Amazon Freighter Runway Overrun, Fire, MIA, 9/6

Tools said:
Seems the strongest case is culture… you know, those phone calls that never actually happen….

If it’s true he was actually observed thinking more about his career than anything else… the answer is sitting right there in plain sight.

More concerned about (at least what he perceived as) career consequences than crashing. I’m also guessing he’s experienced more career consequences than crashing consequences.
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I’d agree as well…there’s a big difference in my mind between your mind focusing on whether your career is over for busting a type ride (it was a big concern for the last person who busted a type ride with me, apparently) vs for an accident that results in multiple deaths as this seems.
 
And there is a great example of a cultural “thing”….

Keep lowering the standards (because as mentioned, not great correlation).

Destroys trust in “the system”

Practically encourages a normalization of deviance.
 
FlightmechH3 said:
It's interesting that the Navy P8 overrun in Hawaii in 2023 has been buried. Zero report and the aircraft was scrapped.

Also the Toronto crash. 20 months later and no findings. Outright refusal of Canada and Delta to release anything.

Why the coverups?
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I guess we're completely done discussing the actual topic of this thread.
 
Tell us more about wires.


Some military officers are somewhat aggressive at achieving the GOAL, whatever it might be.

One November morning, the fog was like a sea of milk, and the army school bus drove at about 5 miles an hour to the airport. We followed the sidewalk to the door, and soon a guy with 2 follow my flashlights lined us up, warned us to stay very close to the soldier in front of us, or we would be lost.
Out on the apron, he followed various painted lines until we arrived at the nose of an airliner, passed close to the hull to the steps to the door, and loaded up.
Once seated, a discussion became heated, 2 engines, or 4? Through the windows, only one each side could be seen, I voted 4, since this was a transatlantic flight.

After 4 were confirmed by the startup, the follow me guy walked just below the Captain's window, and led us out to the correct runway, and aligned us exactly straiht. Suddenly, edge lights appeared, as the tower raised them to maximum brilliance, the 4 big radials of the C54 came up to full roar, and soon we rotated, committed to flight.

Loosing 1 engine was fairly common in the '50's.
Loosing 2 fairly rare.
2 engines on the same side, half that often, and touch and go if your load was light enough to climb at all.
If that clearly finite chance caught us, no way to return to this airport.

The Captain clearly felt that maintaining the schedule was more important than avoiding the risk, and the FO did not veto the decision, so we went.

We popped out at just 10 feet or so below the top of the Eifel Tower, the only speck of color around us.

They were clearly more skilled in the plane that we were flying than the Miami crew. If I had had my Instrument rating then, I would have been lost in the fog near the terminal, and missed that flight.


A C 47 I crossed the North Sea in, I noticed oil flowing out of the nacelle of the left engine, reported it to the pilot, he sent the flight engineer to verify the rate of loss. The engine was feathered while oil pressure was available, the other engine adjusted to max continuous, and everyone donned poopy suits, parachutes, and life jackets. We flew at a constant rate of descent all the way to the runway. The Captain had called for an escort plane to circle if we did splash down, and was prepared to restart and sacrifice the low oil engine to make it to shore.

A very different approach to risk.


Military pilots are necessarily accustomed to more risk than civilian pilots, so the question, What wires is relevant to our understanding of this pilots risk tolerance.
 
Velocity173 said:
The Captain in question actually has a history with wires. ;) I’m sure the NTSB won’t go back that far into his records though. That’s even if they still exist.
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You jest, but there's always [email protected] if you know that much, and feel that strongly about your former peer/co-worker's purported below average hands, as it may relate to the negligent death of 5 innocent bystanders.

That out of the way, we don't want to throw the baby out with the bathwater here. There's already a reputational history with .mil rotor guys making civilian transitions to turbine commercial fixed wing; I think it is important to isolate this case study so people don't go fanning that flame more than it needs to. Personally, I'd de-emphasize the degree to which this guy was army rotor in a prior life, if there's enough degrees of separation between the time he last flew helos, and when he started slinging gear in civilian wagons. I think that would be in the interest of the industry as well.

Problem is the public record has been very opaque with the CA's background, admittedly. The FO we know it all pretty much. Pretty standard profile there. But the only thing we know about the CA is, according to some rando blurb on social media, supposedly he spent 15 years in the Army and "transitioned to commercial aviation in 2018". Of course, we don't know if that was to fly for one of the EMS operators like yours in a rotor wing capacity, or did he immediately pivot to fixed wing life.

If the latter, 2018 should be more than plenty of time for a mil rotor guy to cut his teeth in fixed wing, regardless of part-[whatever]. The 7k TT is meaningless without that context. We also don't even know if he was an SIC in the 76. 21 Air only flies 75/76s (unless that is a recent fleet change), and last I checked it was a common type minus differences-training. So if he wasn't typed on the 76 until May, then that could imply he was a direct entry hire? Point being, those are very different rabbit holes, which I think makes way more difference than whether he flew helicopters.

