What will happen to the pilots of the MIA 21Air 767?

[MountainDude]

Based on all the analyses of the flight and voice data, do you think these pilots will continue to fly professionally?

 

[midwestpa24]

Not in the US.

Maybe flying vulcanized canine feces in Southeast Asia.

 

[172andyou]

The PM repeatedly mentioned excess speed. We don't have the detailed transcript. But if anyone has a prayer, it's him. Other dude? Hard to see a path to a comeback. I've read that he knew this and was making comments along the lines of "my career is ruined" as he walked away.

 

[hindsight2020]

Yeah, I think the FO is likely to remain in the space (unfortunately). The CA no, I think he is much more likely to self-attrit at this juncture.

 

[geezer]

The Captain, a Military helicopter pilot reminds me of two of my superior officers from my service time.

I am with those that believe the FO advanced the throttles prior to reaching the runway, and was over ruled by the Captain, possibly with vigor.

Unlike the FO, I never backed down. The Lt. Col stood his ground until reveille, but I was TDY from the signal company, my Co signed my leave, and his Exec drove me to the train station so I would not miss the morning train. They knew that I had planned on the 1 AM train, and checked for the next to the same destination. I had not had leave for 20 months.

 

[Bell206]

Based on all the analyses of the flight and voice data, do you think these pilots will continue to fly professionally?

I think it depends on the person whether they will continue to pursue that professional career vs being completely blacklisted. Sometimes the mental side takes its toll after these types of events to include the mx side of the business.

 

[Domenick]

The MIA crash was negligence, pure and simple. Both pilots should be charged and tried for manslaughter.

 

[Larry in TN]

The MIA crash was negligence, pure and simple. Both pilots should be charged and tried for manslaughter.

When was the last time a US Airline pilot was criminally charged for negligence leading to an accident?

 

[172andyou]

I am with those that believe the FO advanced the throttles prior to reaching the runway, and was over ruled by the Captain, possibly with vigor.

I haven't seen it written that way, but if this turns out to be true then I amend my prediction for the PM "having a prayer" to "he's definitely coming back".

 

[OneCharlieTango]

When was the last time a US Airline pilot was criminally charged for negligence leading to an accident?

For whatever reason, that never seems to happen. If they’d been driving a truck, they’d be locked up already.

 

[Bell206]

For whatever reason, that never seems to happen. If they’d been driving a truck, they’d be locked up already.

For the simple reason their actions rarely meet the bar to be charged... not that its never been tried and failed a number of times. And to get arrested, they would also need to break a law somewhere.

 

[bonefishpete]

For the simple reason their actions rarely meet the bar to be charged... not that its never been tried and failed a number of times. And to get arrested, they would also need to break a law somewhere.

I think everyone will let the Civil Judiciary handle it.

Remember the airline pilots that hit the fire truck in Peru? They got locked up a day or so I believe.

 

[Doc Holliday]

I think everyone will let the Civil Judiciary handle it.

Remember the airline pilots that hit the fire truck in Peru? They got locked up a day or so I believe.

Several countries around the world will arrest pilots for an accident or even an incident. Something to consider operating outside the US.

But as previously noted, to get arrested in the US a law needs to broken first.

 

[Tarheelpilot]

The MIA crash was negligence, pure and simple. Both pilots should be charged and tried for manslaughter.

They will be in civil court. Not criminal.

I’m to close to the role to feel comfortable expressing an opinion. Kinda like asking cops about qualified immunity.

 

[M20K]

The PM repeatedly mentioned excess speed. We don't have the detailed transcript.

I'm also curious to see what the ultimate outcome is and what the full transcript reveals.

Any freight or air carrier crews out there... So the FO apparently keeps saying excessive speed. Don't know if he said to Go Around early than the one time they say someone said it seconds before the end.

