Ethiopian Airlines Crash; Another 737 Max

flyingcheesehead said:
These posts bring up something that hasn't been discussed yet:

Several years ago, shortly after the "Miracle on the Hudson", I went back and looked at a bunch of well-known aviation accidents where the outcome was better than anyone could have hoped for. Cactus 1549, United 232, Aloha 243, United 811, the Gimli Glider, and several others, and I noticed a common theme:

In EVERY SINGLE ONE of the accidents I looked at, at least one pilot on the flight deck had more ratings than they needed to be where they were. Everyone knows that Sully was a glider pilot, but I saw a bunch of things like glider and seaplane ratings among this group of pilots.

That tells me that these were people who *did* have a background in additional, and likely more challenging environments than would be seen in an airline-track 141 training program, and were likely aviation geeks - people who got home and flew their own airplanes, thought about flying, talked about flying with other pilots, etc. These other experiences likely made them better pilots.

Now, if you look at Ethiopian, Lion Air, Atlas, Air France 447, etc. I'll bet you don't find those additional ratings. Food for thought.
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Excellent point. Don't forget that Jeff Skiles, Sully's FO, is also an aviation enthusiast, 20k+ hours, active in EAA, flies anything with wings, comes from a flying family,... Sully always points out that the Miracle was a team win.
 
flyingcheesehead said:
These posts bring up something that hasn't been discussed yet:

Several years ago, shortly after the "Miracle on the Hudson", I went back and looked at a bunch of well-known aviation accidents where the outcome was better than anyone could have hoped for. Cactus 1549, United 232, Aloha 243, United 811, the Gimli Glider, and several others, and I noticed a common theme:

In EVERY SINGLE ONE of the accidents I looked at, at least one pilot on the flight deck had more ratings than they needed to be where they were. Everyone knows that Sully was a glider pilot, but I saw a bunch of things like glider and seaplane ratings among this group of pilots.

That tells me that these were people who *did* have a background in additional, and likely more challenging environments than would be seen in an airline-track 141 training program, and were likely aviation geeks - people who got home and flew their own airplanes, thought about flying, talked about flying with other pilots, etc. These other experiences likely made them better pilots.

Now, if you look at Ethiopian, Lion Air, Atlas, Air France 447, etc. I'll bet you don't find those additional ratings. Food for thought.
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That's definitely a point about "experience vs hours".

Most us start at the bottom and work our way up (and I'm still at the bottom...but that's not the point). We'll go through all sorts of beater aircraft and learn airmanship and single-pilot CRM through all sorts of situations, some of which are self inflicted. Then we'll move up, maybe get a paying gig and work that for a while. Aircraft, weather, decision making, mx, instruction, whatever, broaden our experiences and add to our personal knowledge base. Eventually, we could end up right seat with an airline. Give that some time and just maybe we'll end up in the left seat.

How about the pilot that gets a job with an airline at 0 hrs, goes through a structured program at an airport with 365.25 sunny days a year and 200 hrs later is right seat?
 
Matthew said:
How about the pilot that gets a job with an airline at 0 hrs, goes through a structured program at an airport with 365.25 sunny days a year and 200 hrs later is right seat?
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That guy is not much different than his CFI that stuck around to 1500 hrs at the same 141 teaching the same syllabus for about a year.
 
TCABM said:
That guy is not much different than his CFI that stuck around to 1500 hrs at the same 141 teaching the same syllabus for about a year.
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I strongly disagree, with all due respect. I think a broader background would help that 1500 hour CFI, but people are different and a CFI with that much experience in the cockpit has learned a lot about human factors, has shown persistence, and has almost guaranteed been through some stressful situations with students by the time they get there. That kind of intangible stuff can’t be gained in 200 hours.
 
If you want some entertainment, crank up the LiveATC channel for the Phoenix TRACON, north sector around SDL and DVT. Chances are within a couple of minutes you'll hear a tentative voice with a callsign that begins "Mesquite" and ends with "student solo." You may also hear the controller's delivery slow down from the usual 78 rpm to 33-1/3 rpm to communicate with the fledgling, for whom English is likely not a first language.

A while back I met one of these students at the remote Gila Bend airport about 25 miles south of my home field (cheap gas!). He got out of his Piper Archer III and was examining the prop and nose gear. I asked if he needed any help. He said he was afraid he might have had a prop strike, because he heard a loud noise and felt bad shaking on the rollout. There didn't appear to be any damage to his aircraft. I told him that what he described sounded to me like a nosewheel shimmy, and I explained to him what that was. He seemed relieved by that, but phoned his instructor before starting up to return to base. He was a very nice, earnest young man, and likely someday will be a fine pilot.

