Challenger 650 BGR

Looks like N10KJ. Crash occurred around 0044z. ADS-B showed a ground speed of around 151 knots and no more than 50' of height above the runway before data was lost. The final ping was at about the middle of the 11000+ foot runway, off the right side. This aircraft had arrived from Houston Hobby (HOU) only 90 minutes prior.

METAR KBGR 252353Z 05006KT 1 1/4SM -SN OVC016 M16/M19 A3040 RMK AO2 SLP302 4/004 P0001 60001 T11611194 11144 21161 58025
SPECI KBGR 260008Z 03006KT 3/4SM R15/6000VP6000FT -SN VV015 M16/M19 A3039 RMK AO2 P0000 T11611194
SPECI KBGR 260026Z 04006KT 3/4SM R15/P6000FT -SN VV012 M16/M19 A3039 RMK AO2 P0001 T11611189
METAR KBGR 260053Z 04009KT 3/4SM R15/6000VP6000FT -SN VV011 M17/M19 A3035 RMK AO2 PRESFR SLP286 P0002 T11671194

An A220 landed 6 minutes prior to the accident (will likely provide info as to runway condition).
 
I’m assuming we probably won’t hear much until tomorrow about the conditions of the pax & crew. The only picture I’ve seen you can’t really make anything out about the condition of the aircraft.

Hoping for a good outcome.
 
There's a ATC file floating around. Not looking too good.

Basically, the airlines were reporting inability to remain uncontaminated long enough after de-ice to takeoff.

Then Challenger calls up ready to go after de-ice. 7 minutes later they are cleared for takeoff.....
 
The only picture I’ve seen you can’t really make anything out about the condition of the aircraft.
Upside down usually isn't good. Unfortunately no survivors reported although I've read there might be 2.
 
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Not much info yet. Found this online, big Texas University boosters. Law firm Arnold & Itkin LLP, a law firm owned by Kurt Arnold and Jason Itkin.
 
Early yes, maybe history repeating. There was mention of a ‘super critical’ wing when it comes to contamination.
Challenger 650's do have supercritical wings, but...
[pedantic] "Supercritical" means the wing/airfoil is shaped to increase the Mach no. where the transonic drag rise begins. It doesn't refer to the sensitivity to contamination; however, supercritical wings do tend to be more sensitive to contamination.[/pedantic]

Still, don't read too much into it in really ****ty weather. Yet.

Nauga,
who can also be super critical
 
There's a ATC file floating around. Not looking too good.

Basically, the airlines were reporting inability to remain uncontaminated long enough after de-ice to takeoff.

Then Challenger calls up ready to go after de-ice. 7 minutes later they are cleared for takeoff.....
Maybe they didn’t have access type IV fluids. Based on the weather, type I would have definitely been tight. The normal type IV used by the airlines should have offered plenty of holdover time to depart BGR without exceeding .
 
Maybe they didn’t have access type IV fluids. Based on the weather, type I would have definitely been tight. The normal type IV used by the airlines should have offered plenty of holdover time to depart BGR without exceeding .

I agree on Type 4, but, hold over time table is not applicable to Part 91. It still requires a contamination check.
 
Getting out of the plane to visually inspect and place hands on the wing? That ain't gonna happen.

Maybe a visual from inside the cabin.
 
This is from memory, but wasn't it a couple of Fokkers, one of which went off the end of Laguardia in a bad way part of what led to more research on the effects of small amounts of ice on wings? I don't remember the specifics of the research, but it was along the lines of ice affecting how smooth the wing surface is. Something of the effect of mattering when it was equivalent to about 80 grit sandpaper on some thin efficient wings. Where things with thicker chords were typically much less affected. The topic came up in an in person I discussion I had with some folks about the sanity of taking off with frost on the wings of a piston single, not so much jets in commercial service.

Understand this is all speculation.
 
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In the airlines I remember the check before T/o just being visual… which is kinda flawed at night staring out a passenger window at a 100’ wing… that CAN’T instill confidence… hated doing it.

And I’ve seen that 7 minutes being too long, so simple wing contamination is certainly in play.
 
