Crash at Reagan National Airport, DC. Helicopter crash into airliner.

Larry in TN said:
If the helicopter had not reported the CRJ in sight and agreed to provide visual separation then they would not have been allowed to continue southbound.
Click to expand...
FlightmechH3 said:
The helicopter pilots failed and needlessly killed a bunch of innocent people.
Click to expand...
The helicopter apparently sighted an aircraft following the Potomac River to the airport in accordance with the Mt. Vernon Visual Approach. It hit an aircraft following I-295, rather than the Potomac, to the airport. Should they have known to look there for the called traffic?
 
dtuuri said:
The helicopter apparently sighted an aircraft following the Potomac River to the airport in accordance with the Mt. Vernon Visual Approach. It hit an aircraft following I-295, rather than the Potomac, to the airport. Should they have known to look there for the called traffic?
Click to expand...

Yes
 
dtuuri said:
Show me on the chart where it says that.
Click to expand...

The chart of how to not hit stuff and die, or the chart of common sense?

If you say you have the traffic in sight, you better be looking at it, that’s how that works

This is a reason some pilots will never report traffic in sight, you take on responsibility when you say that, if you can’t handle that responsibility don’t say you have traffic in sight.

It is that simple


Sadly for the crew and pax of that airliner the helicopter crew was more interested in quickly completing their chauffeur training than their safety.
 
flyingcheesehead said:
I know better camera work exists of this, but it seems to only show the last 30 seconds and be on crappy "news" shows that are exploiting it for clicks.

So here's the whole performance, even though it seems to have been taken on a cell phone it's worth a watch. Don't miss the second half when three additional skaters join him.


Oh, I should also mention that when I was looking for this I found a thread on Reddit that said it was his father's favorite song, and the lyrics are roughly translated as follows:

The night and the silence given forever
It's raining, or maybe snow is falling
Anyway, I'm endlessly warmed by hope.
I see a city in the distance that doesn't exist.

Where is it easy to find shelter for a traveler
Where they surely remember and wait
Day after day, now losing, now confusing the trail
I'm going to this city that doesn't exist.

There's a hearth burning for me.
As an eternal sign of forgotten truths
I'm one last step away from him.
And this step is longer than life.

Who will answer me what fate has given?
Don't let anyone know about it.
Maybe beyond the threshold of wasted years
I'll find this city that doesn't exist.

There's a hearth burning for me.
As an eternal sign of forgotten truths
I'm one last step away from him.
And this step is longer than life.

There's a hearth burning for me.
As an eternal sign of forgotten truths
I'm one last step away from him.
And this step is longer than life.
Click to expand...
How touching, yet heartbreaking as well.

Airplane crashes leave gaping holes in so many lives, and I think perhaps when those involved are known to us, we as a group may be more susceptible to those effects than non aviators, because many times the cause of the mishap is something that could easily have been avoided. We curse fate because we know those lost should still be with us, and the pain is like a punch to the face.

As an example, two recent fatal crashes involved an improperly secured door. Those type of losses are particularly painful for me, because that was the cause of a crash that claimed the lives of six people forty years ago last month. The victims were the parents of my closest friends, and reconciling the loss has been a journey that has yet to end.

Thanks for taking the time to read this. It helps.
 
dtuuri said:
Not really. Somebody in the past 50 years decided to re-define "follow the Potomac" to mean "cross the Potomac". There's the culprit.
Click to expand...

Somehow I don’t think that excuse would work if it was a private rich guy in a bell 407 smashing into a airliner

You say you have the traffic and will avoid, that’s a wrap

But plenty of other blame to go around

I’d wager there will be very minimal if any consequences for any GS workers, as always


MauleSkinner said:
So you’re saying the collision was intentional?
Click to expand...

If I wanted to say that I would have, I was clear in my statement

They valued their chauffeur training over the lives of the crew and pax flying in and out of that busy airport. Maybe they were just grossly negligent, maybe expectation basis, maybe normalizing of deviation, maybe a combo of the above.
 
Roller said:
If I wanted to say that I would have, I was clear in my statement

They valued their chauffeur training over the lives of the crew and pax flying in and out of that busy airport. Maybe they were just grossly negligent, maybe expectation basis, maybe normalizing of deviation, maybe a combo of the above.
Click to expand...
Maybe they made a simple,honest mistake.
 