On another recent day I was enroute (if 15 nm is a "route") to Buckeye (more cheap gas). The ASOS was calling wind 080 at 13, directly across the lone runway 17/35. There was nobody else in the pattern, and I decided from my present position, a right downwind for 17 would be easier. Just then a Lufthansa F33A Bonanza student solo called inbound. I said I was setting up for right traffic 17. He said, "Are you sure about 17? The wind is from 080!" I said, "Yes, it's a 90-degree crosswind either way." After a few seconds he said, "Returning to Goodyear, this is beyond our crosswind limit."

We've all been there. I certainly have, but at that stage of my training I was looking forward to getting my "license to learn" and flying for travel, fun and practice while working on advanced ratings, and maybe CFI'ing for a while, then ... who knows? I knew that becoming immersed in aviation and learning its concepts, its mysteries, its eternal truths, its sights and sounds (even smells), its hidden gotchas, would take ... time, and I had barely cracked open the door.

But these young folks are on the fast track to being in the right seat of a large turbine aircraft with paying passengers in the back.

My, my ...
 
flyingcheesehead said:
These posts bring up something that hasn't been discussed yet:

Several years ago, shortly after the "Miracle on the Hudson", I went back and looked at a bunch of well-known aviation accidents where the outcome was better than anyone could have hoped for. Cactus 1549, United 232, Aloha 243, United 811, the Gimli Glider, and several others, and I noticed a common theme:

In EVERY SINGLE ONE of the accidents I looked at, at least one pilot on the flight deck had more ratings than they needed to be where they were. Everyone knows that Sully was a glider pilot, but I saw a bunch of things like glider and seaplane ratings among this group of pilots.

That tells me that these were people who *did* have a background in additional, and likely more challenging environments than would be seen in an airline-track 141 training program, and were likely aviation geeks - people who got home and flew their own airplanes, thought about flying, talked about flying with other pilots, etc. These other experiences likely made them better pilots.

Now, if you look at Ethiopian, Lion Air, Atlas, Air France 447, etc. I'll bet you don't find those additional ratings. Food for thought.
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What you are seeing is the result of being an airman. Not just a pilot. Men and women that are true airmen are special.
 
Read a detailed narrative of what all transpired on the Qantas Airways A380 that had the uncontained explosion of the number two engine. I am very glad that the cockpit of that airplane was occupied by pilots, and not mere systems operators.

Captain Richard Champion de Crespigny (what cool name, btw!) exercised exceptional command authority and aeronautical decision-making skills, delegating the process of reading the (literally hundreds of) computerized alerts and errors to another crew member, while he proceeded to operate as a test pilot, experimenting with flight regimes and failures never anticipated by the manufacturer, understanding what did and did not work. The likelihood of a successful outcome with a crew strictly dependent upon the computer's judgment seems pretty low.

Ultimately, he landed the airplane safely, even though one of the engines could not be brought back from cruise thrust; it ultimately had to be shut down by drowning it with a firehose.

Sometimes, the machines don't do what you expect; what happens next is entirely up to the capabilities and demeanor of the flight crew.
 
flyingcheesehead said:
These posts bring up something that hasn't been discussed yet:

Several years ago, shortly after the "Miracle on the Hudson", I went back and looked at a bunch of well-known aviation accidents where the outcome was better than anyone could have hoped for. Cactus 1549, United 232, Aloha 243, United 811, the Gimli Glider, and several others, and I noticed a common theme:

In EVERY SINGLE ONE of the accidents I looked at, at least one pilot on the flight deck had more ratings than they needed to be where they were. Everyone knows that Sully was a glider pilot, but I saw a bunch of things like glider and seaplane ratings among this group of pilots.

That tells me that these were people who *did* have a background in additional, and likely more challenging environments than would be seen in an airline-track 141 training program, and were likely aviation geeks - people who got home and flew their own airplanes, thought about flying, talked about flying with other pilots, etc. These other experiences likely made them better pilots.

Now, if you look at Ethiopian, Lion Air, Atlas, Air France 447, etc. I'll bet you don't find those additional ratings. Food for thought.
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And I'd bet the ratings themselves had little to do with the outcome, they merely show that the pilots are actively engaged in aviation, not just "punching the clock ".
 
flyingcheesehead said:
These posts bring up something that hasn't been discussed yet:

Several years ago, shortly after the "Miracle on the Hudson", I went back and looked at a bunch of well-known aviation accidents where the outcome was better than anyone could have hoped for. Cactus 1549, United 232, Aloha 243, United 811, the Gimli Glider, and several others, and I noticed a common theme:

In EVERY SINGLE ONE of the accidents I looked at, at least one pilot on the flight deck had more ratings than they needed to be where they were. Everyone knows that Sully was a glider pilot, but I saw a bunch of things like glider and seaplane ratings among this group of pilots.

