What will happen to the pilots of the MIA 21Air 767?

[Roger Wilco]

The problem is ... a qualified pilot who is trying to salvage bad decisions

This is a good reply, I think we could widen the net to include the competent pilot who found him/herself trying to salvage an approach that became non-compliant due to reasons beyond his/her control, ATC and weather being two frequent culprits.

In the circumstances under discussion, we should also take into account the possibility that the PF has experienced a medical condition that has rendered him/her incapacitated ("subtle incapacitation"), and is unable to function. A rare scenario, but one that has actually happened.

Guessing again...pilot was more stunned/frozen than anything else, so betting he would've let copilot just fly it.

There's no way for any of us to get inside the heads of the crew of that flight. What good does it do to try to guess?

 

[mryan75]

You have created a binary strawman.

The problem is not an incompetent mad-man who has lost all reason.

And you’ve created one yourself.

It is a qualified pilot who is trying to salvage bad decisions and has gone farther than before due to repeated normalization of deviance.

You should share your conclusions with the investigators.

He will respond to strong enough opposition from his co-worker using the established phraseology and protocols.

As evidenced by what?

 

[flyingcheesehead]

I was wondering if it was that assertive where you took over or just state "Go Around" and the FP was was supposed to do it.

The first time, you just call for the go-around and the PF is supposed to do it. Same with the second time, and maybe the third - But if the PF continues to be unresponsive, then you state that you are taking control and execute the corrective action. There is no implicit transfer of controls unless that is a particular operator's SOP. I haven't worked anywhere it has been, but I've heard of places where, for example, the PM will make the landing on an instrument approach because they'll be visual before the PF was.

As to the Avianca Flt 52, as I understand it, that is what triggered Crew Resources Management (CRM). The crew of that flight apparently tried to "hint" that they were low on fuel while the Capt. had been dealing with (I think) a gear issue for an hour. It was back in the day were you DID NOT question the Captain!!! So all that training you get now to question if things are safe and to even say "I have the aircraft; going around!" were not a thing back then.

The flight that ran out of fuel due to a landing gear issue and no CRM was United Flight 173 which crashed near Portland, OR December 1978. That's the flight which started the airlines using CRM. Avianca Flight 52 happened January 1990 and was caused by multiple ATC holds and poor communication between the Flight Crew and ATC.

United pretty much invented CRM and started training their crews on it in 1979 after the United 173 crash. In 1989, United 232 lost all hydraulic systems and thus all control over the flying surfaces, yet they managed to save 184 people. The actions of Captain Al Haynes, off-duty Captain Denny Fitch who had come up to the cockpit to help, FO Bill Records, and FE Dudley Dvorak were examined closely by the NTSB and they found that the crew used all available resources and worked together exceptionally well because of that CRM training which United had been doing, which prompted the FAA to mandate all airlines to have CRM training going forward.

And if at some point during an event a FO's extremely emphatic verbal inputs are still being ignored... still flying and halfway down a 9,000' long runway, cooking along at 155 kts with no reversers or brakes, and the Captain doesn't call going around, or relinquish control of the aircraft, what then? Just pray if you're so inclined, and brace for impact?

Where the go-around was specifically called for, it was already FAR too late. The PM should be calling for the go-around no later than 500 AGL on final, and if it isn't executed, should be making the increasingly emphatic calls and then taking control by 200-300 feet AGL.

On the ground with 4000 feet of runway already behind you is far too late. Where "too late" starts depends on what you're flying - For us, it's after touchdown when lift dump is selected (the PF's first action after touchdown). Once that handle is down, go-around is no longer an option, or this happens. Dunno what the specific point of no return on the 76 is.

IMH (and mostly worthless) O as a low-time VFR-only private pilot,.....

This seems like a culture/mindset problem. It seems to me that either pilot should be able to call for a go-around, and such a call is not subject to discussion or debate but must be immediately executed. As soon as anyone in the cockpit says "Go around," the GA begins, and any discussion takes place after the plane is stable and climbing. There should be no such thing as a "wrong" GA call.