I agree on Type 4, but, hold over time table is not applicable to Part 91. It still requires a contamination check.
true, but know holdover times from the 121 world give helpful data. holdover times start at the first application of fluid. so, depending on where the deicing was done in relation to the runway, with the seven minutes added to the time it took to deice, the holdover time for type iv could even have been exceeded. with light snow, type I only would be a foolish decision.
 
Getting out of the plane to visually inspect and place hands on the wing? That ain't gonna happen.

Maybe a visual from inside the cabin.

We operate Challenger 605s (almost identical to the 650), and our GOM requires an actual tactile check within 5 minutes of takeoff if there is any reasonable expectation of frost/ice/snow accumulation, regardless of any application of anti-ice/de-ice fluid.

Granted we are a government agency, so our pressures are understandably different.
 
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To close some loops, here’s some more background from ADS-B data:

After arriving from Houston, they initially taxied to and parked on the eastmost ramp (presumably one of the FBO’s, BGR Aviation maybe?) at 2315z.

At 0013z, they departed that spot and taxied through the terminal ramp, to another spot just northwest of there. I assume this is the de-ice pad. They arrived there at 0017z.

I’ll use more time detail from this point:
They departed that pad at 00:36:00z and taxied to the end of runway 33, arriving at the hold short at 00:40:16z (4:16 time elapsed from leaving the pad). They departed the hold short at 00:43:08 (7:08 elapsed). Note that the brake release time could be off by just a few seconds.

They taxied onto runway 33 and were lined up by 00:43:55, (7:55 elapsed) and began the takeoff roll immediately, culminating in the final datapoint at 00:44:33z.

Note also the Breeze A220 landed at 0038z.
 
Within 5 minutes of what? And Reasonable expectation? They may have thought they were good.

I'm just saying I have never seen ANY aircraft, in the taxi lane or waiting to depart, see a pilot open the door, get out, and walk around touching a wing. It may happen but I've never seen it. Jet friends of mine when I asked they have never seen it either.

Appears one crew member survived. I hope they fully recover and we can learn more.

Just an awful accident.
 
Interestingly, an Allegiant 737 looks like it left the same (presumably deice) pad at prior to the accident, at 0008z. It taxied onto runway 33 at 0019z and never departed, instead taxiing back along the runway (not clear if it was an aborted takeoff or simply a taxi-back, evidence leans toward the latter as it was a very slow acceleration, more indicative of taxi).

They stayed on the ramp from 0024 to 0034, then taxied back to the same (deice?) pad, arriving at 0036, just as the accident aircraft was leaving that pad. The accident occurred while the Allegiant was still on the pad for the second time and that aircraft ended up taxiing back to the gate 40 minutes after the accident.
 
Within 5 minutes of what? And Reasonable expectation? They may have thought they were good.

I'm just saying I have never seen ANY aircraft, in the taxi lane or waiting to depart, see a pilot open the door, get out, and walk around touching a wing. It may happen but I've never seen it. Jet friends of mine when I asked they have never seen it either.

Appears one crew member survived. I hope they fully recover and we can learn more.

Just an awful accident.
Within 5 minutes of takeoff. I've edited my post.

I'm not assuming anything about the accident aircraft or crew actions or speculating as to the cause. I'm not even referring to them. I'm responding to your comment of "ain't gonna happen".

At least in our operation with a near-identical aircraft, it will. We even briefed it on my last flight as a possibility. This is required under our GOM because we do not operate under an approved anti/de-icing program and so while we can use anti/de-icing fluid application, we cannot rely solely on holdover times to ensure a clean airframe. This seemed similar to Doc's comment in Post #11.
 
true, but know holdover times from the 121 world give helpful data. holdover times start at the first application of fluid. so, depending on where the deicing was done in relation to the runway, with the seven minutes added to the time it took to deice, the holdover time for type iv could even have been exceeded. with light snow, type I only would be a foolish decision.
I’ve only exceeded type IV holdover tables a few times ever. It happens but not too often. Looking at even the more conservative SAE tables it seems they should’ve had at least 30min HOT with proper application.
I understand this is 121 charts but still helpful.
Type I only, or type IV applied/reapplied incorrectly, could easily be fatal in those conditions.
 