That tells me that these were people who *did* have a background in additional, and likely more challenging environments than would be seen in an airline-track 141 training program, and were likely aviation geeks - people who got home and flew their own airplanes, thought about flying, talked about flying with other pilots, etc. These other experiences likely made them better pilots.

Now, if you look at Ethiopian, Lion Air, Atlas, Air France 447, etc. I'll bet you don't find those additional ratings. Food for thought.
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I’m totally with you up until you started “betting” in the last sentence.

I see a number of posts that have the start point that only the USA produces first rate pilots.
I don’t know squat about the reality. It may be based in reality, I don’t know. On the other hand, I have a problem with the assumption that “third world” countries produce inferior pilots.

None of that matters though, because these accidents involved two sets of pilots, and the only real question then is what kind of pilots they were. It’s totally bogus to pretend that all pilots from Ethiopia are under trained, etc. there most certainly are some that just want to make the bucks, and others that love flying as much as any pilot anywhere. Love of flying is a thing. They may be any point on the scale but we don’t know yet where they were. One had low time. They both, reportedly, had gone through the preocedure for a probenecid, if that is what happened with the MCAS system.

I’m just a lowly student pilot, not even a real pilot yet, for GA SE prop airplanes. I don’t know squat about airliners. But it still bothers me that the “disagreement annunciator” was optional. Many things bother me about the whole situation. I imagine that pilots of large commercial airplanes have a lot more going on and that they have to monitor than me in a Cessna 172. Seems like they ought not to go cheap and give customers the option to not buy an annunciator light that would have told them clearly that there was a disagreement on the AOA.

Seems to me that ought to be mandatory. But I don’t know much more about this than any other non pilot.
It is a point though, there are more non-pilot passengers than ones that are pilots. If they get the idea that cost cutting is endangering their lives it might be a bad outcome for Boeing in this case. Yes, they aren’t pilots and don’t know the “real” considerations, but this is a forum for pilots (including professional commercial ones)and even here we are seeing disagreements on the main points.

I’m still going to wait until the authorities come to a conclusion. And pay attention also to what kind of pilots these were.
 
Half Fast said:
Excellent point. Don't forget that Jeff Skiles, Sully's FO, is also an aviation enthusiast, 20k+ hours, active in EAA, flies anything with wings, comes from a flying family,... Sully always points out that the Miracle was a team win.
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And the continuing references to it as a miracle does a disservice to those two pilots and their skills. The only higher power involved was those skills.
 
Tarheelpilot said:
What you are seeing is the result of being an airman. Not just a pilot. Men and women that are true airmen are special.
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That begs the question, how many pilots can we expect out of the pool to be airmen?
“Exceptional” in itself dictates that it is not the norm. If I understand th situation, there is a shortage of pilots for commercial, and that would tend to mean that the design and information ought to b tailored to pilots. Trained pilot but not necessarily “airmen”.
 
LongRoadBob said:
Seems like they ought not to go cheap and give customers the option to not buy an annunciator light
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Unfortunately, the majority of customers main concern is the cost of a ticket. And to provide a service that the customer is willing to pay for drives the operator to only buy those things necessary to offer those services. Just look at flight MH 370. Customers don't think about crashing but getting to their destination -- on time. This is found globally across all sectors. The few times where the customer drove the operator to change were very specific operations. For example, after an Airbus H225 helicopter lost its rotor system in-flight, in your country, the collective offshore workers refused to board that model aircraft. It's not the same when dealing with millions of passengers. Aviation has always been about the cost. There is an old adage that if you want to start a $1M aviation company, start with $2M. It is what it is.
 
SkyDog58 said:
And the continuing references to it as a miracle does a disservice to those two pilots and their skills. The only higher power involved was those skills.
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Amen to that! Totally agree.

But then again, if Sully had had a sleepless night, and was not in the pocket, was fatigued, stressed, would he make the same, perfect decision? Who knows? Not me. He was cool, calm, and collected at least from his decisions and outward appearance. But would he have made the same perfect decision 99 out of a 100 times?

Something in him rose to the situation, and probably would almost always do that, but also even that to me seems like the best man for the job, but also a bit of serendipity,in the mix. A lesser pilot would not have made it. For sure. Unless it was their most perfect day. It all comes down to judgement, experience, and being able to take over and make the right or best decision in the moment.

I am awed by him.
 
