Amazon Freighter Runway Overrun, Fire, MIA, 9/6

Kenny Phillips

Final Approach
Joined
Jul 29, 2018
Messages
6,572
Display Name
Kenny Phillips
A pretty good plume of smoke, could be a tire fire, or worse.
Edit: looks under control. Almost skidded up to the Amazon warehouse.
Airport currently closed.
 
Last edited:
ADS-B data points approach/landing to runway 30 at 1753Z:

Crossing Dolphin Expressway (SR836): 183 kts, -1800 fpm

Crossing runway 30/27 (~threshold): 178 kts, -1200 fpm

Runway 30/T: 175 kts, -770 fpm

Runway 30/Y: 166 kts

Runway 30/JJ (~midfield): 155 kts

Runway 30 end: 118 kts

METAR KMIA 061753Z 19017G26KT 10SM TS SCT020CB BKN048 BKN150 BKN250 30/22 A2994 RMK AO2 PK WND 18026/1752 WSHFT 1737 SLP137 TSB12 OCNL LTGICCG E-S TS E-S MOV E CB DSNT NW
 
ADS-B data points approach/landing to runway 30 at 1753Z:

Crossing Dolphin Expressway (SR836): 183 kts, -1800 fpm

Crossing runway 30/27 (~threshold): 178 kts, -1200 fpm

Runway 30/T: 175 kts, -770 fpm

Runway 30/Y: 166 kts

Runway 30/JJ (~midfield): 155 kts

Runway 30 end: 118 kts

METAR KMIA 061753Z 19017G26KT 10SM TS SCT020CB BKN048 BKN150 BKN250 30/22 A2994 RMK AO2 PK WND 18026/1752 WSHFT 1737 SLP137 TSB12 OCNL LTGICCG E-S TS E-S MOV E CB DSNT NW

Wow... added some extra knots landing in this gusty crosswind for Mom, Dad, Grandma, his first born and the Church Choir....
 
Seriously… As a professional pilot, when are people going to start doing better? That’s a serious question!

I think it’s time to start profiling pilots as well. I’d love to see the data on age, time in industry, etc on these accidents that are pilot error. I couldn’t care any less about the Juan videos etc.

There is a systematic problem and I have an idea about it but I’m curious on the data, all of the data. 91, 135, & 121.
 
If the wind report is accurate, they are within the 767-300's limitations with less than a 9kt tailwind gusts and a less than 25kt crosswind gust.

Was a landing on 12 unavailable due to storms on 12's final?
 
Seriously… As a professional pilot, when are people going to start doing better? That’s a serious question!

There is a systematic problem…
When they are appropriately trained, experienced, and practice better judgement. There is nothing confusing about the criteria to go-around, and in this case it was “go around!”. The ADSB data shows they were smoking fast before touchdown. There is a runway-side video that was taken. Are the pickings that slim that a pilot flying a 767 can’t figure out they are about to botch this landing? Yes, it’s a systemic problem.
 
As a reference, the preceding aircraft, AAL2947 (B738), crossed SR836 at 159 kts and exited runway 30 at Q2.
 
Interesting
 

Attachments

  • 111084491-16109917-An_Amazon_plane_crashed_in_Miami_Sunday-m-22_1788721646208.jpg
    111084491-16109917-An_Amazon_plane_crashed_in_Miami_Sunday-m-22_1788721646208.jpg
    37.6 KB · Views: 58
  • IMG_0146_jpeg-3823348.jpeg
    IMG_0146_jpeg-3823348.jpeg
    276.8 KB · Views: 59
When they are appropriately trained, experienced, and practice better judgement. There is nothing confusing about the criteria to go-around, and in this case it was “go around!”. The ADSB data shows they were smoking fast before touchdown. There is a runway-side video that was taken. Are the pickings that slim that a pilot flying a 767 can’t figure out they are about to botch this landing? Yes, it’s a systemic problem.

Let’s talk about this…..

I think the statement about experienced is BS…. Trained yes….

