CRJ collides into Fire engine on runway at La Guardia 3/22/26

midwestpa24 said:
The ARFF crew also bears responsibility
Click to expand...
unpopular position (although every airport SIDA drivers course will stress this):

AIRCRAFT HAVE THE RIGHT OF WAY, ALWAYS. There is absolutely nothing a heavy can do once they have wheels on the ground that doesn't take a few hundred/thousand feet. ATC controls the movement area, but like FAR 91.3 it doesn't mean you give up all responsibility to see and avoid. I'd like to see the airport and the firefighter procedures on crossing runways... I'm gonna make a safe bet of a warm diet cola that it also says that they have the duty to see and avoid and moving aircraft have the right away.

While ATC did make a mistake, the responsibility to take an active runway will always include a visual scan. The weather was not so bad that the CRJ popped out of the clouds at 200 ft or was doing CATII/III ops (i don't think CRJ-700/900 can do CAT-III, but CAT-II is a real thing).

No hate on the responders, but they are the ones that screwed up the most like 80%. ATC maybe 20%, the flight crew 0%.
 
Half Fast said:
And this is why we have juries.

Could 12 people be convinced it’s 4/4 and convict? Doubtful.
Click to expand...
No. Because you'd have to convince a prosecutor and a grand jury first. And factually, you'd need a theory how these guys sitting in the break room would have prevented this accident.
 
There's nothing wrong with a controller arranging his/her breaks so that they have their last break at the end of the shift, but they must remain available for recall until their shift is over. If things get busy, recall one or both to help with the operation. Leaving the facility before the end of the shift is a no-no. It'll be interesting to see if management condoned leaving early.
 
PastZTL said:
There's nothing wrong with a controller arranging his/her breaks so that they have their last break at the end of the shift, but they must remain available for recall until their shift is over. If things get busy, recall one or both to help with the operation. Leaving the facility before the end of the shift is a no-no. It'll be interesting to see if management condoned leaving early.
Click to expand...
But then its really not a "break."
 
then what would you consider a break to consist of?
 
Bob Noel said:
then what would you consider a break to consist of?
Click to expand...
Everyone knows what a break is. For example you work two hours take a ten minute coffee break then go back to work two more hours.

Do you consider showing up 40 minutes late for work a break? Same things as quiting 40 minutes early.
 
I can't see how blaming somebody for not being there is going to solve anything, unless the new system is that there are always 2 people there. That means, by my simple math, 3 people working so that any 1 can take a break and leave 2 people in the tower. Or n and n+1, depending on how many people are required for redundancy.

I do see how blaming two people makes it easier for everyone to continue on, promise that this punishment will fix the problem, and waiting for it to happen again in X years. Because that's the cheap and easy solution, and that's often the choice taken.

Kinda seems like having a procedure in place along the lines of "emergency at airport requiring trucks rolling, unless we have Y people in the control tower, we close the airport until the crisis is over" might work. Yes, people will get all bent out of shape, but believe it or not it's good for people to be bent out of shape once in a while.

Or we just say, it's rare enough, you'll probably be fine.

I'm kinda wondering how the fire department folks are feeling about all of this. They probably aren't thrilled with any of this either, and I could see how they'd want better tracking for their trucks across the country. Guessing on that, though.
 
PastZTL said:
There's nothing wrong with a controller arranging his/her breaks so that they have their last break at the end of the shift, but they must remain available for recall until their shift is over.
Click to expand...
Are you a Controller? (aka: in the know of ATC rules and guidelines?) So if you are on a break, you can be pulled back to plug in? There's no mandatory "I'm on a break, go away" time period?

Just curious because I know of some jobs that if you're on a break you cannot be called back. So if you're break happened to be 20 minutes before you got off shift and the break was required to last 20 minutes, I could see how people would leave with no regrets. Who says you can't be "on break" driving toward home or the bar for those last 20 minutes that you cannot work on anything anyway.
 
M20K said:
Are you a Controller? (aka: in the know of ATC rules and guidelines?) So if you are on a break, you can be pulled back to plug in? There's no mandatory "I'm on a break, go away" time period?

Just curious because I know of some jobs that if you're on a break you cannot be called back. So if you're break happened to be 20 minutes before you got off shift and the break was required to last 20 minutes, I could see how people would leave with no regrets. Who says you can't be "on break" driving toward home or the bar for those last 20 minutes that you cannot work on anything anyway.
Click to expand...
Controllers are subject to recall to work in the operation at any point in their shift.
 