LongRoadBob said:
That begs the question, how many pilots can we expect out of the pool to be airmen?
“Exceptional” in itself dictates that it is not the norm. If I understand th situation, there is a shortage of pilots for commercial, and that would tend to mean that the design and information ought to b tailored to pilots. Trained pilot but not necessarily “airmen”.
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So true.

Many events over the years have shown us, again and again, that it is difficult to impossible to design the need for airmen out of the system.

Ask someone who knows about Denny Fitch, the airman who had literally seconds to invent a whole new way to fly a widebodied airliner, without flight controls.
Consider Richard Champion de Crespigny, who was presented, in a computerized airplane designed to anticipate every possibility, a combination of realities that vastly outstripped the computers' (and designers') imaginations and abilities. Only an airman coordinates the resources to bring that plane to the ground safely.

And, by way of counterpoint, the absence of airmen allowed a completely functional A330 to crash in the Atlantic with all souls lost.
 
SCCutler said:
Ask someone who knows about Denny Fitch, the airman who had literally seconds to invent a whole new way to fly a widebodied airliner, without flight controls.
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I remember watching coverage of UA232 in the Laughlin O Club. I think it was live, but it’s been a while.
 
LongRoadBob said:
That begs the question, how many pilots can we expect out of the pool to be airmen?
“Exceptional” in itself dictates that it is not the norm. If I understand th situation, there is a shortage of pilots for commercial, and that would tend to mean that the design and information ought to b tailored to pilots. Trained pilot but not necessarily “airmen”.
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Hmm
That’s a conversation that is best had in person over a beer. Hard for me to express how I perceive these issues on an Internet forum. I have a pretty good track record of failing miserably at expressing complex ideas on this board. That said... it’s an issue. One that I think has no clear answer. Almost all of the possible solutions would cost money in an environment that is very competitive with relatively thin profit margins and can be very cyclical.
 
SCCutler said:
Ask someone who knows about Denny Fitch, the airman who had literally seconds to invent a whole new way to fly a widebodied airliner, without flight controls.
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UAL Flight 232 pilot experience:
Source- Wikipedia

“Captain Alfred Clair Haynes, 57, was hired by United Airlines in 1956. He had 30,000 hours of total flight time with United Airlines, of which 7,000 were in the DC-10.

First Officer William Roy Records, 48, was hired by National Airlines in 1969. He subsequently worked for Pan American World Airways. He estimated that he had approximately 20,000 hours of total flight time. He had 665 hours as a DC-10 first officer.

Second Officer Dudley Joseph Dvorak, 51, was hired by United Airlines in 1986. He estimated that he had approximately 15,000 hours of total flying time. He had 1,900 hours as a second officer in the Boeing 727 and 33 hours as a second officer in the DC-10.

Training Check Airman Captain Dennis E. Fitch, 46, was hired by United Airlines in 1968. He estimated that, prior to working for United, he had accrued at least 1,400 hours of flight time with the Air National Guard. His total DC-10 time with United was 3,079 hours, of which 2,000 hours were accrued as a second officer, 1000 hours as a first officer, and 79 hours as a captain.[2] He had learned of the crash of Japan Airlines Flight 123, caused by a catastrophic loss of hydraulic control, and had wondered if it was possible to control an aircraft using throttles only. He had practiced under similar conditions on a simulator.”

Experience makes a BIG difference. A FO with 200 hrs. is not experienced enough to be any help in a real emergency. Even simple tasks may overload him.
 
nrpetersen said:
Q from a FLAP to experienced 737 (or 7X7 pilots) - How often do you experience runaway trim?
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Once during my initial DC8 FE training.
Once during my initial DC9 FO training.
Once during my initial DC8 FO training.
Once during my initial 767 FO training.
Once during my initial CRJ FO training.
Once during my initial 737 FO training.

Each recurrent includes some systems failures. I don't recall if any of them were a runaway trim. The procedure is very, but not exactly, similar from airplane to airplane. They aren't that big of a deal compared to some of the other things we train for. Just annoying to have to use the backup trim system for the approach and landing.

Bill Jennings said:
Spike, Qantas Flight 72 is another example of a very good crew overcoming an aircraft that was trying to kill them.
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QF32? The Captain's autobiography, QF32, has a great, detailed, account of the flight.
 
flyingcheesehead said:
These posts bring up something that hasn't been discussed yet:

Several years ago, shortly after the "Miracle on the Hudson", I went back and looked at a bunch of well-known aviation accidents where the outcome was better than anyone could have hoped for. Cactus 1549, United 232, Aloha 243, United 811, the Gimli Glider, and several others, and I noticed a common theme:

In EVERY SINGLE ONE of the accidents I looked at, at least one pilot on the flight deck had more ratings than they needed to be where they were. Everyone knows that Sully was a glider pilot, but I saw a bunch of things like glider and seaplane ratings among this group of pilots.

