT.
 
Banjo33 said:
The inhibited bells & lights would have delayed (momentarily) their reaction to whatever was occurring
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The inhibited items are all items that aren't important enough to reject a takeoff outside of the low-speed regime. They are items that are deemed less of a concern than a high-speed rejected takeoff.
 
I don't know how a 787 works, but I think I can do better than the theory of two engines shutting down at the same time for unrelated reasons.

My 100k foot random guess: 1) The takeoff run starts with one or more of the following - misconfigured system that sets appropriate take off power, a faulty system related to engine control or fuel, or an engine control or fuel system that wasn't put together after maintenance properly.
2) Upon noticing the problem on takeoff, the crew did one or more of the following - something very wrong, something that relied on a system that was broken or unavailable, or something very unexpected that the aircraft reacted weirdly to.

As an example, they set it up for being way lighter, thrust was reduced, they simultaneously pulled back more and tried to go to full power, but something didn't work right for them and they got less.

Complete guess. My experience is with aircraft that weigh 2000x less than that, and aircraft systems that are 70 years older.

Question for the people that know how these things fly: If you have enough power to set to barely get off the ground by end of a runway that long, but not climb up, and do whatever it is that you need to do to bring the power up, is it possible to get enough power to climb out? Or will you end up in a high angle of attack situation where the engines can't spool up enough to get you out of it? If it's possible, how many seconds might they have to get that right? Realize that's about 3 questions.
 
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I have the same thought. Misconfigured performance numbers, a hot afternoon, then an action that caused the final sequence.
 
@Albany Tom @MacFlier

The only problem is neither of those theories would cause deployment of the RAT, which is pretty well believed to have happened. Only a dual engine failure fits the profile, although why a modern airliner would have a dual engine failure at liftoff, with no obvious signs of damage such as smoke, fire, or compressor stalls, is the question.
 
TWO things can deploy the rat…

A/c thinks it needs to
Person pushes a button

To use its deployment as diagnostic criteria against a/c systems is flawed.

You wanna see some crazy? Give an airline crew an unscripted emergency.

The only trained for emergency that even comes close this set up would be wind shear. And those are FAR from unscripted. “Ok guys, new plane, new day, we got 10 minutes left and there’s only one thing I haven’t seen yet, information A mentions low level wind shear advisories in effect, let’s do before take off checks, coming off freeze…”
 
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Tools said:
TWO things can deploy the rat…

A/c thinks it needs to
Person pushes a button

To use its deployment as diagnostic criteria against a/c systems is flawed.

You wanna see some crazy? Give an airline crew an unscripted emergency.

The only trained for emergency that even comes close this set up would be wind shear. And those are FAR from unscripted. “Ok guys, new plane, new day, we got 10 minutes left and there’s only one thing I haven’t seen yet, information A mentions low level wind shear advisories in effect, let’s do before take off checks, coming off freeze…”
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Apparently you never participated in a 121 AQP program.
 
Actually over 20 initial school, pre AQP, hybrid AQP and AQP.

SF340, 72/73/75/76, MD-82/83/88/90, L1011, A330.

Most of them twice, one five times. American Eagle, American, Delta, Everts, USA Jet.

Also did US Navy Aviation Safety Officer School. I’ve taught for the US Navy and US Air Force.

Not that I feel I need to vet myself… just demonstrating how wrong assumptions can be. I assume you are even more qualified than that, yet still fall prey to assumptions. They’re difficult to eliminate.
 
Tools said:
Actually over 20 initial school, pre AQP, hybrid AQP and AQP.

SF340, 72/73/75/76, MD-82/83/88/90, L1011, A330.

Most of them twice, one five times. American Eagle, American, Delta, Everts, USA Jet.

Also did US Navy Aviation Safety Officer School. I’ve taught for the US Navy and US Air Force.

Not that I feel I need to vet myself… just demonstrating how wrong assumptions can be. I assume you are even more qualified than that, yet still fall prey to assumptions. They’re difficult to eliminate.
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AQP is not “canned” nor do you do the same maneuvers and procedures over and over. You alluded in your post that no unscripted emergencies are ever practiced, which simply isn’t true. In AQP depending on the phase a crew can expect to experience something that has not been briefed.

The old days of doing everything over and over with each maneuver or emergency being prebriefed, or a last ten minutes “we need to see this to check the box” are long gone.

Training is train to proficiency, not a check ride for each sim session.
 
Larry in TN said:
The inhibited items are all items that aren't important enough to reject a takeoff outside of the low-speed regime. They are items that are deemed less of a concern than a high-speed rejected takeoff.
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Where did this even come from? Are you saying there are some warnings or cautions that aren’t inhibited during takeoff? If so, I wasn’t aware, so please share for my own education. Going through my company’s systems manual for the 75/76, this is all I can find (paraphrased): ALL warnings and cautions are inhibited during takeoff: caution lights/aural beeper from 80kts until 400’ AGL or 20 seconds following nose gear extension (unless activated before 80 kts) and warning lights/fire bell from nose gear extension to 400’ AGL or 20 seconds. Granted, one of our ops manuals makes the one caveat that the Capt can elect to abort above v1 if they assess the aircraft isn’t flyable, but there’s no expounding on what would drive that decision that I can find (dual engine failure would obviously force that decision).
 
