Meridian helo down in the Hudson river.

Some of the speculation points at a failed tail rotor driveshaft flailing around and severing the tailboom. The main rotor then impacts the departing tailboom, and that combined with the unusual loads from flying sideways causes the transmission attachment structure to fail.

Don't know enough about the 206's airframe to have an opinion on the theory above, but figured it would be worth sharing.
Thing is, it sure looks like the tail boom separated after it went 90 degrees left. While both the 206 and the 407 have a 35 kt side limit for controllability reasons, at some point it becomes structural as well. I don’t believe for one second that a 206 tail boom could be brought broadside into roughly 90 kts of airflow without separating. Also if the tail rotor drive shaft failed, it wouldn’t sling the tail because you’d still have enough thrust from the vertical fin to keep trucking along. At 90 kts, the nose would cant to the right slightly but wouldn’t go that far out.
 
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The forces necessary to rip the mast deck from the fuselage seem to indicate a catastrophic transmission seizure. The torque imparted to the fuselage by that event could have caused the simultaneous tailboom failure.1000004472.png
 
The forces necessary to rip the mast deck from the fuselage seem to indicate a catastrophic transmission seizure. The torque imparted to the fuselage by that event could have caused the simultaneous tailboom failure.View attachment 139960

I take it that's the transmission under the blades mounted in that cradle?
Should be a shoe in to see if it is jammed?
 
As a transmission starts to fail the tendency is to continue to apply power which in reality is your only option…the incident I had where the transmission seized on the ground kind I was over torquing the aircraft at touchdown…as soon as power was removed it locked up…I had a chip light (second one as I was recovering the aircraft after a fuzz cleaning) but also noted the increase power required to keep the rotor spinning.
 
The forces necessary to rip the mast deck from the fuselage seem to indicate a catastrophic transmission seizure. The torque imparted to the fuselage by that event could have caused the simultaneous tailboom failure.
You'll find the explanation mentioned in Post 38 fits more to the sequence of events. With this particular model, there is typically not enough torque in the drivetrain to cause that type of failure sequence. However, while the 206 design is very bulletproof in normal ops, its does have certain weaknesses when forces and loads are applied to the MR system outside that envelope which has led to the similar deck failures, if that makes sense. Regardless, IMO the failure of the tailboom for whatever the reason what the incipient failure which led to the loss of the aircraft.
 
Very upsetting. The CEO needs to be held liable criminally. RIP.
 
I’m not disappointed with Juan because I don’t follow him, but the “kids, don’t just fly to 1500anywhere mantra was a bit disgusting in the delivery, even if the message was spot on.
While it might be nice to not hear that, he’s ****ed off about these pointless accidents and rules, from his perspective. He has freaking amazing content. If I sit thru a ****ty YouTube ad, he can put in his pitch if he wants to ;)
 
While it might be nice to not hear that, he’s ****ed off about these pointless accidents and rules, from his perspective. He has freaking amazing content. If I sit thru a ****ty YouTube ad, he can put in his pitch if he wants to ;)

Yeah; I’m a .mil guy. He can be perturbed, but he’s not the law and more importantly it’s not relevant to the mishap at hand. In that respect he’s no different than DG; clicks for tricks.
 
I had a look at the upper deck structure on a 206 today while visiting a hangar with a buddy who has extensive experience working on them. I had no idea that the transmission assembly could move the way it can within the isolation mount. Very interesting design.
 
As a transmission starts to fail the tendency is to continue to apply power which in reality is your only option…the incident I had where the transmission seized on the ground kind I was over torquing the aircraft at touchdown…as soon as power was removed it locked up…I had a chip light (second one as I was recovering the aircraft after a fuzz cleaning) but also noted the increase power required to keep the rotor spinning.
Bringing back memories! I watched a guy hover one of our Hueys in to a revetment one day and go to shut it down. Soon as the blades started slowing down all of a sudden they abruptly stopped. Something you don’t ordinarily expect. Transmission had locked solid.