M20K said:
Are you a Controller? (aka: in the know of ATC rules and guidelines?) So if you are on a break, you can be pulled back to plug in? There's no mandatory "I'm on a break, go away" time period?

Just curious because I know of some jobs that if you're on a break you cannot be called back. So if you're break happened to be 20 minutes before you got off shift and the break was required to last 20 minutes, I could see how people would leave with no regrets. Who says you can't be "on break" driving toward home or the bar for those last 20 minutes that you cannot work on anything anyway.
Click to expand...

Not a controller but dealing with typical union rules they would not be subject to recall while on break, but they likely could have been forced overtime if notified prior to clocking out.

My union crew take their lunch break at end of shift and clock out for that unpaid lunch 30 min prior to the published end of shift. That was supposed to be the exception, but it was normalized by management and cannot be gotten back. I do not see an unpaid lunch as the same as a paid break though. Regardless, if management has been allowing this to happen for some time, the union will almost certainly prevent this termination.
 
M20K said:
Who says you can't be "on break" driving toward home or the bar for those last 20 minutes that you cannot work on anything anyway.
Click to expand...
If your shift ends at midnight, and you're on the way to the bar at 11:45, you left work early.

Maybe there's a reason that's ok . But if your timecard says you worked until midnight, that's false.
 
Things work slowly in government. Get a union involved, and that will drag it out further. The FAA may be "moving toward firing", bit I suspect it's a long way from a done deal.
 
A break is defined by Webster as an interruption between two periods of work for the purposes of rest. That would be necessary in an ATC environment to avoid fatigue and keep the controllers sharp.

The conclusion is inescapable: ATC has been hiring former military E-4's. IYKYK
 
If I'm hired for 8 hours of work from 8am to 5pm, what do you care if I start work at 8, take an hour for lunch, and stop work at 5pm, or I start work at 8am, take 30 minutes for lunch, and leave at 4:30pm?

and then there can be discussion of the purpose of a break. Very few people can work continuously for 8 hours without some kind of break. And I doubt controllers are superhuman, I doubt they can maintain full proficiency and safety for hours and hours without a break from the scope.
 
Bob Noel said:
If I'm hired for 8 hours of work from 8am to 5pm, what do you care if I start work at 8, take an hour for lunch, and stop work at 5pm, or I start work at 8am, take 30 minutes for lunch, and leave at 4:30pm?

and then there can be discussion of the purpose of a break. Very few people can work continuously for 8 hours without some kind of break. And I doubt controllers are superhuman, I doubt they can maintain full proficiency and safety for hours and hours without a break from the scope.
Click to expand...

Your arguments contradict each other.
 
But……

The accident happened because another controller cleared a fire truck to cross the runway.

The two controllers in question even if they hadn’t left the building were not in the tower. Even if they were in the tower they did not clear the truck.

These two guys didn’t walk off the tower floor without permission.

So let’s get back to how the error happened, who and/or what policy was at fault.
 
WDD said:
But……

The accident happened because another controller cleared a fire truck to cross the runway.

The two controllers in question even if they hadn’t left the building were not in the tower. Even if they were in the tower they did not clear the truck.

These two guys didn’t walk off the tower floor without permission.

So let’s get back to how the error happened, who and/or what policy was at fault.
Click to expand...
Sounds like a systemic issue with the flight controllers getting complacent and the fire truck knowingly crossing an active runway by "running a red light" when they knew they had to wait despite a go-ahead from the tower.

The only way to correct this issue (two people died) is to fire the all controllers and supervisors working that night.
 
FlightmechH3 said:
Sounds like a systemic issue with the flight controllers getting complacent and the fire truck knowingly crossing an active runway by "running a red light" when they knew they had to wait despite a go-ahead from the tower.

The only way to correct this issue (two people died) is to fire the all controllers and supervisors working that night.
Click to expand...
No, it was a loss of situational awareness by the local controller regarding the Air Jazz flight on final, due to task saturation related to the emergency.
 
WDD said:
But……

The accident happened because another controller cleared a fire truck to cross the runway.

The two controllers in question even if they hadn’t left the building were not in the tower. Even if they were in the tower they did not clear the truck.

These two guys didn’t walk off the tower floor without permission.