But WHAT WOULD YOU DO? Or what are you trained to do? We have a relatively low time FO.... Do you wrestle the controls away from the Captain? Do you utter some command that gets on the CVR that says you said no to the continued approach and puts it all on the PF? I know there has been a lot of changes in CRM since the 90s. Just curious what the training is for this type of situation, ASSUMING the FO knew they shouldn't continue?

Again, assuming the FO knew they shouldn't continue, this ultimately sounds a whole lot like Avianca Flt 52.

 

[Roger Wilco]

I'm also curious to see what the ultimate outcome is

Do you mean the findings of the investigation?

and what the full transcript reveals.

Given what is already known, it doesn't seem likely that the full transcript will reveal any surprises.

But WHAT WOULD YOU DO? Or what are you trained to do? We have a relatively low time FO.... Do you wrestle the controls away from the Captain?

There may be differences between airlines in the way this scenario is to be handled. At my airline, F/Os were expected to firmly state "I have the aircraft; going around!" while taking the controls and executing the procedure. In such circumstances, the captain is supposed to relinquish the controls and assume PM duties. I say "supposed" because I have never been in that situation and can't speak from experience, and it's difficult to predict how a given individual will react.

this ultimately sounds a whole lot like Avianca Flt 52.

You mean, the 707 that ran out of gas over Long Island? I don't see the connection.

 

[Roger Wilco]

The MIA crash was negligence, pure and simple. Both pilots should be charged and tried for manslaughter.

Domenick, I do not know what kind of fictional societies you create for the characters in your books, but a just society is founded, in part, on the principles of fairness, impartiality, and the presumption of innocence. Put the torch and pitchfork back into the barn, please.

[Re-write of an earlier reply that mysteriously disappeared].

 

[Rick A]

Any freight or air carrier crews out there... So the FO apparently keeps saying excessive speed. Don't know if he said to Go Around early than the one time they say someone said it seconds before the end.

But WHAT WOULD YOU DO? Or what are you trained to do? We have a relatively low time FO.... Do you wrestle the controls away from the Captain? Do you utter some command that gets on the CVR that says you said no to the continued approach and puts it all on the PF? I know there has been a lot of changes in CRM since the 90s. Just curious what the training is for this type of situation, ASSUMING the FO knew they shouldn't continue?

Great questions (another re-write of an earlier reply of mine that mysteriously disappeared).

I'm relatively certain that repeated punches by the FO to the pilot's head and throat would be an assault charge and loss of flying income forever if they survived. What options beyond being ignored and the pending crash happening? Should the Captain and FO both be fired, and as some suggest subject to criminal charges and civil lawsuits?

I asked a just retired Jet Blue Captain friend for his opinion on this subject. He said instead of punching his head, he would have punched the TOGA button while on short final and climbed out. If the Captain reported an insurrection of authority, it's better to ask for forgiveness from the company than to be dead.

 

[Larry in TN]

He said instead of punching his head, he would have punched the TOGA button while on short final and climbed out.

I'm not sure what that's supposed to do. The pilot-flying just disconnects the A/T (if engaged) and A/P (if engaged) and hand-flies while ignoring the F/D command bars. It doesn't force him to go-around against his will. If the A/T and A/P were already disengaged, the only affect would be the F/D command bars.

Fighting over control of a 200,000+ pound airplane at 500' is not a good plan.

The proper action is to forcefully, and repeatedly if necessary, make the applicable calls from your airlines flight manual.

 

[RockyMtnFlyer]

...But WHAT WOULD YOU DO? Or what are you trained to do? We have a relatively low time FO.... Do you wrestle the controls away from the Captain? Do you utter some command that gets on the CVR that says you said no to the continued approach and puts it all on the PF? I know there has been a lot of changes in CRM since the 90s. Just curious what the training is for this type of situation, ASSUMING the FO knew they shouldn't continue.....

Seems like I got this question during an interview...

 

[Albany Tom]

Will they be able to tell, based on recorded data, which of the two attempted to initiate a go-around, and which cancelled the go-around? I'm guessing not, given common throttles in the middle and guessing no video, but those are both guesses.

