Citation into Homes, San Diego, 5/22/25

“When the altimeter setting(s) on which the approach is based is not available, the approach is not authorized” AIM 5-4-5.a.4
Right, but legalities aside, is it the “why” behind the accident? There are plenty of things we’re assuming, and we’d have to add that he, with no prompting from anyone else, decided to dial in an enormously high altimeter setting to make the causation match the result. This, despite having hit other altitudes successfully on the way down.
 
Old sales listing for the airframe https://www.aircraft.com/aircraft/233112243/n52ft-1985-cessna-citation-siii

It had the Willimas engines then so it should have been worth over 2M if it was still on an engine program.

“When the altimeter setting(s) on which the approach is based is not available, the approach is not authorized” AIM 5-4-5.a.4
The lawyers representing the families of the deceased are going to appreciate that information....
 
Something I’ve been pondering is would a person attempt to fly down to the published AGL (HAT) minimums using a radar altimeter in conjunction with a LNAV approach versus using the baro (MSL) minimums? The Allied Gardens area is a valley with elevations that get as low as 70’ at the San Diego River, which is along the flight path less than a mile before it rapidly swings back up to that 420’ mesa (plus obstacle) where they impacted. Like a dive and drive down to the 417’ “minimum descent height” (not really a thing, but bear with me), which is almost exactly the altitude of the mesa. In the profile, he does start to level off just before the wires (which could also have been due to a number of other factors). I don’t know why a person with local knowledge of the undulating area would do that, but people omit and fixate on weird things, especially when they’re tired and/or stressed. But again, he seemed to have had a GTN, which should have been throwing TAWS alerts at him, provided they were installed/activated/not inhibited.

Also considering automation issues, which would be a much simpler explanation.
 
Something that just occurred to me.....with the AWOS being down, tower closed and therefore no local altimeter setting (approach plate does not specify an alternate altimeter setting), can you legally fly the approach using the Miramar altimeter?

I don't think you can.
I think some approach plates will reference to this as well.
 
I don't know why I didn't think about that myself. I ended up at Ramona a couple years ago as an alternate due to the same kind of marine layer.

Wasn't a great experience. The people were unhelpful, borderline rude.

Their recommended driver never answered calls.

The tie downs were unusable because the rings were embedded in the asphalt. Then I got scolded for using a screwdriver to clear the rings sufficiently to get a rope through.

I called an uber to take me into town and, holy cow did I smell! I had been camping for three weeks and fairly modest opportunity to clean up. I had become totally nose blind. Got to the hotel, showered, went to dinner, came back to my room and had to put those clothes in a plastic bag. Still feel badly for that driver!

Then I went to Mexico for 2-3 months, walking across the border and leaving the plane in Ramona. When I got back I had a flat tire. I was parked right in front of the FBO and they knew my plan. No idea why they didn't bother to, you know, give me a call.

Lastly, I had hundreds of dollars worth of drone batteries ruined by being expose to the heat.

But, you know what didn't happen. I didn't end up CFIT trying to make an unwise approach. I guess I would make the same choice again.

Let me guess, Pacific Executive. Gotta go to Chuck. And yeah, gets hot at RNM, but how's anyone else's fault?

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The lawyers representing the families of the deceased are going to appreciate that information....
Woe to the families if they hire lawyers not already familiar with the FARs and AIM (and much other relevant information and law).
 
Following all the reliable post-crash information we've seen so far in this accident, I'll go out on a limb and propose a WAG as to what I think may have happened. No disrespect is intended, just a stab at some quasi-familiarity of this situation (which I've survived similar in bolder days), and speculating where it went wrong.

The pilot was relatively new flying in this aircraft, as it appears it was up for sale late last summer (AUG 2024), then purchased at some point and repainted with the N666DS vanity registration number. New paint is not a quick job that ever goes smoothly on an older aircraft (1985), so there likely was a fair amount of down time somewhere during six to nine months of his ownership.

If this pilot was active (which I've been told he was) in running a multi-employee business that relied heavily upon personal contacts with many people. He likely didn't have a whole bunch of time in his new plane, particularly while conducting low instrument approaches at night, solo.

Coming out of a concert in Manhattan, herding a group of at least six people, possibly getting some food, obtaining a ride out to Teterboro (NYC area traffic is a bit*ch), obtaining a briefing, filing the IFR, pre-flighting, taxi, picking up the clearance and departing NY airspace took some time. Probably more than he had hoped. The fatigue factor was likely beginning before departure on the first leg to ICT.

