Crash at Reagan National Airport, DC. Helicopter crash into airliner.

My point is, today it's deemed necessary to fly over terrain where in my experience it wasn't.
Our stabilized approach criteria are more stringent today than it was when you flew it. A CRJ is also flying faster than the biz jets you flew. Flying that approach completely over the water today will require a go-around every single time.

We are never going to convince you that you are wrong so what is the point in this continued argument?
 
A mixture of fact and sarcasm...

Back in dtouri's day a DC 3 from Norfolk flew the over the river version to 33, stalled in the inbound turn, with fatalities. Not everybody is as skilled as dtouri was. I remember this accident personally, I knew the pilot who crashed. FACTS.

Now we can consider, if the CRJ had followed the runway 1 approach until they reached the runway 33, and turned left, they would have been safe. SARCASM.

dtouri flew before the procedures were made safer, and is demanding that todays pilots fly the old path. As a sailor on the Potomac River from before the DC 3 crashed until just a few years ago, I can assure dtouri that airliners do not fly up the river when landing on 33. Additionally, the military airbases he was avoiding, Anacostia Naval Air Station and Bolling AFB no longer exist.

It took a crash with fatalities to move the route to 33 east for less bank in the turns, and more margin above stall speed to maneuver and align with the runway. The GPS waypoints well east of the river are something that did not exist in those old days, but are essential to modern safety standards.

It will doubtless take years to evolve changes at DCA to reduce the odds of another helicopter/airliner collision, and many will demand a return to the good old days, forgetting this crash.

A standard that required all helicopter flights to be head on with the airliners seems a poor standard, even if it usually resulted in seeing and avoiding. SARCASM again.
 
You guys are putting words in my mouth and motives in my head that aren't there, despite my flat out telling you different. There's a video of an RJ flying the river the same as I remember doing it. Had this happened in my day, this accident most surely wouldn't have. So, the change in "flight procedures" is the culprit. There was no change in the charted procedure — practically verbatim unchanged for 50 years. A change in interpretation should have had a change in the chart to back it up and changes to ATC procedures as well. That's all I'm implying, so please get off my back.
 
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You keep talking about the procedure. The procedure is specific to Runway 1. It does not apply to any other runways. Once the runway changed, the procedure no longer applies. It say, "...to the airport" because that is how you are supposed to fly to runway 1, which is on the airport.

It is all in the title of the procedure. "MT VERNON Visual Rwy 1"

There are charted visual approach procedures that serve more than one runway and that is indicated in the title of the procedure. Two examples are:

Parkway Visual Rwy 13L/R at JFK
QUIET BRIDGE Visual Rwys 28L/R at SFO

Also, landings lights aren't laser beams. They are visible over a wide angle. Being twenty degrees off to the left will not prevent the opposite direction traffic from seeing them, particularly when viewing from below without any ground lights in the background.
 
I'm on record as NOT putting blame on the RJ crew. I have asked why nobody else has, though, in view of the different way I and others have interpreted and flown the very same approach in prior years:
Dturi,

Why are you being so dense?

As other folks have tried to tell you, once ATC cleared the CRJ crew to maneuver to, and land on RWY 33, the crew was no longer obliged to stay within the confines of the River.

As a matter of fact, it would be physically impossible to stay within the confines of the river in a CRJ while maneuvering to position the airplane unto the the final approach path to RWY 33 so as to make a properly stabilized approach.

Looking at the chart for the River visual RWY 1, staying within the confines of the river is required only if you are flying straight-in to RWY 1.

So what, exactly, is it that you do not understand?

Also, what is all of the gibberish about “noise abatement?”
 
Technically, I think what you wrote applies to parallel runways according to Order 8260.61, like the Parkway Visual to JFK.

The chart is noise abatement to the airport via the Potomac, so I'd follow it until necessary to turn downwind, wouldn't you?

Ok, so you would too.

My point is, today it's deemed necessary to fly over terrain where in my experience it wasn't. Everybody today follows the same route, so it isn't just the crew on that RJ, but it's why the helicopter didn't see them. Which doesn't absolve the helicopter of blame, it only explains the accident.

Well, the noise still applies no matter what you call it so I'd stay over the river because I can, but I guess nobody seems to care anymore.


Hey, you made me answer without reference to the charted Mt. Vernon approach, so I used the ILS/LOC/circle to land analogy instead. :)
The whole point is the restrictions of the mt Vernon visual didn’t apply. Not being over the river did not cause this accident.

Sigh…

It’s not possible to stay over the river to 33 and maintain compliance with current industry best practices for stable approach criteria. This has been stated many times already in this thread in direct response to your posts. Yet you still assert it’s an unwillingness of crews to do so. Things have changed since you were cowboying around in your Learjet. You are looking under the wrong tent flap brother.
 
