United 767 hits bread truck at EWR

Captain stated his preferred glideslope is 3 red 1 white. Why is that? Is that a routine thing for heavy approaches to 29?
 
AKiss20 said:
Captain stated his preferred glideslope is 3 red 1 white. Why is that? Is that a routine thing for heavy approaches to 29?
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A widebody pilot should be looking for 3 white and 1 red due to the distance between the cockpit and the main landing gear. But even at that, had he been at 3 red and 1 white he would have still cleared the highway with some margin. He was well below 4 reds a mile from the runway and never corrected it.

1780664366247.png
 
Does anyone know how low you can be and still see any PAPI? IOW, once you have four reds, can you see that down to ground level (from the same distance from the threshold)? My local airport has a major highway 0.45 nm from the approach end, so I don't really want to experiment! (Can't see the PAPI from the highway, a line of low trees blocks it.)
Basically, when you see four reds have you lost any information besides "too darned low"?
 
midwestpa24 said:
A widebody pilot should be looking for 3 white and 1 red due to the distance between the cockpit and the main landing gear. But even at that, had he been at 3 red and 1 white he would have still cleared the highway with some margin. He was well below 4 reds a mile from the runway and never corrected it.

View attachment 152515
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Yeah I saw that graphic, just struck me as odd that they are targeting below nominal but I guess that’s standard for wide bodies?

Edit: I misread your post and thought you said the 3R and 1W was what he should be aiming for, not 3W and 1R. My bad
 
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"At 500 ft, the first officer stated, they were on speed and on profile, and the captain was
maintaining his planned profile of 3 red and 1 white on the PAPI. Once again, the CVR did not
capture any discussion of PAPI lights for runway 29 prior to landing."

At 500 ft, the NTSB says they were actually well above the glide slope. And how did he know that the captain was aiming for three reds if the CVR never captured any discussion of that? Is the NTSB implying something?
 
WRRR was a bad plan. Says so right in the notes on the approach plate. A widebody would more likely target WWWR due to the larger difference between pilot eye-level and the lowest part of the airplane.

In those conditions, you aren't going to have a nice, stable, WWRR the whole way down. You'll be bracketing the desired glidepath, whether electronic or visual. An airplane of that size doesn't respond instantly, either. There is a lot of inertia. There is a significant difference in the maneuverability, in that phase of flight, between the 757-200 and 767-300, the largest I've flown. The 767-400 would only be more so.

Sure would have been nice to have been flying either the RNAV Y or Stadium Visual, each giving an extra mile on final to get everything stabilized.
 
Kenny Phillips said:
Does anyone know how low you can be and still see any PAPI? IOW, once you have four reds, can you see that down to ground level (from the same distance from the threshold)? My local airport has a major highway 0.45 nm from the approach end, so I don't really want to experiment! (Can't see the PAPI from the highway, a line of low trees blocks it.)
Basically, when you see four reds have you lost any information besides "too darned low"?
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I can't speak for all brands and installations of PAPI, but I know ours is all red until you are way underground. The upper and lower limits are pretty wide.
 
Larry in TN said:
In those conditions, you aren't going to have a nice, stable, WWRR the whole way down. You'll be bracketing the desired glidepath, whether electronic or visual.
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Based on the NTSB's graph, it looks like they just kept getting further and further below the glideslope with decaying energy except for a brief level-off to change their underwear after hitting the light pole.
 
midwestpa24 said:
I can't speak for all brands and installations of PAPI, but I know ours is all red until you are way underground. The upper and lower limits are pretty wide.
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As I thought, which means (if all the lights are red) you have zero protection from light poles. (Gimme three whites any day.)
 
Kenny Phillips said:
As I thought, which means (if all the lights are red) you have zero protection from light poles. (Gimme three whites any day.)
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Red over red, or all red, you're dead. The four red is your final layer of protection, it doesn't get any redder. @RussR can probably give more detail just how close 4 red can put you over the obstacles.
 
midwestpa24 said:
Red over red, or all red, you're dead. The four red is your final layer of protection, it doesn't get any redder. @RussR can probably give more detail just how close 4 red can put you over the obstacles.
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I can!