One day I was assigned a factory new aircraft, went out to preflight, and discovered several bolts missing in the transmission housing. It was not a confidence builder. Don’t think anybody took them out, they all just never got put in and nobody caught it was the problem.

I remember part of the emergency procedure if you’re in flight and have a transmission light, was to go emergency governor so you could goose every bit of power out of that L13 engine. Meantime you’re headed to the ground or whatever’s down there.
 
He can be perturbed, but he’s not the law and more importantly it’s not relevant to the mishap at hand.
I'm not sure that's true. It sounds like the CEO fired the DO in retaliation for pausing operations during the investigation, which indicates that there was not a good safety culture in that company. There are FAR too many shady 91 and 135 operators who get away with this largely because there's always some young kid who's willing to fly there regardless of their own safety.

One of the things that all engineering students in my school had to take was a class that covered various bases not covered in other classes. One of the sessions was dedicated to ethics and emphasized the need to save 6-12 months' salary ASAP so that you could walk away immediately; they talked a lot about the situation faced by Boisjoly, Ebeling, et al at Morton Thiokol among others.

This sort of thing should be imparted to young pilots as well - Unfortunately, it seems like there's always a warm body to fill a seat no matter how bad the safety situation is at a carrier. Juan only spent a couple of sentences on it; it could be a video of its own.
 
One of the things that all engineering students in my school had to take was a class that covered various bases not covered in other classes. One of the sessions was dedicated to ethics and emphasized the need to save 6-12 months' salary ASAP so that you could walk away immediately; they talked a lot about the situation faced by Boisjoly, Ebeling, et al at Morton Thiokol among others.
To an engineer, integrity is more important than ability.
 
I spoke to my avionics guy again last night. The leasing company is local and he does some work for them. Word is that the A/C recently came out of maintenance where the tail structure was removed/replaced. He didn’t know the exact reason for requiring that procedure. Hopefully not mis torquing of bolts.
 
I’m not disappointed with Juan because I don’t follow him, but the “kids, don’t just fly to 1500anywhere mantra was a bit disgusting in the delivery, even if the message was spot on.
Yeah it’s a bit early to start putting blame on management / maintenance as well. I saw one post on FB that was titled there was no records for the aircraft. No, there was no flight recorder. The aircraft had maint records.

Fact is we have no idea the maint history of this aircraft or company safety culture. B206 / 407 aircraft have lost their tail booms in the past. It can happen and as @Bell206 pointed out, it can happen at the bulkhead aft of the tail boom attachment point such as this case. For all we know, the pedal lock might not have been attached to the pedals in the left side and the pax dropped something on the floor jamming the right pedal. Too early to assume maintenance error on xmsn / tail boom or company culture.

This pilot might not even be working on hours. I’ve seen pics of him flying CH-47 fire birds so there’s a good chance this wasn’t an hour building job. Could be just a part time gig or a job that’s close to home.
 
Yeah it’s a bit early to start putting blame on management / maintenance as well. I saw one post on FB that was titled there was no records for the aircraft. No, there was no flight recorder. The aircraft had maint records.

Fact is we have no idea the maint history of this aircraft or company safety culture. B206 / 407 aircraft have lost their tail booms in the past. It can happen and as @Bell206 pointed out, it can happen at the bulkhead aft of the tail boom attachment point such as this case. For all we know, the pedal lock might not have been attached to the pedals in the left side and the pax dropped something on the floor jamming the right pedal. Too early to assume maintenance error on xmsn / tail boom or company culture.

This pilot might not even be working on hours. I’ve seen pics of him flying CH-47 fire birds so there’s a good chance this wasn’t an hour building job. Could be just a part time gig or a job that’s close to home.
I believe the pilot was chasing hours. Somewhere it said he had 800 hours also said he taught fixed wing too. Never heard TT in helicopters. Juan is right about the 1500 rule. In a pilot’s career that first 1500 hours are probably the most dangerous in their whole career flying.
 
I'm not sure that's true...
Given the facts known, how, exactly, can the type of operation or motivation of an aspiring airline pilot be a relevant casual or contributing factor in this mishap?