Also, what is all of the gibberish about “noise abatement?”
I would like some clarification of this. @dtuuri keeps mentioning it, others say it not applicable. Which is it?

By the way, on Tuesday the government's attorneys admitted in court via a filing the FAA and the Army failed the duty of care owed to the plaintiffs, and accepted liability for the crash:

"The United States admits that it owed a duty of care to Plaintiffs, which it breached, thereby proximately causing the tragic accident on January 29, 2025," the government said in the filing.

The government also conceded that the air traffic controller at Reagan National Airport did not comply with regulations that state "if aircraft are on converging courses, inform the other aircraft of the traffic and that visual separation is being applied."


Another part of the filing states:

“The United States admits pilots flying PAT25 failed to maintain proper and safe visual separation from AE5342."
 
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The government also conceded that the air traffic controller at Reagan National Airport did not comply with regulations that state "if aircraft are on converging courses, inform the other aircraft of the traffic and that visual separation is being applied."
That is true, but I don't think it made much of a difference. It would have been difficult for the CRJ crew to identify the helicopter and realize that it was a threat in time to take action. The helicopter was likely hidden by aircraft structure during the time that those decisions needed to be made. The final NTSB report should address the visibility issues from each aircraft.
 
The government tried blaming the victims at one point (CRJ pilots) and then trying to obfuscate on the ATC who wasn't doing their job. Sickening.

This is mostly on Lobach because the copilot was too busy coddling a green pilot.

The government deflected on the near misses over the years. No wonder 67 innocent people died for a taxi service.

Just shut PAT down. There's bunkers all over DC they can use if there is an emergency.
 
Things have changed since you were cowboying around in your Learjet.
Bingo, that's basically it. This whole back and forth essentially comes down to that hidden subtext. The inference that if younger (generationally) airline pilots weren't such meow meows, things would work out. At the end of the day, it's just MCS language.

When it came to heavies, having to share aircraft controls with people who wanted to whip around cattle wagons like it was the fighter they didn't get out of pilot training, was ultimately the biggest reason I grew to dislike my time in the bomber. And full disclosure I didn't want to be there either, but I wasn't about to take my poor life timing and turn it against the safety of my crew and their families by proxy. Several such bystanders lost their lives to that ego-compensatory imprudence; that never sat well with me.

Even in the Talon we used to do objectively gratuitous knife-edged stuff, and killed a buuuunch of students and instructors in the process through the decades, for no added value in combat readiness.

BL: Horses for courses, people.
 
A mixture of fact and sarcasm...

Back in dtouri's day a DC 3 from Norfolk flew the over the river version to 33, stalled in the inbound turn, with fatalities. Not everybody is as skilled as dtouri was. I remember this accident personally, I knew the pilot who crashed. FACTS.

Now we can consider, if the CRJ had followed the runway 1 approach until they reached the runway 33, and turned left, they would have been safe. SARCASM.

dtouri flew before the procedures were made safer, and is demanding that todays pilots fly the old path. As a sailor on the Potomac River from before the DC 3 crashed until just a few years ago, I can assure dtouri that airliners do not fly up the river when landing on 33. Additionally, the military airbases he was avoiding, Anacostia Naval Air Station and Bolling AFB no longer exist.

It took a crash with fatalities to move the route to 33 east for less bank in the turns, and more margin above stall speed to maneuver and align with the runway. The GPS waypoints well east of the river are something that did not exist in those old days, but are essential to modern safety standards.

It will doubtless take years to evolve changes at DCA to reduce the odds of another helicopter/airliner collision, and many will demand a return to the good old days, forgetting this crash.

A standard that required all helicopter flights to be head on with the airliners seems a poor standard, even if it usually resulted in seeing and avoiding. SARCASM again.
Methinks you’re the one with wrong facts. If you’re referring to Capital Airlines Flight 500,
it was on approach to runway 36 with a 400’ ceiling. I found no other DC3 stall accident.
 
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My apologies dtouri, he was flying for Capital Airlines, and I was not sailing that weekend, so was not one of the sailors who saved the survivors in the water. I was there the next weekend and heard the story from the other sailors.
 
My apologies dtouri, he was flying for Capital Airlines, and I was not sailing that weekend, so was not one of the sailors who saved the survivors in the water. I was there the next weekend and heard the story from the other sailors.
It's ok. Isn't it funny how the farther in the rearview mirror things get, the harder it is to distinguish which events came before the other? Don't sweat it. ;)
 
I would like some clarification of this. @dtuuri keeps mentioning it, others say it not applicable. Which is it?
One way, which I wouldn't bet money on, is that maybe airlines have an FMS database loaded with an "RVFP" by the same name as the public CVFP that hasn't changed in 50 years. The RVFP is secret. Ok, it isn't published; I couldn't resist making it more interesting. You can read about the differences here: https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/Order_826060B.pdf

I just learned of them myself. Perhaps that's why they aren't violating the published noise abatement procedure legally — they have had their desired course over land approved and it's running stealthily instead of the original Mt. Vernon Visual when it's selected? :dunno: @Larry in TN might know.
 
