...WAS NAVWORX AUTHORIZED TO MAKE THE 4.0.6 CHANGE?
Yes. Fortunately from product inception our internal GPS met SIL 3 performance. The FAA approved our internal GPS as SIL 3. During the TSO certification process, the FAA accepted our “compliance matrix” – which is the FAA’s primary means of compliance - showing our internal GPS integrity was 1x10-7, which translates to SIL of 3.
(See compliance matrix here). However, FAA policy at that time was that ADS-B GPS must have its own separate TSO – our internal GPS was certified under TSO-C154c, the same as the UAT OUT/IN transceiver. It’s important to note that the FAA authorized us to certify our internal GPS in this manner, and that they know that our internal GPS is safe – applicants for TSO certification must present a project plan and the FAA reviews and approves this project plan before the FAA ever allows an applicant to proceed with TSO certification of any product. Although they approved our internal GPS to be SIL of 3 (integrity of 1x10-7), based on FAA policy at the time they made us transmit SIL 0, with the explanation that “uncertified GPS must transmit SIL 0”. This really is a misnomer, as our GPS is “certified” (under TSO-C154c), but the FAA refers to it as “uncertified”. The FAA AD states that “uncertified” GPS must transmit SIL of 0. This shows how the FAA is harming our customers by not sending TIS-B traffic and creating the risk of a mid-air collision.
THE FAA AMENDED THE LAW TO ALLOW FOR UNCERTIFIED ADS-B
In February 2015, the FAA amended the law to allow uncertified ADS-B equipment; as long as it met the performance of the TSO. Based on the fact that the FAA approved our compliance matrix showing our internal GPS met the performance of SIL 3, we submitted version 4.0.6 – and we created the experimental
200-8013 product.
IS NAVWORX THE ONLY MANUFACTURER OF UNCERTIFIED ADS-B?
No, there are other manufacturers producing “uncertified” ADS-B radios and ADS-B GPS – and these uncertified products transmit SIL of 3. Today, there are over 1000 experimental and light-sport aircraft flying with uncertified GPS that transmit SIL of 3, yet the FAA has not issued an AD for any experimental manufacturers of these uncertified GPS products.
WHY DID THE FAA PROPOSE THE AD FOR THE EXPERIMENTAL PRODUCT?
Our experimental product uses the same internal GPS that our 12/13 certified products use and with an approved integrity of SIL 3, meets the performance requirements.
In March 2015, well over a year and a half ago, we sent a letter to the FAA telling them that we would be selling the
200-8013 product, and requested that they approve of it before we sell it. About a week later they called to say it was approved for sale.
FAA policy for experimental ADS-B products is that they monitor their ADS-B compliance reporting system for problems. None of our five hundred
200-8013 customers have ever been contacted by the FAA about any issues with the product related to the GPS (or any other ADS-B issue other than configuration issues). Between the time of approval and the issued AD, the FAA never communicated to us any concerns about the performance of the
200-8013 product.
We can only conclude that the FAA is deliberately sabotaging our business.
THE FAA SAYS THAT THEY DENIED APPROVAL FOR 4.0.6. - IS THIS TRUE?
No! They sent us a letter, regarding the 4.0.6 change on February 29th, stating that our internal GPS wasn’t a “TSO GPS”; therefore we couldn’t transmit SIL of 3. This letter came from the certification office, which is the same office that wrote the AD, and is obviously unaware of the recent rule change that allows for uncertified equipment. Specifically this letter stated that we needed to use a TSO GPS and that we set the SIL back to 0. As part of their efforts to sabotage our business they released this letter to the public as part of the AD filing. By selectively releasing only this letter, they make it appear that we never had authorization to transmit SIL of 3.
What they didn’t release to the public, and which we are now making available, is that a month later, they approved all of the changes in 4.0.6 (which included SIL 3), by approving three subsequent releases – versions 4.0.7, 4.0.8, and 4.0.9
(See 4.0.9 approval here). So they did approve 4.0.6 – three subsequent times.
