PA-32 down Brentwood, TN

I think I can honestly say that I have not flown a PA28 or PA32 where the system was disabled. I’ve used the override when training. But the system worked.
I’ve only flown one that was not permanently disabled. All we need to do now is determine the condition of the remaining fleet. I’ve flown ~ six.

how many do we need to have a statistically valid determination?
 
Fortunately, AvGas is quite likely to evaporate before hitting the ground, which is of course dependent on altitude and the atmospheric conditions present.
It’s also very explosive. Might not be looking for the fire on the ground.

This is a terrible idea.
 
I didn’t do it. But, I understand that most have been for exactly the reasons mentioned previously. They tended to fail often enough that they caused more problems than they ever solved.
 
Because it has the potential to dump the gear during an emergency when you need to stay clean which can kill you. Or you can keep it functional and not gear up during a normal landing.

:yeahthat:

Risk vs. benefit. A gear-up landing might be expensive but it's unlikely to be fatal. Uwanted gear deployment during an emergency, though, has a greater chance of a fatal outcome.

Risk management involves both probability of occurrence and consequence of occurrence. Even if a gear-up landing has a significant probability and an emergency that needs max glide has a miniscule probability (and I don't think that's really the case), it's the consequence of each that drives the decision.
 
I’ve only flown one that was not permanently disabled. All we need to do now is determine the condition of the remaining fleet. I’ve flown ~ six.

how many do we need to have a statistically valid determination?
This is the internet.... all conclusions shall be drawn from one anecodote, per the bylaws.
 
I should have known better. My point was not to debate the merits of auto-extension, it was to give an example of a "safety-enhancing" system that is/was thought to be simple, and was found to have adverse unintended consequences. These one-shot systems that have potentially catastrophic outcomes when inadvertently activated are never as simple as they seem at first blush.

Nauga,
and his FMECA
 
I should have known better. My point was not to debate the merits of auto-extension, it was to give an example of a "safety-enhancing" system that is/was thought to be simple, and was found to have adverse unintended consequences. These one-shot systems that have potentially catastrophic outcomes when inadvertently activated are never as simple as they seem at first blush.

Nauga,
and his FMECA


Agreed!

Like your new avatar, BTW. Did you just turn 45? ;) (Get it? Turn? 45? Hee hee hee...)

FMECA, Formica, whatever,.....
 
Would you rather perform emergency landing with empty tanks or fuel present?
What do you fly and how long would it take to dump all your gas if you lost the engine at, say, 500ft AGL after takeoff? I don't particularly want a system on my airplane that can get rid of all my gas rapidly unless it's converting it to thrust.

Nauga,
who would rather have a system to ADD fuel inflight
 
fwiw, mine's not disabled. The pitot line/diaphragm/bellow get finnicky and slow to recognize airspeed above the threshold, so it doesn't trigger the retract at reasonable speeds sometimes. There's adjustments to the bellows to be made, more complexity. I would remove it, but I ain't paying what they're asking for the kit plus labor. Sooooo, engaging the override as part of my takeoff and descent actions works like a charm. I'm completely indifferent to that system otherwise.
 
Are we crossing threads? Maybe I missed it, but how did we get from a seized engine to fighting over controls?
somebody brought up a wonderful idea for a system that can dump the fuel on a light aircraft so that when you're about to crash you won't do so with full tanks

i pointed out that in many of these incident threads, some clown will come up with some poorly thought out idea to address only one circumstance in the incident that will make that crash more survivable but likely lead to way more crashes. as was the case in the SMO thread, where people were seriously suggesting that there should be a mechanism to disengage the flight controls.
 
PA-32 crash witness statement from preliminary report: "After he exited the truck, he saw fire “come from the plane” before he heard it “shift” in the trees and then fall to the street, where it “exploded” and became engulfed in flames."

http://www.kathrynsreport.com/2014/10/a-horrible-way-to-die-post-crash-fires.html

"USA TODAY found that post-crash fires have been killing and maiming dozens of people a year for more than two decades."
"Two-thirds — 604 deaths — were attributed exclusively to fire, which suggests those people survived the impact and would be alive if fire had not ignited."
 
PA-32 crash witness statement from preliminary report: "After he exited the truck, he saw fire “come from the plane” before he heard it “shift” in the trees and then fall to the street, where it “exploded” and became engulfed in flames."

http://www.kathrynsreport.com/2014/10/a-horrible-way-to-die-post-crash-fires.html

"USA TODAY found that post-crash fires have been killing and maiming dozens of people a year for more than two decades."
"Two-thirds — 604 deaths — were attributed exclusively to fire, which suggests those people survived the impact and would be alive if fire had not ignited."
yep. and something sensible like regulations to reduce fuel spillage after minor to moderate incidents makes a lot of sense.

adding a system to purge fuel...not so much
 
Let's look at a counter example. Gear-up landings are a known issue in retract airplanes, even those with gear warning tones. It would be a great idea, and relatively simple, to put in a system that automatically extends the gear when, say, airspeed and throttle are below some threshold. It's simple and would significantly reduce the number of gear-up landings...right?