One way, which I wouldn't bet money on, is that maybe airlines have an FMS database loaded with an "RVFP" by the same name as the public CVFP that hasn't changed in 50 years. The RVFP is secret. Ok, it isn't published; I couldn't resist making it more interesting. You can read about the differences here: https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/Order_826060B.pdf

I just learned of them myself. Perhaps that's why they aren't violating the published noise abatement procedure legally — they have had their desired course over land approved and it's running stealthily instead of the original Mt. Vernon Visual when it's selected? :dunno: @Larry in TN might know.
They flew the RNAV 33 which I posted about earlier. There's no noise abatement procedure.
 
Perhaps that's why they aren't violating the published noise abatement procedure legally — they have had their desired course over land approved and it's running stealthily instead of the original Mt. Vernon Visual when it's selected? :dunno: @Larry in TN might know.
I'm not sure to what noise abatement procedure you are referring. The Mt. Vernon's noise abatement feature is that you follow the river, south of the bridge, instead of the localizer. It doesn't have anything to do with the east bank east of the airport.

The procedure I was taught was to fly either the ground track from the RNAV to 33 or fly up the highway, which is nearly identical tracks to the RNAV. Reloading the FMS was a distraction threat so the Captain had the option of doing it visually if workload management dictated. There was no separation CVAP in the FMS.
 
dtouri, my search skills are not as good as yours, would you post the link to the Capital Airlines crash report? I have always wondered what the official cause might have been.

TIA
 
dtouri, my search skills are not as good as yours, would you post the link to the Capital Airlines crash report? I have always wondered what the official cause might have been.

TIA
Click on the flight number in post 1771.

EDIT: Click the pdf file at the end of that page for the full report.
 
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Thanks, dtouri.

That is strange, monitored by GCA on the ILS, and until near breakout, a good approach. Then off to the right, turn back when advised of the deviation, and lost it.

When I met him, I was just starting my PPL adventure, and he gave me great advice on transitioning
DCA airspace, by picking my departure times for slow traffic That was good advice for many years.

He had a premonition that he would stall into the Potomac, and talked of it often.

For various reasons, I would not have knowingly flown with him into DCA in particular, or anywhere else. I have always had a suspicion of one contributing factor, but it is not in the report, so remains unknown. 2 very experienced pilots, and I believe that he was an ex military C47 pilot, memory is fuzzy on that.
 
To the whole calls for shutting all of the .mil footprint down, forgive me for I haven't kept up with all the DC swamp power jousting: Remind me again why is merely restricting that route/crossing during DCA 33 ops not a viable compromise COA ?
 
He had a premonition that he would stall into the Potomac, and talked of it often.

For various reasons, I would not have knowingly flown with him into DCA in particular, or anywhere else. I have always had a suspicion of one contributing factor, but it is not in the report, so remains unknown.
I get ya. It's a bit too coincidental to be a coincidence. I wonder if the Air India Flight 171 captain had a lot of premonitions too.
2 very experienced pilots, and I believe that he was an ex military C47 pilot, memory is fuzzy on that.
I doubt it. See the last paragraphs of the pdf file. He was hired in 1932 as a non-pilot. After ten years he qualified for a commercial certificate and was sent through training. Then more training. Then assigned as a copilot. After two years he made captain.
 
dtouri, I just noticed the DC 3 Cap Air crash was 1949, the crash I referred to was 1959 or 1960.
 
Name is not in my memory. I am not sure that he shared names in our conversations, but he was well known to the other sailors as both a pilot, and problem drinker. There may be a clerical error in the digital report date, perhaps.
I started sailing in 1959, when released from the Army, so that date is positive!
 
Name is not in my memory...but he was well known to the other sailors as...a... problem drinker.
I started sailing in 1959, when released from the Army...
Boat club, huh? If boat club drinking was involved in this tale there's no telling what the facts really are or if he even crashed anything.
 
NTSB released a simulation. Not sure why they used green phosphor when their PPT depicts white. Also I think they got the NVGs too far away from the viewer. They should be about 3/4 of an inch away from the viewer in real life. This looks more like a couple of inches. You’re not gonna have the full 40 FoV and won’t have this much viewing area around the NVGs as depicted. But, if the IP was staring straight ahead or even up to the right, the CRJ would be mixed in with the lights on the center windscreen as shown.

