Richard McSpadden and Russ Francis Crash | The Final Report

No surprises, pretty much the same cause as always in such scenarios.

My feeling is that reacting to engine out in a critical time like this is similar to going into combat for the first time - no matter how much training , you never quite know how an individual will react until it happens… some folks pass with flying colors and some don’t.
 
No surprises, pretty much the same cause as always in such scenarios.

My feeling is that reacting to engine out in a critical time like this is similar to going into combat for the first time - no matter how much training , you never quite know how an individual will react until it happens… some folks pass with flying colors and some don’t.
I had an engine out in my Luscombe. I had a pilot in the right seat who only had time in a Cirrus. I tried to clear the trees, but when I realized I couldn't, I picked a big fluffy tree (kidding, I think it was made of stone!) and told my friend to hang on that I was going to stall it into the trees. He later told me he was surprised I was so so calm, he panicked. You're correct that you don't know how you'll react until you face it.
 
No surprises, pretty much the same cause as always in such scenarios.

My feeling is that reacting to engine out in a critical time like this is similar to going into combat for the first time - no matter how much training , you never quite know how an individual will react until it happens… some folks pass with flying colors and some don’t.

The engine was running with reduced power (2145 rpm).
The PIC had 9,000 hours.
 
The pouf pouf pouf reported occurring as the engine reduced power should have been explainable by the NTSB investigators.

That was the evidence of the initial problem causing the need to turn back, It is puzzling that a freshly overhauled engine failed in what otherwise appears to have been a well maintained aircraft.

Perfect hindsight, since the engine was still producing power, the turnback should have been more gentle, and might have been successful.

The pilot in command was a successful professional football player, a career that rewards quick and aggressive response to all sudden changes from the expected. That is probably the key ingredient of that turn. EDITED to add, This is not a criticism of the pilot, just an explanation of why he should be expected to have that startle response. Decades of perfecting quickness cannot be wiped out in a few years and hundreds of hours of flight training.

Again, surprised that the investigators found no explanation for the reduction of power.
 
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Startle response. Training needs to identify what is there, and make sure it’s a good idea.

My startle response is apparently PUSH, rather than pull… I wish I could positively identify WHY or HOW, but honestly I can’t. I can tell you I’m glad for it.

I think very poignant repetitive training is probably a reliable way to get that there… and also it’s important to really break things down to VERY basics. You CAN NOT afford to stall, PERIOD. I cannot think OF ONE situation in an airplane where it’s better to stall than not. Bottom line, DO NOT STALL.

Somehow you need to be more afraid of stalling than crashing.

Unless you’re @Ed Haywood and playing upside down, pushing is the better option.

I don’t get judgy about experienced people doing something wrong, rather, it makes that much more aware of how susceptible I am.
 
There were 15,000 hours of experience in that aircraft, including some at the absolute pinnacle of high performance flying. Very sobering.

The sobering part is that the owner had a verifiable and recent history of steep turns at low altitude in abnormal conditions in an aircraft he had less than 10 hours time in type in. It’s also sobering that despite the total experience, there is no apparent W&B calculation performed.

What I did find interesting was the throttle control being 2” from full open. If it was in that position prior to the crash, that could explain a loss of power, especially if the friction lock was not tight.
 
It’s also sobering that despite the total experience, there is no apparent W&B calculation performed.

To be fair, how many people actually do a fresh W&B with 2 pilots and 2/3 tanks in a 4 seat aircraft? Of those, how many document it? How many will scratch a flight or add ballast if the CG is 1" forward?

I'm curious about other 177 owners' thoughts on the CG finding. Are they always out of balance with 2 pilots? Are they also out of balance with a solo pilot? Is ballast a common practice?

To me, this report feels like bureaucrats bureaucrating. They found a written rule that was broken, so of course that must be the proximal cause.

I did not catch the throttle position. That would truly be shocking if neither of them checked that.
 
To be fair, how many people actually do a fresh W&B with 2 pilots and 2/3 tanks in a 4 seat aircraft?
In most aircraft, that won't put you out of CG. But you run the math first to find out what will.
In my case, unless my front seat pax weighs more that 250 lbs, I know I'm good. If anyone looks to be over 210, I ask what their weight is and do the math.

