Kobe Bryant dead in helicopter crash

SToL said:
It doesn't matter, people are just speculating, and sometimes there's lessons to be learned in that.
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Unfortunately (and I agree with your thoughts in this thread), I don't think there are any new lessons here. Rotary wing pilots have lots of options to avoid IMC, but they've gotta exercise those options before they are IMC. That's an old lesson. Gettheritis is an old lesson too.

These seem to be some of the same mistakes that have killed pilots for 100+ years.
 
Piperonca said:
During my years of experience as a helicopter instrument flight examiner for the Army, I noted that when pilots at the controls in IMC panicked, they always seemed to go into the fetal position from primal fear. Since their hands were firmly attached to the controls, guess what happened? The cyclic stick gets pulled back into the belly, nose goes up, and you start to see all white on the artificial horizon.
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Yeah, I call that the "Prune effect." It usually occurs during the last part of the flare for landing in an airplane or during loss of visual references in helicopters.
 
https://www.pilotsofamerica.com/com...-helicopter-crash.124018/page-10#post-2867303

In post #364 (above) I detailed the autopilot/flight director system in the S-76 series helicopters.

As we learn little bits more information, I still contend that most likely the pilot was doing fine until he coupled the flight director into an incorrect mode and was overcome by the unexpected results.

Since he was single pilot, he had to do all the IIMC recovery immediate action steps himself:

Attitude- Level the "wings"
Heading- Turn ONLY to avoid know obstacles
Torque- Apply maximum power
Airspeed- Adjust to best climb

After these immediate steps, the rest is dealing with weather, IFR clearance and recovery to an airfield with a suitable approach and conditions. Squawking and talking are done once everything else is under control. This is where coupling the autopilot allows the single pilot the time and free hands to look up charts, frequencies, weather, obstructions, etc.

If all this is pre-planned and set up, all goes well. If not, you could turn a totally survivable event into a smoking hole...
 
IK04 said:
https://www.pilotsofamerica.com/com...-helicopter-crash.124018/page-10#post-2867303

In post #364 (above) I detailed the autopilot/flight director system in the S-76 series helicopters.

As we learn little bits more information, I still contend that most likely the pilot was doing fine until he coupled the flight director into an incorrect mode and was overcome by the unexpected results.

Since he was single pilot, he had to do all the IIMC recovery immediate action steps himself:

Attitude- Level the "wings"
Heading- Turn ONLY to avoid know obstacles
Torque- Apply maximum power
Airspeed- Adjust to best climb

After these immediate steps, the rest is dealing with weather, IFR clearance and recovery to an airfield with a suitable approach and conditions. Squawking and talking are done once everything else is under control. This is where coupling the autopilot allows the single pilot the time and free hands to look up charts, frequencies, weather, obstructions, etc.

If all this is pre-planned and set up, all goes well. If not, you could turn a totally survivable event into a smoking hole...
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Is there an attitude hold that is separate from the auto pilot? On our aircraft with SAS engaged, all I have to do is click the trim release on the cyclic and it’ll hold attitude. Double tap SAS and it’ll level the wings.
 
Doc Holliday said:
I would seriously doubt retreating blade stall played a part.
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So thought I, and it depends on the voracity of the witness (a roll vs. a banked turn) and it would simply be nothing more than the end of the accident chain if so.
 
Kenny Phillips said:
So thought I, and it depends on the voracity of the witness (a roll vs. a banked turn) and it would simply be nothing more than the end of the accident chain if so.
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If they truly got into retreating blade stall, the aircraft would turn left and pitch up. I haven’t read anything that suggests that happened.

The S76 has a Vne of 155 KIAS. So with a report of 160 kts gs at impact, it’s entirely possible that they were over Vne. The problem is, Vne doesn’t necessarily mean getting into retreating blade stall or compressibility either. There are other aerodynamic and structural factors involved in determining Vne. Based on the rotor design of the S76, I’d say it could easily go above 155 with no indications of RBS.