WHY DID YOU DENY THE FAA INSPECTION OF YOUR FACILITY?
The FAA informed us that they wanted the production documents showing the contact information of our 700 12/13 customers. Using this information, they planned on contacting these customers and force them to revert to version 4.0.5. Version 4.0.5 transmits SIL 0 and subsequently puts our customers at risk of mid-air collisions. We complied with their requests for production documents, but redacted the customer contact info, as we would not, and will never be, party to purposely creating a risk to life. Please note that the FAA’s position today, with the publication of the Unapproved Parts Notice (UPN) states in order to continue using the 12/13 products, version 4.0.5 with SIL 0 must be used – and the FAA knows this will endanger our customers lives.
WHAT DOES THE FAA HAVE TO SAY ABOUT THE TIS-B SERVICE CHANGE?
After our attorneys pointed out to the FAA that their TIS-B policy change affected our 12/13 products and posed risk to life and property, the FAA couldn’t provide a coherent answer – instead they came up excuses. Here are two of our “favorites”:
- “NavWorx made a business decision to manufacture a product that did not comply with these requirements” (meaning our product transmitted SIL 0). This from the certification office that approved our 12/13 products to be certified, and demanded that we set the SIL to 0. In other words, they blame us for them certifying our products.
- Later they stated that the certification office (An office whose sole role is to certify avionics) didn’t know that the product was certified. By saying something so outrageous, they must think this covers them from their responsibility – recall the TIS-B Service change was to affect only uncertified products – so if the FAA can claim that they thought our product was uncertified, they think they’re off the hook.
IS A SOLUTION POSSIBLE?
Absolutely - We proposed to the FAA that we replace our internal GPS module with the GPS module from the vendor that has sold over 1000 modules to various experimental avionics manufacturers for sale to experimental and light-sport aircraft.
Our proposal had the FAA inspecting our facility and witnessing the testing of the modified 12/13 product on Friday October 24th. The proposal was agreed to by the FAA attorney representing the certification office. In bad faith, the FAA never showed up. Instead the next week they sent over a new proposal that wanted us to re-certify most of the 12/13 product, and told us they didn’t have a lot of time to work with us, so it would take them up to 6 months to approve the paperwork. For the experimental product, we contacted the certification office for approval to use this other vendor’s uncertified GPS module five weeks ago and they still haven’t replied to our email request.
It doesn’t appear to us that the FAA wants to rectify the problem they created.
IS LACK OF TIS-B TRAFFIC REALLY DANGEROUS?
Yes! The FAA says so in their rational for implementing the TIS-B service change. The change was to remove
uncertified ADS-B OUT products – the ADS-B OUT of these
uncertified systems would not be displayed when received by aircraft with certified traffic displays.
Not displaying all traffic on an ADS-B display poses a risk of a mid-air collision:
"This introduces a potential safety hazard into the NAS."
SUMMARY
The FAA implemented the TIS-B Service change to fix a safety hazard related to uncertified equipment, but they knowingly created a much larger safety hazard by destroying the traffic functionality of our TSO certified products, putting over 700 of our customers at risk of a mid-air collision. The FAA continues to cover up this safety hazard, and won’t fix the problem nor will they allow us to resolve the problem.
The FAA has a mandate to create a safe National Airspace System (NAS), but instead have created an on-going risk of mid-air collisions for our 700 certified systems for almost a year now.
Bill Moffitt
President,
NavWorx Incorporated
If you have comments or questions on the TIS-B Service change, and how it puts your safety at risk when flying in the NAS -
Contact Fort Worth ACO, ASW-143:
Michael.A.Heusser@FAA.gov, 10101 Hillwood Parkway, Fort Worth, Texas 76177, telephone
(817) 222-5038, fax
(817) 222-5245.
Contact: Administrator Huerta Via: Max.Slutsky, Special Advisor to the Administrator email:
Max.Slutsky@FAA.gov tel:
202-267-9869
Contact your Congressman
http://www.house.gov/representatives/find/ "
