Richard McSpadden and Russ Francis Crash | The Final Report

A lot of difference between a 10-hour student and a 9,000-hour pilot flying the aircraft he owns. He was DC-3 type rated, and actually had 3,000 hours more flying time than McSpadden. Most pilots have a pretty strong ego; few are going to tolerate a less-experienced pilot trying to take over control of THEIR aircraft.

Ron Wanttaja

Gotta admit, I don’t take the time to review resumes before TRYING TO SURVIVE.

And I REALLY don’t care about egos…. or who owns the a/c.

Even worse, I’d do it in a DC-3.. and I don’t have a single minute experience, much less a type rating.

I guess the point here is I believe this attitude of deference for ego, PIC formality, ownership or perceived experience isn’t good. We’re not talking about anything complicated, it’s a simple stall spin in a lightweight straight wing aircraft.

I don’t recall an AFIP determination of whose hands were where, we don’t know what took place, and sadly won’t. Honestly it never occurred to me someone would have the notion “no matter what the guy next to me does, he’s PIC and I’ll accept whatever he does”. THAT is the discussion. I think THAT notion is worth discussing, it has nothing to do with those dearly departed.

BOTH guys were well experienced, maybe owner deferred to McSpadden? Doesn’t really matter.
 
Do I really have to watch a video to find out the answer to a simple question?
Basically he said that in a slow plane that glides well it's very doable, but in a faster higher wing load plane like a Bonanza it’s not. The final word was that you should learn how much altitude your plane needs to turn around and plan accordingly. I think it's not fair to say he advocated for the impossible turn; he advocated knowing your plane and having a plan.
 
Basically he said that in a slow plane that glides well it's very doable, but in a faster higher wing load plane like a Bonanza it’s not. The final word was that you should learn how much altitude your plane needs to turn around and plan accordingly. I think it's not fair to say he advocated for the impossible turn; he advocated knowing your plane and having a plan.

Thanks!!
 
A bit of reading suggests the 177 has a tendency for the nose to drop as it approaches stall speed, because the slotted stabilator loses authority rather abruptly.

It could be that neither pilot realized they were in trouble until the last few seconds, when there was nothing to be done. Looks like they came up about 20 feet short. For all their thousands of hours, they only had a combined time of 10 hours in that plane. Not nearly enough to know all the nuances of MCA handling.

IOW Mcspadden would not have taken the controls if he agreed with the decision to turn back and felt it was being executed successfully.
 
Last edited:
It seems to me like the experience in the plane worked against them. First time flight and the engine dies taxiing? “No thanks I’ll do this another day.”
 
Gotta admit, I don’t take the time to review resumes before TRYING TO SURVIVE.

And I REALLY don’t care about egos…. or who owns the a/c.

Even worse, I’d do it in a DC-3.. and I don’t have a single minute experience, much less a type rating.

I guess the point here is I believe this attitude of deference for ego, PIC formality, ownership or perceived experience isn’t good. We’re not talking about anything complicated, it’s a simple stall spin in a lightweight straight wing aircraft.

I don’t recall an AFIP determination of whose hands were where, we don’t know what took place, and sadly won’t. Honestly it never occurred to me someone would have the notion “no matter what the guy next to me does, he’s PIC and I’ll accept whatever he does”. THAT is the discussion. I think THAT notion is worth discussing, it has nothing to do with those dearly departed.

BOTH guys were well experienced, maybe owner deferred to McSpadden? Doesn’t really matter.
Full of straw man arguments. I think you're missing the point.
 
Gotta admit, I don’t take the time to review resumes before TRYING TO SURVIVE.
And you'd have no objection...none...if your passenger attempted to take control of your aircraft in the middle of an emergency? You're a saint, you are.

I've got relatively few hours in multiseat aircraft (and even those are mostly solo) and *I've* had a passenger grab the controls in the middle of a maneuver. I Was Not Amused.

Old military aphorism: "Order, Counterorder, Disorder." Fighting over the controls in the middle of an emergency generally doesn't have a positive outcome.

Ron Wanttaja
 
By the time the bank was in, their fate was probably sealed. Is anyone suggesting there was a maneuver (worth fighting over) that would have improved things *after* the initial bank?
 
By the time the bank was in, their fate was probably sealed. Is anyone suggesting there was a maneuver (worth fighting over) that would have improved things *after* the initial bank?

Reduce the bank angle and look for a soft spot, rather than fixating on making the airfield.

As I understand it, they impacted sharply rising terrain at an embankment just off the end of the runway. It was basically a head on collision.

