With at least two more threads on the 737 MAX here, why am I starting a new one? Because the article I am about to post is more about the engineering culture at Boeing than about the two accidents. I have a lot of respect for the IEEE and its flagship magazine IEEE Spectrum, where the article was published. Though I am an engineer and a pilot, I do not have sufficient aviation and engineering experience to tell how correct the article is. But it is a very well written article and it does a great job presenting complex issues to the general public. I am looking forward to reading your thoughts about this article. Fair warning for the TL/DR brethren: the following article has about 5700 words. Click anywhere on the text below to read the full article on the IEEE Spectrum online edition (free access/no paywall/no registration). I did a quick search on the forums here and I don't believe anyone has posted this yet. How the Boeing 737 Max Disaster Looks to a Software Developer "... So Boeing produced a dynamically unstable airframe, the 737 Max. That is big strike No. 1. Boeing then tried to mask the 737’s dynamic instability with a software system. Big strike No. 2. Finally, the software relied on systems known for their propensity to fail (angle-of-attack indicators) and did not appear to include even rudimentary provisions to cross-check the outputs of the angle-of-attack sensor against other sensors, or even the other angle-of-attack sensor. Big strike No. 3. None of the above should have passed muster. None of the above should have passed the “OK” pencil of the most junior engineering staff, much less a [Designated Engineering Representative]. That’s not a big strike. That’s a political, social, economic, and technical sin. ..."