5 killed in Bloomington crash (Cessna 414)

MyassisDragon said:
What happened to this thread? I jumped to the last page to look for any new information on the tragic accident in Illinois, so maybe I could learn something and increase my odds of survival.

But I am reading about health issues and western cultural beliefs? :dunno:
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Welcome to PoA! ;)
 
Henning said:
I'm not understanding why you would assume a VMC roll just because there was an engine out. You do realize that on the Twin Cessnas with the VG kit that Vmc is below stall making it a non issue right?
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If you have full flaps (dropping the stall speed) and the gear down you'll Vmc roll. There was a 421 accident in Marengo County, Alabama a few years back where that exact thing happened - so it's very possible.
 
Henning said:
Interesting, sounds like he had 7 people onboard and I'd bet that that's 1650 lbs in the cabin. Figure if he was landing with minimum 45 minutes fuel that's another 175lbs. That's 1825lb load. Not sure how well it would perform on one at even that.
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Useful load for 414As is 1800-2000 lbs. Add another 120 lbs with RAM.
 
Fitcja said:
Useful load for 414As is 1800-2000 lbs. Add another 120 lbs with RAM.
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Not an expert, but I guess the theory is that to maintain a practical OEI RoC on departure, you need to reduce the load below book gross, perhaps well below it. Which, in the case of 7 hefty males plus some baggage, might result in significantly reduced fuel and range. Would be interesting to see the NTSB calculations.
 
Fitcja said:
Useful load for 414As is 1800-2000 lbs. Add another 120 lbs with RAM.
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Exactly, and on a single engine, things aren't looking friendly in a 414, especially if it doesn't have the extra HP from Ram. The biggest reason they sold all the TSIOL kits on the 414 is because they were 350hp, but they didn't work out either, I haven't seen one in well over a decade.

Did the 421 that rolled have VGs?
 
Last edited:
Some new information today. The 414 hit the FAF about 400 feet low and yet started a decent. The plane then turned towards the east before reaching the MAP. At that point the plane oscillated between 800 and 1200 AGL before dropping below radar.

The key question here is why did the plane turn east? The missed approach course is straight and the turn to the right. In addition, the last recording was on the CTAF after Peoria cleared him for the approach.

You're off the approach and in the wrong direction, 800 feet off the ground with 1/2 mile visibility at night traveling 70 knots in a fully loaded plane. Why?
 
He ended up with 1000fpm climb once he caught the initial sink and turn. Could he make that climb gradient on a single? Possibly if he was minimum fuel and had the RAM upgrades. The didn't mention if the engines were making power or not which was disappointing.

The most telling thing in the whole report really is the name of the owners holding company, "Make it Happen". A lot of guys want to play in that league, but you can't do it on a budget, it costs what it costs. I have boat owners that get in the same bind of thinking. A program based on that principle involves elevated thresholds of risk tolerance, which requires elevated vigilance (read $$$) to counter.

This guy had a 414 on a Cheyenne minimum budget program, and the elevated risk caught up to them. :(
 
Henning said:
This guy had a 414 on a Cheyenne minimum budget program, and the elevated risk caught up to them. :(
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I guess the FAA and NTSB can go home now since Henning knows exactly what happened and, more importantly, has completely dissected and analyzed the psyche of all the individuals involved.

I'll be waiting with baited breath to read your final report. :nonod:

:rofl:
 
Henning said:
This guy had a 414 on a Cheyenne minimum budget program, and the elevated risk caught up to them. :(
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I'm not sure that that's a fair assessment. I did some research and there was a lot of money put into that plane.
 
timwinters said:
I guess the FAA and NTSB can go home now since Henning knows exactly what happened and, more importantly, has completely dissected and analyzed the psyche of all the individuals involved.

I'll be waiting with baited breath to read your final report. :nonod:

:rofl:
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:confused: Where did I say what happened? :dunno:

Are you saying that you disagree that this was an occurance where the odds inherent with operations at elevated levels of exposure didn't catch up with them?:dunno:

Are you disputing that he was operating his aircraft at or very near the limits of its capability?:dunno:
 
Fitcja said:
I'm not sure that that's a fair assessment. I did some research and there was a lot of money put into that plane.
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It has nothing to do with what he spends on that plane, for that mission, the plane in any condition was being operated at or very near the limits of it's capability, which causes compromises which elevate risk.

Normally you want a recip twin to be operating with a 20% load margin to assure sufficient SE performance, he didn't have that.

It costs twice as much to operate a Cheyenne as a 414 minimum.

I'm not saying he's a bad guy or that operating at an elevated level in of risk is unacceptable, just pointing out it exists and was likely involved here.
 
Henning said:
The most telling thing in the whole report really is the name of the owners holding company, "Make it Happen". A lot of guys want to play in that league, but you can't do it on a budget, it costs what it costs. I have boat owners that get in the same bind of thinking. A program based on that principle involves elevated thresholds of risk tolerance, which requires elevated vigilance (read $$$) to counter.