IMO a big problem of the impossible turn is unwillingness/inability to abort the attempt when it becomes evident you aren't going to make it. Some of those attempts would be survivable had the pilot changed his mind halfway through the turn and flown it into the crash site instead of stall/spinning or hitting the ground in a steep bank.
 
Last edited:
giphy.gif
 
Basically he said that in a slow plane that glides well it's very doable, but in a faster higher wing load plane like a Bonanza it’s not. The final word was that you should learn how much altitude your plane needs to turn around and plan accordingly. I think it's not fair to say he advocated for the impossible turn; he advocated knowing your plane and having a plan.
Not at low altitude
 
First time flight and the engine dies taxiing? “No thanks I’ll do this another day.”
Not enough information to draw that conclusion, nor will there ever be, with both pilots no longer here to tell their stories. There are a lot of benign reasons an engine could stop on the ground, many of which are obvious pilot-induced "oopsies" related to aggressiveness with the mixture lever or sloppy mag handling during the ground check. In those instances, many reasonable pilots would laugh at themselves, restart, and move on with their flights.
 
Not enough information to draw that conclusion, nor will there ever be, with both pilots no longer here to tell their stories. There are a lot of benign reasons an engine could stop on the ground, many of which are obvious pilot-induced "oopsies" related to aggressiveness with the mixture lever or sloppy mag handling during the ground check. In those instances, many reasonable pilots would laugh at themselves, restart, and move on with their flights.
Happened to me twice in my 600 hours flying so far …both times when picking up the plane after the annual, when they leave the main fuel switch off ( I always keep it on) and consequently the engine dies after about 100 seconds or so while I am taxing to do my run-up…
 
Basically he said that in a slow plane that glides well it's very doable, but in a faster higher wing load plane like a Bonanza it’s not. The final word was that you should learn how much altitude your plane needs to turn around and plan accordingly. I think it's not fair to say he advocated for the impossible turn; he advocated knowing your plane and having a plan.

That's an accurate description of what McSpadden preached. The major beef I have with the entire "Impossible Turn" process is using it as a significant option to determine, then create an above the ground number as the go/no go altitude.

There are a lot of factors involved that would or could change that magic turn back altitude depending upon each particular emergency situation, so it's not a "hard" number, but a variable one. Nice to remember that altitude as a fuzzy reference of possibility, especially if there's obvious survivable landing areas on the way back to the airport, but not a hard number to count on.

Passing over survivable landing sites in an effort to make it back to a runway, while wasting brain cells announcing the predicament on the radio then conversing (as if someone else can help you), seems to happen too often, even with experienced pilots. Compare variability (wind, pilot startle factor, distance from the airport, local terrain, power available, failure altitude, etc.) then compare it to the tried and true method of lower the nose and find a survivable crash site that you know you can positively maneuver your plane into....

I believe the "tried and true" lower the nose and look around method is of a much higher priority than the creation and execution of the impossible turn altitude... which should often be obvious just by looking out the window.

No matter how it happens, it's likely to be a one shot deal... so make the best out of it.
 
The "aggressive turn" in the previous practice flight was not so aggressive. Maximum bank angle of 40 degrees to reverse course, followed by 30 degree bank to align with runway. That would not alarm me in that situation, as long as the pilot was maintaining sufficient airspeed and monitoring sink rate relative to terrain.
 
The "aggressive turn" in the previous practice flight was not so aggressive. Maximum bank angle of 40 degrees to reverse course, followed by 30 degree bank to align with runway. That would not alarm me in that situation, as long as the pilot was maintaining sufficient airspeed and monitoring sink rate relative to terrain.
It was aggressive when you consider what prompted it. it wasn't an emergency. It was a baggage door.
 
Sadly, this reminds me of our own member, GaryV, who we lost in a 177RG while attempting to turn back. GaryV Gone West
 
I have flown both 150 and 180 HP Cardinals. They were factory production after the elevator redesign.

Both their stall and glide characteristics are remarkably different from 150, 152,172, 182 Cessna's. The airspeed difference from flying, and stalled is relatively small, the stall abrupt. If you avoid stall, the glide is great. The efficiency of the wing has a cost, just as Mooney's do.

Inadequate training and practice in the stall region of flight becomes more critical as the wing becomes more efficient.
The forward center of gravity pointed out by the investigation should have produce a vigorous nose drop, to recover airspeed, but pulling it back up killed that.

Hours in type is not enough, training in type with a thorough instructor is needed.

If, as some have suggested, the engine stoppage was fuel selector in off position, we have basic, universal check list failure, nothing unique to the Cardinal. Could the fuel boost pump also have been off, and fuel flow ended when the nose was higher than the fuel tank? That is possible with the Cardinal, a rare high wing plane requiring a fuel boost pump.
 
Back
Top