Air India 787 Crashes in Western India

What? I'm trying to figure out what any of that has to do with anything I wrote, what the Max problems could possibly have to do with this accident, what the landing gear has to do with the fuel switches, and what a pilot's nationality has to do with absolutely anything at all.
Yeah, yeah . . . but . . . was Mars ascending or descending through Gemini . . .?
 
There was only one engine at issue there... And I think that any additional safety systems should defer to the pilots when it comes to shutting off fuel to the first engine. The computers don't need to start thinking about it until the pilots try to shut off two engines, or all engines with thrust.
My example certainly isn't perfect, it's only loosely related to the subject.

I think the issue with tasking software to make decisions, and your statement exemplifies, is that there is an almost endless decision tree present in all attempts to develop an electronic hierarchy which will successfully filter out nefarious actions from highly unusual situations best left to the humans at the controls.

A committee tasked with developing the autonomous monster will come up with neverending what ifs, and in the end the complexities of the supposed solution will provide more dangers rather than reducing them.

It goes against human nature to stand back and observe that a one in a billion event that resulted in a human cost might not need to be suffocated. But it's a worthwhile consideration.
 
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If software always filters the pilots' input in this plane, and manuals recommend never to decrease power below 400' why did the software, in takeoff configuration, allow for two engines to be shut off on purpose or inadvertently, below this altitude?

I don't think Boeing is off the hook as you believe. On a $300M plane I would expect a FADEC software instruction such as:

-If on takeoff configuration and altitude below 400', then disallow input from cockpit to shut engines down.
-Display failure on EICAS along WITH message for automatic override.

In other words, they recommend actions but don't implement these in their FADEC software? We're talking 5 lines of code that could have saved hundreds of lives if this in fact was the cause of the accident.
What happens when you need to shutdown an engine and the software won’t let you?

At some point there has to be a pilot in the design. Your thought process would lead to pilotless aircraft.
 
What happens when you need to shutdown an engine and the software won’t let you?

At some point there has to be a pilot in the design. Your thought process would lead to pilotless aircraft.
I think about my new car and all the safety features to prevent me from running into anything - auto braking, for example. I joke, sort of, that “sometimes someone needs running over” and there needs to be a zombie apocalypse switch that overrides all s/w protections.

At some point you need to trust the PIC.
 
I think about my new car and all the safety features to prevent me from running into anything - auto braking, for example. I joke, sort of, that “sometimes someone needs running over” and there needs to be a zombie apocalypse switch that overrides all s/w protections.

At some point you need to trust the PIC.
I was just (kinda) thinking the same thing over the weekend while driving. Sometimes the emergency autobrake in newer vehicles ain't so bright. (please no derailing the topic...) For example when we first got our Tesla in 2019 it would slam on the brakes in the same spot (going 75 mph) and throw you into the belts. Even our newer Subaru occasionally is overly aggressive autobraking if the closing rate is too high on someone in front of you making a turn, that isn't even going to be close. Thankfully it's easy enough to override these.

The more automation-to-prevent-stupid-pilot-tricks we do with the already-complex systems in aircraft, the more software-induced incidents/accidents there'll be. Between faulty sensors and unforeseen use cases, **** will happen.

Anyway, I kinda agree: Occam's Razor here is pilot induced screwup, either intentionally or unintentionally. If unintentionally, that will be interesting to know if there _is_ some invalid muscle memory that came into play.
 
Thought it was a hammer, but well could have been an axe. Guy failed out of Navy flight training in Meridian, and then somehow made his way back to the majors on the civilian side. Well before my time, but I'd guess he had mental illness or at least personality problems dating back to him washing out of the Navy program.
You may be right about the hammer. It was a long time ago. Isn't there some type of heavy emergency hand tool kept in the cockpit of a large aircraft so the flight crew can bust their way out of the flight deck in case of a crash? Maybe it was that...
 
You may be right about the hammer. It was a long time ago. Isn't there some type of heavy emergency hand tool kept in the cockpit of a large aircraft so the flight crew can bust their way out of the flight deck in case of a crash? Maybe it was that...

Crash axe, but that wasn't used.
Boarding as a deadhead passenger, Calloway planned to hijack and crash the plane while disguising it as an accident, so his family would benefit from FedEx's life-insurance policy worth US$2.5 million (equivalent to $5.3 million in 2024). Calloway intended to murder the flight crew using blunt force. To accomplish this, he brought on board two claw hammers, two club hammers, a speargun, and a knife (which was not used) concealed inside a guitar case.
 
My example certainly isn't perfect, it's only loosely related to the subject.

I think the issue with tasking software to make decisions, and your statement exemplifies, is that there is an almost endless decision tree present in all attempts to develop an electronic hierarchy which will successfully filter out nefarious actions from highly unusual situations best left to the humans at the controls.

