Navworx receives a "stop order" from FAA

So in essence, the FAA is twitterpated over a single bit in the bitstream that says "The world's most common and popular on board certified navigation sources, are accurate".

LOL.

I think it is friggin' ludicrous that the FAA is losing its mind because they're like "Yes, your GPS source is totally okay, as long as it doesn't broadcast a message saying that it is okay."
 
With all the talk over privatizing ATC, it's interesting that the FAA seems to be going out of its way to block one of the only transponders which doesn't snitch your identity out to anyone when it's being used on 1200.
 
So what's the solution for the -EXP unit? I don't see any listed on Navxorx's web site. ??
 
So what's the solution for the -EXP unit? I don't see any listed on Navxorx's web site. ??

Both units either have to use the one and only certified source or buy a software patch to stop sending a "3", is how I read it. FAA doesn't care if the thing is in an Experimental or not. Their wording is that the "3" being broadcast somehow jeprodizes the national airspace system.

As if someone sitting in a car broadcasting false crap information into UAT doesn't. LOL.
 
Word from Scott Edwards at Dallas Avionics is further details are expected to be posted on Navworx website by the end of the week. EXP owners can expect a two step program, software patch followed by hardware update at a later date.

I may wait to make any move until after I hear what Navworx has to say at OSH.
 
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Still seems interesting to me that the same Garmin GPS sources used by Garmin's competing products, are magically not good enough when plugged into a competitor's product.

Almost like someone got paid off to make sure they couldn't be used.

Especially considering Garmin was very late to market with their product at the same price point.

But without knowing who talks to whom and who knows each other, that just sounds like conspiracy theory stuff.

Problem is, it's probably true and probably only took a phone call.

"Can you somehow stop them from using our GPS? How are they allowed to do that? Our new transponder is behind schedule."

It's sure suspicious anyway.

It's not like transmitting the "3" has been proven to harm real safety in any way. FAA didn't bother to even attempt to prove that.

The whole thing could have just as easily been handled by an AD that said "We see its transmitting a 3 and we don't like that, but it causes no real problem. Must be fixed by 2020."

The dramatic "raid" and what not, don't appear to have been necessary at all. A little extra drama to drive purchases to others? A little kick to the face for following the spec and still having a "stealth" mode. Embarrassed some folks that the spec allows that?

All sorts of entertainment going on here if any of that is true. And a bit hard to believe what they found, a single bit twiddle in an unsecured message stream, even from experimental aircraft, is any real threat to the NAS as they say, or worth as much drama as they've made it out to be so far.

I mean I know sometimes government inspectors like to flex muscles to look cool, but this one is a bit over the top.

"We found you were plugging in some great GPS units that we love, and claiming your GPS source was accurate! Damn you people! We're raiding your facilities!"

LOL. WTF.
 
Still seems interesting to me that the same Garmin GPS sources used by Garmin's competing products, are magically not good enough when plugged into a competitor's product.

Almost like someone got paid off to make sure they couldn't be used.

Especially considering Garmin was very late to market with their product at the same price point.

But without knowing who talks to whom and who knows each other, that just sounds like conspiracy theory stuff.

Problem is, it's probably true and probably only took a phone call.

"Can you somehow stop them from using our GPS? How are they allowed to do that? Our new transponder is behind schedule."

It's sure suspicious anyway.

It's not like transmitting the "3" has been proven to harm real safety in any way. FAA didn't bother to even attempt to prove that.

The whole thing could have just as easily been handled by an AD that said "We see its transmitting a 3 and we don't like that, but it causes no real problem. Must be fixed by 2020."

The dramatic "raid" and what not, don't appear to have been necessary at all. A little extra drama to drive purchases to others? A little kick to the face for following the spec and still having a "stealth" mode. Embarrassed some folks that the spec allows that?

All sorts of entertainment going on here if any of that is true. And a bit hard to believe what they found, a single bit twiddle in an unsecured message stream, even from experimental aircraft, is any real threat to the NAS as they say, or worth as much drama as they've made it out to be so far.

I mean I know sometimes government inspectors like to flex muscles to look cool, but this one is a bit over the top.

"We found you were plugging in some great GPS units that we love, and claiming your GPS source was accurate! Damn you people! We're raiding your facilities!"

LOL. WTF.

Did you read the AD and comments sections?
 
FWIW SIL of 0 isn't 2020 compliant.

"While 14 CFR § 91.227 requires a SIL of 3, TSO–C154c (the TSO under which the affected units are produced) does not. Thus, when the affected units broadcast a SIL of 0, they are TSOcompliant. Until the performance requirements of 14 CFR § 91.227 become effective on January 1, 2020, the FAA does not find the internal uncertified GPS source objectionable, as long as the ADS–B unit is correctly broadcasting a SIL of 0."
 
Did you read the AD and comments sections?

FWIW SIL of 0 isn't 2020 compliant.

"While 14 CFR § 91.227 requires a SIL of 3, TSO–C154c (the TSO under which the affected units are produced) does not. Thus, when the affected units broadcast a SIL of 0, they are TSOcompliant. Until the performance requirements of 14 CFR § 91.227 become effective on January 1, 2020, the FAA does not find the internal uncertified GPS source objectionable, as long as the ADS–B unit is correctly broadcasting a SIL of 0."