As to hiring histories, again there's no conspiracy there. Most reputable employers (and yes, I'm saying 21 Air isn't reputable) ask if .mil applicants were ever the subject of either 1) an accident investigation and/or 2) a flying board. So as far as 21 Air is concerned, unless the guy lied on his application and interview, it's on 21 Air to ask and establish a disclosure record before putting him in their seat, not the ARMY.
 
Larry in TN said:
Stabilized approach criteria procedures have evolved significantly over the past decades but there are still differences in the implementation and philosophy from airline to airline.

At my previous airlines, the reject gate was at 1,000' AFL. If you did not meet stabilized approach criteria at, or after, 1,000' AFL a go-around was mandatory and it was the pilot-monitoring's job to call for one if the pilot-flying did not do it on his own. This is also when the "Stable" call would be made verifying that the criteria was met.

At my current airline, there are three gates. Plan, Report, and Reject at 1,500', 1,000', and 500'.

At first, the lower reject seemed odd, but there's a good reason for it. The threat of non-compliance (not going around) when unstabil at the reject gate is what is being addressed. At 1,000', there is still plenty of time to fix small exceedances. Pilots develop a habit of intentional non-compliance at the 1,000' gate and that leads to there not really being a hard reject gate in practice.

My current company's system is to plan to be gear-down, speed 180kts, or less, by the plan gate. Fully configured, airspeed +15/-5 Vtgt, and on vertical and lateral profile with sustained vertical speed <= 1,200 fpm at the Report gate. If any parameter is not met, the PM calls out the deviation but the approach can continue. At the Reject gate, the PF calls out "Stable" or "Unstable, going around". If he does not, the PM calls, "Go-around, [reason]" i.e "Go-around, airspeed".

In my now over 11 years of using this system, I like it a lot better. It removes most of the intentional non-compliance on approaches that are still safe while emphasising the hard reject gate at a point when you really do need to go-around if unstable.
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Is this for VMC and IMC, or do the altitudes change when in IMC?
 
flyingron said:
Amazon would need to have been shown to exert some control (economic or otherwise) over 21 Air to be liable.
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I wonder what kind of "on time" or "early" incentives Amazon puts on companies like 21Air?

I'm sure it is going to all come out... Just wonder if we'll ever hear about it years from now when they go to court. That is IF they end up in an actual court room.
 
hindsight2020 said:
You jest, but there's always [email protected] if you know that much, and feel that strongly about your former peer/co-worker's purported below average hands, as it may relate to the negligent death of 5 innocent bystanders.

That out of the way, we don't want to throw the baby out with the bathwater here. There's already a reputational history with .mil rotor guys making civilian transitions to turbine commercial fixed wing; I think it is important to isolate this case study so people don't go fanning that flame more than it needs to. Personally, I'd de-emphasize the degree to which this guy was army rotor in a prior life, if there's enough degrees of separation between the time he last flew helos, and when he started slinging gear in civilian wagons. I think that would be in the interest of the industry as well.

Problem is the public record has been very opaque with the CA's background, admittedly. The FO we know it all pretty much. Pretty standard profile there. But the only thing we know about the CA is, according to some rando blurb on social media, supposedly he spent 15 years in the Army and "transitioned to commercial aviation in 2018". Of course, we don't know if that was to fly for one of the EMS operators like yours in a rotor wing capacity, or did he immediately pivot to fixed wing life.

If the latter, 2018 should be more than plenty of time for a mil rotor guy to cut his teeth in fixed wing, regardless of part-[whatever]. The 7k TT is meaningless without that context. We also don't even know if he was an SIC in the 76. 21 Air only flies 75/76s (unless that is a recent fleet change), and last I checked it was a common type minus differences-training. So if he wasn't typed on the 76 until May, then that could imply he was a direct entry hire? Point being, those are very different rabbit holes, which I think makes way more difference than whether he flew helicopters.

As to hiring histories, again there's no conspiracy there. Most reputable employers (and yes, I'm saying 21 Air isn't reputable) ask if .mil applicants were ever the subject of either 1) an accident investigation and/or 2) a flying board. So as far as 21 Air is concerned, unless the guy lied on his application and interview, it's on 21 Air to ask and establish a disclosure record before putting him in their seat, not the ARMY.
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Well it’s actually kind of a humorous story but it’s not relevant so I won’t go into details. I’m sure his Army background will eventually get out.

