Toronto - Delta Airlines CRJ-900 upside down, Flight 4819 from Minneapolis-Saint Paul International Airport (MSP) to Toronto

[Larry in TN]

I'm not as concerned about the FO as the captain. However, even with 500 hours in the airplane, the FO's overall flying experience level is pretty low.

If 500 hours in type isn't enough experience to handle winds which are pretty routine then I don't know what is.

I am saying that this was not a good crew pairing, even though it was legal, and that the captain should be flying more and more often

There is no good or bad. There is only legal and not legal. Changing what is legal requires FAA action.

The FAA requires each pilot to have had three takeoffs and landings within the previous 90 days. That's all. As has been pointed out, international F/Os struggle to do that and often have to go back to the sim to do a "landings class" to get in their three landings. The company, not the pilot contract, sets the policy for how management and instructor pilots maintain their currency and how much over the minimum they fly. Seniority has nothing to do with it.

This captain failed the test

I don't recall at what altitude the performance-increasing wind gust ended but it was pretty low. At a nearly 1,100fpm descent rate, the time available for the Captain to recognize that the F/O was not applying correction, make a decision on the corrective action, and take that action may not have been sufficient to prevent the accident. Add a couple of seconds to that process due to his lack of recent flying experience and I doubt he had a chance.

What was the GPWS callout?

"Sink Rate. Sink Rate."

Is the flight simulator of 2025 for a CRJ the same as a CRJ?

Not really sure what you're asking. It would have been a Level C or Level D simulator.

 

[Tarheelpilot]

If 500 hours in type isn't enough experience to handle winds which are pretty routine then I don't know what is.


There is no good or bad. There is only legal and not legal. Changing what is legal requires FAA action.

The FAA requires each pilot to have had three takeoffs and landings within the previous 90 days. That's all. As has been pointed out, international F/Os struggle to do that and often have to go back to the sim to do a "landings class" to get in their three landings. The company, not the pilot contract, sets the policy for how management and instructor pilots maintain their currency and how much over the minimum they fly. Seniority has nothing to do with it.


I don't recall at what altitude the performance-increasing wind gust ended but it was pretty low. At a nearly 1,100fpm descent rate, the time available for the Captain to recognize that the F/O was not applying correction, make a decision on the corrective action, and take that action may not have been sufficient to prevent the accident. Add a couple of seconds to that process due to his lack of recent flying experience and I doubt he had a chance.


"Sink Rate. Sink Rate."


Not really sure what you're asking. It would have been a Level C or Level D simulator.

Anything over 1000’fpm has been considered an unstable approach with a mandatory go around at all five of the airlines I’ve worked.

I would be shocked if this airline had any other policy.

I’ll stand by my harsh judgment of this captain. Especially considering his longevity and role in flight standards.

 

[dtuuri]

"Sink Rate. Sink Rate."

I think the relevant call was "Fifty feet" if we're talking about the illusion of height due to a partially plowed runway ("we" are).

 

[MauleSkinner]

I think the relevant call was "Fifty feet" if we're talking about the illusion of height due to a partially plowed runway ("we" are).

But the “sink rate” callout should have generated a go around before that.

 

[dtuuri]

But the “sink rate” callout should have generated a go around before that.

It came after: https://www.flyingmag.com/approach-speed-focus-of-accident-probe-into-overturned-crj-900-in-toronto/

 

[Ed Haywood]

Consider: 1100 fpm is 5.5 seconds per 100 feet of descent, and 2.2 seconds per 50 feet.

Not much time to react.

 

[Tools]

Well… in this sort of flying, it’s not a find the deviation on the gages and react, it’s a sight picture, seat of the pants, sensory sort of thing.

It’s not that hard to react. And if you have the energy, read airspeed, the jet reacts instantly.

If you don’t fly much… well… not likely gonna be able to do much. But you can certainly immediately feel the bottom drop out.

Always had the best landings on gusty days, you’re on step, carrying extra speed (which is negated in landing distance by the slip - cross wind - or headwind), you are basically landing power on; made it pretty easy to set her down soft and squishy like. Timing the bleed off of speed at idle on a calm day, no chance.