I did.

The point being, what actual safety problem truly exists in the real world with a device sending a "3" when hooked to a different *certified* GPS source than the one approved unit?

None.

For that matter, why even have an SIL?

Either your ADS-B crap works or it doesn't.

Real world ...

Controller: "Say altitude... Stop Mode-C squawk, your altitude appears to be inaccurate."

After 2020: "Say location... Stop ADS-B squawk Your location appears to be inaccurate."

(Not that the pilot wouldn't be reading the location right off of the same GPS that's feeding the bad info to the transponder or UAT transmitter...)

What's the actual real world problem they needed the drama of a raid to fix? Ooooh. It's sending a "3". Whoop dee freaking doo.
 
I did.

The point being, what actual safety problem truly exists in the real world with a device sending a "3" when hooked to a different *certified* GPS source than the one approved unit?

None.

For that matter, why even have an SIL?

Either your ADS-B crap works or it doesn't.

Real world ...

Controller: "Say altitude... Stop Mode-C squawk, your altitude appears to be inaccurate."

After 2020: "Say location... Stop ADS-B squawk Your location appears to be inaccurate."

(Not that the pilot wouldn't be reading the location right off of the same GPS that's feeding the bad info to the transponder or UAT transmitter...)

What's the actual real world problem they needed the drama of a raid to fix? Ooooh. It's sending a "3". Whoop dee freaking doo.

I think most of the drama is fictional, the standard armchair internet quarterbacking at its finest.
 
All I can say is Navworx ought to use a word other than "unbelievable" in it's advertising at this point.
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FWIW SIL of 0 isn't 2020 compliant.

"While 14 CFR § 91.227 requires a SIL of 3, TSO–C154c (the TSO under which the affected units are produced) does not. Thus, when the affected units broadcast a SIL of 0, they are TSOcompliant. Until the performance requirements of 14 CFR § 91.227 become effective on January 1, 2020, the FAA does not find the internal uncertified GPS source objectionable, as long as the ADS–B unit is correctly broadcasting a SIL of 0."
Why cant 'they' (somebody) get the internal GPS source certified? What are the odds that it is sending inaccurate data. I would bet slim to none, it just doesn't have the certified stamp on it (the manufacturer didn't pay their fee to get tested?) If its tested and certified, they can legally send a '3'. Must cost too much or take too long to jump those hoops.
 
Why cant 'they' (somebody) get the internal GPS source certified? What are the odds that it is sending inaccurate data. I would bet slim to none, it just doesn't have the certified stamp on it (the manufacturer didn't pay their fee to get tested?) If its tested and certified, they can legally send a '3'. Must cost too much or take too long to jump those hoops.
As I read it, the odds are exceedingly low that it is sending inaccurate data, but because it doesn't have a flag to tell you that it's sending inaccurate data then it must be assumed to be inaccurate data. I believe that was referred to as Catch-22.

By the way, this is exactly, precisely the atoms on the head of a pin attitude that will either doom privatized ATC or make it so ungodly expensive that GA can't participate.
 
Why cant 'they' (somebody) get the internal GPS source certified? What are the odds that it is sending inaccurate data. I would bet slim to none, it just doesn't have the certified stamp on it (the manufacturer didn't pay their fee to get tested?) If its tested and certified, they can legally send a '3'. Must cost too much or take too long to jump those hoops.

In addition to Bill's catch 22, the certification issue goes something like this: the position sensor chipset need not be TSO'd, but it must meet the performance standards of a tso'd chip. In order to prove its meets TSO performance standards, it must pass the RCDO evaluation testing procedure. So basically, in order for it not to be TSO'd, it must be TSO'd.
 
Why cant 'they' (somebody) get the internal GPS source certified? What are the odds that it is sending inaccurate data. I would bet slim to none, it just doesn't have the certified stamp on it (the manufacturer didn't pay their fee to get tested?) If its tested and certified, they can legally send a '3'. Must cost too much or take too long to jump those hoops.

Time and money. Much easier to charge their customers a bit more money now, move on, and keep their future units at a low cost. In the grand scheme of things, $600 is cheap for complying with an AD.
 
Time and money. Much easier to charge their customers a bit more money now, move on, and keep their future units at a low cost. In the grand scheme of things, $600 is cheap for complying with an AD.

Not on something that should cost about $150 total from a manufacturer in China. LOL.
 
Anybody know if Navworx made it to Oshkosh? They were supposed to have an updated STC to cover Garmin WAAs units as an approved source, but I have not heard back on that from their distributor. Their web site is rather stale, but they may just be busy with the FAA work. Anybody have any update on this topic...other than what Garmin and others are doing?
 
Anybody know if Navworx made it to Oshkosh? They were supposed to have an updated STC to cover Garmin WAAs units as an approved source, but I have not heard back on that from their distributor. Their web site is rather stale, but they may just be busy with the FAA work. Anybody have any update on this topic...other than what Garmin and others are doing?

I was hoping their distributor went quiet because they were busy at the show... no?


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They are here....and happy to sell you a certified unit. They should have the ES version ready 1 quarter next year. So that prolly means next fall sometime.
 
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