Roller said:
I don’t even reckon I need my magic 8 ball when all the ATC, and prior comms and radar tracks are on YouTube for the world to see
Click to expand...
I don’t see anything that says, “we’re playing fast and loose,” “we’re placing training above safety,” or any of the other things you claim the helicopter pilots were thinking.
 
PastZTL said:
If the helo does see the arrival, they are instructed to maintain visual separation from the aircraft. The position of the CRJ was given, the type, and the intended route of flight.
Click to expand...
From what I've heard, from listening to many other recordings of the PAT traffic around DCA, the helicopter pilots immediately report traffic in sight and request visual separation every single time traffic is pointed out to them. That suggests to me, that the pilots in that unit have a practice of reporting the traffic in sight regardless of whether or not they see them with the expectation that they will pick them up in time to stay separated. That may be the normalization of deviance that has been uncovered by this accident.

dtuuri said:
The helicopter apparently sighted an aircraft following the Potomac River to the airport in accordance with the Mt. Vernon Visual Approach. It hit an aircraft following I-295, rather than the Potomac, to the airport. Should they have known to look there for the called traffic?
Click to expand...
While you believe that the instructions from the charted visual approach apply to airplanes transitioning to runway 33, the airline pilots who fly that procedure do not.
 
Larry in TN said:
. . . That suggests to me, that the pilots in that unit have a practice of reporting the traffic in sight regardless of whether or not they see them with the expectation that they will pick them up in time to stay separated. That may be the normalization of deviance that has been uncovered by this accident . . .
Click to expand...
My old English teacher told me to "fake it 'till you make it", my CFI did not.
 
dtuuri said:
The helicopter apparently sighted an aircraft following the Potomac River to the airport in accordance with the Mt. Vernon Visual Approach. It hit an aircraft following I-295, rather than the Potomac, to the airport. Should they have known to look there for the called traffic?
Click to expand...
At the initial traffic call, the CRJ was just beginning to deviate from the MTV1 visual track. Thus, it should have made no difference where the CRJ was going to track as the PAT25 crew had indicated the CRJ had been identified and they would maintain visual contact. If visual contact was lost, the PAT25 crew was obligated to immediately inform ATC.

As to what the PAT25 crew should have expected regarding the CRJ, I think it is completely unreasonable for the crew to have expected the CRJ to continue to track the MTV1 visual north of the Wilson Bridge given that the PAT25 crew had been informed the CRJ was inbound for 33. That would be quite a feat of airmanship for a CRJ to track up the center of the river until breaking off for 33. Even if that had been the case, the CRJ would still have presented a collision threat to PAT25, requiring continuous visual contact.

The reality is that 95% of the aircraft landing on runway 33 at DCA follow approximately the same track as that flown by the accident CRJ. As operators based at DAA that regularly fly Route 4, the PAT25 crew should have known (and almost certainly did know) this. The DCA ATIS indicated runway 33 (and 1) was in use and the moderate, gusty NW winds should have made the PAT25 crew aware that more than typical amount of traffic would be landing 33 that evening. All of this should have been part of PAT25’s mission briefing.

All that being said, it’s possible that the NTSB will recommend that a visual approach path to 33 should be published.
 
so, we going with this then?

eman1200 said:
e2ce02614cb713dd55d8c1a901ea179b.gif
Click to expand...
 
Good article on the “short comings” of using visual separation.

www.ifr-magazine.com

IFR/VFR Separation - IFR Magazine

Regulations prevent collisions through right-of-way rules. These codified decencies apply to the road, sea and air. For aviation, 14 CFR §91.113 warns that regardless of whether an operation is conducted under instrument flight rules or visual flight rules, vigilance shall be maintained by each...
www.ifr-magazine.com www.ifr-magazine.com
 
MauleSkinner said:
If that were true, the fact that there were no previous accidents means it was safe prior to this accident.
Click to expand...
This is the definition of Normalization of Deviance.

I would like challenge anyone here to step forward to justify these CoG flights that were allowed to play chicken.

Heck, let's just throw out all Aviation rules and go visual separation.
 
Roller said:
The chart of how to not hit stuff and die, or the chart of common sense?

If you say you have the traffic in sight, you better be looking at it, that’s how that works

This is a reason some pilots will never report traffic in sight, you take on responsibility when you say that, if you can’t handle that responsibility don’t say you have traffic in sight.