This guy had a 414 on a Cheyenne minimum budget program, and the elevated risk caught up to them. :(
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:rolleyes2:
 
3393RP said:
:rolleyes2:
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More appropriate:

photo-2276_zpsjdlyvpdz.gif
 
nddons said:
I'm curious, how do you find that kind of information?
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The plane was on the market and pictures of the interior, avionics and amenities were published with the listing. Among the notable enhancements were winglets - which are not cheap. I also noticed that the plane has been painted since its last listing in 2013.
 
Henning said:
Exactly, and on a single engine, things aren't looking friendly in a 414, especially if it doesn't have the extra HP from Ram. The biggest reason they sold all the TSIOL kits on the 414 is because they were 350hp, but they didn't work out either, I haven't seen one in well over a decade.

Did the 421 that rolled have VGs?
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I owned the last liquid cooled 414A built, N149AR is still flying, most have been converted to Series VII now. It wasn't a bad conversion, but after owning another one with Series VII (335hp) engines, I didn't see a lot of difference, other than a much lower useful load on the liquid cooled. :dunno:
The 335 hp 414's are OK on one engine, but not spectacular, I haven't flown a stock 310 hp one, but I've got to think it's not pretty on one. :yikes: Most 414A's have been upgraded to RAM engines, it's actually odd to see one for sale that hasn't been upgraded. :D
 
Not speculating, but I'm 'assuming' that they did a CO test on the pilots remains in time? I hope.
I await the final report with interest.
 
Dr. O said:
Not speculating, but I'm 'assuming' that they did a CO test on the pilots remains in time? I hope.
I await the final report with interest.
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Is CO much of a risk in twins, vs having an engine mounted to the firewall? I guess I never thought about that. Does cabin heat come from exhaust shrouds like in a single?
 
nddons said:
Is CO much of a risk in twins, vs having an engine mounted to the firewall? I guess I never thought about that. Does cabin heat come from exhaust shrouds like in a single?
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It can be if the combustion heater is in bad shape, though I can't recall hearing of a case where it got that bad.

I also have to wonder if his CG was too far aft and then he slowed down he was having control problems.
 
The thread is over 2 years old but due to original interest it makes sense to revive it since the final report is finally available:
https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/R...ID=20150407X70528&AKey=1&RType=Final&IType=FA

Like all final reports - we can always learn something from it.

So first of all - an equipment malfunction did play part in this accident - namely the aircraft lacked the glideslope information because of a poor electrical connection to the GS antenna, the reason for this malfunction could not have been determined. But based on the replay of the EHSI data it was determined the pilot had this information in front of him - a big X was plastered over the GS indicator and GS deviation pointer was not displayed. So pilot should have known he was flying a localizer approach only. The second item was the balance - CG was aft of the allowable limit hence pitch control was probably difficult. No other equipment malfunctions were uncovered. Let me quote directly from the report:

The presence of low cloud ceilings and the lack of glideslope guidance would have been stresses to the pilot during a critical phase of flight. This would have increased the pilot's workload and situational stress as he flew the localizer approach, a procedure that he likely did not anticipate or plan to conduct. In addition, weight and balance calculations indicated that the airplane's center of gravity (CG) was aft of the allowable limit, and the series of pitch excursions that began shortly after the airplane turned left and flew away from the localizer suggests that the pilot had difficulty controlling airplane pitch. This difficulty was likely due to the adverse handling characteristics associated with the aft CG. These adverse handling characteristics would have further increased the pilot's workload and provided another distraction from maintaining control of the airplane.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be: The pilot's failure to maintain control of the airplane during the instrument approach in night instrument meteorological conditions, which resulted in the airplane exceeding its critical angle of attack and an aerodynamic stall/spin.
 
Yeah, flying a localizer approach where reported weather was way below minimums for a LOC approach would have been a bit stressful. I can picture setting power for a step down descent, leveling off at the altitude for that segment and not adding enough power back to stay at blue line airspeed (110kts). With gear down and probably two notches of flaps down a 414 would slow down very quickly. The aft cg would make the handling squirrelly and down you go. Very sad. Pilot error, sure, but very repeatable by ANY of us.
 
I hadn't heard about this crash until this thread popped up again.
Really sad.
I'm working on my instrument rating, and just shot the ILS on 29 in Bloomington yesterday.
Knowing my skill level and experience (300 hrs) compared to this pilot (12,000 hrs), things like this always make me uneasy.
A very experienced pilot, in a well-equipped plane, in virtually flat terrain, and accidents can still happen.
Just makes me more vigilant...and I hope I never find myself trying to push my minimums.
 
Lance F said:
Very sad. Pilot error, sure, but very repeatable by ANY of us.
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Absolutely. Just makes you wonder why when his glideslope X'ed out didn't he just go missed and request vectors for the RNAV and use LPV. I try to read an analyze mishaps like these to hope if I find myself in similar situations I can have a different outcome.
 