That is exactly how it is supposed to work. That's one of many reasons why this accident is so egregious - The Captain either didn't recognize the wildly unstable approach or chose not to go around anyway, ignored several warnings about the speed from the FO, was still calling for config changes over the runway, touched down well beyond the touchdown zone, and several other mistakes. The FO did not (as far as we know at this point) call for the go-around at an appropriately early time.

 

[Albany Tom]

There's no way for any of us to get inside the heads of the crew of that flight. What good does it do to try to guess?

Maybe nothing. But the "what if" scenarios can be good to try to think through options for situations that we might never be in. In this particular situation, from the way it seems, any escalation of tone or action by the co-pilot wouldn't seem to make it any worse.

Maybe it comes down to what someone else mentioned as a form of normalization of deviance. That it's maybe routine to land X percent of the time where you're not on a stabilized approach by whatever metric. And the pilot flying can correct and land in 99% of those situations. Then what exactly is too fast to the point that maybe the guy 10-15 years older with way more hours says "yeah, I've got this", but he doesn't? What's the line between "sketchy" and "nuts"?

 

[M20K]

The FO did not (as far as we know at this point) call for the go-around at an appropriately early time.

Can't wait for the full transcripts to be released....

 

[Roger Wilco]

United pretty much invented CRM

In the credit-where-credit-is-due department: The origin of CRM can be traced to a 1969 book entitled The Human Factor in Aircraft Accidents by David Beatty. Beatty was an interesting chap, having flown for the RAF in WWII and subsequently with BOAC. He was also a novelist. But yes, UA had a come-to-Jesus epiphany after 173 crashed and was the first airline to develop, implement, and train CRM. I have come to believe that it was the single most important flight safety development in the jet age.

Maybe nothing. But the "what if" scenarios can be good to try to think through options for situations that we might never be in.

That makes sense.

Can't wait for the full transcripts to be released....

I’m more interested in what the investigation reveals about the carrier’s training and qualification programs, procedures and crew compliance with SOPs, and safety culture.

While the crew of CSB 7598 will not be executed tomorrow at dawn (as some here seem to clamor for), they most assuredly will be held accountable.

 

[Larry in TN]

As evidenced by what?

My comments are based on my experience and training over 35 years of flying in multi-pilot crews

 

[luvflyin]

The first time, you just call for the go-around and the PF is supposed to do it. Same with the second time, and maybe the third - But if the PF continues to be unresponsive, then you state that you are taking control and execute the corrective action. There is no implicit transfer of controls unless that is a particular operator's SOP. I haven't worked anywhere it has been, but I've heard of places where, for example, the PM will make the landing on an instrument approach because they'll be visual before the PF was.



United pretty much invented CRM and started training their crews on it in 1979 after the United 173 crash. In 1989, United 232 lost all hydraulic systems and thus all control over the flying surfaces, yet they managed to save 184 people. The actions of Captain Al Haynes, off-duty Captain Denny Fitch who had come up to the cockpit to help, FO Bill Records, and FE Dudley Dvorak were examined closely by the NTSB and they found that the crew used all available resources and worked together exceptionally well because of that CRM training which United had been doing, which prompted the FAA to mandate all airlines to have CRM training going forward.


Where the go-around was specifically called for, it was already FAR too late. The PM should be calling for the go-around no later than 500 AGL on final, and if it isn't executed, should be making the increasingly emphatic calls and then taking control by 200-300 feet AGL.

On the ground with 4000 feet of runway already behind you is far too late. Where "too late" starts depends on what you're flying - For us, it's after touchdown when lift dump is selected (the PF's first action after touchdown). Once that handle is down, go-around is no longer an option, or this happens. Dunno what the specific point of no return on the 76 is.