I will say I never really cared for the guy though. Few other friends texted me recently and stated the same. Been 25 years but as I recall, he wasn’t exactly a stand out. Like a lot of warrant I knew, some only concentrated on building hours and getting a high paying civ job. Outside the cockpit, they did the bare mins. Typical warrant officer meme you read about.

I was never asked about military accidents in my current job. While I disclosed one, it wasn’t necessary. All they wanted to know were any FAA accidents. PRIA stuff.
 
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The CVR on this accident (MIA) has been released just 6 days after the accident , whereas in the case of the Citation crash accident at Laredo on June this year has not -as far as I know-; Does any one has an idea why?
The B767 was part 121 (5 dead, 5 injured) and the Citation part 91 (1 dead , 3 injured), maybe this is why?
 
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M20K said:
I wonder what kind of "on time" or "early" incentives Amazon puts on companies like 21Air?

I'm sure it is going to all come out... Just wonder if we'll ever hear about it years from now when they go to court. That is IF they end up in an actual court room.
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An incentive isnt likely to do it. Now if they made the actual contract contingent on some schedule not safely meetable, that may work.
 
Larry in TN said:
At my current airline, there are three gates. Plan, Report, and Reject at 1,500', 1,000', and 500'.

At first, the lower reject seemed odd, but there's a good reason for it. The threat of non-compliance (not going around) when unstabil at the reject gate is what is being addressed. At 1,000', there is still plenty of time to fix small exceedances. Pilots develop a habit of intentional non-compliance at the 1,000' gate and that leads to there not really being a hard reject gate in practice.

My current company's system is to plan to be gear-down, speed 180kts, or less, by the plan gate. Fully configured, airspeed +15/-5 Vtgt, and on vertical and lateral profile with sustained vertical speed <= 1,200 fpm at the Report gate. If any parameter is not met, the PM calls out the deviation but the approach can continue. At the Reject gate, the PF calls out "Stable" or "Unstable, going around". If he does not, the PM calls, "Go-around, [reason]" i.e "Go-around, airspeed".

In my now over 11 years of using this system, I like it a lot better. It removes most of the intentional non-compliance on approaches that are still safe while emphasising the hard reject gate at a point when you really do need to go-around if unstable.
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Yes! That's the way it should be.

Larry in TN said:
I don't get the referrence.
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"Jerry" is Jerry Wagner, of Air Wagner YouTube channel where he infamously hit minimums on one approach and said he was "proceeding to secondary minimums". He frequently does some exceptionally dangerous stuff, laughs it off like it's nothing, and then quickly deletes the video when he's called out on it. Things like 60-degree-bank turns to final at maybe 100 AGL. And this is in a 421.

I'll put it this way, NorCal Approach controllers know his tail number and make extra sure they're using standard phraseology because they're pretty sure that eventually they're going to be in a transcript on an NTSB report. That's how bad he is.
 
flyingcheesehead said:
Yes! That's the way it should be.


"Jerry" is Jerry Wagner, of Air Wagner YouTube channel where he infamously hit minimums on one approach and said he was "proceeding to secondary minimums". He frequently does some exceptionally dangerous stuff, laughs it off like it's nothing, and then quickly deletes the video when he's called out on it. Things like 60-degree-bank turns to final at maybe 100 AGL. And this is in a 421.

I'll put it this way, NorCal Approach controllers know his tail number and make extra sure they're using standard phraseology because they're pretty sure that eventually they're going to be in a transcript on an NTSB report. That's how bad he is.
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Yeah I’m honestly surprised that dude is still alive.
 
Larry in TN said:
The CVR has not, and will not, be released. A full transcript will be released in the final report. All we have so far is a few of the relevant items transcribed from the CVR and DFDR released.
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I meant a transcript of the CVR contents ……
 
GLMS_NC said:
I'm sure the contract between 21Air and Amazon is tight and Amazon has zero responsibility. Much like regionals have with the big carriers. Mary Schiavo has covered this topic thoroughly. Her example was the Colgan Air accident where Colgan got pinned for everything.
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Lost me at Mary Schiavo.
 
bonefishpete said:
Air worthy cargo planes probably in short supply versus passenger jets.
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The planes that 21 Air is no longer flying will be transferred/leased to the new operators. Happens all too often in the ACMI world.

Cesarmx said:
I meant a transcript of the CVR contents ……
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It will be in the final report. For now, we just get excerpts.
 
Omalley1537 said:
Lost me at Mary Schiavo.
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Scary Mary. And Colgan was a shiatshow long before they were allied with any particular airline. I was based at HEF during most of their run. Their ascension into the regional airline was just the culmination of their incompetence. Back when they were flying piston twins, old man Colgan would berate his pilots for "tankering fuel" resulting in a few fuel exhaustion accidents, etc...
 