In comparison, the UH-60 has a very similar blade design and tip speed on both aircraft is 725 FPS. The difference is, the UH-60 has a 193 KIAS Vne without getting into RBS or compressibility in the flight conditions (estimate) of the accident. So, with the similarities of the two aircraft, I’d be willing to bet RBS in the S76 occurs at a much higher speed than 155.

Having said that, RBS is based on level flight, and influenced by certain environmental conditions, weight, and maneuvering. The key here is the aggressive pull out if indeed that’s what the pilot was doing. If that occurred, then RBS could very well happen at well below the level flight RBS. No telling if that’s what happened here or not and it doesn’t matter anyway. If the data shows a 4,000 FPM RoD, then it would take several hundred feet for recovery. If the pilot didn’t start a pull up until exiting the clouds, the aircraft is going to mush and no chance at leveling before impact. Just not enough room for recovery with that kind of descent rate.
 
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Velocity173 said:
Is there an attitude hold that is separate from the auto pilot? On our aircraft with SAS engaged, all I have to do is click the trim release on the cyclic and it’ll hold attitude. Double tap SAS and it’ll level the wings.
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Nope. The autopilot is on full time to act as SAS, stability only and mostly yaw. You have to engage the roll axis on the FD to get a wing leveler...
 
kyleb said:
What surprises me is that a very experienced pilot couldn't maintain wings (or rotor) level for the minute or two it would have taken to climb to VMC conditions. This wasn't JFK Jr. This was a guy who should have had plenty of simulated instrument experience. That's the part that baffles me.
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This reminds me of a favorite old quote: "In theory, there's no difference between theory and practice. In practice, there is."

Simulated instrument is a ****-poor substitute for the real thing. I hesitate to even say it's a substitute. It's just not, especially during the day when you have so many additional cues as to what is going on. I've never experienced the leans under the hood, but one of my most vivid flying memories is the moment I first hit actual IMC at the controls of an airplane - I was just ticking over 10 hours total flight time, I was in a standard rate turn to the left when we hit the coulds, and IMMEDIATELY I felt like I was baking 30º to the right.

I'm sure many others have similar experiences. I would not for one minute (or 78 seconds) believe that a person who has only simulated instrument time is going to have a successful outcome in a complex aircraft with a full load of passengers hitting IMC for the first time single pilot. That's a fairy tale from FAA fantasyland that they use to allow people to get instrument ratings in Arizona without any actual instrument time. In fact, you can get an ATP with zero actual. Unbelievable... And this kind of accident is a direct result.
 
flyingcheesehead said:
I would not for one minute (or 78 seconds) believe that a person who has only simulated instrument time is going to have a successful outcome in a complex aircraft with a full load of passengers hitting IMC for the first time single pilot.
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I would have thought "maintain heading and climb at VX (or some helicopter version thereof) for 90 seconds" would be fairly straightforward.
 
kyleb said:
I would have thought "maintain heading and climb at VX (or some helicopter version thereof) for 90 seconds" would be fairly straightforward.
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Yeah, but spatial disorientation will throw a wrench in the works quicker than you'd believe. That memorable occasion I was speaking of, it was pretty much instantaneous upon hitting IMC that I felt like I was in a 30-degree right bank, which is probably 45-50 degrees off from what was really happening (left turn). It was an incredibly powerful sensation that really threw me for a loop, in the snap of a finger. It's really hard at first to consciously suppress sensations that have worked reliably for you for your entire life.
 
flyingcheesehead said:
This reminds me of a favorite old quote: "In theory, there's no difference between theory and practice. In practice, there is."

Simulated instrument is a ****-poor substitute for the real thing. I hesitate to even say it's a substitute. It's just not, especially during the day when you have so many additional cues as to what is going on. I've never experienced the leans under the hood, but one of my most vivid flying memories is the moment I first hit actual IMC at the controls of an airplane - I was just ticking over 10 hours total flight time, I was in a standard rate turn to the left when we hit the coulds, and IMMEDIATELY I felt like I was baking 30º to the right.