The FAA issued Airworthiness Directive AD 2024‑16‑07, effective October 23, 2024, requiring Boeing 787 operators to update the Thrust Management (TM) and Crew Alerting (DCA) software. This update addresses cases where low-range radar altimeter (LRRA) errors could improperly engage autothrottle commands, leading to reduced engine thrust during takeoff, climb, or balked landing phases .

The implemented software change ensures the autothrottle system:

- Ignores solitary or spurious low-altitude radar altimeter readings,

- Requires corroboration from multiple flight parameters before reducing thrust,

- Prevents premature thrust rollback based solely on low AGL signals .

Boeing issued the fix via Service Bulletin B787‑81205‑SB340053‑00, released in November 2022. Airlines had a six-month compliance window.

The next question: Was this specific aircraft compliant? Or did the software update fully fix the malfunction? If so, what changes were implemented in the new software version?

I'm fairly sure 787 pilots still lack clear visibility into whether the aforementioned software update actually prevents thrust rollback during takeoff on their aircraft.

HAL does not share what it implements with flight crews.
 
Doc Holliday said:
AQP is not “canned” nor do you do the same maneuvers and procedures over and over. You alluded in your post that no unscripted emergencies are ever practiced, which simply isn’t true. In AQP depending on the phase a crew can expect to experience something that has not been briefed.

The old days of doing everything over and over with each maneuver or emergency being prebriefed, or a last ten minutes “we need to see this to check the box” are long gone.

Training is train to proficiency, not a check ride for each sim session.
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Every aqp i've ever done (4 airlines) is canned as can be. They are gouged to hell and back and anyone whos done one cycle in them knows what to expect. Even first look items context clues alone are usually enough to see whats gonna happen even if you didn't talk to any other pilot or look up documents.
 
falconkidding said:
Every aqp i've ever done (4 airlines) is canned as can be. They are gouged to hell and back and anyone whos done one cycle in them knows what to expect. Even first look items context clues alone are usually enough to see whats gonna happen even if you didn't talk to any other pilot or look up documents.
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The concept is the carrier submits 2 to 4 scenarios (or more) each year to the FAA for review, using information gathered through SMS, FOQA and line checks. Each phase has scenarios for each training module and these should be chosen on a random basis. It defeats the purpose of AQP if the carrier tries to treat the program as the old Part 121 program.

First Look is a clue, that’s why it’s called “First Look”. But First Look as well as the rest of the program changes each year due to the inputs mentioned above.

No doubt by the end of the cycle the majority have experienced all scenarios given. No way to prevent that without increasing the number of revisions which is impractical.

But again, this is a TTP program and far above the old programs.
 
Banjo33 said:
Where did this even come from? Are you saying there are some warnings or cautions that aren’t inhibited during takeoff? If so, I wasn’t aware, so please share for my own education. Going through my company’s systems manual for the 75/76, this is all I can find (paraphrased): ALL warnings and cautions are inhibited during takeoff: caution lights/aural beeper from 80kts until 400’ AGL or 20 seconds following nose gear extension (unless activated before 80 kts) and warning lights/fire bell from nose gear extension to 400’ AGL or 20 seconds. Granted, one of our ops manuals makes the one caveat that the Capt can elect to abort above v1 if they assess the aircraft isn’t flyable, but there’s no expounding on what would drive that decision that I can find (dual engine failure would obviously force that decision).
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Engine fire warning?
 
Banjo33 said:
Are you saying there are some warnings or cautions that aren’t inhibited during takeoff?
Click to expand...
It depends on the airplane. I've never flown the 787 so don't know the specifics.

On my current airplane, fire warning, for example, is not inhibited at any time. Another example is windshear warnings. Some are inhibited (predictive) while others are not (reactive).

My point is that those warning that are inhibited are warnings that don't require immediate action.

Mikey52 said:
Engine fire warning?
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Some airplane yes, some no. On my airplane, we don't action the fire warning memory items until at least 400', and then only if the Captain decides that the situation is stable enough to do so. Otherwise, they are actioned after the acceleration and clean up.

Fly the airplane. Silence the warnings. Confirm the emergency.

As far as all of this speculation, it works better when there's some actual data which is suggestive of the topic of the speculation.
 