I did not catch the throttle position. That would truly be shocking if neither of them checked that.
Judging by the take-off roll, if it was the throttle, it happened early in the roll.
It would be shocking if they didn't notice.
I do wonder what the white puffs of smoke were.
 
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To be fair, how many people actually do a fresh W&B with 2 pilots and 2/3 tanks in a 4 seat aircraft? Of those, how many document it? How many will scratch a flight or add ballast if the CG is 1" forward?

I'm curious about other 177 owners' thoughts on the CG finding. Are they always out of balance with 2 pilots? Are they also out of balance with a solo pilot? Is ballast a common practice?

To me, this report feels like bureaucrats bureaucrating. They found a written rule that was broken, so of course that must be the proximal cause.

I did not catch the throttle position. That would truly be shocking if neither of them checked that.
I had a straight leg Cardinal, C177B. I used ballast. It was easy to get to far forward. Even with lighter passengers it was at the edge. I didn’t worry too much about flying over the desert. I had enough water back there to last for days.
 
What got my attention was the part about the engine dying during the taxi. That would've scrubbed the mission for me, but at a minimum it should've put them on HIGH alert that something could be wrong.
 
The impossible turn. Sad to say, even those who advocate for it, do not seem to have much success with it.

Tim
The "impossible" turn is predicated on a complete engine failure. Merely reduced power gives you more options as to manouvering. However, if you're going to do the 45 degree teardrop back, you dang well better know how to do it without stalling.
 
Never flown a 177 but in docket photograph 6 (also 5:12 in ASI video), appears accident aircraft has a lap full of nose-up stabilator. Perhaps just a transient condition?
 
Minor nit, but I can't gripe about how poor journalism is and not call this out... What's a cessna 117?IMG_2177.jpeg
 
What got my attention was the part about the engine dying during the taxi. That would've scrubbed the mission for me, but at a minimum it should've put them on HIGH alert that something could be wrong.
Idk. Aggressively ground leaning followed by giving a quick bit of throttle to get it to move wouldn't make me scrub the flight if I realized what I did.

One thing I noticed is those controls were pegged at the firewall. I always thought there should be a bit of a gap so it hits the stop at the other end rather than the firewall. Which also make me wonder if the mixture was actually set properly being a relatively newly overhauled engine.

That previous thought reminded me of this recent Rod Machado video. Granted we're not talking about the same DA. But I think it's noteworthy to share as it was something my CFI never really touched on...or more likely, I didn't pay attention to or grasp at the time.
 
So the PIC was a hothead prone to inappropriate and dangerous responses to trivial problems.
 
What puzzles me is that McSpadden agreed to fly with him.
Normally cowboy pilots have a reputation that precedes them. You'd think he would've thrown enough red flags.
 
There is a visual illusion when one departs from a Mesa (Lake Placid isn't as bad as the HMS sedona but it is on an elevated plain) and that is that you are higher thean you really are. it's really hard to resist.

There was a road available 45 degree right turn ahead....might als have turned out badly- it's 2 lanes and has a curve.....very sad.
 
This just should not have been the result. With the engine generating that amount of power, no need for a 40-degree banked turn back to the field at that altitude. Forward CG didn’t help. I feel like had McSpadden been at the controls they’d both be here today.
 
This just should not have been the result. With the engine generating that amount of power, no need for a 40-degree banked turn back to the field at that altitude. Forward CG didn’t help. I feel like had McSpadden been at the controls they’d both be here today.

I agree with your general point, but I do not think the exact power made by the engine has been established yet. All the report says about power is that engine RPM was estimated at 2145 RPM 2 seconds before impact. However, the aircraft was in a dive. The CS prop will open up to try and maintain the set RPM, which was likely firewalled. The aircraft could have been at idle power and still maintain that RPM in a steep enough dive.
 
The aircraft could have been at idle power and still maintain that RPM in a steep enough dive.
I think they looked at the noise signature to determine that power was being made. You can clearly hear an exhaust note in the video, an engine at idle power or lower wouldn't have too much exhaust note.

Wonder why the throttle isn't firewalled?
The impact could've messed-up the linkages.
 
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