Wichita (ICT) was a good choice for fuel. There is a very nice hotel within an easy walking distance from an excellent FBO (Yingling). By the time the turn-around was completed, he would have known (likely knew it already) that the weather was down in San Diego, and was going to be down all night. Not remaining at ICT was a bad idea.

The easy part of the late flight went smoothly until the descent into SoCal. By not utilizing some enroute time to pick the best destination (none of the coastal ones were pretty), and consider all the logistics involved in his selection (including NOTAMS), he (IMO) got behind the aircraft and didn't realize how hard it is to visually pick up approach lights with the potential of 1/2 mile and 200' ceilings in fog at the DH.

I believe his last transmission heard before impacting the wires was clicking the transmitter to turn on the approach and runway lights. The final WAG wild guess is while clicking he was intently looking outside into the fog, and not seeing anything. Particularly if his landing lights were on, which they probably were, illuminating nothingness. During this clicking the transmitter and looking ahead, he allowed the aircraft to sink below the glide slope and impact wires on top of the small hill. As simple as that.


An afterthought: The radio conversations with SoCal approach were on an approach frequency, and the controller authorized a frequency change (without sharing it) to the tower freq with a reminder to cancel the IFR. If the tower frequency to activate the approach lighting was not yet set up in the flip-flop, entering it and flipping was one more distraction at a bad (and late) time to accomplish for a pilot who got behind. I wonder if the transmissions that are out in the public had the clicking on SoCom's, or if the tower frequency clicking was added clicking heard the end of the tape?
 
The lawyers representing the families of the deceased are going to appreciate that information....
No lights either according to this:

 
No lights either according to this:

But AP sez: "The pilot also would have likely noticed the lights weren’t working as he descended."

Because, you know, there was such great visibility. :mad:
 
Following all the reliable post-crash information we've seen so far in this accident, I'll go out on a limb and propose a WAG as to what I think may have happened. No disrespect is intended, just a stab at some quasi-familiarity of this situation (which I've survived similar in bolder days), and speculating where it went wrong.

The pilot was relatively new flying in this aircraft, as it appears it was up for sale late last summer (AUG 2024), then purchased at some point and repainted with the N666DS vanity registration number. New paint is not a quick job that ever goes smoothly on an older aircraft (1985), so there likely was a fair amount of down time somewhere during six to nine months of his ownership.

If this pilot was active (which I've been told he was) in running a multi-employee business that relied heavily upon personal contacts with many people. He likely didn't have a whole bunch of time in his new plane, particularly while conducting low instrument approaches at night, solo.

Coming out of a concert in Manhattan, herding a group of at least six people, possibly getting some food, obtaining a ride out to Teterboro (NYC area traffic is a bit*ch), obtaining a briefing, filing the IFR, pre-flighting, taxi, picking up the clearance and departing NY airspace took some time. Probably more than he had hoped. The fatigue factor was likely beginning before departure on the first leg to ICT.

Wichita (ICT) was a good choice for fuel. There is a very nice hotel within an easy walking distance from an excellent FBO (Yingling). By the time the turn-around was completed, he would have known (likely knew it already) that the weather was down in San Diego, and was going to be down all night. Not remaining at ICT was a bad idea.

The easy part of the late flight went smoothly until the descent into SoCal. By not utilizing some enroute time to pick the best destination (none of the coastal ones were pretty), and consider all the logistics involved in his selection (including NOTAMS), he (IMO) got behind the aircraft and didn't realize how hard it is to visually pick up approach lights with the potential of 1/2 mile and 200' ceilings in fog at the DH.

I believe his last transmission heard before impacting the wires was clicking the transmitter to turn on the approach and runway lights. The final WAG wild guess is while clicking he was intently looking outside into the fog, and not seeing anything. Particularly if his landing lights were on, which they probably were, illuminating nothingness. During this clicking the transmitter and looking ahead, he allowed the aircraft to sink below the glide slope and impact wires on top of the small hill. As simple as that.


An afterthought: The radio conversations with SoCal approach were on an approach frequency, and the controller authorized a frequency change (without sharing it) to the tower freq with a reminder to cancel the IFR. If the tower frequency to activate the approach lighting was not yet set up in the flip-flop, entering it and flipping was one more distraction at a bad (and late) time to accomplish for a pilot who got behind. I wonder if the transmissions that are out in the public had the clicking on SoCom's, or if the tower frequency clicking was added clicking heard the end of the tape?
The clicks were on MYF’s CTAF right after a 3-mile final call from 6DS

But there’s a lot of evidence (even briefed by the NTSB) that the MALSR and PAPI were NOTAMed out of service, which would not have helped things with such low weather.