That is exactly how it is supposed to work. That's one of many reasons why this accident is so egregious - The Captain either didn't recognize the wildly unstable approach or chose not to go around anyway, ignored several warnings about the speed from the FO, was still calling for config changes over the runway, touched down well beyond the touchdown zone, and several other mistakes. The FO did not (as far as we know at this point) call for the go-around at an appropriately early time.

Don’t forget Tenerife when taking about “…It was back in the day were you DID NOT question the Captain!!!…” culture.

 

[Bill]

Don’t forget Tenerife when taking about “…It was back in the day were you DID NOT question the Captain!!!…” culture.

17:06:44 UTC (Pan Am Captain - from Cockpit Voice Recorder):"There he is... look at him! ******n, that son of a ***** is coming!" (Spotting the landing lights of the accelerating KLM 747 rushing out of the thick fog nine seconds before impact).

17:06:46 UTC (Pan Am First Officer):"Get off! Get off! Get off!" (Pan Am crew applied maximum throttle and turned sharply left toward the grass, which slightly deflected the collision angle).

 

[luvflyin]

17:06:44 UTC (Pan Am Captain - from Cockpit Voice Recorder):"There he is... look at him! ******n, that son of a ***** is coming!" (Spotting the landing lights of the accelerating KLM 747 rushing out of the thick fog nine seconds before impact).

17:06:46 UTC (Pan Am First Officer):"Get off! Get off! Get off!" (Pan Am crew applied maximum throttle and turned sharply left toward the grass, which slightly deflected the collision angle).

From the KLM cockpit

Final Doubts Dismissed: As they sped down the runway, Flight Engineer Schreuder questioned whether the Pan Am plane ahead was clear:

Schreuder: "Is he not clear, that Pan American?"
Van Zanten: (Emphatically) "Oh, yes."
Van Zanten: "We're going."

 

[Tarheelpilot]

From the KLM cockpit

Final Doubts Dismissed: As they sped down the runway, Flight Engineer Schreuder questioned whether the Pan Am plane ahead was clear:

This accident cemented a very basic concept in multi pilot cockpits. If anyone is in doubt we take the 5 seconds required to verify whatever it is in question.

 

[flyingcheesehead]

17:06:44 UTC (Pan Am Captain - from Cockpit Voice Recorder):"There he is... look at him! ******n, that son of a ***** is coming!" (Spotting the landing lights of the accelerating KLM 747 rushing out of the thick fog nine seconds before impact).

17:06:46 UTC (Pan Am First Officer):"Get off! Get off! Get off!" (Pan Am crew applied maximum throttle and turned sharply left toward the grass, which slightly deflected the collision angle).

The real last link in the chain at Tenerife was when the KLM captain shoved the throttles forward and the FO questioned "are we cleared for takeoff?" The captain, who was not just a captain but THE captain at KLM who was most senior and best looking and in their marketing materials and all the other things, answered "ja wel" which is an *emphatic yes*.

 

[luvflyin]

This accident cemented a very basic concept in multi pilot cockpits. If anyone is in doubt we take the 5 seconds required to verify whatever it is in question.

I hadn’t heard about that 5 second rule before. It’ll never be the same again when I pick a piece of food off the floor and invoke the 5 second rule.

 

[Albany Tom]

There's two questions that can help. 1 Is this decision easily reversible? 2 What's the worst possible outcome?
If the answers are "no" and "fiery death", it might be worth a second thought before proceeding.

To me the KLM accident takeaway was that arrogance is the worst flaw a pilot can have, more so than lack of skill.

 

[Tools]

Fight over the controls at 500’? They were unstable at 1500’, THAT is when that convo shoulda taken place. Prolly MUCH earlier than that.

What we have is a case of primary AND secondary backup systems failing.

Not many procedures for that scenario. A reasonable way out scenario for the time frame mentioned here was WAY long gone. Gotta go back to where this was SUPPOSED to be fixed. Why didn’t it happen when it wasn’t a crisis, just a screwed up start to an approach..