It is that simple


Sadly for the crew and pax of that airliner the helicopter crew was more interested in quickly completing their chauffeur training than their safety.
Click to expand...
Thank you.
 
FlightmechH3 said:
This is the definition of Normalization of Deviance.

I would like challenge anyone here to step forward to justify these CoG flights that were allowed to play chicken.

Heck, let's just throw out all Aviation rules and go visual separation.
Click to expand...

Remember the FaA designed the routes and made no special changes to 7110.65 in doing so.

I get the emotion behind this event, but every controller and pilot who utilized the approved routes and methods instead of saying “unable” played a part in the accident chain.

That Congress kept piling s- -t in the 5lb sock that DCA is also is a contributing factor.

There’s plenty of blame to go around, but to learn from this accident we need to be examining if visual separation is “safe enough”in a high density, low altitude traffic area. Is it “safe enough” for only one of at least three participants (2 aircraft + ATC) to be able to make that declaration or should more than one participant in the deal be required to concur?

Looking at the 9, I think it is, other major metropolises with defined H routes, has the rigor the NTSB applied to route analysis been performed? Why do those areas get a pass?

None of the emotion brings anybody back and ignoring that the same things happen elsewhere in the NAS only does nothing to reduce the risk.

But “zero” fatals just isn’t achievable; neither is zero mid-airs. Lots can be done to make it low risk and even more can be done to continue to lower that risk, but it’ll never be zero risk unless we put aviation back in the genie’s bottle.
 
TCABM said:
Remember the FaA designed the routes and made no special changes to 7110.65 in doing so.

I get the emotion behind this event, but every controller and pilot who utilized the approved routes and methods instead of saying “unable” played a part in the accident chain.

That Congress kept piling s- -t in the 5lb sock that DCA is also is a contributing factor.

There’s plenty of blame to go around, but to learn from this accident we need to be examining if visual separation is “safe enough”in a high density, low altitude traffic area. Is it “safe enough” for only one of at least three participants (2 aircraft + ATC) to be able to make that declaration or should more than one participant in the deal be required to concur?

Looking at the 9, I think it is, other major metropolises with defined H routes, has the rigor the NTSB applied to route analysis been performed? Why do those areas get a pass?

None of the emotion brings anybody back and ignoring that the same things happen elsewhere in the NAS only does nothing to reduce the risk.

But “zero” fatals just isn’t achievable; neither is zero mid-airs. Lots can be done to make it low risk and even more can be done to continue to lower that risk, but it’ll never be zero risk unless we put aviation back in the genie’s bottle.
Click to expand...
Risk.

I've flown many times in zero-zero conditions that all flights were grounded in SE AK. We knew the risks and people depended on us who were in trouble. Flown into horrible storms in the Gulf of Mexico with hurricane-force winds. We knew the risks, but we also knew when to pull the plug if it came to that.

It's risk management and lessons learned from other crashes. Not one person stepped up here to say "this is unsafe". I guess it's great for an Army pilot to get another feather in their cap and get promoted, means to not rock the boat and get the CoG taxi service flight time. Maybe rub elbows with a Senator or a 3-Star.

This crash was preventable.
 
flyingron said:
Again, once they were told to circle to 33 it necessarily removed the follow the river "guarantee."
Click to expand...
No, the exception proves the rule. Other Charted Visual Approaches specify the runway while this one states the "Airport'. We (meaning us old-timers) flew the same approach at the same speeds and stayed over the river. It was kind of fun, by the way.

Larry in TN said:
While you believe that the instructions from the charted visual approach apply to airplanes transitioning to runway 33, the airline pilots who fly that procedure do not.
Click to expand...
Therein lies the problem, imo. I'm guessing somebody felt the need to utilize the FMS' runway centerline feature and felt they needed more time to set up the avionics. We used our eyes.

AquaLand said:
That would be quite a feat of airmanship for a CRJ to track up the center of the river until breaking off for 33.
Click to expand...
Who said the center?

AquaLand said:
Even if that had been the case, the CRJ would still have presented a collision threat to PAT25, requiring continuous visual contact.
Click to expand...
They might have seen all those lights on the CRJ if it was coming straight at them instead of from over to their left behind the windshield post hidden in a sea of ground-level lighting.
AquaLand said:
The reality is that 95% of the aircraft landing on runway 33 at DCA follow approximately the same track as that flown by the accident CRJ.
Click to expand...
I don't doubt that, but they should have had the approach changed before they modified their SOPs.
 