When we commission a set of PAPIs, one of the checks we do is to fly down final on what we call a "below path" run (or runs). We stay low enough to keep all 4 lights (or 2 on a 2-box system) red, and if we don't hit anything (!) it passes. Since we usually try to not hit anything (pro tip there), that means that if we have to climb to avoid an obstacle to the point where we get one white light, then it fails and there are other actions we can take. We may do multiple runs if there are multiple obstacles left and right of centerline that are a concern, or too many that we can't just weave back and forth as we go.

The idea, of course, is that if you have even one white light, you will not hit anything. But if you have all red lights, you are assured of nothing regarding obstacle clearance (because, how could you be? Four reds is the lowest indication, like a glideslope needle being full scale, you don't know where you are reference the glidepath).

If there is a problem, corrective action can involve either raising the angle of the system, or if the obstacle is off to the side of centerline (but still where you can see the PAPI) baffles can be installed to block the view of the lights - to make it unusable for example more than 5 deg right of centerline.

How far do we have to clear an obstacle? Technically, we have to just not hit it while still getting all reds. What that means in practical terms depends on the size of our individual pilots' cajones. How close are we willing to get to that tree, church steeple, antenna tower before we say "okay, that doesn't pass". Admittedly, we do get pretty close some times.

And if you're wondering, yes, PAPI commissionings can be one of the most fun inspections we do (and, naturally, one of the most dangerous as well). Lots of low level flying and maneuvering.
 
dmspilot said:
Aiming for 3 reds sounds like intentional noncompliance with SOPs. I'd be worried about my job if I was that crew.
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Interestingly, C-FOQA data indicates that coming in lower and flatter more often results in longer touchdowns rather than shorter.
 
dmspilot said:
Aiming for 3 reds sounds like intentional noncompliance with SOPs. I'd be worried about my job if I was that crew.
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I might would do it in a Cessna or Piper if aiming for the numbers, but not a 767. In practice, widebody and other large aircraft usually teach 3 white to account for the distance between the cockpit and the main gear.

Even at that, had the captain maintained 3 red, he probably would have gotten away with. Probably has done it in the past too. But he was not even near 3 red, he was well below 4 in no man's land. The FO called out getting low, but maybe not forceful enough. The Captain was clearly not stable and should have gone around.
 
midwestpa24 said:
I might would do it in a Cessna or Piper if aiming for the numbers, but not a 767. In practice, widebody and other large aircraft usually teach 3 white to account for the distance between the cockpit and the main gear.

Even at that, had the captain maintained 3 red, he probably would have gotten away with. Probably has done it in the past too. But he was not even near 3 red, he was well below 4 in no man's land. The FO called out getting low, but maybe not forceful enough. The Captain was clearly not stable and should have gone around.
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The FO called out getting low after they were already way too low.
 
I wonder if the PIC was focusing too much on the runway being shorter than what they were originally planning for.

Also, the FO called out the situtaion. That's a good start. At what point should the FO have taken the controls?

As they descended, the airspeed began to decay, and the first officer recalled that he stated,“hey you are slow,” followed moments later by, “you are still slow and a little low.”
 
WDD said:
I wonder if the PIC was focusing too much on the runway being shorter than what they were originally planning for.

Also, the FO called out the situtaion. That's a good start. At what point should the FO have taken the controls?

As they descended, the airspeed began to decay, and the first officer recalled that he stated,“hey you are slow,” followed moments later by, “you are still slow and a little low.”
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Did you mean to say “when should the FO have called the go around”

Because that’s what should have happened.
 
Half Fast said:
I feel a Skynyrd tune coming on....

Gimme three whites,​
Gimme three whites mister,​
Gimme three whites toward the ground.​
Gimme three whites,​
Gimme three whites mister,​
And I won't have to go around!​

:biggrin:
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"I said don't ask about PAPI
And I won't send you away
If you want to talk fishing
Well I guess that'll be okay"
 
Tarheelpilot said:
Did you mean to say “when should the FO have called the go around”

Because that’s what should have happened.
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Are there times when a FO is supposed to take direct action vs making request, etc. ? Given the captain not responding to the first call out and how time critical it was becoming, should he have called “go around” or just taken the controls?
 
Or frankly just nudged the go around buttons. Odds are better than not it would elicit a simple go around as that’s what his flight director would command.

Kind of like calling general quarters to break up a riot on the mess deck of a ship.

Actually fighting over controls is NOT a good idea.

And yes, this is one of those times.
 
