Heli crash NYC

[3393RP]

It’s in the link that I provided. I wanted to attach the article to allow those to read the highlights of the report.

Here's one of the highlights:

The pilot and eight passengers [including baseball legend Kobe Bryant] died when the helicopter, operated by Island Express Helicopters, Inc., entered a rapidly descending left turn and crashed into terrain.

 

[mryan75]

Here's the Aerossurance Cline 139 report mentioned above. It also has a link to the UK accident the crew was discussing prior to hitting the water.
http://aerossurance.com/helicopters/ntsb-aw139-cline-bahamas/

Is it me or did they fly this like a special forces rescue operation? GPWS was howling the entire time. Why wouldn't that make you think about what you were doing? They seemed to just keep on truckin'. Right into the water.

You had a commercial pilot and an ATP on board and it seems like nobody even kept a basic scan going.

 

[Bell206]

s it me or did they fly this like a special forces rescue operation?

The unofficial consensus was it was the only way to perform this "load and go" flight given the local rules, time of night, and the nature of the issue. Cline's initial call wasn't until 11pm. And it is assumed the reason he didn't use additional advanced modes of the 139 was that was not how he normally flew the aircraft on previous flights. Problem with this flight was he had no external references until he hit
the water.

 

[3393RP]

I read somewhere passengers in the helicopter were friends of Cline's daughter, and the group had gone to the island to celebrate a birthday and graduation from university.

The story said Cline's daughter and one of her friends had either overdosed on something or they were suffering from acute alcohol poisoning, which resulted in the call to the helicopter crew and its hurried flight to the island.

 

[mryan75]

The unofficial consensus was it was the only way to perform this "load and go" flight given the local rules, time of night, and the nature of the issue. Cline's initial call wasn't until 11pm. And it is assumed the reason he didn't use additional advanced modes of the 139 was that was not how he normally flew the aircraft on previous flights. Problem with this flight was he had no external references until he hit
the water.

I've been reading through he CVR transcript the last day or so and oh, the irony. Copilot (PNF, ATP) said twice on the way out:

"well [expletive] you won't get spatially disoriented with two of us on board."

The whole atmosphere is just very cavalier. PF hadnt flown the helicopter in a month, it was just out of maintenance "for every [expletive] thing", at night, over water, black hole landing and takeoff. They couldn't find the cockpit light dimmer, and their attitude seemed to be "what could go wrong?" Even during the most critical phase of flight they were just ho-hum, flying it straight into the water while talking about someone else doing the same.

It's just astonishing. To me a lot of it lies with mission-type flying and attitudes. They just didn't seem to consider the risks of what they were doing. Not adequately anyway.

Obviously I'm clueless here, both with helicopters and two-pilot operations. But would it have been at least a good thought for the PF to tell the PNF before takeoff, "Keep your eyes on that altimeter until we get to altitude" or similar?

 

[Bell206]

But would it have been at least a good thought for the PF to tell the PNF before takeoff, "Keep your eyes on that altimeter until we get to altitude" or similar?

I would think so. Or if they really had thought about it for a minute, they could have used one of the established departure procedures listed in the RFM that would have given them a checklist to get to altitude. However, given the "urgency" of the flight, I think that played more a part in the mindset and actions taken in the cockpit especially once the boss and pax got on board at 1:45am with rotors turning. The CVR script was non-stop chatter and a lot going on. I wouldn't have been surprised if someone in the back was yelling "go, go, go" over the intercom as well.....

 

[mryan75]

I would think so. Or if they really had thought about it for a minute, they could have used one of the established departure procedures listed in the RFM that would have given them a checklist to get to altitude. However, given the "urgency" of the flight, I think that played more a part in the mindset and actions taken in the cockpit especially once the boss and pax got on board at 1:45am with rotors turning. The CVR script was non-stop chatter and a lot going on. I wouldn't have been surprised if someone in the back was yelling "go, go, go" over the intercom as well.....

How would you have handled the departure, generally sleaking?

 

[Bell206]

How would you have handled the departure, generally sleaking?

I'd ask that to V173 as that is outside my skill set. But in all the night flights I've been on the crew/pilot followed a specific departure procedure but more due to potential failure scenarios which this 139 didn't seem to even consider. Imagine if he had an engine decel instead. The whole thing was unfortunately a cluster from the get-go.

 

[Velocity173]

I'd ask that to V173 as that is outside my skill set. But in all the night flights I've been on the crew/pilot followed a specific departure procedure but more due to potential failure scenarios which this 139 didn't seem to even consider. Imagine if he had an engine decel instead. The whole thing was unfortunately a cluster from the get-go.

Well like I alluded to, have some sort of SAS/AFCS/AP engaged. As @Direct C51 stated, there are different types of SAS, in this case, SAS was engaged but unlike the 407, it has nothing to do with holding attitude. That’s an AP function on this aircraft. Since this type of departure is essentially an actual weather operation, you’d think they’d treated as an instrument take off.

So, why they didn’t have some sort of attitude hold engaged is anyone’s guess. They definitely sounded unfamiliar with the systems on board. Possibly they just didn’t know how. I don’t know. Personally, I just think the PIC didn’t understand the challenges with flying into a black hole and was thinking hand flying it wouldn’t be an issue.

Really comes down to a failure in CRM. I’ve talked before about the only times in the Black Hawk I’ve seen a pilot completely spatially disoriented was at night. Never had a student / copilot get spatial D in the clouds. Only on black moonless nights over open water or the desert. Like I said earlier, the black hole stuff pilots tend to want to fly both outside inside when really, they need to stick inside and fly instruments. It’s obvious in this accident, no one gave the attitude indicator the importance it deserves. That’s a failure not just in basic instrument scan but a failure in CRM.