While I'm guessing, reads to me like pilot flying got into a situation where they were too fast, but thought their skill was more relevant than the judgement of the pilot monitoring, and by the time he figured out he was wrong his head was spun around so much that everything just fell apart for him mentally.

The other part I'm wondering is how long before there's an automated system in airliners that says "go around" when someone tries to fly it into, er I mean when an approach isn't stable. The electronic equivalent of someone waving them off the landing.

 

[Rick A]

Fighting over control of a 200,000+ pound airplane at 500' is not a good plan.

And either is crashing a 200,000+ pound aircraft.

The proper action is to forcefully, and repeatedly if necessary, make the applicable calls from your airlines flight manual.

Forceful and repeated tough talk, quoted from the flight manual. Directed at a Captain who's ignored 10 computer generated warnings about fixing an outrageously unstable final approach. The same Captain who has completely ignored his FO's repeated "suggestions" to go around because this landing is not going to work out...

I hope the next FO challenging the Captain in this type of situation is a fast button pusher and can focus on delivering a loud and forceful regurgitation from their company's flight manual. And if he's fortunate enough to survive his stubborn Captain's airmanship skills(sarc), gets to keep his career, home, stuff and professional reputation.

 

[flyingcheesehead]

The other part I'm wondering is how long before there's an automated system in airliners that says "go around" when someone tries to fly it into, er I mean when an approach isn't stable. The electronic equivalent of someone waving them off the landing.

Some of the single pilot jets have something like this already. Newer Phenom 300s, IIRC.

Any freight or air carrier crews out there... So the FO apparently keeps saying excessive speed. Don't know if he said to Go Around early than the one time they say someone said it seconds before the end.

But WHAT WOULD YOU DO? Or what are you trained to do? We have a relatively low time FO.... Do you wrestle the controls away from the Captain? Do you utter some command that gets on the CVR that says you said no to the continued approach and puts it all on the PF? I know there has been a lot of changes in CRM since the 90s. Just curious what the training is for this type of situation, ASSUMING the FO knew they shouldn't continue?

The training I've gotten was to do something like so:

"Unstable, go around."
"(Captain/FO <Name>), you are unstable. Go around!"
"UNSTABLE! GO AROUND! GO AROUND! DO IT NOW!"
"I am taking control of the aircraft, going around."

Forceful and repeated tough talk, quoted from the flight manual. Directed at a Captain who's ignored 10 computer generated warnings about fixing an outrageously unstable final approach. The same Captain who has completely ignored his FO's repeated "suggestions" to go around because this landing is not going to work out...

There's a time for "suggestions" and being passive aggressive. This was not it. You don't just mention the airspeed a bunch, say go around once when it's already too late, and watch the PF crash the plane. You make it clear that a go-around is necessary. It doesn't have to be "quoted from the flight manual". That's for the debrief, after you've gone around and then come back in to land safely. You use clear, unambiguous language and an increasingly emphatic tone of voice.

 

[M20K]

There may be differences between airlines in the way this scenario is to be handled. At my airline, F/Os were expected to firmly state "I have the aircraft; going around!" while taking the controls and executing the procedure.

I was wondering if it was that assertive where you took over or just state "Go Around" and the FP was was supposed to do it.

On your other comments.... Yes, curious if anything will come out of the investigation to save the FO or if he really made no comments or took any actions to try and prevent what happened. Seems to go against all training I've either read about or heard from friends. On the the transcript we know at the very end there was one "Go Around," but again, just curious if there were any other statements other than the high speed. And if we here the CVR, how forceful were the comments on the speed.

As to the Avianca Flt 52, as I understand it, that is what triggered Crew Resources Management (CRM). The crew of that flight apparently tried to "hint" that they were low on fuel while the Capt. had been dealing with (I think) a gear issue for an hour. It was back in the day were you DID NOT question the Captain!!! So all that training you get now to question if things are safe and to even say "I have the aircraft; going around!" were not a thing back then.