That tells me that these were people who *did* have a background in additional, and likely more challenging environments than would be seen in an airline-track 141 training program, and were likely aviation geeks - people who got home and flew their own airplanes, thought about flying, talked about flying with other pilots, etc. These other experiences likely made them better pilots.

Now, if you look at Ethiopian, Lion Air, Atlas, Air France 447, etc. I'll bet you don't find those additional ratings. Food for thought.
Click to expand...
Interesting, I think you bring up a good point with that. As a believer, there was certainly more than just their flying skills at work in each one of those accidents. There was a higher power above that was at work without a doubt. Truly a miracle!
 
I remember one of my many CFIs complaining that the Airbus engineers weren't getting any credit for building an airplane that could take that kind of beating and still safely land in a river.
 
Tantalum said:
It's not an agenda. I'm trying to keep people sane here and their heads on straight. The only people with an obvious agenda are the media and the ones cancelling orders for the jets before any real findings are out.
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That's the only people in the media with an agenda? You don't think that Boeing, SWA and American Airlines PR machine is cranking full blast to get articles out there in the media saying how safe the plane is, the solution was just a simple procedure that every pilot is trained on, every pilot we put in the simulator was able to land safely? You think media agenda only goes one way? You're smarter than that.

Tantalum said:
What would you have done different if you were Boeing, and had a business to run?
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If I was Boeing, I would have at least:
  • Disclosed that the actual amount of stabiziler travel available to the MCAS was 2.5 degrees per activation instead of the submitted .6 degrees.
  • I would have correctly classified this system as a critical safety system and required at least two sensor inputs to avoid erroneous activation instead of one sole input.
  • I would have included MCAS system information in the Pilot's Systems Manuals.
  • I would have allowed the stabilizer trim brake system to stop trim movement opposite to pilot elevator input.
But, more to my point. (Emphasis below all mine.)
Tantalum said:
I would think competent trim runaway procedures would cover what to do, when the trim runs away.
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Larry in TN said:
Every 737 crew has been trained on the runaway stabilizer procecure (sic). It hasn't changed in the 50 years since the airplane was introduced. Same for every other transport jet. They all have runaway stabilizer procedures and all of their crews have been trained in them.
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mryan75 said:
It was a simple trim runaway. They didn't need to know a blessed thing about MCAS to have handled it properly, as you can see.
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Checkout_my_Six said:
run away Stab procedure......Fail. ;)
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In all my previous posts, I haven't been trying to exonerate the crew from any wrong doing. Maybe they were inexperienced (it seems the case with Ethiopian FO). Maybe they screwed up. But, in my mind they were faced with a lot tougher problem I've ever been trained for. My opinion... this was not a simple runaway stab trim. Not by any stretch of the imagination.

You can start with the fact everyone who has said they trained for a runaway stab trim failure in the simulator has had the advantage of a trim brake that stops the trim from running as soon as pressure is applied to the yoke opposite to the trim. That right there should stop the conversation. The trim never really "runs away." It at most goes a fraction of a unit before the brake stops it, allowing time for troubleshooting the problem. This list can go on and one how this MCAS activation differs from the runaway trim that we are trained for.

I had a whole post thought out trying to explain again how this wasn't just a run-of-the-mill stab trim runaway, but then I read a post on Facebook made by a 737 pilot and it summed up exactly what I was going to type.

Boeing (and many posters) say "Hey, it's just a trim runaway. Do the drill and all is good." But this is not the simple trim runaway that the QRH contemplates. It starts with a stall warning stick shaker shortly after lift off. Close to the ground this will, and should consume both pilots undivided attention. After a number of seconds they realise that the airplane hasn't stalled and they start figuring out that they may have an airspeed and/or AOA problem.

This is a second problem to deal with on top of the first. And they can't shut the &%$#@ stick shaker off once they realise that it may be spurious. (Sluggo63: For anyone who doesn't know how distracting the stick shaker can be) The PM will be frantically scanning the panel to try and find some clue what is going on. And this whole time, among the din of the stick shaker, crews concern for the airplanes flight path, and the confusing instrument indications, MCAS has been intermittently dialing in nose down trim. Not steadily, in a calm cockpit at altitude like the QRH contemplates.