I'm sure many others have similar experiences. I would not for one minute (or 78 seconds) believe that a person who has only simulated instrument time is going to have a successful outcome in a complex aircraft with a full load of passengers hitting IMC for the first time single pilot. That's a fairy tale from FAA fantasyland that they use to allow people to get instrument ratings in Arizona without any actual instrument time. In fact, you can get an ATP with zero actual. Unbelievable... And this kind of accident is a direct result.
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I agree completely. I have my IR and need to stay current, so I avoid simulated instrument conditions as much as possible. No comparison, if you ask me.
 
flyingcheesehead said:
Yeah, but spatial disorientation will throw a wrench in the works quicker than you'd believe. That memorable occasion I was speaking of, it was pretty much instantaneous upon hitting IMC that I felt like I was in a 30-degree right bank, which is probably 45-50 degrees off from what was really happening (left turn). It was an incredibly powerful sensation that really threw me for a loop, in the snap of a finger. It's really hard at first to consciously suppress sensations that have worked reliably for you for your entire life.
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Agree 100%. When the leans hit, they hit hard, and even with training it takes almost all of your concentration to suppress them.

For this poor fellow, the factors of very little actual, gethereitis, VIP aboard, and worry about close terrain, it was just probably too much for him to process...
 
flyingcheesehead said:
This reminds me of a favorite old quote: "In theory, there's no difference between theory and practice. In practice, there is."

Simulated instrument is a ****-poor substitute for the real thing. I hesitate to even say it's a substitute. It's just not, especially during the day when you have so many additional cues as to what is going on. I've never experienced the leans under the hood, but one of my most vivid flying memories is the moment I first hit actual IMC at the controls of an airplane - I was just ticking over 10 hours total flight time, I was in a standard rate turn to the left when we hit the coulds, and IMMEDIATELY I felt like I was baking 30º to the right.

I'm sure many others have similar experiences. I would not for one minute (or 78 seconds) believe that a person who has only simulated instrument time is going to have a successful outcome in a complex aircraft with a full load of passengers hitting IMC for the first time single pilot. That's a fairy tale from FAA fantasyland that they use to allow people to get instrument ratings in Arizona without any actual instrument time. In fact, you can get an ATP with zero actual. Unbelievable... And this kind of accident is a direct result.
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So as a result of the S76 accident, in which it was poor PIC decision making by taking a flight into rising terrain and deteriorating weather, you want the FAA to change the regulations on requirements to get an instrument rating (fly in actual)? Thousands upon thousands have gotten their ratings without flying actual (me included), and yet never had a problem flying actual.

Your conclusion that this accident is a direct result is disingenuous at best. A Part 135 VFR Helicopter operation operates quite differently from an airplane operation. Had the PIC stayed within the confines of the operating certificate there would have been no accident. But he didn't, and decided to operate outside of them.
 
Doc Holliday said:
So as a result of the S76 accident, in which it was poor PIC decision making by taking a flight into rising terrain and deteriorating weather, you want the FAA to change the regulations on requirements to get an instrument rating (fly in actual)? Thousands upon thousands have gotten their ratings without flying actual (me included), and yet never had a problem flying actual.

Your conclusion that this accident is a direct result is disingenuous at best. A Part 135 VFR Helicopter operation operates quite differently from an airplane operation. Had the PIC stayed within the confines of the operating certificate there would have been no accident. But he didn't, and decided to operate outside of them.
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What seems disingenuous to me is to assume that learning to fly in simulated conditions, prepares you for actual. Thankfully, my instructor had me fly in as much actual as simulated. I did not find simulated nearly as worthwhile as actual.
 
Weekend Warrior said:
What seems disingenuous to me is to assume that learning to fly in simulated conditions, prepares you for actual. Thankfully, my instructor had me fly in as much actual as simulated. I did not find simulated nearly as worthwhile as actual.
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I learned in simulated, just has thousands of others. And I have thousands of hours actual, including Cat 2 and Cat 3 approaches in actual as well as IFR and IMC in a wide variance of conditions.