Talk about a difficult situation, after being awake for 18 hours he was dealing with low IFR at night on a non precision approach. I only read parts of the report, was a fuel estimate noted? If the tanks were low, certainly would of limited his options and made a bad situation worse.
 
The actual weather was 200 & 1/2 for the localizer only approach. That's pretty much key, should of flown elsewhere.

Sorry, just skimmed through.
 
FlyingTiger said:
was a fuel estimate noted? If the tanks were low, certainly would of limited his options and made a bad situation worse.
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Actually he carried plenty of fuel, at the time of the crash he still had over 90 min worth of fuel. It seems carrying plenty of fuel (and load) was the theme of his flying that day - not only his CG was far aft but at the time of the accident he was 366 lbs over the maximum landing weight. Obviously his takeoffs were over the MTOW too.
 
olasek said:
Actually he carried plenty of fuel, at the time of the crash he still had over 90 min worth of fuel. It seems carrying plenty of fuel (and load) was the theme of his flying that day - not only his CG was far aft but at the time of the accident he was 366 lbs over the maximum landing weight. Obviously his takeoffs were over the MTOW too.
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It all sort of adds up though...in terms of the quality of decision making all the way through.
You can get away with a lot in an airplane, and often for a long time. But sometimes you can't get away with everything.
 
olasek said:
The thread is over 2 years old but due to original interest it makes sense to revive it since the final report is finally available:
https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/R...ID=20150407X70528&AKey=1&RType=Final&IType=FA

Like all final reports - we can always learn something from it.

So first of all - an equipment malfunction did play part in this accident - namely the aircraft lacked the glideslope information because of a poor electrical connection to the GS antenna, the reason for this malfunction could not have been determined. But based on the replay of the EHSI data it was determined the pilot had this information in front of him - a big X was plastered over the GS indicator and GS deviation pointer was not displayed. So pilot should have known he was flying a localizer approach only. The second item was the balance - CG was aft of the allowable limit hence pitch control was probably difficult. No other equipment malfunctions were uncovered. Let me quote directly from the report:

The presence of low cloud ceilings and the lack of glideslope guidance would have been stresses to the pilot during a critical phase of flight. This would have increased the pilot's workload and situational stress as he flew the localizer approach, a procedure that he likely did not anticipate or plan to conduct. In addition, weight and balance calculations indicated that the airplane's center of gravity (CG) was aft of the allowable limit, and the series of pitch excursions that began shortly after the airplane turned left and flew away from the localizer suggests that the pilot had difficulty controlling airplane pitch. This difficulty was likely due to the adverse handling characteristics associated with the aft CG. These adverse handling characteristics would have further increased the pilot's workload and provided another distraction from maintaining control of the airplane.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be: The pilot's failure to maintain control of the airplane during the instrument approach in night instrument meteorological conditions, which resulted in the airplane exceeding its critical angle of attack and an aerodynamic stall/spin.
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That analysis was all in the Preliminary Report two years ago, I think.

Well, maybe it doesn't matter, since a reminder does no harm, especially for somebody like me who had already forgotten all about this accident.

What sets the Final Report apart from the Preliminary one is mainly the inclusion of 15 pages of Factual Info, which don't change the lesson much.

My take on this accident is that the pilot made too many bad choices before launch: he failed at least the P A and V of PAVE:
P was pilot fatigue,
A was bad weight and balance along with a broken glideslope indicator,
V was low IFR conditions below the minimums for a localizer approach, with nighttime as well.
 
teejayevans said:
And once again the speculation wasn't even close.
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If one reads carefully what points henning made, it seems he was very close to getting it right. The pilots first mistake was to attempt to fly home. They should have spent the night. From there on, it was all downhill. He did indeed push it right to the edge and killed a bunch of people. I'm still not aware of how many hours he had in this type aircraft . Anyone?
 
Adam Weiss said:
I hadn't heard about this crash until this thread popped up again.
Really sad.
I'm working on my instrument rating, and just shot the ILS on 29 in Bloomington yesterday.
Knowing my skill level and experience (300 hrs) compared to this pilot (12,000 hrs), things like this always make me uneasy.
A very experienced pilot, in a well-equipped plane, in virtually flat terrain, and accidents can still happen.
Just makes me more vigilant...and I hope I never find myself trying to push my minimums.
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Doing a weight and balance would have helped that guy out a bunch. This is one of those times where good decision making would have significantly lowered the skill level required to succeed.
 
Jimmy cooper said:
I'm still not aware of how many hours he had in this type aircraft . Anyone?
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This isn't in the report, suffice to say he had ton of experience, he had multiple jet ratings, this 414 was most likely a lowly aircraft he flew. In the preceding 6 months he flew 500 hours - this is like flying almost 3 hours every day, Monday-Sunday, actually pretty unbelievable if you think about it.
 
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