 
Not sure why they used green phosphor when their PPT depicts white.
During yesterday’s hearing, the NTSB explained that the visibility simulations could use either green or white (they had to pick one or depict a simulation twice) because there were two sets of green NVGs and two sets of white NVGs aboard PAT25 and the NTSB was not able to conclude which crew member was using white or green.
 
The CRJ is correctly depicted well above the ground lighting at 3:28, and straight ahead as seen from the right seat, and inside the view with NVG.
3 sets of landing lights are there, the CRJ is the furthest to the left and closest to the helicopter.

4:02, still there, and lead of 3. Just passing out of the instructor pilots NVG view.

4:28, still visible above ground lighting, if either helicopter pilot swivels head just a little to the left to bring it back into the NVG view.
Responds to ATC that airplane is in sight. Requests visual separation. We do not know if either pilot looked to the left of straight ahead.

4:36,clearly visible to the left, but too late.

4:31, it is all over.

Failure to look to the left from 3:28 to 4:28 is key to the failure to identify the correct set of lights that they said they would maintain visual separation with.


For the CRJ, the helicopter was mostly a light in the lights of the city, and they were never given a point out that there was a helicopter on the river route.
 
The CRJ beginning to move right to left in the FOV, especially after the helicopter establishes the southbound course, could easily be mistaken for a lack of collision course. In the absence of a clear understanding that the CRJ was to the left, preparing to maneuver and subsequently cross in front of them, it becomes hard to predict. Those communications were squashed. If there is other observed traffic to 12-1 o’clock that will remain to the right of you and you will clearly “pass behind” when remaining on the normal route, it further complicates the picture.
 
The animation with the NVG is incorrect. It was fixated straight ahead with zero movement.

Pilots are usually constantly scanning due to the limitations of the FOV.

Now, it was insanity to fly on goggles in that environment. The route and conflict with other aircraft was unsafe.

Politics basically got a bunch of people killed.
 
Why wouldn't the CRJ be above the lights since it was at a higher altitude?
Yeah it would be slightly above as depicted but mixed in as in, there’s several dots of light in that area. Complicating this is that they’re over water at around 300 MSL. The terrain out to the 10-11 o’clock is around 300 MSL as well. So essentially they’re just slightly above the terrain in the distance. The aircraft isn’t that definitely separated from the city lights like the aircraft further in the distance.

I think what they’re trying to depict is that there’s very little left to right movement on the center windscreen. Could easily be mistaken out of the corner of the eye as a tower. Also, this vid doesn’t depict any glare. While the interior lights are required to be NVG compatible, there’s gonna be some glare on the windscreen.
 
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The animation with the NVG is incorrect. It was fixated straight ahead with zero movement.

Pilots are usually constantly scanning due to the limitations of the FOV.

Now, it was insanity to fly on goggles in that environment. The route and conflict with other aircraft was unsafe.

Politics basically got a bunch of people killed.
Well we don’t know where the IP was looking so I suppose the NTSB assumed straight ahead. If I had to guess, I think both were staring straight ahead or off to the 1 o’clock. Still like to know what the CE was doing in the back. Can’t remember what seat he was in. Unfortunately, being as cold as it was, I’d be willing to bet his window was shut and not able to scan that area. Heater is horrible in the back.
 
Failure to look to the left from 3:28 to 4:28 is key to the failure to identify the correct set of lights that they said they would maintain visual separation with.

And that's assuming they were properly attempting to visually acquire traffic. Recall that the CRJ was called out to them several minutes prior when they were many miles apart, and they immediately requested visual separation. Was it part of that unit's culture to always request visual separation to avoid annoying delays even if the other traffic was not positively identified?
 
And that's assuming they were properly attempting to visually acquire traffic. Recall that the CRJ was called out to them several minutes prior when they were many miles apart, and they immediately requested visual separation.
No, watch it again. While it was initially called out to them when it was crossing the Wilson Bridge (about 4-5 miles south of where they collided), ATC asked them when they were very close if they had it in sight to pass behind it. It was then that they requested visual separation.
 
No, watch it again. While it was initially called out to them when it was crossing the Wilson Bridge (about 4-5 miles south of where they collided), ATC asked them when they were very close if they had it in sight to pass behind it. It was then that they requested visual separation.
DCA LC: PAT two five traffic just south of the Wilson Bridge is a C-R-J one thousand two hundred feet circling runway three three.

PAT25: PAT two five has the traffic in sight request visual separation.
 
Now, it was insanity to fly on goggles in that environment. The route and conflict with other aircraft was unsafe.

Politics basically got a bunch of people killed.

Although the amount of vertical separation between fixed wing aircraft on short final, and the published rotary route was terribly tight, having the entire crew wearing NVG's made it super dangerous.

Politics was only a casual factor many years ago when the routes were created. IMO, the use of NVG's and allowing visual separations that close to a busy commercial airport while flying that route was very bad Army policy. Training flights, or not.
 
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