The real learning of flying IFR comes after getting the rating.
 
Weekend Warrior said:
What seems disingenuous to me is to assume that learning to fly in simulated conditions, prepares you for actual. Thankfully, my instructor had me fly in as much actual as simulated. I did not find simulated nearly as worthwhile as actual.
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I don't think it is easy to conduct training in actual using a helicopter. Most of the little gnats used for training are not well equipped and in something like a S76 it is cost prohibitive to go out with a two man crew to look for instrument weather.
 
weilke said:
I don't think it is easy to conduct training in actual using a helicopter. Most of the little gnats used for training are not well equipped and in something like a S76 it is cost prohibitive to go out with a two man crew to look for instrument weather.
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Let’s not forget a key component of the discussion at hand, the PIC was not intending on conducting an IFR flight. Because of poor decision making he put himself into a IIMC.

His company, as required by Part 135, has minimums for operating VFR. And in addition, the company has procedures for IIMC. The PIC is tested and evaluated annually on these
Annually.

Unfortunately no amount of regulations and training will stop an individual once they decide to depart from limitations.
 
As I’ve said, if you don’t have actual experience, then you better have an aggressive IIMC training program. If this was a once a year 293 ride program, that won’t cut it.

The problem with simulated in helos, is just like the guy in the earlier vid said, “you can cheat.” Now for those who fly fixed wing that doesn’t make a whole lotta sense but you have to understand the differences in outward visibility. You can see in the video below that the hood is useless in a typical helicopter. If the school isn’t using window/ chin bubble covers like we used in the Army, then it’s not true simulated. I fear many who’ve gone the civilian route aren’t just getting actual, they’re not getting true simulated either.

Now, if the pilot doesn’t have a solid foundation of actual and they haven’t gotten true simulated, how simulator time has the pilot gotten? I’m still wondering if this company is springing the cash to send their pilots on at least a quarterly basis to the S76 simulator. That remains to be seen.

Yes, it’s a VFR program and yes, it’s incumbent of the pilot to avoid IMC but we should expect a pilot with an IFR ticket to live thru an IIMC episode. The FAA isn’t going to change the requirements for the rating and I’m not saying hiring all former military trained pilots either. But, if you’re not getting pilots with a solid instrument background, even in a VFR program, it’s just common sense that an accident like this is more likely to happen.

 
@Velocity173 nailed it.

Doc Holliday said:
So as a result of the S76 accident, in which it was poor PIC decision making by taking a flight into rising terrain and deteriorating weather, you want the FAA to change the regulations on requirements to get an instrument rating (fly in actual)?
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No. Remove everything before the second comma. It isn't "as a result of the S76 accident". I've felt this way for many years.

Simulator, fine. Simulated, no.

Thousands upon thousands have gotten their ratings without flying actual (me included), and yet never had a problem flying actual.
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It certainly depends on other factors... And I think someone who trains in simulated and then gains experience with other pilots or in a simulator or probably several other scenarios can get to the point where they have lots of experience and it's nothing. That's why many regs have exceptions or multiple methods of compliance, and I don't think this would be any different.

But right now, it's legal to do 100% simulated training, wait 5 months and 29 days, and launch into 200 and 1/2 with no additional training or experience. It's also legal to do 100% simulated training, and then NEVER launch into the muck, get a job flying part 135 with unsuspecting paying passengers aboard, and merely do your recurrent training/check flights in simulated conditions, and kill your passengers because get-there-itis with a high value client pushed you into less-than-optimal weather.

Had the PIC stayed within the confines of the operating certificate there would have been no accident. But he didn't, and decided to operate outside of them.
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Actually, I'm impressed that he was able to recognized that he'd painted himself into a corner, admit his mistake, and go for something that was illegal but safer. That's very hard to do. It's unfortunate that he didn't have the skills to back up the good decision he finally made.
 
flyingcheesehead said:
No. Remove everything before the second comma. It isn't "as a result of the S76 accident". I've felt this way for many years.