Jdm said:
Is anyone considering that something intentional may have happened here?
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I'd first suspect a murderous software engineer thousands of miles away who can't simply look out the window to verify the aircraft is actually not in the air before turning off the engines.
 
dtuuri said:
I'd first suspect a murderous software engineer thousands of miles away who can't simply look out the window to verify the aircraft is actually not in the air before turning off the engines.
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Yup, as much of an occam guy (aka the apes did it) as I generally am, on this one I'm kinda leaning on FADEC-HAL killed all those people. As I said, the transhumanists will not be pleased if this ends up being partly or wholly true.....
 
dtuuri said:
I'd first suspect a murderous software engineer thousands of miles away who can't simply look out the window to verify the aircraft is actually not in the air before turning off the engines.
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Given my personal experience with automotive "assist" software, I tend to agree

Never ascribe to malice that which can be adequately explained by incompetence.
 
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Lindberg said:
Because it doesn't really fit the facts.
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What facts are those? The only facts I know are that the aircraft flew past a camera with the RAT deployed and no discernable sound from the engines, and the Captain's mayday call said there was no engine thrust.

Everything else has been speculation, some of it so tortured the writer might still be tied in knots.
 
hindsight2020 said:
yeah ANA 78, but the bulletin dealt with "abrupt" thrust reverser command, making HAL think it was a runaway engine condition on the ground due to the transient delay between performance and selection.

But, the hypothetical airborne failure mode is supposed to be impossible since the logic requires ground mode. Essentially the WOW switch acts as the arming mechanism for the logic. The problem is, if HAL thinks they're still on the ground (faulty WOW indication), and for whatever reason an idle throttle position signal indication (regardless of cause, swiss cheese type of thing) is encountered, the otherwise expected condition of accelerating flight and high N2 condition on liftoff/climb could trigger TCMA logic and shut down the engines on you. oooof.

I can see the optics of that mode not going well for Boeing, if another "software easter egg" finds its way to the causal column of a loss of thrust accident. The transhumanists will not be pleased.
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I have nothing but gut feeling to validate the statement coming shortly:

This would never happened to an airplane without computers. I’m waiting to hear how the software killed a bunch of people.

Edit: even more interested to see how they blame it on the pilots from the wrong country.
 
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3393RP said:
What facts are those? The only facts I know are that the aircraft flew past a camera with the RAT deployed and no discernable sound from the engines, and the Captain's mayday call said there was no engine thrust.
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Are all those facts consistent with someone intentionally crashing r the plane.
 
Daleandee said:
The 787's have been flying for 15 years. Seems if it was a software issue that it would have appeared by now unless the conditions for this particular flight were quite varied from all the preceding ones. Or could it be that a software upgrade was not properly vetted?
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The most popular airliner in the world had a fatal flaw that went unnoticed for almost 30 years (B737 rudder hardover).
 
Mental health has become a hot topic with the FAA and ALPA for a reason. 1st time in my career I’m seeing professional pilots talk about it in recurrent training videos.
Some of our guys have even sent group texts confirming that friends are available to lean on in times of need. It’s resulted in many colleagues taking a personal pledge to reach out if anythings ever weighing them down excessively.
Impressive, some of the most experienced and solid pilots that I’ve ever worked with are so dedicated to the well-being of others.
 
The black boxes are coming to the US for data retrieval and analysis.

m.economictimes.com

India to send black box of crashed Air India 787 aircraft to US for data recovery

The black box from the crashed Air India Boeing 787 will go to the US for analysis. The recorder faced heavy damage, making data extraction in India impossible. The National Safety Transport Board in Washington will extract the data. India's Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau will receive...
m.economictimes.com m.economictimes.com
 
Sluggo63 said:
The black boxes are coming to the US for data retrieval and analysis.

m.economictimes.com

India to send black box of crashed Air India 787 aircraft to US for data recovery

The black box from the crashed Air India Boeing 787 will go to the US for analysis. The recorder faced heavy damage, making data extraction in India impossible. The National Safety Transport Board in Washington will extract the data. India's Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau will receive...
m.economictimes.com m.economictimes.com
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I thought they were sent weeks ago?
Probably all erased by now. WTF
 
Sluggo63 said:
The black boxes are coming to the US for data retrieval and analysis.

m.economictimes.com

India to send black box of crashed Air India 787 aircraft to US for data recovery

The black box from the crashed Air India Boeing 787 will go to the US for analysis. The recorder faced heavy damage, making data extraction in India impossible. The National Safety Transport Board in Washington will extract the data. India's Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau will receive...
m.economictimes.com m.economictimes.com
Click to expand...
Sluggo63 said:
The black boxes are coming to the US for data retrieval and analysis.

m.economictimes.com

India to send black box of crashed Air India 787 aircraft to US for data recovery

The black box from the crashed Air India Boeing 787 will go to the US for analysis. The recorder faced heavy damage, making data extraction in India impossible. The National Safety Transport Board in Washington will extract the data. India's Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau will receive...
m.economictimes.com m.economictimes.com
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Paywall

Another source https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/clyn2227jlyo
 
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I have a tangential question: How likely is a foreign country to send its post-crash black boxes to the US for examination? I am specifically asking about the ratio of all foreign crashes against those crashes which resulted in American investigation.
 
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