First of all, I agree 100% with this. Secondly, the mental gymnastics going on throughout these 22 pages, and the evolution of such, has been interesting:

"This was most likely caused by an unknown software anomaly that shut the engines down, and Boeing engineers screwed up"

Learns that there in fact isn't a software feature that contributed or could contribute to an automatic shutdown

"Well then Boeing should have engineered that feature into the software!!! THIS IS 2025!!!! It's their fault the crew was able to do this!!!!"
 
The Captain. Maybe working for the airlines for 15,000+ hours of flight time drove him to depression? And the doctors with help from Big Pharma cleared it up? /Sarc
 
I've been watching this string quietly, thinking, "depression". I think every one of the STRIDENT Gripers, that "FAA psychiatry is too long and too difficult" needs to read this string. EVERYONE of these "wingnuts...unless proven not"....needs to appreciate the difficutly we have with detection and monitoring and the consequences when we fail at that (and I"m not saying this is, but IMO the Indian State aeromedical...well leaves something to be improved. I daresay, it's nowhere near as rigorous as ours.

You know who you wingnuts are:
"But that's not me"
"But I'm fine"
"FAA is so unfair. It takes wayyy to long".
"False diagnosis of Bipolar"
"Unfairly denied"

Maybe so but the process of "demonstrate your assertions" and "getting it right" just isn't quick, cheap, nor easy.

We lost all hands save one. Remember that then next time we lose 241 lives.
 
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all due respect theres a difference between an atp pilot flying hundreds of passengers and a ga pilot in a four seat airplane. moreover all of these suicide/homicide by pilot attemps of successes. egypt air. german wings the nutter on mushrooms likely air india are professional pilots flying huge aircraft.
 
all due respect theres a difference between an atp pilot flying hundreds of passengers and a ga pilot in a four seat airplane. moreover all of these suicide/homicide by pilot attemps of successes. egypt air. german wings the nutter on mushrooms likely air india are professional pilots flying huge aircraft.
Of course. But we have the "one airspace one standard" philosophy promoted by ALPA, and you can do a lotta damage even in a 707 (KC 135) being flow third class. Travolta was a good example.

The wing nutters need to "get" why FAA has the attitude, "If we can't tell...you're not a gonna PIC".
Until we have weight limits by class (do you hear anyone promoting that?) it's going to remain tough....and this isn't a gonna help.
A suicide is a suicide if that's what it is. The wingnuts (until proven not) get to complain all they want but the agency ain't-a'gonna do it if they can't reasonably tell.
 
Got to be a way to keep the people out of the cockpit who shouldn’t be there and still have a responsive, reasonable, timely system.

Actually, the less clunky and bureaucratic things are usually lead to better results.
 
First of all, I agree 100% with this. Secondly, the mental gymnastics going on throughout these 22 pages, and the evolution of such, has been interesting:

"This was most likely caused by an unknown software anomaly that shut the engines down, and Boeing engineers screwed up"

Learns that there in fact isn't a software feature that contributed or could contribute to an automatic shutdown

"Well then Boeing should have engineered that feature into the software!!! THIS IS 2025!!!! It's their fault the crew was able to do this!!!!"
That was a rather amusing 180° turn, wasn't it?
 
Of course. But we have the "one airspace one standard" philosophy promoted by ALPA, and you can do a lotta damage even in a 707 (KC 135) being flow third class. Travolta was a good example.

The wing nutters need to "get" why FAA has the attitude, "If we can't tell...you're not a gonna PIC".
Until we have weight limits by class (do you hear anyone promoting that?) it's going to remain tough....and this isn't a gonna help.
A suicide is a suicide if that's what it is. The wingnuts (until proven not) get to complain all they want but the agency ain't-a'gonna do it if they can't reasonably tell.

On this note Doc, I'm interested if there has been any evolution in the FAA Medical outlook on psychiatry? Obviously some folks are psychologically incompatible with flying duties....no argument there. But we also have a culture (both in the FAA, as well as the military flying community) where any diagnosis, however treatable, is considered to be disqualifying. So folks just don't get the help they need. I'm less well versed on the civilian/FAA side, so maybe you can educate me if I'm off base. But at least on the mil side, no way is anyone voluntarily reporting something like depression or anxiety. Those folks could go med down for 6-12 months, get essentially preventative maintenance performed before they ever end up in crisis, and return to duty once they have recovered. Instead, folks hide what they might be going through, because they are afraid of being removed from the cockpit permanently with associated career ending impacts to boot. Good buddy of mine did this. This Jan 2nd was the first anniversary of his successful suicide. Come to think of it, he's maybe the 5th person I've known in this business who chose to not speak up, and battle his temporary demons alone.
 
Of course. But we have the "one airspace one standard" philosophy promoted by ALPA, and you can do a lotta damage even in a 707 (KC 135) being flow third class. [...]

