Toronto - Delta Airlines CRJ-900 upside down, Flight 4819 from Minneapolis-Saint Paul International Airport (MSP) to Toronto

I'm getting a 403 for the entire TSB site now.
OK, they must just be getting pounded. I was able to get the text of the report loaded after a few more attempts.
The sequence leading up to landing is as follows:

CTSB prelim said:
At 1412:01, the aircraft descended through 500 feet above ground level (AGL). The aircraft’s indicated airspeed was 150 knots, its ground speed was 121 knots, and the engine thrust was indicating approximately 64% N1.N1 is the engine’s low-pressure compressor rpm, displayed digitally on the top of the primary engine display information which indicates the current N1 in percent. The rate of descent was 720 fpm, and the localizer and glide slope were centred. Five seconds later, the PF disconnected the autopilot.

At 1412:26, while the aircraft was descending through 175 feet AGL, its indicated airspeed was 144 knots, with a ground speed of 121 knots, and a rate of descent of 672 fpm. The thrust remained at approximately 64% N1.

At 1412:30, while the aircraft was descending through 153 feet AGL, its indicated airspeed increased to 154 knots whereas the ground speed did not change appreciably, consistent with a performance-increasing wind gust. The PF pulled back the thrust levers, and as a result, over the following 5 seconds, N1 decreased from 64% to approximately 43%, where it remained until touchdown. The airspeed began to decrease.

At 1412:40 (3.6 seconds before touchdown), when the aircraft was at a height of 50 feet AGL, the indicated airspeed was 145 knots, and the ground speed was 112 knots. The rate of descent had increased to 1114 fpm. The enhanced ground proximity warning system (EGPWS) aural alert “fifty” sounded to indicate the aircraft was at 50 feet AGL, which is a standard callout.

One second later (2.6 seconds before touchdown), the EGPWS alert “sink rate” sounded, indicating a high rate of descent. The aircraft’s indicated airspeed was 136 knots, its ground speed was 111 knots, and the rate of descent had remained at about 1100 fpm. The bank angle increased to a 4.7° right bank. The engine thrust was steady at approximately 43% N1.

At 1412:42 (1.6 seconds before touchdown), the aircraft’s indicated airspeed was 136 knots, and its ground speed was 111 knots. The aircraft was slightly below the glide slope, but on the visual segment of the approach and tracking the runway centreline. The rate of descent had increased to 1072 fpm, and the bank angle was 5.9° to the right.

Less than 1 second before touchdown, the aircraft’s indicated airspeed was 134 knots, and its ground speed was 111 knots. The bank angle was 7.1° to the right, and the pitch attitude was 1° nose up. The rate of descent was recorded as 1110 fpm.

At 1412:43.6, the right main landing gear (MLG) contacted the runway. The aircraft was in a 7.5° bank to the right with 1° of nose-up pitch and 3g vertical acceleration, at a rate of descent of approximately 1098 fpm (18.3 fps).

Oh, and Vref was 139 knots, Endeavor's manual states approaches are to be flown at Vref + 5 + half the gust factor (up to 10). Winds they'd have had were 27028G35, so Vref+9/148 KIAS should have been their speed on approach.

So, everything looked good until the gust of headwind at 153 AGL which put them momentarily at Vref+20 and she pulled some power out. At 50 AGL, where you should be at Vref, they were 6 knots fast but descending at 1114 fpm so it sounds like they may have pitched down to maintain speed or make a glidepath correction. "Sink Rate" and crunch.

Commercial/Instrument/multi legally required, but I’d guess between 500&1000 to get hired.
I don't think things were that good in 2007 were they? Maybe if you had a lot of multi time.

In any case, the report states that the captain had flown 3.5 hours in the past 30 days, which would be an average of 42 hours per year, so no matter what, the numbers do not look good.

FO/PF had 1422 TT, 418 in type, and 56 in the past 30 days. So, more than half of the captain's time in type in one year vs 17+... But not a lot of total time.

FOM says to initiate flare between 30 and 20 AGL and that landing attitude should be between 3º and 8º, so pitch was too low at landing.
 
He's a sim instructor who apparently rarely flies an actual airplane... Having had that conversation earlier in the thread, I sure hope carriers start having their sim instructors fly more, because what this guy was doing is not enough to stay proficient IMO.

Couldn’t just hit reset after getting the red screen this time. :)
 
Uh… folks, this is NOT a carrier landing. One does NOT pull power at a hunnert and fiddy feet.

You do NOT pull power on ANY jet I’ve flown (granted only 10 or so types) that high.