In the instances where my students got spatial D, it’s a simple procedure for pilot not on the controls. It’s called the two challenge rule. 1) make them aware of small errors in reference to attitude, altitude, airspeed, etc. 2) those errors increase to exceeding PTS / ATC assignment, then “emergency, I have the controls.” At some point the non flying pilot has to alert, then take over control when the alert didn’t work. That didn’t happen here and unfortunately, that sort of thing will continue to happen. Just look at some of the black hole articles that were attached to your aerossurance link. Some of those aircraft were very capable of flying in those conditions but for whatever reason, the breakdown in CRM resulted in disaster.

 

[Velocity173]

Something else I was just thinking of when it comes to the fixed wing guys on POA understanding helo ops. As an airplane pilot myself, an instrument take off is a lot easier because it’s simple and also intuitive. Full throttle, pitch up x number degrees, get to Vy and adjust attitude as necessary to maintain Vy.

Well in a helo it’s strange because unlike an airplane where you’re always pitching up, you’re most likely pitching down to climb. You could also pitch level to climb or even pitch up and climb. The problem is in all this, there needs to be a standard applied. In the 139 accident, it’s obvious that there was no standard applied on climb out. A crew brief should’ve specified an attitude setting (3-5 degrees below horizon) and a TRQ setting (10-15 % above hover pwr). If you’re not adhering to any of this then you’re basically just winging it and on a dark moonless night over water, the results are predictable.

 

[mryan75]

Well in a helo it’s strange because unlike an airplane where you’re always pitching up, you’re most likely pitching down to climb.

It's interesting that you mention this because I was thinking exactly that, it's not just a simple matter of monitoring the AI like in a plane. That's why I was thinking, have the PNF watch the altitude like a hawk and tell me if I'm going the wrong way (ie down). Like you said about the alerts. Just seems like they didn't have a real plan.

 

[Bell206]

If you’re not adhering to any of this then you’re basically just winging it and on a dark moonless night over water, the results are predictable.

Just seems like they didn't have a real plan.

I think the above sums it up. But for reference here is a link to a 139 QRH that was sent to me and gives the factory publish departure procedures for various scenarios. Screenshot below. Had they simply followed one of them... even if for just the initial flight to altitude... probably would have had a different result.
http://helicopterindia.com/yahoo_site_admin/assets/docs/FM-AW_139.242230204.pdf

 

[IK04]

This makes the requirement for night flight limited to IFR qualified aircraft and crews for part 135 ops.

Departing from a helipad VS. a runway makes a difference and the "black hole" takeoff without NVGs must be performed as an IMC departure.

Anything else is an unnecessary risk.

 

[IK04]

That is pretty much the same procedure for the S-76 and S-92.

 

[weilke]

I always wonder what mechanism it is that pairs rich people with sub-par helicopter pilots. I say sub-par because a top of the line professional when faced with a unreasonable demand from the boss-man can say 'eff it, I rather fly powerlines than put up with this $#it'. Or in the case of the botched repositioning flight a professional would have texted the boss-man 'sorry, there is gonna be a hefty parking bill, can't get the ship to Linden today'. He wasn't flying the diphtheria serum to Nome, this was just to get the aircraft to a cheaper parking spot.

 

[mryan75]

I always wonder what mechanism it is that pairs rich people with sub-par helicopter pilots. I say sub-par because a top of the line professional when faced with a unreasonable demand from the boss-man can say 'eff it, I rather fly powerlines than put up with this $#it'. Or in the case of the botched repositioning flight a professional would have texted the boss-man 'sorry, there is gonna be a hefty parking bill, can't get the ship to Linden today'. He wasn't flying the diphtheria serum to Nome, this was just to get the aircraft to a cheaper parking spot.

That’s what I just dint understand. This guy was a billionaire, and he died at the hands of two chuckleheads in a balky helicopter. It just doesn’t make any sense.

 

[Bell206]

I always wonder what mechanism it is that pairs rich people with sub-par helicopter pilots.

This guy was a billionaire, and he died at the hands of two chuckleheads in a balky helicopter.

In my experience, it's not so much a "mechanism" as it simply revolves around the word "no." Most A-type extremely successful people achieved their success by not listening to or accepting that word. Fortunately, people who take this "no" attitude across the board are the exception rather than the norm. The problem is when the boss doesn't accept "no", one either loses their job or puts themselves into situations that test their skill levels no matter what level or "par" they are. The UK 139 accident had 2 top-shelf pilots at the controls. Unfortunately, the ability to use or accept the word "no" is not exclusive to rich people or helicopters. If you dig deep enough you'll find the word "no" was a direct or indirect root cause to a majority of aviation accidents as in: no to checklists, no to weather, no to refuel, no to 20 minute annual, no to following the rules, and so on.

 

[Albany Tom]

My takeaway from all of this as just an airplane pilot is how miserable IFR helicopter can be. I already knew that helicopter was crazy weird, and difficult, compared to fixed wing - learned that flying RC, and trying to do the same heli. But I just assumed that the lift from helicopter VFR to IFR would be similar to that between fixed VFR and IFR. And my belief now is that it just isn't at all.

To the 'no' comments above, I'd say part of that is that some people can make things look so easy, and so routine, that it's hard to see that they're neither.