And yet...how many of us familiar with these systems know of airplanes that still have it enabled? Sometimes something that seems obvious to a casual observer is far from it.

Nauga,
who is simply complex

I think it was a great example. I've flown an arrow, and auto-extend was disabled on that one. It's a good example because a page of discussion points out that not everyone agrees on the safety or practicality of the auto-extend. I kinda like it not-enabled, because that's just my preference, and that I'd rather know it isn't going to do things on its own.

My point on new ideas isn't that we should always seek to come up with a solution for every aviation problem, but rather that it's much better to discuss options than to automatically discount anything new as not required.

Back to the original thread here, my take away is that aircraft not flown regularly can be a hazard, and flying a piston single over a forested area at night can be a hazard. It's sad no matter how you slice it, though.
 
safety improvements for such an incident as a student grabbing the controls would be informing the student that such a thing can occur and having a solid briefing and practicing. not adding further complexity and failure mechanisms to the flight controls

weren't you the one saying that flying a C172 is more dangerous than flying in desert storm?

1 - Practice at altitude, including full stalls not just "first indication" are a help. But you can't always logic someone out of a panic situation.

2 - Nope. I did point out that basic flight instruction is comparable, in terms of fatalities/hr flown, to combat flying in the USAF during desert storm. That's a fact.

The funny thing about #2 is that I believe this happened at least once before. The British were losing more pilots to basic flight instruction than they were combat in ww1.
 
Are we crossing threads? Maybe I missed it, but how did we get from a seized engine to fighting over controls?

See post # 53 ... seems he can't let it go nor live with the concept that others have the right to a differing opinion. If they do he classifies them as "clowns" (post # 95) ...
 
1 - Practice at altitude, including full stalls not just "first indication" are a help. But you can't always logic someone out of a panic situation.

2 - Nope. I did point out that basic flight instruction is comparable, in terms of fatalities/hr flown, to combat flying in the USAF during desert storm. That's a fact.

The funny thing about #2 is that I believe this happened at least once before. The British were losing more pilots to basic flight instruction than they were combat in ww1.

Absolutely it is a fact. One often lost in the allure vs realities of what constitutes combat in a permissive environment. Not only WWI either. In WWII, it's undisputed fact the losses in training were staggering. Almost 16K fatalities, compared to 26K total aircrew fatalities by 8th AF in the German Campaign for instance. That's 60% of the replacement rate the service would have benefitted from otherwise, not lost to enemy action. That's horrendously bad.

Fast forward to a post Desert Storm paradigm? Without question we have a higher fatality rate in training than in forward deployment, both in AETC and NATRACOM. Not even close.
 
"The airplane’s most recent annual inspection was completed October 4, 2022, at 3,623.3 total aircraft hours."

Fatal accident occurred on October 18, 2022. Preliminary found lots of things wrong. I'm thinking they may want to have a chit-chat with whomever signed off the annual ...

As someone on the outside looking in, the number of planes that have serious problems shortly after maintenence or repair is surprising. Frankly, it is the only thing I have yet to get past in deciding whether or not to start working toward a PPL. I'm willing to accept the risk of my own actions and decisions, but being required to accept the risks of someone else's may be more than I can get comfortable with. Which leads to my question: Is it reasonable to assume an aircraft in ANY condition undergoing an annual inspection should be expected to at least not fall out of the sky two weeks later, assuming the owner is willing to foot the bill for the work?
 
Is it reasonable to assume an aircraft in ANY condition undergoing an annual inspection should be expected to at least not fall out of the sky two weeks later, assuming the owner is willing to foot the bill for the work?
In my experience no. Being proactive/knowledgeable with your aircraft maintenance and using qualified maintenance providers goes more to mitigating maintenance induced issues than having all maintenance rechecked by a separate provider. Who will then check their work? That said, using a different provider for your Annual on occasion does tend to highlight any complacency issues.

FYI: while I don't know where you get your information, just because an aircraft has an accident after recent maintenance doesn’t mean the maintenance had any cause. In this accident, it had been 2 weeks since the annual inspection with no subsequent history reported until that day. So until there is more info is released, the fact the aircraft had maintenance 2 weeks ago could simply be part of the investigative process vs a cause.
 
As someone on the outside looking in, the number of planes that have serious problems shortly after maintenence or repair is surprising. Frankly, it is the only thing I have yet to get past in deciding whether or not to start working toward a PPL. I'm willing to accept the risk of my own actions and decisions, but being required to accept the risks of someone else's may be more than I can get comfortable with. Which leads to my question: Is it reasonable to assume an aircraft in ANY condition undergoing an annual inspection should be expected to at least not fall out of the sky two weeks later, assuming the owner is willing to foot the bill for the work?