 

[Larry in TN]

Anything over 1000’fpm has been considered an unstable approach with a mandatory go around at all five of the airlines I’ve worked.

At my current airline, it is 1,200fpm. Previous airlines were 1,000fpm. In either case, I think the DFDR data showed 1,080fpm which looks like 1,000 on the VSI. It's not a big part of the scan below 100'. PF was likely devoting more attention to the airspeed.

But the “sink rate” callout should have generated a go around before that.

Not required above 500' AGL/RA. Not required in visual conditions below 500' AGL/RA.

 

[Tarheelpilot]

At my current airline, it is 1,200fpm. Previous airlines were 1,000fpm. In either case, I think the DFDR data showed 1,080fpm which looks like 1,000 on the VSI. It's not a big part of the scan below 100'. PF was likely devoting more attention to the airspeed.


Not required above 500' AGL/RA. Not required in visual conditions below 500' AGL/RA.

We can debate this all day. You figure there was nothing the captain could do and I don’t. We both have solid knowledge to support our position. Just have to agree to disagree.

 

[dmspilot]

Having more 400 hours as an FO is plenty of time...unless the FO was weak and needed coaching every landing.

Bringing the thrust back at 150' and not touching it again, and it was quite a big reduction of 21 points, is a big problem. Maybe the PF took their hand off the thrust levers and put both hands on the yoke.

Endeavor's wind gust adjustment to approach speed seems inadequate. I'm not sure if that's their formula or if it's the one recommended by Bombardier, but the same wind at my company (which does not fly a CRJ) would result in a 15 to 19 knot adjustment depending on flap setting, not 5 knots.

 

[MauleSkinner]

Not required in visual conditions below 500' AGL/RA.

Even if the rate that triggers a “sink rate” callout is greater than the company definition of “unstable”?

 

[Ed Haywood]

Instrument scans aside, I think the runway approaching me at that rate would get my attention.

 

[wanttaja]

Instrument scans aside, I think the runway approaching me at that rate would get my attention.

Actually *look out the window*? That's crazy talk!

Ron Wanttaja

 

[francisco collazos]

Actually *look out the window*? That's crazy talk!

ThE SUN iS In My EYESSS..

 

[Piperonca]

Instrument scans aside, I think the runway approaching me at that rate would get my attention.

How could it be more basic? Exactly what I was thinking.

 

[bbchien]

1400 hours and the pilot flying is into challenging conidtions with 60 odd pax in the back.
When i stop to think about how I flew at 1400 hrs vs how i fly now....no thank you.

Agree with Tarheel.

 

[Larry in TN]

Even if the rate that triggers a “sink rate” callout is greater than the company definition of “unstable”?

I doubt you can form an argument that will change what's written in my company's manual.

Instrument scans aside, I think the runway approaching me at that rate would get my attention.

It should. If it doesn't, at that point, it's too late for the other pilot to fix it. A 65,000 pound airplane has too much inertia. At that altitude, the window for reintroducing power is too small.

The data I see shows that at 175' AGL the rate-of-descent was normal, 672fpm. The performance-increasing gust occurred at 153' AGL. In response, the PF reduced thrust. The excessive rate-of-descent was noted 3.6 seconds prior to touchdown. At 2.6 seconds prior the automated "sink rate" call was heard. There was 13.6 seconds from the beginning of the performance-increase gust until touchdown. Less than 4 seconds from the beginning of the excessive sink rate until touchdown. Subtract the amount of time it would have taken for the airplane to respond to increased thrust and there's not enough time for the PM to recognize that the correction is not being applied and to apply it himself.

 

[midwestpa24]

I doubt you can form an argument that will change what's written in my company's manual.


It should. If it doesn't, at that point, it's too late for the other pilot to fix it. A 65,000 pound airplane has too much inertia. At that altitude, the window for reintroducing power is too small.