If you do… the outcome is VERY predictable. The bottom falls out. At that point lowering the nose for speed is ALSO NOT what to do.

Wind gust schmind gust, this was just poor flying and worse monitoring. So the REAL question is why were they flying at all? I’ve landed Piper Cubs and A330s in worse conditions. Distraction results in not doing something. They did something, and they did it poorly.
 
Pull power at 100' with 1° nose-up. What could go wrong? I'm actually thinking that the PF was way over her head.

Does Delta hate their customers or what (besides beating them up over a seat)?
 
OK, they must just be getting pounded. I was able to get the text of the report loaded after a few more attempts.
The sequence leading up to landing is as follows:



Oh, and Vref was 139 knots, Endeavor's manual states approaches are to be flown at Vref + 5 + half the gust factor (up to 10). Winds they'd have had were 27028G35, so Vref+9/148 KIAS should have been their speed on approach.

So, everything looked good until the gust of headwind at 153 AGL which put them momentarily at Vref+20 and she pulled some power out. At 50 AGL, where you should be at Vref, they were 6 knots fast but descending at 1114 fpm so it sounds like they may have pitched down to maintain speed or make a glidepath correction. "Sink Rate" and crunch.


I don't think things were that good in 2007 were they? Maybe if you had a lot of multi time.

In any case, the report states that the captain had flown 3.5 hours in the past 30 days, which would be an average of 42 hours per year, so no matter what, the numbers do not look good.

FO/PF had 1422 TT, 418 in type, and 56 in the past 30 days. So, more than half of the captain's time in type in one year vs 17+... But not a lot of total time.

FOM says to initiate flare between 30 and 20 AGL and that landing attitude should be between 3º and 8º, so pitch was too low at landing.
with numbers like that, the captain should have been flying with a check airman, not a low time FO.......
 
In Canadian airspace, would the PIC be responsible for the FO’s mishaps in this case?
 
Wonder if they made this CA return to the line to help with the PIC shortage caused by the majors hiring most of their experienced SICs the past few years.
 
Does Delta hate their customers or what (besides beating them up over a seat)?
Yes, they do.

I write this from seat 2A on a Delta A319, about to depart KHOU.

That said, Delta treats the self-loading cargo as well as any of the large airlines does.
 
Last edited:
Well gee whiz . . .

"At touchdown, the following occurred: the side-stay that is attached to the right MLG fractured, the landing gear folded into the retracted position, the wing root fractured between the fuselage and the landing gear, and the wing detached from the fuselage, releasing a cloud of jet fuel, which caught fire. The exact sequence of these events is still to be determined by further examination of the fracture surfaces."

My emphasis.

I sure hope there are some double-PhD, BSAEs who can use ultra high-tech methodology to figure out if the right main collapsed BEFORE the wing tip hit the ground. If the wing tip hit the ground BEFORE the wing broke loose. If the wing broke loose BEFORE the fuel was released onto a runway with a broken airplane skidding down it. And if the broken airplane skidding down the runway played any part in igniting that fuel.

Inquiring minds just wanna know.
The bolts that attach the wing to the center section carry though are basically right at the outer part of the MLG bay. A few inches inboard and forward. Two big honking bolts (that I know of) so it a wing is gonna snap that's the place. The side stay 'fracturing' is weird wording. A fracture would be like a crack... the thing had to have snapped into pieces (ie not fracture, but up and broke).
 
It happened because it is legal.
Yea I’ve been seeing comments like this”how did these pilots get paired together.” It’s not some sort of magical formula. They were both 90 day current, sim current, had the required FAR 117 rest, no green on green, and they both bid for what they could hold. Crew scheduling can’t just say well this guy only flew 10 hours this year so maybe we won’t pair him with a lower time FO
 
Yea I’ve been seeing comments like this”how did these pilots get paired together.” It’s not some sort of magical formula. They were both 90 day current, sim current, had the required FAR 117 rest, no green on green, and they both bid for what they could hold. Crew scheduling can’t just say well this guy only flew 10 hours this year so maybe we won’t pair him with a lower time FO
Yabut, once this goes through the SMS, management *should* be saying that and adjusting the rules so the computer doesn't put someone with so little recent experience with a low time FO.
 
Yabut, once this goes through the SMS, management *should* be saying that and adjusting the rules so the computer doesn't put someone with so little recent experience with a low time FO.
The airlines don’t work like that. It’s all seniority based and the things I mentioned above. Whether that’s right or wrong is a different discussion.
 
correct. you seniority number is everything in airline world. it was dumb lunch that I was 1 digit ahead a coworker but I will always get first pick for bids/road trips/OT even if he has more military exp than me.
 