 

[mryan75]

The best suggestion I’ve read thus far is that the FO should’ve just raised the gear handle. But it is a good question how do you literally FORCE a go-around with an idiot at the controls?

 

[Kenny Phillips]

The MIA crash was negligence, pure and simple. Both pilots should be charged and tried for manslaughter.

The safety system prohibits that in most cases. It's literally the worst possible thing to do, if preventing future occurrences is important.
And preventing future occurrences is important.

 

[jayhawk74]

As to the Avianca Flt 52, as I understand it, that is what triggered Crew Resources Management (CRM). The crew of that flight apparently tried to "hint" that they were low on fuel while the Capt. had been dealing with (I think) a gear issue for an hour. It was back in the day were you DID NOT question the Captain!!! So all that training you get now to question if things are safe and to even say "I have the aircraft; going around!" were not a thing back then.

The flight that ran out of fuel due to a landing gear issue and no CRM was United Flight 173 which crashed near Portland, OR December 1978. That's the flight which started the airlines using CRM. Avianca Flight 52 happened January 1990 and was caused by multiple ATC holds and poor communication between the Flight Crew and ATC.

 

[Rick A]

"Unstable, go around."
"(Captain/FO <Name>), you are unstable. Go around!"
"UNSTABLE! GO AROUND! GO AROUND! DO IT NOW!"
"I am taking control of the aircraft, going around."

And if at some point during an event a FO's extremely emphatic verbal inputs are still being ignored... still flying and halfway down a 9,000' long runway, cooking along at 155 kts with no reversers or brakes, and the Captain doesn't call going around, or relinquish control of the aircraft, what then? Just pray if you're so inclined, and brace for impact?

We all have been taught in aviation that "hope is not a strategy." But isn't that exactly what is expected?

 

[Larry in TN]

Will they be able to tell, based on recorded data, which of the two attempted to initiate a go-around, and which cancelled the go-around?

The TOGA switches are on the thrust levers which is where the pilot-flyings inboard hand would have been.

The other part I'm wondering is how long before there's an automated system in airliners that says "go around" when someone tries to fly it into, er I mean when an approach isn't stable. The electronic equivalent of someone waving them off the landing.

The GPWS/TAWS already does in windshear encounters. In this case, the GPWS was already making the appropriate calls which required a go-around, "Too low, flaps".

And either is crashing a 200,000+ pound aircraft.

It's not a binary. Just because an accident resulted doesn't mean that any alternative suggestion would have produced a better result.

The pilot-monitoring, we presume the F/O, should have been more forcefull with his required callouts. The PM commands the go-around when unstable under the reject gate.

The best suggestion I’ve read thus far is that the FO should’ve just raised the gear handle. But it is a good question how do you literally FORCE a go-around with an idiot at the controls?

That's a terrible suggestion. You can't fight for control with each pilot doing different things. The rest will be worse, not better.

 

[Roger Wilco]

I was wondering if it was that assertive where you took over or just state "Go Around" and the FP was was supposed to do it.

As the event unfolds, the PM (Pilot Monitoring) first calls-out significant deviations (airspeed, vertical speed, configuration, navigation). If the deviations are not corrected by 500' agl or become so excessive at any point that a successful landing becomes doubtful, the PM should firmly declare "Go-around, (reason)," multiple times if necessary. In the real world, if the PF (Pilot Flying) does not initiate a go-around, the PM must make a decision as to whether it would be safer to allow the PF to continue the approach and landing, or take the control of the jet and execute the go-around, stating "my airplane, going-around." In that rather extreme scenario, if the PF refused to relinquish the controls, fighting for control of the aircraft could lead to a worse outcome as Larry In TN stated in post #19. But I've never heard of such a situation actually happening.

On your other comments.... Yes, curious if anything will come out of the investigation to save the FO or if he really made no comments or took any actions to try and prevent what happened. Seems to go against all training I've either read about or heard from friends. On the the transcript we know at the very end there was one "Go Around," but again, just curious if there were any other statements other than the high speed. And if we here the CVR, how forceful were the comments on the speed.

