Ed Haywood
Final Approach
Unfortunately, while the A-10 was designed in an era of SA-2, SA-3, SA-6 and SA-8 which were all legacy SAMs, it really came into its career after the Soviets began designing and ultimately a few years later fielding the modern systems we have faced since at least the late 1990s. It would have no business flying amongst modern IADS networks, or even 20 year old FSR SAMs. Low, even really low, isn't protection anymore. Yes there is something to be said for direct terrain masking due to physics, but again, string enough of these systems and other forms of detection into a coherent IADS, and the Fulda Gap scenario becomes very unsurvivable for a Hog, even when you think its hiding behind a hillside.
That assumes BAI as a primary employment scenario. The problem is that land warfare is in an unprecedented period of uncertainty. Nobody really knows what ground operations are going to look like as a result of drones, AI, and autonomous systems. Everyone is trying to draw lessons from Ukraine, but there is little consensus thus far, other than that the next peer to peer war is going to be drastically different than anything seen before.
Two relevant conclusions that I think are supported by recent experience:
1. Massing ground combat forces is a recipe for destruction. Ground forces will be dispersed and hidden.
2. Versatility and adaptability of forces and weapons platforms are essential.
The Fulda Gap type scenario is unlikely for any form of air power. First, tactical air defenses have made it too dangerous. Second, armored columns are going to get raped by drones before air power ever gets in the game.
Right now the dominant force on the battlefield are Russian glide bombs launched from 30 miles behind the FLOT, beyond the range of Ukrainian air defenses. Both sides are widely dispersed and hidden. When the Russians identify a defensive concentration, they hit it with glide bombs to make a hole, then infiltrate their forces into the gap. At that point, combat forces from both sides are interspersed, with the front lines uncertain. The Ukraines have started dealing with this tactic by allowing the Russians to infiltrate into prepared traps, then cutting them off and chopping them up in close infantry combat.
Point being, right now land warfare is a mess, and any air platform that enters that environment better be able to survive that mess. I have great respect for Air Force and Navy pilots, but I have low confidence in their leadership's willingness to risk hundred million dollar platforms like the F35 by mixing it up over a chaotic battlefield.
The A-10 has some qualities that may make it useful in such a mess. First, it can operate from austere forward bases. Second, it is designed to survive heavy ground fire. Since those qualities are unique among current US military fixed wing platforms, I think it is foolish to discard that capability entirely when the operational environment is uncertain.
Maybe modern tech means we won't need mud fighters again. Maybe not.