Tarheelpilot said:
Did you mean to say “when should the FO have called the go around”

Because that’s what should have happened.
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The prelim indicates the FO did a good job monitoring altitude and airspeed on final, and kept the captain apprised of the situation. It appears the FO considered making the call for a go around, but didn't have time to do so before the plane touched down.

At 500 ft, the first officer stated, they were on speed and on profile, and the captain was maintaining his planned profile of 3 red and 1 white on the PAPI. Once again, the CVR did not capture any discussion of PAPI lights for runway 29 prior to landing. Additionally, the captain, as the PF, was looking outside the airplane, and the first officer as the PM was “more committed to being inside the airplane, looking for trends.”

As they descended, the airspeed began to decay, and the first officer recalled that he stated, “hey you are slow,” followed moments later by, “you are still slow and a little low.” The PM then looked back outside, and at that point recalled “I thought we were low”, however they were just about to touch down, and he didn’t process the information in time to get a go-around callout verbalized. The airplane landed, taxied to the gate, and all passengers and crew deplaned normally.

As several posters have mentioned above, when ATC informed the crew they would be landing on RWY 29 using the published RNAV approach, the captain decided he would fly to touchdown using three red and one white on the PAPI. Runway length wasn't an issue, but it appears that the captain may have thought it was. One would think he had flown the RNAV approach to RWY 29 many times. It's all very odd.

After the incident, and clearly in response to the captain's decision regarding the PAPI, United took the following actions:

After the accident, United Flight Operations issued an Ops Alert that applied to EWR arrivals specific to the RNAV vertical guidance for runway 29. It reminded pilots that the visual glideslope indicator (VGSI) was designed to provide safe obstruction clearance within 10 degrees of the runway centerline up to 4 NM. In addition, United Flight Operations issued Pilot Bulletin 26-069 revision 1 to all pilots that applied to short runway landing guidance.

It mentioned that a hazard was identified through their Safety Management System (SMS) that the pilot technique of shifting the aimpoint of electronic or visual glide path indications, or “ducking under”, contributes to low approach altitudes during the visual segment into certain airports and runways.

It emphasized that all approaches shall be conducted so that
touchdown occurs 1500’ from the runway threshold, but not prior to 1000’ from the threshold, in accordance with their Flight Manual, Chapter 3.
 
3393RP said:
The prelim indicates the FO did a good job monitoring altitude and airspeed on final, and kept the captain apprised of the situation. It appears the FO considered making the call for a go around, but didn't have time to do so before the plane touched down.

At 500 ft, the first officer stated, they were on speed and on profile, and the captain was maintaining his planned profile of 3 red and 1 white on the PAPI. Once again, the CVR did not capture any discussion of PAPI lights for runway 29 prior to landing. Additionally, the captain, as the PF, was looking outside the airplane, and the first officer as the PM was “more committed to being inside the airplane, looking for trends.”

As they descended, the airspeed began to decay, and the first officer recalled that he stated, “hey you are slow,” followed moments later by, “you are still slow and a little low.” The PM then looked back outside, and at that point recalled “I thought we were low”, however they were just about to touch down, and he didn’t process the information in time to get a go-around callout verbalized. The airplane landed, taxied to the gate, and all passengers and crew deplaned normally.

As several posters have mentioned above, when ATC informed the crew they would be landing on RWY 29 using the published RNAV approach, the captain decided he would fly to touchdown using three red and one white on the PAPI. Runway length wasn't an issue, but it appears that the captain may have thought it was. One would think he had flown the RNAV approach to RWY 29 many times. It's all very odd.

After the incident, and clearly in response to the captain's decision regarding the PAPI, United took the following actions:

After the accident, United Flight Operations issued an Ops Alert that applied to EWR arrivals specific to the RNAV vertical guidance for runway 29. It reminded pilots that the visual glideslope indicator (VGSI) was designed to provide safe obstruction clearance within 10 degrees of the runway centerline up to 4 NM. In addition, United Flight Operations issued Pilot Bulletin 26-069 revision 1 to all pilots that applied to short runway landing guidance.

It mentioned that a hazard was identified through their Safety Management System (SMS) that the pilot technique of shifting the aimpoint of electronic or visual glide path indications, or “ducking under”, contributes to low approach altitudes during the visual segment into certain airports and runways.

It emphasized that all approaches shall be conducted so that
touchdown occurs 1500’ from the runway threshold, but not prior to 1000’ from the threshold, in accordance with their Flight Manual, Chapter 3.
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I’m going to take the position that since the airplane hit an obstacle on the approach the FO should have called for a go around much earlier.