The data I see shows that at 175' AGL the rate-of-descent was normal, 672fpm. The performance-increasing gust occurred at 153' AGL. In response, the PF reduced thrust. The excessive rate-of-descent was noted 3.6 seconds prior to touchdown. At 2.6 seconds prior the automated "sink rate" call was heard. There was 13.6 seconds from the beginning of the performance-increase gust until touchdown. Less than 4 seconds from the beginning of the excessive sink rate until touchdown. Subtract the amount of time it would have taken for the airplane to respond to increased thrust and there's not enough time for the PM to recognize that the correction is not being applied and to apply it himself.

In my experience, any power that comes out should be put right back in to account for the gust and correct the trend. At 13 seconds prior to touchdown it would have had enough effect. At 3 seconds, I'd be curious to see what if any change in thrust would have occurred.

Honestly the best action, in hindsight, with that big of a gust on short final, go around instead of trying to salvage the landing. Then we wouldn't even be talking about it.

 

[Fearless Tower]

Interesting news article from paper said in headlines landing gear failure caused the crash. Something about investigations found landing gear Stay broke from fracture then folded up wing tip hit runway and tore wing off. No mention other than the stay fractured or what caused stay to fracture.

Are the Pilots going to get a pass on this?

That's journalists not understanding what a prelim is. They latch on to the facts of what broke without understanding what the 3G vertical load/1100 FPM right before the landing gear stay fractured.

Most of us who've been actually flying can connect dots...

 

[Fearless Tower]

Juan I believe said they hit at 1100 FPM at touchdown. Seems hard but not excessive.
Did any passengers complain I wonder.

Have to wait and see what they decide on the landing gear failure. Landing didn’t look really awful and thinking other like airframe’s must of been dropped in before without failure.

Side loads also matter and often matter more than vertical.

 

[midwestpa24]

That's journalists not understanding what a prelim is. They latch on to the facts of what broke without understanding what the 3G vertical load/1100 FPM right before the landing gear stay fractured.

Most of us who've been actually flying can connect dots...

It isn't just journalists; lawyers, family members, etc., all read too much into the details without understanding. One accident I was involved in many years ago, the families of the victims and their lawyers latched onto the fact the tail rotor of the helicopter was found 200 yards from the wreckage of the fuselage, therefore the tail rotor caused the accident and blamed maintenance. The truth, the tail rotor was found at the point of impact, the rest of the wreckage kept moving.

 

[Fearless Tower]

I don't recall at what altitude the performance-increasing wind gust ended but it was pretty low. At a nearly 1,100fpm descent rate, the time available for the Captain to recognize that the F/O was not applying correction, make a decision on the corrective action, and take that action may not have been sufficient to prevent the accident. Add a couple of seconds to that process due to his lack of recent flying experience and I doubt he had a chance.

Might not have been able to completely avoid, but CA intervention (like adding power) could have kept it from breaking the wing off and going inverted.

The final report will obviously have more detail on the Captain's actions (or lack thereof), but I suspect that is the difference between this one and the LGA wingtip strike last week where the Captain took control of the aircraft.

 

[MauleSkinner]

I doubt you can form an argument that will change what's written in my company's manual.

I doubt that I would try to change your company’s manual.

 

[Wagondriver]

Air speed went up from the gust by 3kts (over the desired IAS, she was already a little slow), seems pulling power to idle for that is a bit excessive. If she had left the power alone the outcome would likely have been quite different.

 

[Warlock]

1100ft per minute is basically 13mph…run anything into a solid surface at that speed something is going to give…speed being the square of kinetic energy you have quadrupled the energy of what appears to be a max normal landing. Qualified or not it’s disastrous.

 

[Larry in TN]

In my experience, any power that comes out should be put right back in to account for the gust and correct the trend. At 13 seconds prior to touchdown it would have had enough effect. At 3 seconds, I'd be curious to see what if any change in thrust would have occurred.

Exactly.

Honestly the best action, in hindsight, with that big of a gust on short final, go around instead of trying to salvage the landing. Then we wouldn't even be talking about it.

Shouldn't have to go-around. Just anticipate that a performance-increase will be followed by a performance-decrease. Bring the power back a bit then push it right back up to where it needs to be in anticipation of the performance-decrease. Happens all the time.