Despite that, the crash was almost 2 miles away and I don’t think they would have seen them from there whether they had been on glidepath or not.
 
“When the altimeter setting(s) on which the approach is based is not available, the approach is not authorized” AIM 5-4-5.a.4

AIM is not CFR…but is a good practice. Some plates allow alternative baro settings but will add xxx feet to mins.

Night, no wx reporting, low ifr, and if i remember correctly the approach lights were inop… bad call on taking a peek.
 
Regarding the paint job comment in post #90, the online pics of N52FT show a paint scheme identical to N666DS so it’s possible that only the tail number was repainted after change of ownership.

Given that the weather associated with this accident was a coastal marine layer (inland airports were clear), I suspect that most of the accident approach was flown in VMC with the pilot’s eyes biased toward looking outside vs flying/monitoring the instruments. For pilots not proficient in IMC flying, an approach with a late transition from VMC to IMC can be disorienting.
 
Regarding the paint job comment in post #90, the online pics of N52FT show a paint scheme identical to N666DS so it’s possible that only the tail number was repainted after change of ownership.

Given that the weather associated with this accident was a coastal marine layer (inland airports were clear), I suspect that most of the accident approach was flown in VMC with the pilot’s eyes biased toward looking outside vs flying/monitoring the instruments. For pilots not proficient in IMC flying, an approach with a late transition from VMC to IMC can be disorienting.

Especially when in the clear just above the tops of a real low layer of ground fog, where it's often possible to see ground lights while looking straight down, but nothing shows up anywhere ahead (slant range). Around here in the east, sometimes the tops are so low that cell phone towers (and other red-lighted towers) are sticking out of the tops and into the clear. Don't know anything about the fog along the west coast, but 1/2 mile vis on the ground means it's pretty thick.
 
AIM is not CFR…but is a good practice. Some plates allow alternative baro settings but will add xxx feet to mins.

Night, no wx reporting, low ifr, and if i remember correctly the approach lights were inop… bad call on taking a peek.
No, AIM is not C.F.R. So what? "AIM is not Regulatory" as my article argues, is at best a misleading half-truth. "Is not authorized" is not quite the same as "should not be flown." So, if some plates allow alternative vetted baro settings, does that mean you can use anything you want?

Or is this one of those where the AIM is just telling us hat the regulations mean? After all, the approach itself is a regulatory creature; does what the plate provides combined with the 91.175(a) requirement to use the published IAP limit you to what it says?

What we don't know, as mentioned before, is whether ATC had a local altimeter setting.
 
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AIM is not CFR…but is a good practice. Some plates allow alternative baro settings but will add xxx feet to mins.

Night, no wx reporting, low ifr, and if i remember correctly the approach lights were inop… bad call on taking a peek.
Typically the ones that mention getting altimeter settings from other airports as a primary do not have reporting on-field. And yeah, some have the alternate options with increased minimums the farther away they are. I’m not sure why MYF doesn’t have that.

But I agree, it’s not regulatory but ends up being in yet another legal gray area - probably could use more precise language and clarification. There’s going to be increased scrutiny and attention on this.
 
What we don't know, as mentioned before, is whether ATC had a local altimeter setting.
Miramar (KNKX) is 4 miles away and is the altimeter setting SOCAL gives with flight following in the local area. I don't know if that could/would suffice for a Montgomery (KMYF) setting though.
 
boned up or peeked-and-lost a step down in IMC, happens all the time. Nothing new. For sure, the ADM wrt flying SP WOCL was relatively atrocious, but ultimately merely contributory.

According to google fu, not even the first time that duck down has got people into that field. The rest of the space aliens exploration is prospecting for the lawsuits, which were gonna happen anyways. That angle I find even more banal.
 
The only thing I can think of that might have made a difference is if that airplane was non-WAAS. Max Trescott goes over the accident on his Aviation NewsTalk podcast and pulled the descent profile from one of the ADS-B sites. There are significant excursions from the glidepath that could mean a number of things. One is non-WAAS which then begs the question, why not use the ILS? The other is not flying it very well after a long day and night.
Let’s see, approach to mins after flying all night? Seems like a good time to let the AP fly the approach while the PIC monitors…
 
Given that the weather associated with this accident was a coastal marine layer (inland airports were clear), I suspect that most of the accident approach was flown in VMC with the pilot’s eyes biased toward looking outside vs flying/monitoring the instruments. For pilots not proficient in IMC flying, an approach with a late transition from VMC to IMC can be disorienting.
At 3:30 in the morning arriving over a San Diego marine layer you think he's eyes outside?