Read the comments of Bell206. I certainly am not blaming the last person to sign the logbook but if anyone was in a position to possibly catch the fact that this aircraft had multiple issues ... it would have been them. But we don't know what the interaction was between the owner and the inspector.

FWIW ... I built and fly my own experimental. I do the maintenance and I trust me but I still have the eyes of others that I trust to take a look and see what I may have missed.

Many perceive that those of us doing our own maintenance do so because we can do it on the cheap. Owner maintenance can save large money as to labor and experimental parts can also save quite a bit of cash but real maintenance with quality parts, and not short cuts or junk is the goal.

I fly this thing and I like me and love my family and friends that often ride with me. I want it to be right whenever it leaves the ground ...
 
I’ve only flown one that was not permanently disabled. All we need to do now is determine the condition of the remaining fleet. I’ve flown ~ six.

how many do we need to have a statistically valid determination?

This is the internet.... all conclusions shall be drawn from one anecodote, per the bylaws.

I agree with @Jim K. @Tarheelpilot is eminently qualified to espouse his opinion on not only the automatic landing gear extension system of the PA32, but any and all subjects arising from discussions regarding that aircraft.

:D :D
 
Another factor is, did you pick the shop because they are known to be good, or because they were cheap?

I only use known good shops. And am willing to pay extra for good work. Can they make a mistake? Yes, but I feel they are less likely to do so.
 
My Dad’s Turbo Lance had the auto extension intact up to the day he sold it. It was never a problem. But I can see the issues.

Mine had it removed by a prior owner. I don’t miss it.
 
In my experience no. Being proactive/knowledgeable with your aircraft maintenance and using qualified maintenance providers goes more to mitigating maintenance induced issues than having all maintenance rechecked by a separate provider. Who will then check their work? That said, using a different provider for your Annual on occasion does tend to highlight any complacency issues.

FYI: while I don't know where you get your information, just because an aircraft has an accident after recent maintenance doesn’t mean the maintenance had any cause. In this accident, it had been 2 weeks since the annual inspection with no subsequent history reported until that day. So until there is more info is released, the fact the aircraft had maintenance 2 weeks ago could simply be part of the investigative process vs a cause.

I got my information here:

https://libraryonline.erau.edu/online-full-text/faa-aviation-medicine-reports/AM02-23.pdf

504 "maintenance related" fatalities in 10 years attributed by the NTSB.
 
Is it reasonable to assume an aircraft in ANY condition undergoing an annual inspection should be expected to at least not fall out of the sky two weeks later, assuming the owner is willing to foot the bill for the work?
It isn't reasonable to expect all humans to have the same high standards or those with the highest standards to be perfect. It is reasonable to do your own due diligence and look for shops with experience maintaing your type of aircraft and having a quality control system of a sort, which could be two mechanics working together who always check each other's work, including the inspection phase. A lone mechanic working out of a station wagon? I'd get involved and be that second set of eyes myself.
 
504 "maintenance related" fatalities in 10 years attributed by the NTSB.
As with any data set it needs to be put into context. What part of this comment was "surprising" to you and as compared to what?
 
As with any data set it needs to be put into context. What part of this comment was "surprising" to you and as compared to what?

Really? The FAA didn't provide sufficient "context" in their report? What more "context" could there be? Either 504 people died in 10 years because of maintenance related crashes or they didn't.

As stated above, I was surprised by the number of people who die because of mistakes made by professional mechanics they are required to use compared to the number who would die if they all did their jobs correctly.
 
It isn't reasonable to expect all humans to have the same high standards or those with the highest standards to be perfect. It is reasonable to do your own due diligence and look for shops with experience maintaing your type of aircraft and having a quality control system of a sort, which could be two mechanics working together who always check each other's work, including the inspection phase. A lone mechanic working out of a station wagon? I'd get involved and be that second set of eyes myself.

If I know enough to be the second set of eyes, I know enough to do the work. But yes, I would certainly double check everything that was touched before trusting my life to it.
 
I was surprised by the number of people who die because of mistakes made by professional mechanics they are required to use compared to the number who would die if they all did their jobs correctly.
The context/comparison I refer to is more big picture. The 504 represents 7% of the 7447 fatalities in that same period. When compared to other professional industries that 7% rate is on the low side. For example, with professional doctors their fatal error rate is 10-15% depending which study you use. So aviation mechanics are actually safer at their jobs than the doctor you use. What surprises me are the 1000s of fatalities still caused by insufficient fuel and flying into clouds.
 