 

[Mikey52]

Same kinda thing happened to me at Islip about 20 years ago. We touched down at full throttle in a 737-200. Was trying to go around but touched down instead. Head wind went away as we dipped below the trees.

 

[Gilbert Buettner]

1400 hours and the pilot flying is into challenging conidtions with 60 odd pax in the back.
When i stop to think about how I flew at 1400 hrs vs how i fly now....no thank you.

Agree with Tarheel.

Bruce, I was 27 years old and making international flights with 100+ passengers and less than 1400 hours. So much depends on recent experience and proficiency, not easily measured by total time.

 

[Sluggo63]

I’m a little late to the game, and we might be past the seniority system boogeyman at this point. But having lived and worked under both systems, @hindsight2020’s Air Force “meritocracy” and the airlines seniority system, I’ll take the airline seniority system every day and twice on Sundays.

Here’s why: the Air Force “merit based” system never is. It should be, but then things like upgrades, great TDYs, instructor schools, avoiding Christmas deployments hardly ever get doled out based on “merit.” They get given out to the pilots who “stand out” to the leadership.

There’s an aircraft commander upgrade slot come open! Do we give it to the best copilot that’s ready? No. We give it to the Captain who raised his hand and volunteered to be the Squadron Executive Officer.

Hey, a great TDY to Hawaii just popped up! Let’s send the guy who volunteered to plan the squadron Christmas party.

That’s how things really go in Big Blue's merit based system. It’s hardly ever based on merit.

Maybe I’m cynical because of my personal run-in with this. In the early 90s when I finished Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT), the AF had too many pilots and not enough seats, so they started a “banked pilot” program. Pilots who didn’t finish in the top part of their UPT class were “banked,” i.e. they graduated, went to a desk job for 2-4 years until a flying seat opened for them. Now, I wasn’t the Ace of the Base, but I finished in the top third of my UPT class, high enough to get an actual seat after graduation while two-thirds of my class went on to non-flying jobs.

Fast forward three years and I’m a senior KC-135 copilot with about 1,400 hours under my belt, ready to upgrade to Aircraft Commander. But now who is getting the upgrade slots? The copilots who were banked out of UPT. They were getting these guys waivers to go to upgrade at 750 hours (the minimum at the time was 1,000 hours). The reason given? They’re coming up on their Major’s promotion board and it would look bad if they were still copilots. Well, **** me. These guys were my friends, but at the same time, they should have done better in UPT!

That’s what would happen if the airlines didn’t have a seniority system. And to be fair, that does happen at the airlines for things that aren’t strictly controlled by the contract and determined by the seniority list. Things like management jobs, instructor jobs, etc. They seem like they get given to “the bros who were good ****s back in the squadron” or “he’s my neighbor and a great guy.”

The seniority list takes all the subjectiveness out of the equation and puts objective criteria on those things.

 

[Rene]

That's journalists not understanding what a prelim is. They latch on to the facts of what broke without understanding what the 3G vertical load/1100 FPM right before the landing gear stay fractured.

Most of us who've been actually flying can connect dots...

"This story just in . . . spring floods down by the river . . .."

 

[hindsight2020]

I’m a little late to the game, and we might be past the seniority system boogeyman at this point. But having lived and worked under both systems, @hindsight2020’s Air Force “meritocracy” and the airlines seniority system, I’ll take the airline seniority system every day and twice on Sundays.

Here’s why: the Air Force “merit based” system never is.

Couple things:

1) Don't ascribe endorsement of that perverse dynamic to me. It's not "my system", nor did I ever indicate any support for such a perversion and personal corruption. The irony, I can bet you a steak dinner I have typed "myth of meritocracy" more often than you have, on this forum alone. (you can take me to Texas Roadhouse, I'm a pretty cheap date). It'd be the biggest reading comprehension fail if your takeaway after all these years is that, of all us sad sacks who spend way more time on this board than we prob should, uncle hindsight is the "he sincerely believes the world is merit-based" guy on POA.