So let’s get back to how the error happened, who and/or what policy was at fault.
Click to expand...
In my view, the primary causal factor was an overloaded controller working an emergency and controlling traffic at the same time. Had the two MIA controllers been in the cab, one of them could have taken full control of the emergency and all the ground movements associated with it. That controller would have likely had full situational awareness of the rescue vehicles as opposed to giving instruction and then shifting attention elsewhere - like landing aircraft. That's why this is being discussed. The mishap controller should have never been allowed to be in that position to begin with.
 
KE5BM said:
In my view, the primary causal factor was an overloaded controller working an emergency and controlling traffic at the same time. Had the two MIA controllers been in the cab, one of them could have taken full control of the emergency and all the ground movements associated with it. That controller would have likely had full situational awareness of the rescue vehicles as opposed to giving instruction and then shifting attention elsewhere - like landing aircraft. That's why this is being discussed. The mishap controller should have never been allowed to be in that position to begin with.
Click to expand...
Even just someone there to say “Hey Bob, you can’t cross the truck and land the RJ at the same time.” Or grab a mic and tell the jet to wave off and/or the truck to stop or gun it. Almost any reaction to the situation a few seconds earlier would have made all the difference.
 
iamtheari said:
Even just someone there to say “Hey Bob, you can’t cross the truck and land the RJ at the same time.” Or grab a mic and tell the jet to wave off and/or the truck to stop or gun it. Almost any reaction to the situation a few seconds earlier would have made all the difference.
Click to expand...
At the Class D where I once kept my plane any movement of emergency vehicles closed the airport. That seems like a decent policy.
 
iamtheari said:
Even just someone there to say “Hey Bob, you can’t cross the truck and land the RJ at the same time.” Or grab a mic and tell the jet to wave off and/or the truck to stop or gun it. Almost any reaction to the situation a few seconds earlier would have made all the difference.
Click to expand...

Yes, for sure. Having only one brain and one set of eyes operating and in command during a non-standard fast-breaking situation was an accident just waiting to happen (if that's factual).

Humans make mistakes, we all have and will continue to do so. Having additional controllers available to assist and cross-check each other should greatly improve safety.

IMO, whatever ATC policy was in place that allowed just one active tower operator (if true) at this large and busy big city airport was a primary factor leading up to this event.
 
FlightmechH3 said:
The only way to correct this issue (two people died) is to fire the all controllers and supervisors working that night.
Click to expand...
Fire the procedures and policy instead. Otherwise the replacement controllers will do the same thing.
 
Kenny Phillips said:
At the Class D where I once kept my plane any movement of emergency vehicles closed the airport. That seems like a decent policy.
Click to expand...

It may be too broad of a policy, especially at a big city airport with landing aircraft in trail for many miles, and takeoffs being conducted at the same time.

I've had airport based emergency vehicles following me to the ramp that I didn't request, or need. Any emergency vehicles possibly needed would likely be from another source way off the airport due to not having enough energy available to make it onto the airport property.
 
Bob Noel said:
If I'm hired for 8 hours of work from 8am to 5pm, what do you care if I start work at 8, take an hour for lunch, and stop work at 5pm, or I start work at 8am, take 30 minutes for lunch, and leave at 4:30pm?

and then there can be discussion of the purpose of a break. Very few people can work continuously for 8 hours without some kind of break. And I doubt controllers are superhuman, I doubt they can maintain full proficiency and safety for hours and hours without a break from the scope.
Click to expand...
Because lunch isn't a paid break.

I pay my guys 2- 15 minute breaks a day and they take 1 hour unpaid for lunch. Some are 7-4. Others are 8-5.

Sometimes, especially out in the field I ask them to skip a break in order to get something done. (I'll usually buy lunch to make up for it.) Skipping a 15 minute break doesn't net them 15 minutes overtime, although one gentleman would write "no break" on his timecard.

Personally, I don't care if my guys take a 30 minute lunch and leave 30 minutes early. But I'm going to be a little upset if they decide to skip their paid break and leave early.

I have no idea if it's similar for ATC. But I'll ask my sister's now fiance who works Chicago approach.

I suspect leaving on break was tolerated by upper management as a morale boost. But when people die, things that may or may not have contributed get put under the microscope.
 
The excuse that the controller(s) were overworked/overloaded is wrong. Their job is to keep things safe, not cry that they have to work through a 10 minute break or want to go home. Then get another job.

No one forced you to be an ATC. You chose your fate. Go work in an HR dept at Wal Mart if working in a tower is too hard.

Fire everyone in that tower and others that left work early or gave approval for time card fraud.
 