 

[Rick A]

There's two questions that can help. 1 Is this decision easily reversible? 2 What's the worst possible outcome?
If the answers are "no" and "fiery death", it might be worth a second thought before proceeding.

To me the KLM accident takeaway was that arrogance is the worst flaw a pilot can have, more so than lack of skill.

I was a kid at a backyard barbecue listening to my Father (former military pilot) discussing the recent Tenerife tragedy with an active TWA international route pilot. Dad asked how the hell did the KLM pilot decide to take off in thick fog with no confirmation the runway was not occupied?

The TWA pilot didn't mention arrogance... he said it was cultural character flaw with the "G**Damn punctual Dutch".

 

[GLMS_NC]

There has been no certificate action taken. The investigation needs to progress before this happens.

IMHO, they both get certificate suspensions. How long is to be determined.They both are ordered training and FAA-manned checkrides to regain certificates.

Employable? That's a different matter. I bet someone will hire them if they can get reasonable insurance. See below. Likely not paid much, cargo, and/or low cost foreign-based carrier. Equipment will be small or very old.

Insurable? Yes but likely a liability which will prevent future employment.

Certificate action they can recover from. Insurance they likely can't recover from which prevent employment. Unless it's a foreign carrier where they routinely have different standards from US.

They won't be charged criminally. Just don't see it. Should they is another topic.

Time to lawyer up for civil actions. They will lose but what are damages? Neither has much for the other party. They are found negligent but real damages they pay - what do they have? Employer, employer insurance, and maybe another source or two pay.

Bottom line - I don't think either will push through all that will be required to fly again. Won't be easy or cheap and there will be loads of distractions along the way.

 

[flyingcheesehead]

IMHO, they both get certificate suspensions. How long is to be determined.They both are ordered training and FAA-manned checkrides to regain certificates.

That's a revocation, not a suspension, unless you're talking a mere 709 ride... But that wouldn't be to "regain certificates" it would be to regain flying privileges.

 

[david wall]

I don’t know if the CA will survive this without certificate action. It probably depends on how the POI of their CMO views it. Multiple violations of their stabilized approach policy, lack of decision making & situational awareness, etc.. From the data that’s out there, it seems like there was a lot of willful non compliance which will probably make the ASAP get rejected.

With a 767, the GA is partially disabled depending on where they hit the switches (paddles). Below 5’ for 2 secs the FD will command the go around but thrust has to be pushed up. So they may have hit G/A earlier but been in the inhibit

 

[hindsight2020]

My bet is he self-attrits. At 55yo, by the time all the legal stuff settles, he's in for more than a pound. I think he's gonna lay low, considering he killed innocent people. Not what he prob signed up for when he started out as a military aviator.

The FO is the one to watch, as he will probably sneak his way back to a 121 cockpit if people sleep on it too long.

 

[david wall]

My bet is he self-attrits. At 55yo, by the time all the legal stuff settles, he's in for more than a pound. I think he's gonna lay low, considering he killed innocent people. Not what he prob signed up for when he started out as a military aviator.

The FO is the one to watch, as he will probably sneak his way back to a 121 cockpit if people sleep on it too long.

Agree - it will be interesting to see how the culture is at 21Air is described in the NTSB findings. Is a Go Around call by any crew member mandatory to comply or can the CA over-rule? (Ours is mandatory if anyone calls it but hasn’t always been that way).

I’m waiting for a little more data before passing judgement on the FO. Did he call G/A? Did he give any comm to the CA that he wasn’t comfortable? (I know he mentioned being too fast per the initial report).

 

[Doc Holliday]

The FO is the one to watch, as he will probably sneak his way back to a 121 cockpit if people sleep on it too long.

Please explain how one "sneaks" back into the cockpit? Does he evade the PRD?

 

[jonnyjetprop]

It’s not that he somehow evades his PRD record, it’s that he becomes well coached to explain his actions that day backed up by a hopefully forgiving NTSB report. Yes, there’s a lot of “ifs” in that.