But intermittently in the background of chaos, noise, and confusion. At some point, well past when it would have been timely, the task saturated PF realizes that the trim is working against him/her and the stab cutout switches get turned off. (hopefully)But the ****show isn't over. Because of everything else going on, this took too long and the airplane is way out of trim. The Lion Air crew reportedly had 60 KG of back pressure on the yoke. Close to the ground, and relying on the lifting component of the underslung engines to help keep the nose up, the crew do not dare reduce power. Now the crew needs to manually trim the airplane, but the airplane is way, way off its trim speed. The B737 QRH makes reference to the large forces
that may be required to break free a servo clutch:

"3 If needed:Use force to cause the disconnect clutch to disengage. Approximately 1/2 turn of the stabilizer trim wheel may be needed.Note:A maximum two-pilot effort on the trim wheels will not cause a cable or system failure."Worse, the "Manual Stabilizer Trim" section of the Boeing FCTM talks about the air loads on a grossly out of trim stab requiring a speed change to reduce the force required to manually trim:

"Excessive air loads on the stabilizer may require effort by both pilots to correct mis-trim. In extreme cases it may be necessary to aerodynamically relieve the air loads to allow manual trimming. Accelerate or decelerate towards the in-trim speed while attempting to trim manually." Sweet Jesus how did this thing get certified?

A guy (or petite gal) has a 60 KG+ force on the yoke trying to stop the airplane from impaling itself into the hard ground just a few thousand feet below, and now he/she has to brute force trim the airplane as well, requiring involved coordination with the PM. Still with all the stick shakers, aural warnings, goofy instrument readings, and whatever else is happening to distract the crew and making communication almost impossible. It is not hard to see how quickly it becomes overwhelming.In addition to a fix for the airplane, if they keep the MCAS system (instead of designing a whole new wing or tail for the airplane), they will have to train the pilots who fly it to deal with its failure.

Right now, there is not a single Max pilot in the world who has been trained for this failure because - there isn't a single simulator in the world that can replicate it. But when they do, all those pilots that claimed "it's just a trim runaway" are going to have a very eye opening simulator session."

​
My only disagreement with the above is in the third paragraph. I don't know how far out of trim the plane was. At least in Lion Air, it looked like the Captain was doing a fairly descent job reversing the trim that the MCAS put in. Once he handed it over to the FO, it seems like his trimming was less effective than the Captain's.

mryan75 said:
The Ehiopian crew had the post-Lion Air "training" and still crashed. Because they were a poorly-trained crew. Simple as that. Boeing can't protect us from poor piloting.
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About that new training. This is a from a buddy of mine who is a 737 Captain for one of the US airlines affected by the grounding regarding the AD and the training and information they received on MCAS. He's been flying 737s for this carrier for the better part of two decades.

"So let me get this straight

Speed trim looks like MCAS activation. But I’m to ignore that

Fast trim looks like MCAS but I ignore that

Fast trim runway looks like MCAS but is deactivated by yoke, electric, and stab cutouts

Slow trim runaway could be mistaken for MCAS but is deactivated by yoke, electric, and stab cutouts

MCAS, when finally noticed can NOT be overridden by the yoke, takes 9 sec to go to the stops, and have to activate the cutouts while fighting the trim, opposing it with pilot activated electric slow mode trim, and increasing yoke forces. All this after having to go they the above scenarios in your head to determine what is happening. Yea. Sounds like a great plan"
​
So, although I will wait and see what comes out in the accident reports, my thinking right now is that there is going to be a lot of links in error chain where this accident could have prevented, but, the first links where these two accidents started was in the boardroom and engineering floor at Boeing and in the back offices of the FAA. That's where this accident should have been prevented. Not at 1000' AGL over Ethiopia with an experienced, but under trained Captain and new FO fighting an airplane with the stick shaker activated, alarms sounding, and unreliable airspeed and AOA indications.
 
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all good....except, the crew before the Lion Air accident got it. They were able to disable the failure mode and mitigate.....What happened to the Lion Air crew who crashed? vs. the one who survived?

I'd bet a nice crisp Benjie that another US crew has survived this.....and the FAA and Boeing know this.
 
Sluggo63 said:
That's the only people in the media with an agenda? You don't think that Boeing, SWA and American Airlines PR machine is cranking full blast to get articles out there in the media saying how safe the plane is, the solution was just a simple procedure that every pilot is trained on, every pilot we put in the simulator was able to land safely? You think media agenda only goes one way? You're smarter than that.


If I was Boeing, I would have at least:
  • Disclosed that the actual amount of stabiziler travel available to the MCAS was 2.5 degrees per activation instead of the submitted .6 degrees.
  • I would have correctly classified this system as a critical safety system and required at least two sensor inputs to avoid erroneous activation instead of one sole input.
  • I would have included MCAS system information in the Pilot's Systems Manuals.
  • I would have allowed the stabilizer trim brake system to stop trim movement opposite to pilot elevator input.
But, more to my point. (Emphasis below all mine.)