I'm guessing you haven't made an arrival to MYF in the dark with a marine layer....

FWIW MYF was my home base when I lived in SD and good chunk of my early IFR days was spent in SoCal airspace. The marine layer is not typically very thick, but it is thick enough that you aren't seeing the lights below when you are above the layer.
 
Let’s see, approach to mins after flying all night? Seems like a good time to let the AP fly the approach while the PIC monitors…
Agree.....until the A/P doesn't ARM or capture GS and you're suddenly hand-flying. I'm not arguing with you, just have a suspicion that may have been his plan and it didn't work out.
 
TERPS talks about doing this but I don’t understand the when conditions well. @RussR?
TERPS (actually the 8260.19) allows backup altimeter source information to not be published if the primary source is considered reliable enough, and a few other factors.

This has changed over the years, so seeing a backup altimeter note on a chart doesn't necessarily mean anything about the primary source.

I believe the intent here was to reduce the amount of chart notes, however that's just my opinion.

I have numerous thoughts and background on this policy and its repercussions/unintended consequences that I am not going to discuss on this forum, especially considering this accident. But I am happy to expound on them in person, preferably with a beer in hand.
 
Let’s see, approach to mins after flying all night? Seems like a good time to let the AP fly the approach while the PIC monitors…
That's the kind of risk-compensating attitude towards IMC in the age of "flying" being relegated to button pushing, that gets people killed on the regular. Frankly I can't believe this has to be spelled out: If you're too fatigued to hand fly it, you're too fatigued to be the glove-save.

The ADM answer is: don't do that, and live.

But you can't tell kerosene burners that; they didn't rich hard to have to drive the final 30 miles like a poor.
 
If you're too fatigued to hand fly it, you're too fatigued to be the glove-save.
True. Same goes for proficiency, fatigued or not. Approaching the DH on a precision approach in low IFR while hand-flying, or coupled to the A/P, you better be on your game. IMO it's best to be hand-flying at some point prior to the DH. Had a "Go-Around" button on an old unreliable Century 41 autopilot and NEVER considered using it on a coupled ILS missed approach, ever.
 
Here’s a more complete timeline:

The aircraft departed from Teterboro at ~0315z (11:15pm EDT/8:15pm PDT) and landed at Jabara in Wichita at ~0650z (2:50am EDT/1:50am CDT/11:50pm PDT). That’s about 3.6 hours in the air.

After about a 45 minute stop, it then departed Jabara at ~0735z (3:35am EDT/2:35am CDT/12:35pm PDT) and crashed at ~1047z (6:47am EDT/3:47am PDT). Another 3.2 in the air for a total of 6.8 flight time and 7.5 total time since departure.

That’s a long night. I agree with the circadian rhythm and fatigue possibilities.
I know I'm preaching to the choir here, but: Departing at 11:15 PM from NYC on the way to San Diego, after what I assume was a full work day.

I'd dread that trip as a passenger sitting in the back of an airliner. I can't even fathom doing that as PIC.
 
Why not use the ILS? I read that the GS was NOTAMed OOS.
For the general public, there isn’t currently a lot of clarity as to what was NOTAMed out, when, and it’s causing a lot of confusion. Even the NTSB briefing was a little confusing - there were several items mentioned that, based on the information one can pull from the NOTAM archive viewer, were not active at the time of the accident sequence.

For instance, from what I can glean, the PAPI and MALS NOTAMs were cancelled on the 21st and didn’t become active again until after the accident. The G/P of the ILS wasn’t NOTAMed until much later in the day of the 22nd, well after the accident. Only the RAIL (the strobes of the MALSR) was NOTAMed out at the time of the accident.

But the NTSB has a lot better info, so I guess we have to wait for the official findings for any clarity.
 
For instance, from what I can glean, the PAPI and MALS NOTAMs were cancelled on the 21st and didn’t become active again until after the accident. The G/P of the ILS wasn’t NOTAMed until much later in the day of the 22nd, well after the accident. Only the RAIL (the strobes of the MALSR) was NOTAMed out at the time of the accident.
Yes. Based on the NOTAMS hyperlink on the top of the Foreflight MYF RNAV 28R approach plate, it is not an intuitive click into NOTAM world (same as many NOTAM's).

Exactly, what is a RAI (RAIL?)? Or G/P (glide path rather than Glide Slope?)? And those lighting NOTAM's are way down a big list... listed by recency, and not importance. I know 200' cranes a located couple of miles away from the airport maybe important for certain operations.