To wit, I have in more than one occassion said the exact same things you just enumerated about the way the USAF corrupts the spirit of intent of upgrade programs. Routinely uses them for promotion fodder for their gumby-handed but on-paper shiny pennies, instead of placing the most competent and safe into such positions. Matter of fact I'm currently living that in real time. Petty reprisal due to my prior across-the-board qualifications at a former duty station. Withholding the Service from the benefit of my multi-million dollar's worth of collective experience, by axe-grinders who are now in a position of operational control over me in the new station (the joys of PCS Hobson choices....).

I'm more than well versed on the dynamics of cronyism, undue command influence, and reprisal. You're not the only one who's got the shaft as a result of in-group/out-group politics in this life. Welcome to the club kinda thing. Though to your own point, you're quite removed from that morass for more than a few years now, as a "free and clear" 3x my pay airline guy. So what the 6th letter in the alphabet are we even talking about here?

2) As to the airline seniority bit, again, please read up where I have now in two separate posts made the point to the peanut gallery, this isn't about airline seniority. I thought it was fairly clear that my argument is this is a mask off moment for 121 training departments. I inform that opinion as a line check airman equivalent with more than 14 years in USAF primary and intermediate pilot training, and self-report as a career flight instructor. BL, my scrutiny is directed at the way 121 conducts their training and releases people to the line, not with airline seniority. I don't know how many more times I have to underline that to not have my position strawmanned.

Hopefully my position is clarified. I love a good debate, but don't strawman my position; it makes honest debate impossible. Cheers mate.

 

[Sluggo63]

Couple things:

1) Don't ascribe endorsement of that perverse dynamic to me. It's not "my system", nor did I ever indicate any support for such a perversion and personal corruption. The irony, I can bet you a steak dinner I have typed "myth of meritocracy" more often than you have, on this forum alone. (you can take me to Texas Roadhouse, I'm a pretty cheap date). It'd be the biggest reading comprehension fail if your takeaway after all these years is that, of all us sad sacks who spend way more time on this board than we prob should, uncle hindsight is the "he sincerely believes the world is merit-based" guy on POA.

To wit, I have in more than one occassion said the exact same things you just enumerated about the way the USAF corrupts the spirit of intent of upgrade programs. Routinely uses them for promotion fodder for their gumby-handed but on-paper shiny pennies, instead of placing the most competent and safe into such positions. Matter of fact I'm currently living that in real time. Petty reprisal due to my prior across-the-board qualifications at a former duty station. Withholding the Service from the benefit of my multi-million dollar's worth of collective experience, by axe-grinders who are now in a position of operational control over me in the new station (the joys of PCS Hobson choices....).

I'm more than well versed on the dynamics of cronyism, undue command influence, and reprisal. You're not the only one who's got the shaft as a result of in-group/out-group politics in this life. Welcome to the club kinda thing. Though to your own point, you're quite removed from that morass for more than a few years now, as a "free and clear" 3x my pay airline guy. So what the 6th letter in the alphabet are we even talking about here?

2) As to the airline seniority bit, again, please read up where I have now in two separate posts made the point to the peanut gallery, this isn't about airline seniority. I thought it was fairly clear that my argument is this is a mask off moment for 121 training departments. I inform that opinion as a line check airman equivalent with more than 14 years in USAF primary and intermediate pilot training, and self-report as a career flight instructor. BL, my scrutiny is directed at the way 121 conducts their training and releases people to the line, not with airline seniority. I don't know how many more times I have to underline that to not have my position strawmanned.

Hopefully my position is clarified. I love a good debate, but don't strawman my position; it makes honest debate impossible. Cheers mate.

You’re right. I was indeed stuffing as much straw as I could into your flight suit. I even tried to shove some in those weird McPeak-era side zippers. It definitely wasn’t fair of me. I’ve read (and mostly agreed) with enough of your posts to know better. Apologies. Steaks (and beers) on me. We’ll find somewhere better than Texas Roadhouse.

I do also have an idea (maybe misguided) that you don’t think too highly of the airline/121 world and their processes. I also get the feeling that those ideas have shifted significantly since a lot of your reserve bros have moved on to that world and reported back.