In all my previous posts, I haven't been trying to exonerate the crew from any wrong doing. Maybe they were inexperienced (it seems the case with Ethiopian FO). Maybe they screwed up. But, in my mind they were faced with a lot tougher problem I've ever been trained for. My opinion... this was not a simple runaway stab trim. Not by any stretch of the imagination.

You can start with the fact everyone who has said they trained for a runaway stab trim failure in the simulator has had the advantage of a trim brake that stops the trim from running as soon as pressure is applied to the yoke opposite to the trim. That right there should stop the conversation. The trim never really "runs away." It at most goes a fraction of a unit before the brake stops it, allowing time for troubleshooting the problem. This list can go on and one how this MCAS activation differs from the runaway trim that we are trained for.

I had a whole post thought out trying to explain again how this wasn't just a run-of-the-mill stab trim runaway, but then I read a post on Facebook made by a 737 pilot and it summed up exactly what I was going to type.

Boeing (and many posters) say "Hey, it's just a trim runaway. Do the drill and all is good." But this is not the simple trim runaway that the QRH contemplates. It starts with a stall warning stick shaker shortly after lift off. Close to the ground this will, and should consume both pilots undivided attention. After a number of seconds they realise that the airplane hasn't stalled and they start figuring out that they may have an airspeed and/or AOA problem.

This is a second problem to deal with on top of the first. And they can't shut the &%$#@ stick shaker off once they realise that it may be spurious. (Sluggo63: For anyone who doesn't know how distracting the stick shaker can be) The PM will be frantically scanning the panel to try and find some clue what is going on. And this whole time, among the din of the stick shaker, crews concern for the airplanes flight path, and the confusing instrument indications, MCAS has been intermittently dialing in nose down trim. Not steadily, in a calm cockpit at altitude like the QRH contemplates.

But intermittently in the background of chaos, noise, and confusion. At some point, well past when it would have been timely, the task saturated PF realizes that the trim is working against him/her and the stab cutout switches get turned off. (hopefully)But the ****show isn't over. Because of everything else going on, this took too long and the airplane is way out of trim. The Lion Air crew reportedly had 60 KG of back pressure on the yoke. Close to the ground, and relying on the lifting component of the underslung engines to help keep the nose up, the crew do not dare reduce power. Now the crew needs to manually trim the airplane, but the airplane is way, way off its trim speed. The B737 QRH makes reference to the large forces
that may be required to break free a servo clutch:

"3 If needed:Use force to cause the disconnect clutch to disengage. Approximately 1/2 turn of the stabilizer trim wheel may be needed.Note:A maximum two-pilot effort on the trim wheels will not cause a cable or system failure."Worse, the "Manual Stabilizer Trim" section of the Boeing FCTM talks about the air loads on a grossly out of trim stab requiring a speed change to reduce the force required to manually trim:

"Excessive air loads on the stabilizer may require effort by both pilots to correct mis-trim. In extreme cases it may be necessary to aerodynamically relieve the air loads to allow manual trimming. Accelerate or decelerate towards the in-trim speed while attempting to trim manually." Sweet Jesus how did this thing get certified?

A guy (or petite gal) has a 60 KG+ force on the yoke trying to stop the airplane from impaling itself into the hard ground just a few thousand feet below, and now he/she has to brute force trim the airplane as well, requiring involved coordination with the PM. Still with all the stick shakers, aural warnings, goofy instrument readings, and whatever else is happening to distract the crew and making communication almost impossible. It is not hard to see how quickly it becomes overwhelming.In addition to a fix for the airplane, if they keep the MCAS system (instead of designing a whole new wing or tail for the airplane), they will have to train the pilots who fly it to deal with its failure.

Right now, there is not a single Max pilot in the world who has been trained for this failure because - there isn't a single simulator in the world that can replicate it. But when they do, all those pilots that claimed "it's just a trim runaway" are going to have a very eye opening simulator session."

​
My only disagreement with the above is in the third paragraph. I don't know how far out of trim the plane was. At least in Lion Air, it looked like the Captain was doing a fairly descent job reversing the trim that the MCAS put in. Once he handed it over to the FO, it seems like his trimming was less effective than the Captain's.


About that new training. This is a from a buddy of mine who is a 737 Captain for one of the US airlines affected by the grounding regarding the AD and the training and information they received on MCAS. He's been flying 737s for this carrier for the better part of two decades.