Approach plate information more relevant to the successful landing following an approach should be simpler to absorb off approach plate being flown. Both late night after tower closing tidbits of information (lighting & glide slope) were seriously relevant, but unfortunately would take some earlier digging and interpolations (at least with Foreflight displayed Jeppesen plates.

I know it's too much to ask for, but maybe someday a late-night controller authorizing approaches (especially on a miserable weather night) could have and share this type of relevant information with the pilot without their asking for it.
 
How much fuel would he have had left starting approach? Presumably topping off Kansas.
 
I did a good amount of flying with the owner of a CJ2+, and while he was an intelligent, competent pilot, he definitely scoffed at the idea of something like IMSAFE. Some of that might have been a function of knowing I was sitting next to him (and well rested), but as he loved to tell me, "If I let a little fatigue affect my performance, I wouldn't own fifty stores."

Obviously I know nothing about the accident pilot, but I'm guessing those sorts of attitudes aren't exactly uncommon amongst people with the means to own and operate their own jet. I even saw this behavior from my wife, who constantly pushed back on the idea of getting an Uber home after spending 30 straight hours at the hospital. "It's fine - I'll pound a coffee. I've gotten good at powering through." :confused:

Well, he was a skydiver, base jumper and, it appears wing suit base jumping was part of his hobbies. So, a thrill seeker who assumes more risks than the average. And, it appears that he was the only pilot on board.
 
Yes. Based on the NOTAMS hyperlink on the top of the Foreflight MYF RNAV 28R approach plate, it is not an intuitive click into NOTAM world (same as many NOTAM's).

Exactly, what is a RAI (RAIL?)? Or G/P (glide path rather than Glide Slope?)? And those lighting NOTAM's are way down a big list... listed by recency, and not importance. I know 200' cranes a located couple of miles away from the airport maybe important for certain operations.

Approach plate information more relevant to the successful landing following an approach should be simpler to absorb off approach plate being flown. Both late night after tower closing tidbits of information (lighting & glide slope) were seriously relevant, but unfortunately would take some earlier digging and interpolations (at least with Foreflight displayed Jeppesen plates.

I know it's too much to ask for, but maybe someday a late-night controller authorizing approaches (especially on a miserable weather night) could have and share this type of relevant information with the pilot without their asking for it.
ATIS can contain some of that info on a loop when the tower is closed - prominent NOTAMs, even which runway the ILS is set to (if there are reciprocals that share the frequency). It can also be tagged onto the ASOS, which some ATIS (like MYF) switch to after-hours.

But in this situation at MYF, with the ASOS unstable or completely inop, wouldn’t it have made sense to not switch it over when the tower closed and instead leave the ATIS loop on with the NOTAMs (including the ASOS being u/s)?

Also, we all need to remember that he did tell SoCal he had the weather at Gillespie. Legalities and accuracy aside, that should have given him enough opportunity to at least get a reasonable ballpark altimeter setting.
 
Let me guess, Pacific Executive. Gotta go to Chuck. And yeah, gets hot at RNM, but how's anyone else's fault?

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Some of what I listed were problems controlled by the airport. Some were not. All combined, it "Wasn't a great experience"
 
Watched a YouTube presentation last night (Dan Millican's "Taking Off") reporting on the NTSB Preliminary and other information I hadn't yet heard.

The 42 year-old CFI pilot was flying with a current Basic Med license so obviously not doing any instructing as PIC. He owned a flight school at MYF with a variety of aircraft models pictured, including rotary.

Not sure if his flight school was based at MYF, but if yes, it's probably safe to assume the pilot was aware that the r/w 28R lead-in RAIL lighting array was NOTAM'ed out of service since March of 2022, due to "an environmental study" yet to be completed. Commencing this approach (very likely to be below minimums) and counting on runway side lighting only, would be (IMO) a very aggressive decision.

The passenger in the right front seat during this flight posted a photo of the panel on social media. The 1984 Citation instrumentation was a six-pack with an HSI, and a Garmin 750 GPS, along with a smaller Garmin GPS as a backup. Dan made the comment he (Dan) would never consider flying this flight without a pilot in the right seat, or without a glass panel.
 
…The 42 year-old CFI pilot was flying with a current Basic Med license.…

Interesting. Looking at the Airman Registry, the only (of 22) David Shapiros listed with a CE525 rating had a Class 3 dated Nov 2024 along with BasicMed. Am I missing something here?
 
Interesting. Looking at the Airman Registry, the only (of 22) David Shapiros listed with a CE525 rating had a Class 3 dated Nov 2024 along with BasicMed. Am I missing something here?

The CE-525 type is for the CitationJets. The S550 is covered under the CE-500 type. Check for that one.
 
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