After seeing the video, I further confirm what I am thinking. Someone needed to be calling a go around, actually both. It would be nice to know if a video of this weeks Excel video existed…. Without a thermal runaway of some device on board or a gun against your head, again, no reason to come across a 1/2 mile final at 200+ knots…

We have a systematic culture problem…
 
Disclaimer- I know very little about commercial turbines in general...
But I do know what thrust reversers are, and even after WOW towards the end of the video above, I do not see them deployed?

21 Air LLC, the operator of the flight, has taken down their website with just a note about the mishap.
 
There’s a level of experience necessary to absorb the training, and that level has decreased dramatically in the last 10 years among the pilots I see.

Meh….

I’m 50/50 on that.

I do agree to a point, but I also think it’s not younger pilots stuffing these planes by the majority. There is also not a safety culture with most operators. Just because you get an emailed or pass a poster about safety on the way to the bathroom doesn’t equal culture.
 
But I do know what thrust reversers are, and even after WOW towards the end of the video above, I do not see them deployed?
Assuming that the 767 and 757 air/ground sensing systems are similar, the 2010 AAL2253 Jackson Hole overrun report provides a description of the 757 air/ground sensing system and its relationship to the thrust reverser and auto spoiler deployment. With the 757, ground mode requires both MLG to be sensed as on the ground based on MLG bogey tilt. Without ground mode, there can be no thrust reverser deployment and no auto spoiler deployment. If intermittent ground mode triggers auto spoiler deployment, the spoilers will auto retract if ground mode transitions back to air.
 
i have no conformation but its reported that they touched down 6000ft down the runway. from the posted video i doubt that, it looks like they were down by the blast fence and thats at taxiway y. but turbine traveller's video shows them somewhere between Y and JJ. that pretty far down.
 
Last edited:
My guess would have been ABX/ATI since they're the primary for the Borg last time I check, but I forgot about 21 Air. Scheds are a peach at all those outfits, on the work/life front. At some point the "homebasing" pitch becomes a pyrrich victory.
 
Last edited:
Meh….

I’m 50/50 on that.

I do agree to a point, but I also think it’s not younger pilots stuffing these planes by the majority. There is also not a safety culture with most operators. Just because you get an emailed or pass a poster about safety on the way to the bathroom doesn’t equal culture.
I agree about safety culture, but also keep in mind that hours in the logbook and experience that allows learning don’t necessarily go hand in hand. I’ve seen some pretty experienced pilots bust recurrent checkrides due to multiple unsat tasks. But the operator is, for lack of a better term, stuck with the pilot for various reasons. Which, of course, DOES go straight back to safety culture.

It’s all pretty intermingled.
 
i have no conformation but its reported that they touched down 6000ft down the runway. from the posted video i doubt that, it looks like they were down by the blast fence and thats at taxiway y. but turbine traveller's video shows them somewhere between Y and JJ. that pretty far down.
As it would be if they crossed the threshold at 178 knots.
 
Crossing runway 30/27 (~threshold): 178 kts, -1200 fpm

Runway 30/T: 175 kts, -770 fpm
That seems WAY too fast. Dunno what their Vref was, but I'd guess they're at least 40 knots fast there. Can't do that in a jet.

Seriously… As a professional pilot, when are people going to start doing better? That’s a serious question!

I think it’s time to start profiling pilots as well. I’d love to see the data on age, time in industry, etc on these accidents that are pilot error. I couldn’t care any less about the Juan videos etc.

There is a systematic problem and I have an idea about it but I’m curious on the data, all of the data. 91, 135, & 121.
This. And the real thing I want to see is whether they were hired in the 2022-23 timeframe where you could get a job at an airline if you could fog a mirror. I know someone who made it to the right seat of a 787 at a major just 4.5 years from their private pilot checkride.

Yes, they all had to pass the training, but were any standards relaxed to make sure they had butts in seats? Probably. Are the lesser-known cargo carriers going to generally have pilots with less experience and/or more violations/failures/etc than the big guys? Also probably yes. Do ALL pilots tend to attempt to land instead of going around more than they should? Yep. Put it all together, and this is what we get.
 
"It's also my opinion based on the landing video, both pilots should be brought up on manslaughter charges. "

From another blog: Would this ever factor in such a crash as this? Also I feel the weather played no part in this crash. Thunderstorms in the area and sudden winds shifts are a daily occurrence in the summer time in Florida. Aircraft land every day in these conditions.
 