Simulator, fine. Simulated, no.
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So the thousand upon thousands that trained using simulated, and flew thousands of hours without a glitch are now wrong because we didn't use simulators? Really? o_O

flyingcheesehead said:
But right now, it's legal to do 100% simulated training, wait 5 months and 29 days, and launch into 200 and 1/2 with no additional training or experience. It's also legal to do 100% simulated training, and then NEVER launch into the muck, get a job flying part 135 with unsuspecting paying passengers aboard, and merely do your recurrent training/check flights in simulated conditions, and kill your passengers because get-there-itis with a high value client pushed you into less-than-optimal weather.
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You need to understand a few things, with the first being that this was a Part 135 VFR Helicopter operation. Yep, certified for VFR Only. Everything was in place to comply with Part 135 VFR requirements, they had OpSpecs that required it, they had a GOM that spelled out their weather minimums, they had a training program which taught VFR minimums as well as meteorology and flight planning, they had a qualifications curriculum as part of their FAA Approved Training Manual which specified 135.293 items which must be checked, including knowledge of VFR weather minimums, and the PIC must demonstrate an IIMC recovery as well as unusual attitude recoveries in order to pass the check.

The PIC, for whatever reason we will probably never know, decided that day to go outside the scope of his operation and exceed the limitations of his company operating certificate.

Changing rating certification standards won't change an individual who decides to exceed limitations.


flyingcheesehead said:
Actually, I'm impressed that he was able to recognized that he'd painted himself into a corner, admit his mistake, and go for something that was illegal but safer. That's very hard to do. It's unfortunate that he didn't have the skills to back up the good decision he finally made.
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IIMC recovery. However he made some bad choices leading up to the event, and more than likely went into saturation overload as it all began unraveling.
 
This is a super informative thread. Stuff regular people just have no clue about...
 
flyingcheesehead said:
@Velocity173 Actually, I'm impressed that he was able to recognized that he'd painted himself into a corner, admit his mistake, and go for something that was illegal but safer. That's very hard to do. It's unfortunate that he didn't have the skills to back up the good decision he finally made.
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You're giving him the benefit of the doubt that he did plan it, but the fact is, you don't know. None of us do.

Just because he reported that he was "climbing above the layer".. does not prove he hadn't already busted into the clouds and then decided he better report it.

The bottom line is , this guy did all kinds of wrong, continued doing so, and paid the ultimate for his mistakes.

I've said it before, and I'll say it again. For every guy who does something like this, there's other guys out there doing their job in the same, or worse conditions, and you don't hear anything about them.

They don't fly fast, they don't fly high, and they always leave themselves options.
 
SToL said:
For every guy who does something like this, there's other guys out there doing their job in the same, or worse conditions, and you don't hear anything about them.
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I am living proof of that. The conditions I have flown in with successful and unsuccessful mission completion would be considered insane by those with no exposure to the world of LEGAL VFR helicopter operations in crummy weather. I have turned around within five miles of a destination and had to fly 150 miles back, retracing those horrible, but legal weather conditions. Good thing I had lots of fuel on board, or I would have spend many more days stuck in the mountains somewhere...
 
donjohnston said:
The charter company was history about two weeks after the accident. Closed up shop and IIRC, filed for bankruptcy.
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Those companies come and go. The aircraft go back to the lessors and the principals behind the outfit start to look for another little operation to buy so they can continue to serve their book of clueless celebrity customers.
 
weilke said:
Those companies come and go. The aircraft go back to the lessors and the principals behind the outfit start to look for another little operation to buy so they can continue to serve their book of clueless celebrity customers.
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And yet I cannot think of another recent clueless celeb that was killed in a helicopter crash in SoCal due to foggy weather and an incompetent pilot.
 
It seems like when a pilot is not covered with enough insurance, this is are the result

this is not the first time this happened.
 
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