Off topic to the accident question, and maybe a dumb question - does every airport that does deice have type IV? I'm sure here in the northeast every airport with regular commercial service, and BGR or course, has it, but I didn't know if places in Texas or Florida or whatever where it almost never is icing would have either or just one.
 
Off topic to the accident question, and maybe a dumb question - does every airport that does deice have type IV? I'm sure here in the northeast every airport with regular commercial service, and BGR or course, has it, but I didn't know if places in Texas or Florida or whatever where it almost never is icing would have either or just one.
I can’t say that I’ve seen a airport equipped for Type I but not IV, but the last time I deiced in Minneapolis, they only had Type I available because they weren’t expecting the weather, and their Type IV truck wasn’t prepped.
 
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Off topic to the accident question, and maybe a dumb question - does every airport that does deice have type IV? I'm sure here in the northeast every airport with regular commercial service, and BGR or course, has it, but I didn't know if places in Texas or Florida or whatever where it almost never is icing would have either or just one.
Well you can’t apply type IV properly without first applying heated type 1. So it’s doubtful you’ll find an airport with type IV and not type 1. If type IV HOT is exceeded it must be re cleared with type I before reapplying IV.
Yes, there are airports with type I only. The only time I’ve seen this is when a FBO was handling the deicing.
 
Some talk about the flaps not set correctly for takeoff, is that possible? Configuration warnings?
 
I remember this incident with a CRJ years ago after de-icing.
Wing drop just after take-off reaching close to 40⁰ bank before they recovered.
 
I remember this incident with a CRJ years ago after de-icing.
Wing drop just after take-off reaching close to 40⁰ bank before they recovered.
From that article, from Norway's transportation board "In this investigation, the AIBN believes to have confirmed that known factors such as wing contamination in combination with an excessive rotation rate contributed to a CL-600 series aircraft stalling during take-off in winter conditions".
Again, no idea if it applies here, but I think it's the first time I've read about the combination of ice and "excessive rotation rate" in an accident report. Wondering if the crew just rotated as they normally would, but in the context of wing contamination it makes things worse. Or in other words, they were unintentionally performing an accelerated stall. That's referring to the Norway incident.

In the reports I remember from the Fokker in Laguardia and Air Florida in DC, I believe those aircraft went in level and with the wing generating lift.
 
New ATC audio released that confirms that Allegiant flight that was supposed to go out prior to the accident aircraft requested a taxi back to the de-ice pad due to “de-ice fluid has failed” and a drop in visibility to 3/4sm. This happened while the accident aircraft was on the de-ice pad, on freq with the de-ice crew. No way to confirm at this time whether they were also monitoring tower to hear that.

Later, a Breeze that was getting ready to depart asked the Allegiant over tower freq if they failed the free contamination check. Allegiant said “Yeah, so I don’t know what blew over at the end of the runway but the visibility dropped and it stuck to us like there is nothing there.” I’m guessing there was a drift of blowing snow. Breeze told Allegiant that their [dispatch] was trying to make them go, but “this is stupid.” They discussed deicing again and that they may stay overnight.

Again, no evidence that the accident aircraft was on-freq to hear that conversation, and they did not talk to the tower until some time later, after de-icing.
 
New ATC audio released that confirms that Allegiant flight that was supposed to go out prior to the accident aircraft requested a taxi back to the de-ice pad due to “de-ice fluid has failed” and a drop in visibility to 3/4sm. This happened while the accident aircraft was on the de-ice pad, on freq with the de-ice crew. No way to confirm at this time whether they were also monitoring tower to hear that.

Later, a Breeze that was getting ready to depart asked the Allegiant over tower freq if they failed the free contamination check. Allegiant said “Yeah, so I don’t know what blew over at the end of the runway but the visibility dropped and it stuck to us like there is nothing there.” I’m guessing there was a drift of blowing snow. Breeze told Allegiant that their [dispatch] was trying to make them go, but “this is stupid.” They discussed deicing again and that they may stay overnight.

