Epic LT Crashes At Spruce Creek (7FL6), 2 Killed

FlyingElvii

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"Two people were killed Tuesday evening when their plane crashed into a front yard in the Spruce Creek Fly-In community of Port Orange.

The crash of the 2009 single-engine Epic LT happened just before 6 p.m. in the area of 22 Taxiway Lindy Loop. One of the witnesses who reported the crash told a dispatcher he saw the aircraft fly into the fog, and that the plane was “in an inverted flat spin when he came out of the fog.”"

Happened after dark. Local Reporter noted the "Very thick Fog" on the drive out to the Creek tonight.

http://www.fox35orlando.com/news/225805733-story

Flightaware shows an Epic originating in Millington, Tn, destination Spruce Creek arriving at about the reported time of the incident.
 
That tail number isn't in the registry


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Pretty sure I know this guy. I think he was one of the owners of epic for awhile till the Russians bought it. If anyone knew Darrell I'm pretty sure this was him.
 
How do you shoot an approach into an airfield that doesn't have one?

I believe this is the correct METAR for EVB at the time of the accident:
METAR KEVB 280050Z 00000KT 1/4SM FG OVC001 19/19 A3019

Here is DAB at roughly the same time:
METAR KDAB 280053Z 16003KT 1/4SM FG VV002 19/19 A3021 RMK
AO2 SLP231 T01890189 RVRNO $=
 
How do you shoot an approach into an airfield that doesn't have one?

I believe this is the correct METAR for EVB at the time of the accident:
METAR KEVB 280050Z 00000KT 1/4SM FG OVC001 19/19 A3019

Here is DAB at roughly the same time:
METAR KDAB 280053Z 16003KT 1/4SM FG VV002 19/19 A3021 RMK
AO2 SLP231 T01890189 RVRNO $=

I think Spruce Creek has a private GPS approach.
 
I think Spruce Creek has a private GPS approach.

Interesting. So it wouldn't be published on ForeFlight or anything like that then? Even if it does though, 1/4 mile with fog and 0100 foot overcast is a nasty METAR readout for 99% of approaches out there!

EDIT: You are indeed correct! Their website shows that they have a GPS approach, and a search of their OpSpec manual gives the following:

(c) IFR GPS Approaches - RNAV/GPS 05 is a private approach to a private airport. Only residents with the approved and number approach plate assigned to them may utilize this procedure.

Haven't seen the plate yet though ;)
 
The GPS05 approach for spruce creek is in the GNS530 database but unless you have received the approach plate from the FAA for this 'special IAP' you are not authorized to use it.
 
Get-There-itis is a real killer, and it is a human factor that you cannot easily quantify. It's like driving faster than you should on an icy road, because you don't want to be late for work. In your mind, the consequences of not getting in outweigh the risks, no matter how trivial they may seem to others.
 
The GPS05 approach for spruce creek is in the GNS530 database but unless you have received the approach plate from the FAA for this 'special IAP' you are not authorized to use it.

Might not even be an FAA TERPd approach. In EMS we go through a private contractor. Unless you work for the company, you won't have access to the IAP plate. Like you said, in this case, you'd have to be based at 7FL6.
 
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An unfortunate accident,didn't need to happen,may they Rest In Peace.
 
Might not even be an FAA TERPd approach. In EMS we go through a private contractor. Unless you work for the company, you won't have access to the IAP plate. Like you said, in this case, you'd have to be based at 7FL6.

My understanding is that the air-park association paid the FAA to design the approach* and that you need to have a face to face visit at the FSDO to get your personal numbered approach plate to be fully legal to use the approach. But my understanding is based on third hand information.



* odds are the FAA then turned around and hired the same private contractor your employer uses to survey the site and design the approach
 
Get-There-itis is a real killer, and it is a human factor that you cannot easily quantify. It's like driving faster than you should on an icy road, because you don't want to be late for work. In your mind, the consequences of not getting in outweigh the risks, no matter how trivial they may seem to others.
I don't think this is a "get-there-itis" scenario. I listened to the approach ATC and when he checked in and told them he had the weather he said he was pretty sure he wasn't going to be able to land there due to the weather. There's nothing wrong with shooting an approach to see, going missed, and then hit your alternate.
The private approach has an MDA of 418' AGL, which was higher than the ATIS, but not by a lot. (found a dated plate)
http://aeronav.faa.gov/acifp/2011042624812601001-7FL6/COMBINED.pdf

Based on him coming out of the fog in an inverted flat spin I would say it sounds more likely that he had a bad go-around attempt and then got slow on the climb out. From what I hear the P factor is crazy on the turbo props, so if he were uncoordinated when he went missed and then got slow it would be game over quickly.
 