The context/comparison I refer to is more big picture. The 504 represents 7% of the 7447 fatalities in that same period. When compared to other professional industries that 7% rate is on the low side. For example, with professional doctors their fatal error rate is 10-15% depending which study you use. So aviation mechanics are actually safer at their jobs than the doctor you use. What surprises me are the 1000s of fatalities still caused by insufficient fuel and flying into clouds.

Yep, roughly 250,000 annual deaths attributed to medical errors. :(
 
(Final Report) N600JG Piper PA-32-300 Brentwood Tennessee 18 OCT 2022

1 POB - Fatal

Pilot Flight Time: 505 hours (Total, all aircraft), 105 hours (Total, this make and model)

On October 18, 2022, at 0741 central daylight time, a Piper PA-32-300, N600JG, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Brentwood, Tennessee. The private pilot was fatally injured.

According to the operator of a maintenance facility at the pilot’s home airport, the purpose of the flight was to deliver the airplane to Fayetteville Municipal Airport (YFM), Fayetteville, Tennessee, for an avionics repair. Automatic dependent surveillance - broadcast (ADS-B) data revealed that the airplane departed Springfield Robertson County Airport (M91), Springfield, Tennessee, about 0717 for YFM

The airplane was in cruise flight about 5,400 ft when the pilot declared an emergency due to a partial loss of engine power. The pilot and controller discussed options for the forced landing, but ultimately the pilot announced that the engine was “stopped,” and that the airplane was “heading down.”

A witness described the airplane maneuvering about 75 ft above the ground before it impacted wires, crossed the road on which he was driving, and came to rest in trees on the opposite side of the road. He reported that there was no engine noise and that the airplane made only a “whistling” sound. After the airplane came to rest suspended in trees, the witness watched as it caught fire, “shifted,” then fell from the trees before it exploded and became engulfed in flames.

Examination of the engine at the accident site revealed that the crankshaft could not be rotated by hand, and the oil suction screen was completely occluded with debris that comprised metallic particles and pieces of rubber material consistent in appearance with pieces of rubber magneto drive cushion (bumper). Further examination revealed that the crankshaft was fractured at the rear edge of the No. 6 connecting rod journal. The No. 6 connecting rod and rod cap were damaged, and the No. 6 rod bearing was extruded.

Review of maintenance records indicated that the engine underwent a field overhaul about 10 years before the accident, during which the crankshaft was replaced. At the time of the accident, the engine had accrued about 101 hours since overhaul.

Examination of the crankshaft fracture revealed a fatigue crack that initiated at the surface in the fillet radius between the No. 6 connecting rod journal and the forward cheek. Similar fatigue cracks were observed at the forward end of the connecting rod journal with features consistent with excessive loads induced during contact between the connecting rods and the engine case. The No. 6 rod bearing was likely destroyed due to interruption of the oil to the bearing from fatigue crack propagation.

The crankshaft was made obsolete 30 years before the engine’s most recent overhaul, and although it was still authorized for use in multiple variants within this series of engines, it was not authorized for use in the accident engine model. Additionally, the connecting rod bearings installed on the accident engine were not authorized for use in the accident engine model.

It is likely that the use of a crankshaft that was not approved for use in the accident engine make and model resulted in abnormal contact between the connecting rods and their journals, imparting stress to the crankshaft and resulting in its failure. It is possible that the renitriding of the crankshaft may have affected its ability to tolerate high loading and contributed to the failure. The observed nitride layer was thicker than the original specification, and the core hardness was lower than the specification. Combined, these factors increased the potential to generate cracks.

While the oil filter screen was occluded with material consistent with a magneto bumper, there was no evidence of general oil starvation elsewhere within the engine, which would be consistent with an occluded screen; therefore, it is likely that the magneto bumper dropped into the engine due to large vibrations following the crankshaft failure, and broken pieces then became trapped in the oil screen.

Further examination revealed that the connecting rod in the number 4 position was labeled 3, and the one in the number 3 position was labeled 4. Although this likely did not contribute to the accident, it is another indication of improper maintenance practices.

Probable Cause and Findings:

A total loss of engine power due to the catastrophic failure of the crankshaft resulting from the improper installation of the crankshaft for this application.
 
Have there been wrongful death lawsuits filed in this case? Figured that ntsb narrative (yes I know, not admissible), it would be prime picking for such a suit.
 
Pilot Flight Time: 505 hours (Total, all aircraft), 105 hours (Total, this make and model)

Review of maintenance records indicated that the engine underwent a field overhaul about 10 years before the accident, during which the crankshaft was replaced. At the time of the accident, the engine had accrued about 101 hours since overhaul.

I couldn't find an ownership history. Did he purchase the plane recently and put 100 hours on it in a year or two, or did he only fly it 10 hours/year?

I wonder if he overhauled the engine, or if it was the previous owner's shade tree overhaul, to sell the plane with a "freshly overhauled" engine.
 
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