Until we have weight limits by class (do you hear anyone promoting that?) it's going to remain tough....and this isn't a gonna help.
A suicide is a suicide if that's what it is.
Good points. However, I don't see how weight limits by medical class address this problem. All of the airliner psych-induced accidents were initiated by pilots with a Class 1, right?

Honestly, it appears to me (as someone with no medical training) that the screening methods used in the medical industry for these psych issues just aren't very reliable. Since they aren't reliable, FAAs approach is to just assume everyone is at risk until proven otherwise - at great expense to the individual.

So, how can the screening be improved?
 
Those investigating know who said what in that cockpit. There are CAM mics; release that info. Also, release the full CAM audio so we can hear the switch movement and/or other sounds.

Due to their culture they are holding back info. This is a difficult topic to discuss/review. What we do know is a human up front moved the switches and there were two people up there. This tragedy was pre-planned by one of them as they knew when to flip the switch, what to say, and when to flip them back. Orchestrated.

The "check switches" statement is to help satisfy the flying public.

Very sad event all around.
 
A lot of speculation that this was some type of murder/suicide and intentional act by one of the pilots. I don't think the current information confirms anything like that yet. All we know is what happened, someone turned off the fuel switches. We don't know the why. As I said in the other thread about suicide, it could have been a deliberate act, an accident, confusion, or just a plain ole brain fart. Anything more is just speculation.

Personally I think if one wanted to suicide an aircraft at takeoff, just shove the yoke forward and pin it. The other pilot wouldn't be able to react quickly enough to do anything.
 
Those investigating know who said what in that cockpit.
I suspect this is true (i.e., that the investigating team knows more than has been released). I had been having some trouble understanding the (albeit slight) delay in returning the fuel switches to "run", but one scenario has occurred to me (and I'm not saying this actually occurred) where the PM moved the switches to cutoff (either intentionally, accidentally or inadvertently) and it was up to the PF to notice the switches had been moved to "cutoff", process the shock of that (and maybe shock at a lack of action on the part of the PM to correct the problem) and then move the switches back to "run" -- all while still flying the plane (and probably contemplating the impending crash). Again, not saying this scenario is accurate -- but it would (in my mind) explain the timing of when the fuel switches were moved back to "run".
 
Those investigating know who said what in that cockpit. There are CAM mics; release that info. Also, release the full CAM audio so we can hear the switch movement and/or other sounds.

Due to their culture they are holding back info.
I don't think that has anything to do with culture. The NTSB doesn't release audio either. If you mean the transcript by mic, that's usually part of the docket later on but I don't think it is generally out by the time the prelim is out.
 
I for one would move this switches to the top panels but I don't fly jets so I don't know if that's reasonable. Or better yet the Genesis device on Star Trek II movie. LOL.

Like so many things these are reactive measures like making people take their shoes off at TSA checkpoints.
 
Those investigating know who said what in that cockpit.

That's a good point. A native speaker who knew both of them could easily distinguish the sound of their voices. Family members could also identify. I'm sure the investigators have done that.

Hearing the rest of the audio would not do the rest of us any good, though. If it starts looking like suicide, it will take over the internet. No reason to feed that ****storm with excessive public releases. There is such a thing as TMI.
 
Dan Gryder is doing more professional analyses now....he is wearing his uniform.
I hit "watch on YouTube", paused, and read the transcript so that nobody has to actually watch it.

Dan Gryder, wearing his captain uniform, thinks it was suicide by the left seater.
 
Like so many things these are reactive measures like making people take their shoes off at TSA checkpoints.
Which we don't even do any more (as of last week). https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&sou...MQFnoECDAQAQ&usg=AOvVaw3y-sfcWmYgSLkUNufwgiUi
That's a good point. A native speaker who knew both of them could easily distinguish the sound of their voices. Family members could also identify. I'm sure the investigators have done that.
There's no need. There are multiple audio tracks on the CVR recordings, so they know exactly who said what. No need to distinguish the sound of voices.
 
Believe it was the pilot who took time off for mental health.

Then again, will be clarified when they release that information.
 
This flight had two pilots. I presume you mean the Captain.
Yes, there are media reports that the captain had taken time off for mental health within the past few years. Depression, bereavement and a dad needing more care. I'm not linking because everything I've seen is from tabloid grade outlets. But I'm sure that's what people here are referencing.
 
This flight had two pilots. I presume you mean the Captain.
Yes. Left seat guy. Pilot vs CoPilot (right seat guy).

Could a guy who had to take time off for mental issues have done this on purpose? Yes. But it is also possible he didn't do it to end his life, but just made a mistake. If I had to bet, I wouldn't take the second possibility, but to be thorough need to examine and document that option. For example, maybe distracted easily because of mental issues. If so, maybe there are behaviors, speech patterns, etc. that can detect that state of mind before something bad happens?

Want to learn everything possible out of this tragedy.
 
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