Investigators will look to the CVR transcript to provide insight into deeper issues such as training and qualification, CRM effectiveness, discipline, and safety culture within the airline.

As to the Avianca Flt 52, as I understand it, that is what triggered Crew Resources Management (CRM). The crew of that flight apparently tried to "hint" that they were low on fuel while the Capt. had been dealing with (I think) a gear issue for an hour. It was back in the day were you DID NOT question the Captain!!! So all that training you get now to question if things are safe and to even say "I have the aircraft; going around!" were not a thing back then.

As jayhawk74 replied, you're thinking of UA 173. In the aftermath of UA 173, the aviation world finally moved to grapple with a question that had long begged to be answered: why do smart, experienced, well-trained, and competent pilots make stupid, inexplicable mistakes? Thus began a concerted effort to understand what we now call human factors elements that cause or contribute to accidents and incidents. CRM (Crew Resource Management) evolved from those studies and continues to evolve. There are parallels between UA 173 and CSB 7598. If we are fortunate, the investigation into CSB 7598 will further our understanding of human factors elements and lead to better training, processes, and procedures in the future.

 

[Half Fast]

IMH (and mostly worthless) O as a low-time VFR-only private pilot,.....

This seems like a culture/mindset problem. It seems to me that either pilot should be able to call for a go-around, and such a call is not subject to discussion or debate but must be immediately executed. As soon as anyone in the cockpit says "Go around," the GA begins, and any discussion takes place after the plane is stable and climbing. There should be no such thing as a "wrong" GA call.

It's sorta like Robert's Rules for a motion to adjourn. A motion to adjourn is always in order, takes priority over all other motions, cannot be debated, and must be voted on immediately.

Are GA procedures not trained that way?

 

[Roger Wilco]

IMH (and mostly worthless) O as a low-time VFR-only private pilot,.....

This seems like a culture/mindset problem. It seems to me that either pilot should be able to call for a go-around, and such a call is not subject to discussion or debate but must be immediately executed. As soon as anyone in the cockpit says "Go around," the GA begins, and any discussion takes place after the plane is stable and climbing. There should be no such thing as a "wrong" GA call.

It's sorta like Robert's Rules for a motion to adjourn. A motion to adjourn is always in order, takes priority over all other motions, cannot be debated, and must be voted on immediately.

Are GA procedures not trained that way?

At least one airline has long trained it that way.

 

[Larry in TN]

It seems to me that either pilot should be able to call for a go-around, and such a call is not subject to discussion or debate but must be immediately executed.

That is the current procedure.

People aren't computer programs. People don't always follow the procedures exactly.

A big focus in threat-error management is combating intentional non-compliance and normalization of deviance.

Nobody drives the speed limit. That is intentional non-compliance. As drivers build experience with all cars exceeding the speed limit, that is normalization of deviance. It becomes normal to accept a bit outside of the limits. The same thing happens in cockpits.

As I discussed earlier, this is why I like the 500' reject gate better than the 1,000' reject gate. 1,000' is too early and encourages intentional non-compliance with small exceedances. Done over and over again, this produces normalization of deviance. Pilots become accustom to flying below the reject gate without being stable. Over time, the degree of "acceptable" deviance increases.

 

[MauleSkinner]

IMH (and mostly worthless) O as a low-time VFR-only private pilot,.....

This seems like a culture/mindset problem. It seems to me that either pilot should be able to call for a go-around, and such a call is not subject to discussion or debate but must be immediately executed. As soon as anyone in the cockpit says "Go around," the GA begins, and any discussion takes place after the plane is stable and climbing. There should be no such thing as a "wrong" GA call.

Are GA procedures not trained that way?

From what I’ve seen, that’s more the norm than the exception in company SOPs. Unfortunately the anti-authority mindset runs deep in some people, and on the “cultural” side, IMO the pilot market right now keeps pilots employed who shouldn’t be.

