Following all the reliable post-crash information we've seen so far in this accident, I'll go out on a limb and propose a WAG as to what I think may have happened. No disrespect is intended, just a stab at some quasi-familiarity of this situation (which I've survived similar in bolder days), and speculating where it went wrong.
The pilot was relatively new flying in this aircraft, as it appears it was up for sale late last summer (AUG 2024), then purchased at some point and repainted with the N666DS vanity registration number. New paint is not a quick job that ever goes smoothly on an older aircraft (1985), so there likely was a fair amount of down time somewhere during six to nine months of his ownership.
If this pilot was active (which I've been told he was) in running a multi-employee business that relied heavily upon personal contacts with many people. He likely didn't have a whole bunch of time in his new plane, particularly while conducting low instrument approaches at night, solo.
Coming out of a concert in Manhattan, herding a group of at least six people, possibly getting some food, obtaining a ride out to Teterboro (NYC area traffic is a bit*ch), obtaining a briefing, filing the IFR, pre-flighting, taxi, picking up the clearance and departing NY airspace took some time. Probably more than he had hoped. The fatigue factor was likely beginning before departure on the first leg to ICT.
Wichita (ICT) was a good choice for fuel. There is a very nice hotel within an easy walking distance from an excellent FBO (Yingling). By the time the turn-around was completed, he would have known (likely knew it already) that the weather was down in San Diego, and was going to be down all night. Not remaining at ICT was a bad idea.
The easy part of the late flight went smoothly until the descent into SoCal. By not utilizing some enroute time to pick the best destination (none of the coastal ones were pretty), and consider all the logistics involved in his selection (including NOTAMS), he (IMO) got behind the aircraft and didn't realize how hard it is to visually pick up approach lights with the potential of 1/2 mile and 200' ceilings in fog at the DH.
I believe his last transmission heard before impacting the wires was clicking the transmitter to turn on the approach and runway lights. The final WAG wild guess is while clicking he was intently looking outside into the fog, and not seeing anything. Particularly if his landing lights were on, which they probably were, illuminating nothingness. During this clicking the transmitter and looking ahead, he allowed the aircraft to sink below the glide slope and impact wires on top of the small hill. As simple as that.
An afterthought: The radio conversations with SoCal approach were on an approach frequency, and the controller authorized a frequency change (without sharing it) to the tower freq with a reminder to cancel the IFR. If the tower frequency to activate the approach lighting was not yet set up in the flip-flop, entering it and flipping was one more distraction at a bad (and late) time to accomplish for a pilot who got behind. I wonder if the transmissions that are out in the public had the clicking on SoCom's, or if the tower frequency clicking was added clicking heard the end of the tape?