So someone could tell they were in an "inverted flat spin" when it was OVC001 at night? I highly doubt it. The plate also says the procedure is N/A at night, so they weren't legal to even shoot the approach.
Spatial disorientation?
 
So someone could tell they were in an "inverted flat spin" when it was OVC001 at night? I highly doubt it. The plate also says the procedure is N/A at night, so they weren't legal to even shoot the approach.

Did you see the crash picture? Plane was upside down. That doesn't mean it was inverted in the sky just prior, but it could be. It was hauled off upside down as well.

I'm not saying it happened either way, but it's possible.
 
Didn't know we had so many NTSB investigators here... Sorry for him and his family.
 
So someone could tell they were in an "inverted flat spin" when it was OVC001 at night? I highly doubt it. The plate also says the procedure is N/A at night, so they weren't legal to even shoot the approach.

That was kind of my feeling. How would that even happen.
 
... The plate also says the procedure is N/A at night, so they weren't legal to even shoot the approach.

Plus with that metar,

METAR KEVB 280050Z 00000KT 1/4SM FG OVC001 19/19 A3019

Here is DAB at roughly the same time:
METAR KDAB 280053Z 16003KT 1/4SM FG VV002 19/19 A3021 RMK
AO2 SLP231 T01890189 RVRNO $=

I hope this wasn't the case

image.jpg
 
Plus with that metar

Meh, I've landed at 7FL6 and X50 both VFR when KEVB and KDAB were socked in - Spruce has its own AWOS on field

It wasn't civil twilight until 1802 and the crash happened before 6.

But hey lets not ruin a good story with facts...
 
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From what I hear the P factor is crazy on the turbo props, so if he were uncoordinated when he went missed and then got slow it would be game over quickly.

In the interest of becoming more cognizant of the challenges the situation represents, over the last couple of months I have examined the facts surrounding a few go around accidents.

There is much more to a successful go around than jamming the throttle and increasing pitch, as I'm sure you are all aware. It requires preplanned procedure and precision control, especially with a lightly loaded powerful aircraft.
 
I personally knew Daryl, as I am based at KBDH in Minnesota, as was Daryl. What I say is not easy, but the truth. Daryl was the third pilot from KBDH to die in a crash very similar to the other two.

Bill Graves: 04 Feb 2015 CE-441 N441TG Fatal crash while attempting to land at KDTO. Weather not too bad: 35017G25KY 2SM -RA -HZ OVC009 03/03
Loren Larson: 28 July 2016 M20P N54PM Fatal crash while attempting to land at KLSE. Weather not too bad: 36007KT 10SM OVC007 21/19
Daryl Ingalsbe: 27 Dec 2016 EPIC N669WR Fatal crash while attempting to land at 7FL6. Weather very bad. 00000KT 1/4SM FG OVC001 19/19

It is VERY disconcerting that three pilots from a VERY small airport in western Minnesota have crashed in the same manner in less than two years.

The crash of Bill Graves was the fist time he had flown by himself in his Conquest II. From what I have been told by others who knew Loren Larson better than myself, is that he was not a very competent instrument pilot, and the weather at LaCrosse was far beyond what he could handle. As for Ingalsbe, only time will tell what happened. One thing for sure..it looks as if Get-There-Itis killed all three pilots.
 
NTSB Identification: ERA17FA074
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Tuesday, December 27, 2016 in Port Orange, FL
Aircraft: INDEPENDENT TECHNOLOGIES INC EPIC LT, registration: N669WR
Injuries: 2 Fatal.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

On December 27, 2016, about 1757 eastern standard time, N669WR, an experimental amateur-built Epic LT, sustained substantial damage when it impacted terrain while executing an instrument approach to Spruce Creek Airport (7FL6), Port Orange, Florida. The private pilot and his passenger were fatally injured. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight that originated at the Millington Regional Jetport (NQA), Millington, Tennessee about 1558 and was destined for 7FL6. An instrument flight rules flight plan was filed for the personal flight conducted under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.

Several witnesses observed the accident. According to a witness, who was driving to the airport's café, he saw the airplane's landing lights as it approached the airport. The airplane was about 100 feet above the ground and in a left turn. The airplane then climbed back into the fog layer and disappeared from view. The witness said, "I didn't hear anything for a few seconds. Then I heard a very loud distinct corkscrewing sound, very familiar to a spinning plane at an airshow. I then saw two wing-tip lights fall through the clouds straight down and heard an extremely loud thud."

Another witness, who was also a Designated Pilot Examiner, said he saw the airplane when it broke out of the overcast about 200 feet above ground level (agl). At that time, the airplane was about 1/8th of a mile to the north of the final approach course. He said the airplane then suddenly pulled up and banked to the right over the airport into the fog, before it descended in an inverted flat spin to impact.