Rick A said:
IMO, whatever ATC policy was in place that allowed just one active tower operator (if true) at this large and busy big city airport was a primary factor leading up to this event.
Click to expand...
Not true. There were two controllers in the LGA tower as specified in the NTSB preliminary report. Hours after the accident, it was known that there were two controllers in the tower because there were different voices heard on the tower and ground control frequencies.

Both of the controllers were qualified on all positions in the LGA tower. The LC had 18 years ATC experience and the GC (also CIC) had 19 years ATC experience.
 
FlightmechH3 said:
The excuse that the controller(s) were overworked/overloaded is wrong. Their job is to keep things safe....
Click to expand...

Not sure they should be firing people when the ATC system is down in numbers, especially if they are long-term experienced controllers... unless they really have to in order to set an example.

A good friend is a former tower controller retired from ATC. First at JFK, then at a non-federal contracted Class D airport tower out in the country (cost of living in NY was too expensive for him).

He explains at JFK (probably all towers too) there are slow times throughout late night shifts that don't need the full compliment of day or evening shifts of tower controllers. Daytimes there are some ebbs and flows, but at push times safety demanded the most.

Bringing recently hired (some from the military) controllers into the tower can and do at times take up to (in his experience) 2 years before they are fully up to speed and trusted on their own, without another set of eyes watching over them. It was not uncommon at both types of towers to have new controllers cycled out and away to other less busy duties and locations. My friend believes that busy towers are the most demanding ATC job, with the highest level of collision potential.

A quick story recently relayed to him from a Class D tower friend about a new hire that was struggling during a busy time handling multiple arrivals, the last of which had just landed and sent over to the ground controller. Then, he sat down in a chair and said, "Whew, I need a break" and began scrolling on his iPhone. The supervisor said, "What are you sitting down for? There's five planes lined up who've been waiting to depart, get them out of here." I'm sure there are other similar stories, some related to understaffed ATC positions, and others for the caliber of some people hired and placed into the system.

On the job supervision of recent hires by more experienced controllers is likely to be in short supply at many facilities. Experienced long-term controllers are retiring out and taking their experience and skills with them. Don't know if this was a factor at LGA, or not.
 
AquaLand said:
Not true. There were two controllers in the LGA tower as specified in the NTSB preliminary report. Hours after the accident, it was known that there were two controllers in the tower because there were different voices heard on the tower and ground control frequencies.

Both of the controllers were qualified on all positions in the LGA tower. The LC had 18 years ATC experience and the GC (also CIC) had 19 years ATC experience.
Click to expand...
Experienced and qualified controllers......and people died because of them. Home they sleep well at night.
 
WDD said:
So let’s get back to how the error happened, who and/or what policy was at fault.
Click to expand...

Most likely it was a loophole in a policy. The boys on the floor figured out a hack, and the bosses were unable or unwilling to close the door. It would not surprise me if a union CBA played a role.
 
The view is from much higher than 50 feet. From 10,000 feet, the federal workforce is full on nonenforced requirements. For example, the ATO double shift on Thursday for the three day weekend to follow. Another: "head on home, we'll cover for you...."

When I am in a CME meeting, for example, my attendance and availability is mandated to the VERY END. If feel sorry for the two guys who got off early. They are being fired to send a GENERAL COMPLIANCE message.
 
But……. It’s yet to be determined that having the two extra guys in the tower would have made a difference. Maybe that had nothing to do with anything.

Why did the controller let the trucks cross, why did the trucks cross when they had a red light?
 
WDD said:
But……. It’s yet to be determined that having the two extra guys in the tower would have made a difference. Maybe that had nothing to do with anything.

Why did the controller let the trucks cross, why did the trucks cross when they had a red light?
Click to expand...
Loss of situational awareness due to task saturation, possibly combined with emergency fixation and expectation bias. Also known as a helmet fire. It’s the same reason 10,000-hour pilots can crash in ways that 50-hour pilots find surprising.
 
iamtheari said:
Loss of situational awareness due to task saturation, possibly combined with emergency fixation and expectation bias. Also known as a helmet fire. It’s the same reason 10,000-hour pilots can crash in ways that 50-hour pilots find surprising.
Click to expand...
Maybe. If so then they need to revise procedures to have increase mandatory minimum people on floor. Change procedures to cover someone who is handling another emergency.

Or change training on managing situations like this.

Let’s figure out the “Why” behind the “what”.
 
You must log in or register to reply here.
Back
Top