If we want to get right to the nuggets of it I also think the FO should have raised some questions during the brief. When the captain discussed flying intentionally low on the path there should have been objection. Not just acceptance. It would have made it much easier to call the go around.

If the FO accepted the intention to fly low on the approach then the GA would have been longer in processing time since they were expecting a low profile based on the briefing.

The FO role is difficult. Have to be a bit of a chameleon to get along with everyone yet still hold the line for standards when an idiot captain tells you they will intentionally fly 3 read into LGA.

Unfortunately on this day the FO missed the mark. Even more unfortunately they didn’t get the opportunity to learn this lesson without incident like so many of us have. Fortunately they did learn it without any injury to people or career.

As one of my mentors told me in the terminal one day when I was asking for advice regarding a difficult captain “Dave, you have to learn how to step on his toes without scuffing the shine on his shoes.”

This FO needed to step a little harder and earlier. In my humble opinion the foundation for this was laid during the briefing.

Although I guess it’s good the FO was thinking about a go around while the airplane was hitting the light pole.
 
WDD said:
Are there times when a FO is supposed to take direct action vs making request, etc.
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Fighting over the controls is not a good idea and it is not procedure.

500' is the go-around gate. Below that, if you are outside of the stabilized approach criteria the pilot-monitoring is to call, "Go-around, [reason]", i.e. "Go-around, altitude", and the pilot-flying is to execute the go-around.
 
But procedure didn’t happen… and…

Likely the captain briefed at the beginning of the rotation “either of us can call a go around”.

Likely the fo said in his interview (for the job) that he’d take the controls and execute a go around in a situation like this.

This was a single piloted aircraft. FO wasn’t there, CAPT did poorly.
 
As far as the FO taking over controls, we used to have a “two communication rule.” If the PM made, in this case, two callouts indicating they were below glidepath with no response from the PF, he was to assume incapacitation and take over controls. Does that exist in the airline world?
 
3393RP said:
The prelim indicates the FO did a good job monitoring altitude and airspeed on final, and kept the captain apprised of the situation. It appears the FO considered making the call for a go around, but didn't have time to do so before the plane touched down.

At 500 ft, the first officer stated, they were on speed and on profile, and the captain was maintaining his planned profile of 3 red and 1 white on the PAPI. Once again, the CVR did not capture any discussion of PAPI lights for runway 29 prior to landing. Additionally, the captain, as the PF, was looking outside the airplane, and the first officer as the PM was “more committed to being inside the airplane, looking for trends.”
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Except the data contradicts the FO's statement. They didn't get to three red until around 300'. And how would the FO have known to be monitoring for the Captain's very nonstandard plan if they never briefed it? I We'll have to wait and see what's on the final, but I think whoever wrote the prelim is leaving some breadcrumbs in the next sentence and asking you to read between the lines.
 
midwestpa24 said:
A widebody pilot should be looking for 3 white and 1 red due to the distance between the cockpit and the main landing gear. But even at that, had he been at 3 red and 1 white he would have still cleared the highway with some margin. He was well below 4 reds a mile from the runway and never corrected it.

View attachment 152515
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midwestpa24 said:
I might would do it in a Cessna or Piper if aiming for the numbers, but not a 767. In practice, widebody and other large aircraft usually teach 3 white to account for the distance between the cockpit and the main gear.

Even at that, had the captain maintained 3 red, he probably would have gotten away with. Probably has done it in the past too. But he was not even near 3 red, he was well below 4 in no man's land. The FO called out getting low, but maybe not forceful enough. The Captain was clearly not stable and should have gone around.
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I'm not disagreeing with you guys, but in all my widebody flying, I aim for WWRR. I've never been taught or even heard WWWR until this thread (maybe I have and dismissed it). I know when we do a CAT III approach the AP flies WWRR all the way down to touchdown. YMMV
 
Sluggo63 said:
I'm not disagreeing with you guys, but in all my widebody flying, I aim for WWRR. I've never been taught or even heard WWWR until this thread (maybe I have and dismissed it). I know when we do a CAT III approach the AP flies WWRR all the way down to touchdown. YMMV
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Regardless of what was trained or planned, even if he had been WRRR, he would have still cleared the pole and highway. They were RRRR+ and unstable and both should have seen the need to correct and/or go around long before they were over the highway.
 
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