Again, no evidence that the accident aircraft was on-freq to hear that conversation, and they did not talk to the tower until some time later, after de-icing.
I hadn't considered the possibility that the pilots may have missed the other conversations about the post-de-ice contamination they were experiencing because they weren't on the tower/ground frequency. If so, that was potentially two big holes of the Swiss cheese lining up. I doubt we'll ever know if the accident flight was pressing to launch due to pressure from the passengers, or if the pilots just trusted that they had properly de-iced and (for some reason) didn't see or notice any post-de-ice contamination (if that was, in fact, the cause). As someone earlier said, they may have just thought all was well until it wasn't.

(Also, I'm not denying that external pressures to launch exist; we just don't know whether that was a factor here (I could also reasonably envision a scenario where a passenger asks the pilot if it is okay to fly in the conditions and the pilot responding that with de-icing, they would be safe)).
 
With the updated vis reported by ATC and Allegiant I’m now seeing that this drastically reduced the HOT.
Looking at the FAA’s “Snowfall Intensities As A Function Of Prevailing Visibility” chart. With the updated conditions, the chart changes the snowfall intensity from light (metar reported) to moderate for holdover purposes. This change reduced the HOT considerably.
The FAA generic type IV chart (more conservative than fluid brand specific chart) with the prevailing vis factored shows a HOT of only 2-9 min.
I also ran a common brand specific type IV computer model which approximately doubles the HOT of generic.
Still, not much wiggle room with the reduced visibility factored in.
 
Looking at the FAA’s “Snowfall Intensities As A Function Of Prevailing Visibility” chart.
Note that all of the METARs around that time frame showed “-SN”, so it’s possible that the pilots were looking at the time box to the left, which has significantly higher holdover times.

Not that I’d expect otherwise, but I find it interesting that definitions aren’t standardized.
 
Note that all of the METARs around that time frame showed “-SN”, so it’s possible that the pilots were looking at the time box to the left, which has significantly higher holdover times.

Not that I’d expect otherwise, but I find it interesting that definitions aren’t standardized.
It was pointed out earlier that HOTs don’t apply to GA from a regulatory standpoint.

Yes, I think it’s highly likely that if they indeed referenced the charts that they were only considering -SN (to the left) as reported.
It’s required for the carriers I’m familiar with to use the FAA’s snowfall intensities as a function of prevailing vis chart to modify the current wx observation for this exact situation.
Drops the HOT by close to 70% in this case.
 
With the updated vis reported by ATC and Allegiant I’m now seeing that this drastically reduced the HOT.
Looking at the FAA’s “Snowfall Intensities As A Function Of Prevailing Visibility” chart. With the updated conditions, the chart changes the snowfall intensity from light (metar reported) to moderate for holdover purposes. This change reduced the HOT considerably.
The FAA generic type IV chart (more conservative than fluid brand specific chart) with the prevailing vis factored shows a HOT of only 2-9 min.
I also ran a common brand specific type IV computer model which approximately doubles the HOT of generic.
Still, not much wiggle room with the reduced visibility factored in.
Based on the communication from Allegiant, it’s quite possible the phenomena they encountered was something local to the southeast end of the airport, around the runway 33 hold pad, that the weather equipment (despite not being all that far away) wasn’t picking up. Bangor is an old SAC Base, so the runway is huge. Lots can change from one end to the other in these types of conditions.

Whatever dropped the visibility and overcame Allegiant’s de-ice also could have to do with overall wind protection or lack thereof. There’s also considerations to make with regard to pavement that’s otherwise being cleared of snow versus adjacent areas that are not, as well as local wind baffles (natural or otherwise). It could be any of that, or just an overall increase in snowfall rate, or some other freak occurrence.

Not saying any of that is the cause here, but highlighting possibilities.
 
"Let there be light"?

It's been theorized (and I can definitely see this), that this was just a joke catchphrase that one of the pilots liked to say when turning on all the external lights prior to takeoff. Kind of like some pilots will say the mnemonic "lights, camera, action" when taking the runway.

Now, if that's the case it wasn't intended to go out over the air, but a whole lot of things go out over the air unintended when you accidentally hold down the PTT switch.

If I am correct above, then it will be interesting to see what the social media and regular media misinterpret it to mean.
 
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