That seems WAY too fast. Dunno what their Vref was, but I'd guess they're at least 40 knots fast there. Can't do that in a jet.
Vref ~141 knots at Flaps 30, IIRC. Maybe 145kts true airspeed due to the temperature. Add in an additive for the gusts--5kts in calm conditions, which it wasn't. Add the 9kt tailwind component. Add possible higher gusts. Then ADSB data may add +/- 2-5kts of uncertainty.

May, or may not, have exceeded stabilized approach criteria. Don't know what they use for airspeed tolerance at 21 Air. Could easily be -5/+15kts from Vtarget for stabilized approach criteria. Need the DFDR data to know for sure. In those condition, nothing is particularly stable, anyway--even in a heavy. Airspeed is bouncing around a good bit.

I've been flying 737s for over a decade. My record on them is a Vtarget of 165KIAS. That was for Runway 29 at EWR. I didn't fly the 767 long enough to remember what was typical.
 
That seems WAY too fast. Dunno what their Vref was, but I'd guess they're at least 40 knots fast there. Can't do that in a jet.


This. And the real thing I want to see is whether they were hired in the 2022-23 timeframe where you could get a job at an airline if you could fog a mirror. I know someone who made it to the right seat of a 787 at a major just 4.5 years from their private pilot checkride.

Yes, they all had to pass the training, but were any standards relaxed to make sure they had butts in seats? Probably. Are the lesser-known cargo carriers going to generally have pilots with less experience and/or more violations/failures/etc than the big guys? Also probably yes. Do ALL pilots tend to attempt to land instead of going around more than they should? Yep. Put it all together, and this is what we get.

So I own a flight school, and, am a 91 corporate pilot flying jets.

My thoughts are, while, yes several hired in the last 5 years could be questionable, I also think they may be some of the safest. Again, NOT a blanket statement and we have many in the industry that are great mentors and educators.

However I’ve seen many times the fact you have someone under 40 questioning a “captain” over 45/50 and they either stay quite or say something and get squashed, and if you think it’s not real, you’re part of the problem.

It’s no different with all these GA insurance forms and quotes either. That system is broken too. While I’m at it, toss the unions too…. :)
 
However I’ve seen many times the fact you have someone under 40 questioning a “captain” over 45/50 and they either stay quite or say something and get squashed, and if you think it’s not real, you’re part of the problem.
Are you referring to 91 or 121 ops?
That system is broken too. While I’m at it, toss the unions too…. :)
What unions, and what part do they play?
 
You can see them push over in a very vain attempt to to get on deck. It seems clear they knew it was bad.

And it’s Miami, not some rinky dink small field.

No way they met stable approach criteria. Bad sight pic, kinda assuming they were idle (if not, it’s even worse than it seems), at that speed VSI gotta be out of limits, way above ref, not on deck in the landing area, spoilers didn’t deploy (kinda affirming the not yet landed)… it’s a sextafecta of BAD.

They had to be so far into startle response mode that hypothesizing about anything is fruitless.

How they got there… my guess bad training?
 
Vref ~141 knots at Flaps 30, IIRC. Maybe 145kts true airspeed due to the temperature. Add in an additive for the gusts--5kts in calm conditions, which it wasn't. Add the 9kt tailwind component. Add possible higher gusts. Then ADSB data may add +/- 2-5kts of uncertainty.

May, or may not, have exceeded stabilized approach criteria. Don't know what they use for airspeed tolerance at 21 Air. Could easily be -5/+15kts from Vtarget for stabilized approach criteria. Need the DFDR data to know for sure. In those condition, nothing is particularly stable, anyway--even in a heavy. Airspeed is bouncing around a good bit.

I've been flying 737s for over a decade. My record on them is a Vtarget of 165KIAS. That was for Runway 29 at EWR. I didn't fly the 767 long enough to remember what was typical.

Thanks for sharing that. Good insight from someone with experience in heavies.

I'm a bit surprised at the runway assignment given the reported weather conditions. Also, I'm not sure I've EVER used RW30 at MIA, not that it means much given I fly bizjets (we are nearly always given 8L/26R or 8R/26L.) A couple of years back we had a crew at my operation refuse a runway at TEB based on the METAR issued just prior to starting the approach - for tailwinds. ATC was initially annoyed, but eventually switched them from RW24 to RW19.
 