FlightmechH3 said:
… It's risk management and lessons learned from other crashes. Not one person stepped up here to say "this is unsafe"...
Click to expand...
I don’t disagree this was preventable; the vast majority of mishaps. The question I’m asking is what effort is being put into examining the risk posed in other high-density, low altitude environments.

To think this problem isn’t going to be compounded as delivery drones and whatever urban air mobility evolves into is putting our heads in the sand, just as it is to say this is the only place this type of mishap can happen.

How do NAS participants force the FAA’s hands? Unable works, but has its drawbacks to things airlines think is important, like on-time arrivals and you can’t sideline vertical lift or GA, whether it’s SETP or just plain old SEP GA unless you want the rest of world model of air space.
 
Larry in TN said:
From what I've heard, from listening to many other recordings of the PAT traffic around DCA, the helicopter pilots immediately report traffic in sight and request visual separation every single time traffic is pointed out to them. That suggests to me, that the pilots in that unit have a practice of reporting the traffic in sight regardless of whether or not they see them with the expectation that they will pick them up in time to stay separated.
Click to expand...

Thanks for researching this. I was wondering if this practice was part of that unit's aviation culture and if this will be probed by army investigators.
 
The major factor that we are ignoring for most of this debate is that the Army saved money by doing two certifications in one flight, NVG's, and the Potomac River routes.
Without NVG's, the normal wide angle vision of the naked eye would almost certainly have identified the nearer airliner, even though it was no longer directly over the Potomac.
Without the NVG's, their radar altitude would have been readily used, and an altitude of 50 feet safely maintained.
Without NVG's, they would have easily stayed over the east shore, left side of the river.
Without NVG's, scan inside, then out, and back in would have been easy and routine.

NVG training should take place away from other aviation traffic, and in low light regions. George Washington National Forrest, perhaps?
 
Daleandee said:
That's a grossly unfair assessment to say the least ...
Click to expand...

How do you figure?

I mean could you imagine a nuclear attack where the sub under secretary of bovine dance theory couldn’t be helo evacuated past the mass traffic of all the tax payers? How would civilization continue!!
 
PastZTL said:
What am I not getting about this?

If the helo does not see the arrival, they are instructed to hold until the conflict is resolved. They are procedurally separated.

If the helo does see the arrival, they are instructed to maintain visual separation from the aircraft. The position of the CRJ was given, the type, and the intended route of flight.

Visual separation is used hundreds of times (or more) throughout the NAS daily. I read phrases like, "the normalization of deviance," and, "an accident waiting to happen." I've seen a cross-section map showing 75' of vertical separation, as if the procedure was being used to vertically separate the aircraft, but it was not, and cannot.
Click to expand...
The problem is that there are no layers of safety in visual separation. It is entirely put upon one human being to not f up, and humans f up a lot.

It's possible for any pilot to see the wrong aircraft and visually separate themselves from it. It's that much more likely when you're on NVGs and you don't have the field of view that you would visually.

I think if we don't begin to prohibit visual separation on NVGs we've missed a big point of this whole thing.

Roller said:
The chart of how to not hit stuff and die, or the chart of common sense?

If you say you have the traffic in sight, you better be looking at it, that’s how that works
Click to expand...
And yet, there is no way to 100% verify that you are looking at the correct traffic. Based on the numbers from the following post, separation gets down to less than 1500 feet laterally and 200 feet vertically a little over twice per month. Nobody looked at that and thought "Gee, maybe we shouldn't be cutting things so close because we're only one additional risk factor away from a crash"?

GilligansRodeo said:
A review of commercial operations at DCA (instrument flight rules departuresor arrivals) between October 2021 and December 2024 indicated a total of 944,179operations. During that time, there were 15,214 occurrences between commercial airplanes and helicopters in which there was a lateral separation distance of less than 1 nm and vertical separation of less than 400 ft. There were 85 recorded events that involved a lateral separation less than 1,500 ft and vertical separation less than 200 ft.
Click to expand...

MauleSkinner said:
I don’t see anything that says, “we’re playing fast and loose,” “we’re placing training above safety,” or any of the other things you claim the helicopter pilots were thinking.
Click to expand...
Not these particular pilots, but the entire group of military brass, air traffic controllers, and pilots who were aware of the risky situation here and did nothing to change it.
 
You must log in or register to reply here.
Back
Top