If the underlying hypothesis is there’s only one acceptable level of safety and that’s part 121 I disagree, but we don’t even know if that’s his theory although it could be implied in how he presented it.

If it is his point, then that’s a bit arrogant.

ETA: MMQBing the mishap is fine, but stick the to facts.
 
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Isn’t it true the most dangerous flying is part 91 followed by part 135 then the safest, part 121 using hours flown, mileage flown, passengers flown? By far?
 
Bringing back memories! I watched a guy hover one of our Hueys in to a revetment one day and go to shut it down. Soon as the blades started slowing down all of a sudden they abruptly stopped. Something you don’t ordinarily expect. Transmission had locked solid.
One of the guys I know flew the UH-1 post Vietnam. He says there is a ring of low melting point metal in the main transmission. Should you lose the oil, the rising temperature will melt the ring and coat the gears. So long as the pilot keeps the system hot and spinning it was supposed to get you down in one piece. Then it cooled and permanently fused everything together.
 
Isn’t it true the most dangerous flying is part 91 followed by part 135 then the safest, part 121 using hours flown, mileage flown, passengers flown? By far?
I'm not saying that 91 is safer than 135 or 121. But, if the basis is passenger miles, 91 in general has far fewer passengers and far fewer miles.
 
How, exactly, can the type of operation or motivation of an aspiring airline pilot be a relevant casual or contributing factor in this mishap?

If the underlying hypothesis is there’s only one acceptable level of safety and that’s part 121 I disagree, but we don’t even know if that’s his theory although it could be implied in how he presented it.

If it is his point, then that’s a bit arrogant.
If that is his point it’s a lot worse than a “bit arrogant.”
 
Yeah it’s a bit early to start putting blame on management / maintenance as well.
Agree. Unfortunately, in today’s age of social media everyone seems to try a speak from a position of authority which is why I follow very little of these experts especially when it comes to helicopters. The majority of young helicopter pilots are not chasing the “airline 1500” goal as the helicopter route is the long way around to that goal. Most are simply looking to build their turbine PIC time which outside of tours is very limited in the helicopter world. And given his time and experience it fits what he's been doing.

Isn’t it true the most dangerous flying is part 91 followed by part 135 then the safest, part 121 using hours flown, mileage flown, passengers flown? By far?
You'll find comparing accidents between different segments of aviation, ie., 91 vs 135 vs 121, will not result in any meaningful data for various reasons. But when they are compared its usually using a rate per 100,000 hours flown vs pax miles, etc.

He says there is a ring of low melting point metal in the main transmission. Should you lose the oil, the rising temperature will melt the ring and coat the gears.
Not familiar with any "low melting point metal" in transmissions on Bell products but there are some OEMs that put a block of special wax inside a transmission that will melt to provide an emergency lube of the gears. Most use a wet sump to keep the oil contained and require an immediate landing at any sign of trouble.
 
Yeah; I’m a .mil guy. He can be perturbed, but he’s not the law and more importantly it’s not relevant to the mishap at hand. In that respect he’s no different than DG; clicks for tricks.
Both of those guys contribute to the community in some way, you seem to just bash everyone. Take a chill pill dude.
 
Yup. That's why Morton Thiokol's engineers were shut out of the final meeting with NASA where the go-ahead was given, and none of them signed off on it. They were still haunted by it the rest of their lives.
Tell me more
 
Isn’t it true the most dangerous flying is part 91 followed by part 135 then the safest, part 121 using hours flown, mileage flown, passengers flown? By far?
Probably and that’s because part 91 flies much slower with less people and usually single pilot? It is less safe, but should we require 4 seaters to have 2 pilots and more maintenance checks?
 
Tell me more
There’s a good movie called The Challenger Disaster (2019). Not a big budget or the best acting but excellent behind the scenes of what happened that night prior to launch. The names are changed and the events slightly off but it hits the gist of what happen which is basically, MT engineers were overruled.
 