Let’s talk about this…..

I think the statement about experienced is BS…. Trained yes….

After seeing the video, I further confirm what I am thinking. Someone needed to be calling a go around, actually both. It would be nice to know if a video of this weeks Excel video existed…. Without a thermal runaway of some device on board or a gun against your head, again, no reason to come across a 1/2 mile final at 200+ knots…

We have a systematic culture problem…
In my opinion training and experience does not fix this kind of flagrant error……ADM, common sense , responsibility , professionalism does! Same applies to ATP, Commercial and PPL pilots in a 767 or 152!
 
You bring up a valid point. Ironically, it’s HR that hires you, having no idea how to screen for that.

What they do screen for is your likelihood to just follow procedure, which of course they didn’t.

So now it becomes a question of why not? Poor ADM? Poor training? Were they in startle response mode?

Of course more experience does reduce the odds of startle response…

How does one ascertain someone’s ADM if they lack experience?

It’s a very complicated simple question. Airlines try to get around this by making sure you are compulsive, and compliant, and just follow their rules which will preclude this (hopefully).

My guess at “training” was oversimplified. A better answer is what in that system’s process allowed these pilots ignore such a flagrant violation? Or what in their screening allowed pilots that simply couldn’t see that developing?

The easiest flying I’ve done in my entire life is this. It’s SO structured you don’t ever get experience outside “perfect”. Maybe that’s the problem?
 
"It's also my opinion based on the landing video, both pilots should be brought up on manslaughter charges. "

From another blog: Would this ever factor in such a crash as this? Also I feel the weather played no part in this crash. Thunderstorms in the area and sudden winds shifts are a daily occurrence in the summer time in Florida. Aircraft land every day in these conditions.
Too high.
Too fast.
Too far down the (WET) runway.
From data points and video evidence (not to mention flight recorders yet to be examined) looks like gross negligence to me.

I wonder if the cockpit voice recordings will eventually be made public...
 
I am going to cut those pilots some slack.



Amazon coming back from Puerto Rico, is going to be near or totally empty of cargo and fuel.

A string off LOADED airliners made successful transits through the weather, and landed = Peer pressure.

The G forces the pilots of the empty plane endured going through the thunderstorm could have been more than twice what the aircrews ahead of them endured

Those passenger plane pilots were PROBABLY more experienced, and better trained in the aircraft they were flying.

The Amazon pilots were probably not aware of the safety interlocks that prevented thrust reverser deployment until landing gear signaled all wheels firmly on the ground.

The lift killing slats have similar safety interlocks, and did not deploy. I suspect that both were selected.

At their speed, and empty, they did not have both gear loaded at the same time until the runway ran out.



From our armchairs, clearly they should have gone around, been vectored to a holding pattern until they could be fitted back in the approach flow. If their pre landing brief included an assessment of fuel remaining, there may have been a strong incentive to get it on the ground, full reverse thrust, slats, and max brakes.



With both reversers and slats selected, they may have feared an even worse outcome if a go around was attempted.

With the “Unstable” approach documented by the ADSB, they were well beaten up, and may have been near wings level most of that time. They would have had an understandable desire to get on the ground.



I have been in a Super Constellation airliner which flew through a violent thunderstorm, and watched the wings flap up and down, when that was the largest airliner flying. When we deplaned, the Captain was not at the traditional location at the door, thanking us for flying with him and his airline (Delta).


If no one died, this would not be such a tough outcome.
 
Yea like it never rains in Miami.
Juan will berate them on un stabilized approach if that’s what it is.
Within minutes of the event. Those guys must monitor the news continuously in hopes of being the first to get a video out.
 
Within minutes of the event. Those guys must monitor the news continuously in hopes of being the first to get a video out.
Is Juan the guy with the epaulettes and ID / security tags on a neck lanyard?
 
That's "Captain" Steve.
I have to wonder if he doesn't feel the least bit silly putting on that costume. My uniform got hung up permanently the day I retired. 33 years was enough.
 
Back
Top