I know publicly scrutinizing the seniority-supremacist bend of some/most cargo/pax 121 is a bit of a third rail, but in this case I don't think fixating on that is as germane to the issue. After all, non-seniority crew outfits also have to deal with pairings causing accidents.

I just think it's a mask-off moment for the 121 training enterprise, and I'm thankful it happened without fatailities, because the industry needs to take heed of the degree to which they systematically rest on the "panacea" of flight automation in 21st century electronics. All while handwaving away those who point at handlflying dexterity/aptitude/depth as the uninformed musings of lessers who dOnT fLy GeE-EHts. Latter aspersion which is also misguided, as many in fact do fly turbines.

The good news it that the industry is entering a hiring downturn; I'm already 100% manned on traditionals, many have been unable to get "career" jobs they thought they'd attain by just walking into like their bros ostensibly did in the past 36 months. At any rate, this will increase safety by applicant experience proxy. The regionals do continue to play the FAFO game, by choosing to honor the cadet paths in order to float the 141 rent-seeking, free recruiting. Perhaps this accident will lead to a pivot on that bend, and the incoming food fight with said universities if they do no doubt. I have not yet seen any open source indicate this pivot has or will happen. We are living in interesting times, as the Chinese say.
 
The airlines don’t work like that. It’s all seniority based and the things I mentioned above. Whether that’s right or wrong is a different discussion.
The "things you mentioned above" are rules that the computer follows, and this is not very different from not allowing green on green. I know it's not done now, but it can be done, and it should.

If Endeavor's safety department is doing their job, there is already a root cause analysis going on, and maybe completed, and those root causes, including the crew time issues and pairing, are being dumped into your SMS. Given that this accident already happened, it's gonna be somewhat difficult to risk-matrix this one into oblivion, meaning that management is going to have to find a way of mitigating that risk.
 
The "things you mentioned above" are rules that the computer follows, and this is not very different from not allowing green on green. I know it's not done now, but it can be done, and it should.

If Endeavor's safety department is doing their job, there is already a root cause analysis going on, and maybe completed, and those root causes, including the crew time issues and pairing, are being dumped into your SMS. Given that this accident already happened, it's gonna be somewhat difficult to risk-matrix this one into oblivion, meaning that management is going to have to find a way of mitigating that risk.
I disagree. Seniority is king and should be kept that way. Beef up training, make sim instructors fly the line more, more line checks, stricter limitations on repeat sim events, etc is what I think would be better.
 
The bolts that attach the wing to the center section carry though are basically right at the outer part of the MLG bay. A few inches inboard and forward. Two big honking bolts (that I know of) so it a wing is gonna snap that's the place. The side stay 'fracturing' is weird wording. A fracture would be like a crack... the thing had to have snapped into pieces (ie not fracture, but up and broke).
"Fracture" can mean crack or disintegration.
 
Interesting news article from paper said in headlines landing gear failure caused the crash. Something about investigations found landing gear Stay broke from fracture then folded up wing tip hit runway and tore wing off. No mention other than the stay fractured or what caused stay to fracture.

Are the Pilots going to get a pass on this?
 
Interesting news article from paper said in headlines landing gear failure caused the crash. Something about investigations found landing gear Stay broke from fracture then folded up wing tip hit runway and tore wing off. No mention other than the stay fractured or what caused stay to fracture.

Are the Pilots going to get a pass on this?
Nope. When you hit something (the ground, in this case) hard enough, things break. Their vertical speed at touchdown was the issue, not a defective or under engineered part. The root cause here was the pilot and I expect the pilot(s) to suffer the consequences.
 
The "things you mentioned above" are rules that the computer follows, and this is not very different from not allowing green on green. I know it's not done now, but it can be done, and it should.

If you have heartburn over this, you should see what we do on the widebody.
 
With only 160' cleared.
True? Take note you folks who say, "Look to the far end of the runway." Looking more off to the side would give more accurate height perception, imo. Tunnel vision down the runway could make a 160' width look farther below if accustomed to seeing something wider there. Pardon Moi, if this has been said before.
 
The "things you mentioned above" are rules that the computer follows, and this is not very different from not allowing green on green. I know it's not done now, but it can be done, and it should.

If Endeavor's safety department is doing their job, there is already a root cause analysis going on, and maybe completed, and those root causes, including the crew time issues and pairing, are being dumped into your SMS. Given that this accident already happened, it's gonna be somewhat difficult to risk-matrix this one into oblivion, meaning that management is going to have to find a way of mitigating that risk.
Are they also rewriting their CBA?
 
Back
Top