"So let me get this straight

Speed trim looks like MCAS activation. But I’m to ignore that

Fast trim looks like MCAS but I ignore that

Fast trim runway looks like MCAS but is deactivated by yoke, electric, and stab cutouts

Slow trim runaway could be mistaken for MCAS but is deactivated by yoke, electric, and stab cutouts

MCAS, when finally noticed can NOT be overridden by the yoke, takes 9 sec to go to the stops, and have to activate the cutouts while fighting the trim, opposing it with pilot activated electric slow mode trim, and increasing yoke forces. All this after having to go they the above scenarios in your head to determine what is happening. Yea. Sounds like a great plan"
​
So, although I will wait and see what comes out in the accident reports, my thinking right now is that there is going to be a lot of links in error chain where this accident could have prevented, but, the first links where these two accidents started was in the boardroom and engineering floor at Boeing and in the back offices of the FAA. That's where this accident should have been prevented. Not at 1000' AGL over Ethiopia with an experienced, but under trained Captain and new FO fighting an airplane with the stick shaker activated, alarms sounding, and unreliable airspeed and AOA indications.
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From the bottom of my heart...thank you!

This is what I would have written, if I were smarter, knew more, and had more experience (or ANY)...and probably also if I were better looking.

seriously, I've been trying to say some of the less technical points, but clumsily. Lots of information there. Thanks!
 
Larry in TN said:
QF32? The Captain's autobiography, QF32, has a great, detailed, account of the flight.
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When QF32 happened, at first I thought it was no biggie, lose an engine, land. But after looking into it a good bit, those guys were is a real jam when that engine let go. IIRC, it severed hydraulic lines, control circuits, etc., a la United 232. Luckily, not all control was lose, but those guys were dealt a very bad hand and played it very well. That flight was in BAD trouble.

QF72 happened years earlier on an A330, where one of the data processing units started sending out bad AoA data, and the flight protections kicked in, causing two big uncommanded nose downs in flight, many pax injured, some severely. Those guys were dealt a schidt sandwich as well, and did a great job getting it on the ground.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qantas_Flight_72
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4501746/Pilot-QF72-breaks-silence-2008-incident.html
 
"Excessive air loads on the stabilizer may be required to be relieved to correct mis-trim".

So as you're screaming toward earth from 3000ft you need to slow the thing down before you can correct the full nose-down trim that's preventing you from slowing the thing down.

Don't like the sound of that.
 
Checkout_my_Six said:
all good....except, the crew before the Lion Air accident got it. They were able to disable the failure mode and mitigate.....What happened to the Lion Air crew who crashed? vs. the one who survived?

I'd bet a nice crisp Benjie that another US crew has survived this.....and the FAA and Boeing know this.
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They had a third man. A jump seat, deadheading pilot. I read they too were struggling, but having the extra pair of eyes, hands, and not fighting all the things mentioned by sluggo, he could take a breath and see it.

Oh, and also...what kind of logic is that? If one or two or even more crews, on a GOOD day, manage to not crash we're all good?
You can probably throw a hundred people off a ten story building and I bet one or even two would survive. That doesn't mean its a good idea to hop off a ten story building.
 
LongRoadBob said:
They had a third man. A jump seat, deadheading pilot. I read they too were struggling, but having the extra pair of eyes, hands, and not fighting all the things mentioned by sluggo, he could take a breath and see it.

Oh, and also...what kind of logic is that? If one or two or even more crews, on a GOOD day, manage to not crash we're all good?
You can probably throw a hundred people off a ten story building and I bet one or even two would survive. That doesn't mean its a good idea to hop off a ten story building.
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I GOT IT!!!! Just stick a check pilot in the jump seat every flight. Probably more expensive then another software patch, but hey, it's worked at least once.
 
LongRoadBob said:
I’m totally with you up until you started “betting” in the last sentence.

I see a number of posts that have the start point that only the USA produces first rate pilots.
I don’t know squat about the reality. It may be based in reality, I don’t know. On the other hand, I have a problem with the assumption that “third world” countries produce inferior pilots.
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It's not that Americans are inherently superior pilots. It's that the regulatory scheme and market conditions allow US pilots a variety of experiences for those that choose to persue them outside of a commercial cockpit that are not realistically possible in other parts of the globe. Cost of fuel (and fuel tax), user fees, landing fees, registration fees, maintenance requirements, availability of training facilities, disposable income, etc., etc.
 
PPC1052 said:
It's not that Americans are inherently superior pilots. It's that the regulatory scheme and market conditions allow US pilots a variety of experiences for those that choose to persue them outside of a commercial cockpit that are not realistically possible in other parts of the globe. Cost of fuel (and fuel tax), user fees, landing fees, registration fees, maintenance requirements, availability of training facilities, disposable income, etc., etc.
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Fair enough. But still in these cases it is about 4 particular pilots who we don't know their abilities, what kind of pilots they were.
 
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