A third witness said he heard a loud engine noise so he went out onto his lanai and looked up. He saw the airplane emerge from the fog in a 70 to 80-degree nose down "fully developed spin," The witness said the airplane made three rotations before he lost sight of it behind trees followed by the sound of an impact.

Review of preliminary radar data provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) revealed that over the final 46 seconds of flight, the airplane approached the airport on a north-easterly heading just north of the final approach course. At 1756:01, the airplane was abeam the runway numbers at an altitude of 100 feet mean sea level (msl) before it initiated a climbing right turn to 200 feet msl over the airport. The airplane continued to turn right and descended back down to 100 feet msl before it climbed back up to 300 feet while still in the turn. At 1756:33, the airplane leveled out and began to climb on a northeasterly heading. Over the next 13 seconds the airplane climbed to 800 feet making a shallow turn to the right followed by a turn to the left before the data ended at 1756:47. The last radar return was near-coincident with the location of where the airplane impacted the ground.

The airplane came to rest inverted at the base of an approximately 50-foot-tall tree on the front lawn of a private residence. All major flight controls were accounted for at the site and there was no post-impact fire. The airplane collided with tree limbs during the impact sequence. An outboard section of the left wing, a section of the left wing's fuel line, tail section and the rudder separated from the airframe. There was little evidence of forward movement of the airplane.

Examination of the airframe revealed the carbon-composite fuselage sustained extensive fracturing. Both wing fuel tanks were breached and a strong odor of jet fuel permeated the wreckage. Flight control continuity was established for all major flight controls to the cockpit. The landing gear was in the fully down and locked position and the flaps were fully extended. The fuel selector was set to the left wing fuel tank.

The engine and the four-blade propeller assembly remained attached to the engine. When the engine was separated from the airframe, fuel was observed draining from the main fuel line.

The pilot held a private pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single and multi-engine land, and instrument airplane. His last FAA third-class medical was issued on December 2, 2016. At that time, he reported a total of 5,635 total flight hours.

Weather reported at 7FL6 at 1755 was calm wind, visibility 2.5 statute miles, mist, temperature 19 degrees C, dewpoint 19 degrees C, and a barometric pressure setting of 30.18 inches Hg. 7FL6 is not equipped to provide ceiling heights.

Weather reported at New Smyrna Beach Municipal Airport, (EVB), New Smyrna Beach, Florida, about 5 miles east of the accident site at 1750, was wind from 090 degrees at 4 knots, visibility 1/4 statute mile, fog, overcast 100 feet, temperature 19 degrees C, dewpoint 19 degrees C, and a barometric pressure setting of 30.18 inches Hg.
 
Doesn't appear to be a second approach as many have reported. I may be missing something but that's my read...
 
Didn't know we had so many NTSB investigators here... Sorry for him and his family.

I guess POA is a hang out for NTSB investigators ... who'd have thunk it;)

What's your point? Should we not discuss accidents and speculate as to their possible causes?

Many of the monthly safety meetings I go to revolve around discussing various accidents so that we can learn from them. In between all the BS that goes on with POA, I am constantly reminded that in fact, we actually do have some very smart people here. Of course we have some no-so-smart people here too, but nobody seems averse to pointing that out.
 
Does anyone know Epic procedures well? It appears the aircraft climbed to around 700'-800' AGL during the what appears to have been a missed approach gone wrong. (Though, noted, after some bobbling of the climb on the way there.) It was found with gear down and flaps fully extended. I feel like that's probably not the configuration you'd expect at 700' on a missed, but I don't know anything about Epic procedures. Is fully dirty expected that late in a missed?
 
Based on the report, it sounds like he didn't break out aligned with the runway and it all went downhill from there.
 
Could this accident be the result of somatogravic illusion? Did the pilot break out of the clouds and then execute a missed approach? The rapid acceleration and pitch up of a lightly loaded turboprop in IMC might produce that effect.
 
What's your point? Should we not discuss accidents and speculate as to their possible causes?

No point, just as it's pointless to speculate and play the 'what happened' guessing game. Wait till post report and then talk about the findings and learn from that.
 
No point, just as it's pointless to speculate and play the 'what happened' guessing game. Wait till post report and then talk about the findings and learn from that.

Why would that be pointless? It's the same process that the investigators themselves use, piecing together what evidence they have. As long as it's done in a respectful fashion (and I don't see anyone being disrespectful to the pilot in this case), why prevent or avoid it? As long as the folks mentally processing the event realize the limitations of the data available and are open to revisions as more becomes available, I find that the mental exercise is very helpful for evaluating my own decision-making processes.
 
As I said because it's based on speculation... if you find value in that kind of education then knock yourself out.

OK, that's certainly a reasonable attitude.

So, back to where we were... Epic procedures. Anyone know the correct procedure for gear and flap retraction on a missed approach?
 
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