But, trust me, I understand from whence you came. I did 4 years as a Tweet IP, never leaving the flight room to take a job in training, STAN/EVAL, Safety… 4 years of trip turning with Studs in the thick Mississippi air. And now I’m involved in the training world at my airline.

I would like to hear your thoughts on the 121 mask off moment for the training departments and how guys/gals are released to the line.

Cheers!

 

[AV8R_87]

What was the GPWS callout?

"Retard... Retard..."

 

[Tools]

Uh… I’ve been through over TWENTY part 121 programs at 5 airlines. 121 training ain’t all that. The worst, in my opinion, Delta. And that was all but 5 of the aforementioned.

let’s face it, the majors don’t really have a track record any better than the minors or third tier, maybe even worse.

Am I an amazing pilot? If so sure ain’t because of their training. Now as for my ability to gaslight a school house type and pass a checkride… I’m a MASTER! Ha! They did teach me that.

Back to this incident. They flew it into the ground. HARD. Ain’t much more complicated than that. Why? Because they weren’t very good. MOST folks are DAMN GOOD by that point. These two weren’t. It happens. VERY infrequently. Enough so it really ain’t worth losing a lot of sleep over. There are bigger fish to fry in that pond.

Oh, and it really ain’t all that hard to land these things in those conditions. Wildly stable, tons of power, pretty lock step procedures to make it a non issue. We could start with NEVER pull the power like that at a 150 feet. NEVER. EVER. NYET. Just don’t. Can’t think of ONE HALF a crappy reason.

Buuuuut… they kinda been inching their way along this path for a good while now. Stand by….

 

[Tarheelpilot]

Uh… I’ve been through over TWENTY part 121 programs at 5 airlines. 121 training ain’t all that. The worst, in my opinion, Delta. And that was all but 5 of the aforementioned.

let’s face it, the majors don’t really have a track record any better than the minors or third tier, maybe even worse.

Am I an amazing pilot? If so sure ain’t because of their training. Now as for my ability to gaslight a school house type and pass a checkride… I’m a MASTER! Ha! They did teach me that.

Back to this incident. They flew it into the ground. HARD. Ain’t much more complicated than that. Why? Because they weren’t very good. MOST folks are DAMN GOOD by that point. These two weren’t. It happens. VERY infrequently. Enough so it really ain’t worth losing a lot of sleep over. There are bigger fish to fry in that pond.

Oh, and it really ain’t all that hard to land these things in those conditions. Wildly stable, tons of power, pretty lock step procedures to make it a non issue. We could start with NEVER pull the power like that at a 150 feet. NEVER. EVER. NYET. Just don’t. Can’t think of ONE HALF a crappy reason.

Buuuuut… they kinda been inching their way along this path for a good while now. Stand by….

Amen

 

[3393RP]

Even if the rate that triggers a “sink rate” callout is greater than the company definition of “unstable”?

We could start with NEVER pull the power like that at a 150 feet. NEVER. EVER. NYET. Just don’t. Can’t think of ONE HALF a crappy reason.

They only had about 9,500' of runway remaining and had to get it on the ground?

 

[Rene]

They only had about 9,500' of runway remaining and had to get it on the ground?

It worked! The wreckage of the CRJ was quite a few feet short of the end of the runway (and a bit off to the right).

 

[35 AoA]

Uh… I’ve been through over TWENTY part 121 programs at 5 airlines. 121 training ain’t all that. The worst, in my opinion, Delta. And that was all but 5 of the aforementioned.

let’s face it, the majors don’t really have a track record any better than the minors or third tier, maybe even worse.

Am I an amazing pilot? If so sure ain’t because of their training. Now as for my ability to gaslight a school house type and pass a checkride… I’m a MASTER! Ha! They did teach me that.

Back to this incident. They flew it into the ground. HARD. Ain’t much more complicated than that. Why? Because they weren’t very good. MOST folks are DAMN GOOD by that point. These two weren’t. It happens. VERY infrequently. Enough so it really ain’t worth losing a lot of sleep over. There are bigger fish to fry in that pond.