Larry in TN said:
The planes that 21 Air is no longer flying will be transferred/leased to the new operators. Happens all too often in the ACMI world.
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And it really sucks to be their pilots. Not only are they going to be suddenly jobless, but the last line on their resumes will be with an operator that most other carriers are going to assume has a terrible safety culture and bad training. That doesn't automatically make them bad pilots, but it would take extra effort to train it out of them.
 
geezer said:
Tell us more about wires.


Some military officers are somewhat aggressive at achieving the GOAL, whatever it might be.

One November morning, the fog was like a sea of milk, and the army school bus drove at about 5 miles an hour to the airport. We followed the sidewalk to the door, and soon a guy with 2 follow my flashlights lined us up, warned us to stay very close to the soldier in front of us, or we would be lost.
Out on the apron, he followed various painted lines until we arrived at the nose of an airliner, passed close to the hull to the steps to the door, and loaded up.
Once seated, a discussion became heated, 2 engines, or 4? Through the windows, only one each side could be seen, I voted 4, since this was a transatlantic flight.

After 4 were confirmed by the startup, the follow me guy walked just below the Captain's window, and led us out to the correct runway, and aligned us exactly straiht. Suddenly, edge lights appeared, as the tower raised them to maximum brilliance, the 4 big radials of the C54 came up to full roar, and soon we rotated, committed to flight.

Loosing 1 engine was fairly common in the '50's.
Loosing 2 fairly rare.
2 engines on the same side, half that often, and touch and go if your load was light enough to climb at all.
If that clearly finite chance caught us, no way to return to this airport.

The Captain clearly felt that maintaining the schedule was more important than avoiding the risk, and the FO did not veto the decision, so we went.

We popped out at just 10 feet or so below the top of the Eifel Tower, the only speck of color around us.

They were clearly more skilled in the plane that we were flying than the Miami crew. If I had had my Instrument rating then, I would have been lost in the fog near the terminal, and missed that flight.


A C 47 I crossed the North Sea in, I noticed oil flowing out of the nacelle of the left engine, reported it to the pilot, he sent the flight engineer to verify the rate of loss. The engine was feathered while oil pressure was available, the other engine adjusted to max continuous, and everyone donned poopy suits, parachutes, and life jackets. We flew at a constant rate of descent all the way to the runway. The Captain had called for an escort plane to circle if we did splash down, and was prepared to restart and sacrifice the low oil engine to make it to shore.

A very different approach to risk.


Military pilots are necessarily accustomed to more risk than civilian pilots, so the question, What wires is relevant to our understanding of this pilots risk tolerance.
Click to expand...

I think some of this might just have been differences between flying in the 50's, and a much more heavily regulated world of aviation today. I know the USN/USMC mishap record was about 1000x what it is now, annually, back then. Less so for scheduled airlines, but even into the 1990s, we were losing a lot of loaded passenger jets every decade compared to now. What I will say about that timeframe, with regard to military flying, was an anecdote my dad had. He was a new active duty pilot in the late 1950s, and he said that there were still a number of old WWII vet pilots who were in the ranks, and that those guys were pretty unpredictable and wild. Like smelling like booze in the morning mostly, kinda wild. I'm sure they did plenty of things that were so far out of anyone's peacetime comfort zone while flying in the war, that everything else seemed silly. Point being, I think things have changed a great deal since the time you describe. At least in my experience flying in a uniform/mil flight suit for quite a long time now.
 
Larry in TN said:
The planes that 21 Air is no longer flying will be transferred/leased to the new operators. Happens all too often in the ACMI world.


It will be in the final report. For now, we just get excerpts.
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It's certainly not here in the prelim but they did say a CVR group would produce it in the "near future". Something changed. But the report has some clarifications of what happened in the charts. One thing that stands out is continuous 1 dot high GS deviation approaching 1600 where most likely the GS hadn't been captured and the autopilot leveled off and added power.
 
JimLAFB said:
It's certainly not here in the prelim but they did say a CVR group would produce it in the "near future". Something changed. But the report has some clarifications of what happened in the charts. One thing that stands out is continuous 1 dot high GS deviation approaching 1600 where most likely the GS hadn't been captured and the autopilot leveled off and added power.
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The climb occurred very, very close to, if not within, the thunderstorm cell that developed near the final approach fix. However, the data seem to indicate that were already following the GS well prior to that point, albeit fast and about a half-dot high.

I also noticed that the groundspeed and airspeed converged just before they began the pull-up maneuver, with minimum differential at 13:51:20, as the pull-up maneuver began. It stayed fairly close during the pull-up, then diverged again on short final as the vertical speed peaked and began reversing. Could be indication errors, but I find that interesting. The beginning of the pull-up was also the point where they selected flaps 15.

Almost 7.5° nose-down at one point - that’d be a sight picture.
 
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