 

[M20K]

The flight that ran out of fuel due to a landing gear issue and no CRM was United Flight 173 which crashed near Portland, OR December 1978. That's the flight which started the airlines using CRM.

Thx for the update.

 

[RalphInCA]

Domenick, I do not know what kind of fictional societies you create for the characters in your books, but a just society is founded, in part, on the principles of fairness, impartiality, and the presumption of innocence. Put the torch and pitchfork back into the barn, please.

[Re-write of an earlier reply that mysteriously disappeared].

Agreed. Well put.

 

[mryan75]

That's a terrible suggestion. You can't fight for control with each pilot doing different things. The rest will be worse, not better.

I agree it’s a terrible suggestion, the question is, is it less terrible than letting someone continue an approach which will end up bad, including the possibility of you yourself dying. The PF listened to a dozen audible warnings and was told umpteen times the approach was unstable and he just kept right on truckin’. At some point you have to do decide which terrible choice is terribler. Putting the gear up may persuade him not to land.

 

[Larry in TN]

I agree it’s a terrible suggestion, the question is, is it less terrible than letting someone continue an approach which will end up bad, including the possibility of you yourself dying.

You have created a binary strawman.

The problem is not an incompetent mad-man who has lost all reason. It is a qualified pilot who is trying to salvage bad decisions and has gone farther than before due to repeated normalization of deviance. He will respond to strong enough opposition from his co-worker using the established phraseology and protocols.

 

[Albany Tom]

I agree it’s a terrible suggestion, the question is, is it less terrible than letting someone continue an approach which will end up bad, including the possibility of you yourself dying. The PF listened to a dozen audible warnings and was told umpteen times the approach was unstable and he just kept right on truckin’. At some point you have to do decide which terrible choice is terribler. Putting the gear up may persuade him not to land.

Not meant as a joke. In this instance, with the gear up they might have stopped a lot shorter. And with I'd guess just the two crew on board, it might have resulted in no loss of life. But...that's hindsight. Had the thing belly landed, destroying the aircraft and cargo wit no injuries, likely the copilot would have been hung out to dry for causing the accident, because the assumption would have been that the pilot would have been able to stop the aircraft before end of runway with no damage.

To me the only way to assert control that's reasonable would be to actually take control and state as much. Guessing again...pilot was more stunned/frozen than anything else, so betting he would've let copilot just fly it. Now what happens after that, no idea, would seem like maybe a company thing if it was just a go around and no damage?

 

[hindsight2020]

This is just people looking at 121 SIC as though they're a monolith. They're far from it. That's where the disconnect lies imo.

Mainline 121 is not, nor was ever designed as, a developmental seat. Not in the way that downline gigs in this 121/135 MLM in fact, are. What that means is that the right seat at mainline tends to be occupied by people who have been captains in their own right, able to fulfill a captain level of behavior if the situation necessitates it. That begets a much different social construct in the cockpit. To wit, a much less functionally subservient one without even having to verbalize it. Legitimate redundancy.

...But that's mainline. 21 Air is not that. SIC in subcontractor hell are a different ball of wax, as are the regionals/ULCCs.

Do take note how even in the context of that Temu-121 job, the pedestrian-killer did in fact react to the late go-around command by our right seat professional checklist reader. So yes, we do have evidence the muppet would have relinquished control if challenged by an adult in the right seat. Which is to say, in a timely fashion.

Mainline just happens to enjoy the privilege of a legitimate Ready-5 demographic, willing to entertain that "Oh cApTain mY cAptain" Carnival Cruise ship genuflecting nonsense (with goofy costumes to boot), as fully vetted and pre-qualified former PICs... as long as you pay them. That is not evidence that the system works up and down the ponzi however. That's the disconnect here.

So, want adult supervision on these downline Uberjobs? How to put this in terms people understand... oh yeah: FUPM. It's not that deep.