Oh, and it really ain’t all that hard to land these things in those conditions. Wildly stable, tons of power, pretty lock step procedures to make it a non issue. We could start with NEVER pull the power like that at a 150 feet. NEVER. EVER. NYET. Just don’t. Can’t think of ONE HALF a crappy reason.

Buuuuut… they kinda been inching their way along this path for a good while now. Stand by….

This is an ironic life experience to draw from, but you are probably just as familiar with the "no further aft than" position of the throttles behind the boat. It isnt specific, there is no measurement for it, and it isnt really "taught" other than maybe by Paddles if you make a fool of yourself/scare someone. It's a "you know it when you feel it" sensation for life preservation. But when you caught the lifties/happy side of the burble, you knew not to get spicy with those throttles..you pulled them a bit and then said no more sir. Anything after that, you just took your bolter like a man with some power still on the jet, because you arent trying to be Casper the friendly whisper jet at idle crossing the ramp ghost (who will one day be dead on arrival with that habit). Guess i cant speak for the war Hoov, but the young Hornet JO in me learned that real quick. I say ironic here because we slammed those hogs into the boat at similar descent rates to what apparently caused this airplane to blow up bigger than ****.

 

[flyingcheesehead]

@flyingcheesehead I think you are looking for solutions to a nonexistent problem.

There's a bunch of scrap aluminum that says there was a problem.

Crew pairing wasn’t the problem.

Let me put it this way. Did this flight require a special skill set that one would not expect any random line pilot to posses? Also just a friendly reminder the captains role as PIC is not to be Chuck Yeager. The captain is the final authority for decisions and safe operation. This captain failed the test and I don’t think more time in the seat would have changed much.

Basically I’m saying this is a failure of the individual, not the system. No one made the sim instructor fly that day. It was his decision making. No matter how little he had flown real metal his decision making skills should have been fine.

I think the captain's decision making skills were maybe a hair too slow because he's spent too much time in the chair in the back of the sim, knowing exactly what was going to go wrong, and having the luxury of just letting it go to red screens than having to save the day.

Like @Tarheelpilot said, I think you’re fixating too much on the crew pairing. And FWIW this wasn’t a green on green pairing because that’s not allowed.

Like I said, I get that it wasn't green on green because I know that's not allowed. The FO wasn't "green" with 400 in type, but the 1400 TT is a different form of green. The Captain wasn't green either, but his recency of experience left a lot to be desired. Put the two together, and now we have a charred mess of airplane parts and used up a helluva lot of our luck bag not killing anyone.

I also dont know of any airline’s CBA that would arbitrarily allow management to change in the name of safety. And I think that’s a good a thing.

Difference of opinion, I suppose. To me, safety trumps everything. But that's what being a Director of Safety will do to a person I guess.

If 500 hours in type isn't enough experience to handle winds which are pretty routine then I don't know what is.

You would think after 400 in type the FO would have probably seen winds like that before? I wonder what will come out in the final report.

Instrument scans aside, I think the runway approaching me at that rate would get my attention.

You would think, but there was potentially a flat light situation with all of the snow and the overcast sky which can create the illusion that you're not so close.

 

[Kenny Phillips]

This is an ironic life experience to draw from, but you are probably just as familiar with the "no further aft than" position of the throttles behind the boat. It isnt specific, there is no measurement for it, and it isnt really "taught" other than maybe by Paddles if you make a fool of yourself/scare someone. It's a "you know it when you feel it" sensation for life preservation. But when you caught the lifties/happy side of the burble, you knew not to get spicy with those throttles..you pulled them a bit and then said no more sir. Anything after that, you just took your bolter like a man with some power still on the jet, because you arent trying to be Casper the friendly whisper jet at idle crossing the ramp ghost (who will one day be dead on arrival with that habit). Guess i cant speak for the war Hoov, but the young Hornet JO in me learned that real quick. I say ironic here because we slammed those hogs into the boat at similar descent rates to what apparently caused this airplane to blow up bigger than ****.

This apparently hit at about 2x the down rate of a carrier landing, which is 4x the energy, on a plane that is not built for it. Plus ... it wasn't intentional.