Tell me more
The Rogers commission report is also a good read, and a long time ago (15-20 years) National Geographic aired a Challenger documentary that included an interview with Roger Boisjoly.
Short clips here and here (the second one has a re-enactment of the NASA-Thiokol before launch teleconference) if you find the whole documentary it's worth watching. Has some TV drama in it, but good information.
 
Isn’t it true the most dangerous flying is part 91 followed by part 135 then the safest, part 121 using hours flown, mileage flown, passengers flown? By far?
If you want to have a meaningful comparison, you'd have to account for different equipment types as well. I don't think anybody would dispute that an airliner has many safety advantages absent on a Piper Cub.
 
If you want to have a meaningful comparison, you'd have to account for different equipment types as well. I don't think anybody would dispute that an airliner has many safety advantages absent on a Piper Cub.
One might also argue there is a safety in that things that happen, happen at 60 mph not 600 mph.
 
One might also argue there is a safety in that things that happen, happen at 60 mph not 600 mph.

Which demonstrates how difficult it is to define “safe” and “safety” in quantitative measures since both are subjectively perceived.
 
Fact is we have no idea the maint history of this aircraft or company safety culture.
No, but sacking the DO the way they did gives us a pretty good clue.

Given the facts known, how, exactly, can the type of operation or motivation of an aspiring airline pilot be a relevant casual or contributing factor in this mishap?
It's not causal to the accident, but it's relevant to the Blancolirio video.

If the underlying hypothesis is there’s only one acceptable level of safety and that’s part 121 I disagree, but we don’t even know if that’s his theory although it could be implied in how he presented it.
I would also disagree with the "one acceptable level of safety". Heck, even the FAA would or we wouldn't have all those other parts to fly under.

However, 121 merely makes it much more difficult to have an unsafe operation. 135 is good, but to be as safe as 121 requires more discipline and desire on the part of the company and its management to be safe. 91 is pretty much the wild west.

Isn’t it true the most dangerous flying is part 91 followed by part 135 then the safest, part 121 using hours flown, mileage flown, passengers flown? By far?
Yes.

You'll find comparing accidents between different segments of aviation, ie., 91 vs 135 vs 121, will not result in any meaningful data for various reasons.
Oh, there's plenty of meaningful data. You do have to work at it though... And I've done that. Pretty much no matter how you slice it, 121 is safer than 135 is safer than 91.

Tell me more
Read about Roger Boisjoly, Bob Ebeling and the rest. Google will give you plenty of resources.

The quote I remember is "take off your engineer hat and put on your manager hat." :nono:

Probably and that’s because part 91 flies much slower with less people and usually single pilot? It is less safe, but should we require 4 seaters to have 2 pilots and more maintenance checks?
IMO, It's mainly that Part 91 has less experienced pilots, no requirement for SOPs and comparatively very little oversight from the FAA.

If you want to have a meaningful comparison, you'd have to account for different equipment types as well. I don't think anybody would dispute that an airliner has many safety advantages absent on a Piper Cub.
Jets are safer than turboprops are safer than pistons... But when you look at only within the same part, they're much more similar.

Also, it's quite possible that the reason jets are safer is that they're usually flown by more experienced, two-person crews.

FWIW, twins are NOT safer than singles. In both piston and turboprop, for every accident caused by an engine failure in a single, there's an accident caused by loss of control after an engine failure in a twin.
 
Is it? And I am not saying it is or isn't. But based on what metric?
Accidents per flight hour is what I was looking at.

The one thing I wasn't able to conclusively prove was the safety of multi-pilot crews vs. single-pilot crews, mainly because of a lack of data for the denominator. The data for accidents isn't 100% when it comes to that either, but for most accidents you can find out whether it was one or two pilots. There's just no data at all to figure out how much flying is done single pilot vs multi crew. I even tried looking at the proportion of single pilot certifications for the types that are one or two crew, but it seems that the standard practice is to give anyone who qualifies the single-pilot cert, so nearly all of the pilots with a CE-525 type for example are single pilot certified even though anecdotally the vast majority of operations are multi crew. Outside of the owner-pilot world, I've only ever seen one CJ operated with a single pilot.
 
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