TBM Crash May Implicate ATC

I see no evidence whatsoever that the pilot ever said why he wanted lower. For all the controller knew, he wanted lower for favourable winds, and when he has other conflicting traffic, a "standby" is an entirely appropriate response to such a request.

If the pilot had, instead, said "I need lower due to pressurization failure", now the controller has a reason to give priority handling, even absent the dreaded e-word.

Sure he did:

"Nine Hundred Kilo November, we need to descend to about 180," the pilot informed the controller, sounding coherent and calm. "We have an indication that’s not correct in the plane."
 
Perhaps. I've had pressurization problems at altitude before and requested ATC for lower and told them I had a problem. They would usually ask if it's an emergency and I would respond "Not at this time, we just need to get down to FLxxx and work this out".

And that's the thought process of the now dead pilot.
 
I'm glad it worked.

Question about the FAA altitude chamber: Do they do this so each individual can experience it, or do they do this so each individual can actually learn something? I'm wondering - just because you experience something that affects your mental capabilities, doesn't necessarily mean you learn from it. Do they videotape the experience so you can look at it afterward, with a clear mind, and see how it affected you? If the experience is such that you get mush-brained but because of that you can't even remember what happened, have you really learned anything?

Or does it come on in such a way that you actually remember later what happened?
When I did it, you learn in 3 ways. First, the whole morning is a lecture covering a lot of aeromedical information besides hypoxia. Second, when you put your mask back on after some minutes at 25,000' cabin altitude, you do remember your "recovery - things like color and peripheral vision returning. Third, you have a partner in the chamber and alternate the mask removal, so you observe your partner's deterioration.

As a totally separate item, the issue of "paperwork" post emergency declaration always comes up. Question: has anyone reading this ever declared an emergency and had to do any "paperwork" afterwards??? I've declared twice, and there was no followup at all.
 
Some of you should seek out a controller to gain a better understanding. If you did, you would know that their training and procedures are very, very specific. They are not triage nurses, they are not 911 operators. There are very few things they can ask and infer.

Rotor&Wing gets it.

A few months ago I was taking the med crew to another city to pick up a patient. About at the halfway point, the med crew tapped me on my shoulder. I turned on the intercom and was informed we no longer need to pick up the patient as he has expired. Ok, time to RTB.

I notified the controller on the change of destination. The controller worked out a turn for me and the clearance, then asked, "Do you need any assistance?"

I just told him that the patients needs have changed and we are no longer needed, and that was that. I thought that was a real clever way to ask me if I had an in flight emergency.

As far as getting involved, one night I listened to a Baron needing a change in altitude and direction to get out of icing conditions. He was losing altitude and airspeed. Due to terrain lower was not available. I soon realized where the Baron was. I notified the controller and told him where VFR was, giving reference to a named mountain, an interstate, a couple of towns and one airport. The controller vectored the Baron out of the icing conditions into the area of VFR. The controller and the pilot of the Baron was very thankful for the information I was able to convey. If I didn't get involved that flight may have ended safely. Because I got involved, the flight did end safely.
 
When I did it, you learn in 3 ways. First, the whole morning is a lecture covering a lot of aeromedical information besides hypoxia. Second, when you put your mask back on after some minutes at 25,000' cabin altitude, you do remember your "recovery - things like color and peripheral vision returning. Third, you have a partner in the chamber and alternate the mask removal, so you observe your partner's deterioration.

As a totally separate item, the issue of "paperwork" post emergency declaration always comes up. Question: has anyone reading this ever declared an emergency and had to do any "paperwork" afterwards??? I've declared twice, and there was no followup at all.


I have declared an emergency more than a few times. No paper work, not even a follow up phone call. But all those flights ended without bending the airplane.
 
I agree. At that first "indication", this pilot should have taken the express elevator down, THEN told ATC what he was doing.

This is made very difficult by the fact that the first sign of hypoxia is usually a euphoric sense of well-being. That is the time to start thinking "oh crap, I'm hypoxic"...but why would you think that, you feel great! :(
 
WAIT A MINUTE! Why did we not launch jets with big nets to get his plane under control, or just have ATC hack the plane and land it? The situation sucks all around, simple.

2 declared emergencies and no paperwork.
 
So the pilot and his wife dead because he didn't say 'emergency?' Consider how frail that premise is...

Guess what? When you are PIC, you are in charge, and there is no backstop for your decisions. You can do anything from the supremely skillful and wise, to the insanely stupid and dangerous...nobody can stop you or effectively intervene.

Whatever happens, if it involves your airplane alone YOU are responsible. This was a problem with an aircraft system, the pilot is completely responsible for his response to that problem and what happened next. Regardless of who was on the other end of a radio communication at the time.

The premise is not frail, what is frail is your chance of survival if you make poor choices when flying.
 
I think you are correct! By the time you realize it's happening, it's too late to do anything. That is why pressurized airplanes have warning lights and or buzzers when cabin altitude reaches a certain level. I think the Citation was 10K for the light and at 14K the masks in the back dropped.:D
It's not unlike sitting down having a few drinks, you feel fine until you stand up, then you realize you might should have stopped a couple drinks earlier. :nono: But, it's too late, so you order the Tequila shots! :D

This is made very difficult by the fact that the first sign of hypoxia is usually a euphoric sense of well-being. That is the time to start thinking "oh crap, I'm hypoxic"...but why would you think that, you feel great! :(
 
As a totally separate item, the issue of "paperwork" post emergency declaration always comes up. Question: has anyone reading this ever declared an emergency and had to do any "paperwork" afterwards??? I've declared twice, and there was no followup at all.

Two emergencies declared, one on a ferry flight. Not so much as a phone call from the FSDO.
 
Two emergencies declared, one on a ferry flight. Not so much as a phone call from the FSDO.

From what I have heard, that's pretty standard. As long as you can justify your reasoning later if somebody asks, I don't think anybody is going to give it a second thought. Which makes it even more puzzling as to why pilots don't declare when necessary.

Does anybody know of a declared emergency that DID result in negative consequences, other than a declaration that was a lie?
 
Busy ATC frequency, another pilot tries to second guess the problem airplane, gets on the frequency, controller is now trying to coordinate, confusion setting in.

Many years ago I was approaching STL during a very nasty winter night. Young pilot in a C-208 was picking up ice on departure and started to panic. Another pilot jumped on the radio and tried to take over the situation. The controller after several attempts to break through had to tell the second pilot to shut up......and that didn't stop him. Meanwhile the trouble aircraft now the pilot is really panicked.

Let the pilot and controller work it out, this is not an emergency by consensus or committee.

I've done contract work for DOE, NASA, NSF and FAA, and volunteer work for CAP and in several teaching machine shops. All of them have safety protocols that include every witness shall speak up in the presence of unsafe behaviors, whether involved or not. CAP words it as "everyone is a safety officer" and I suspect that came from the Air Force, as much of CAP's habits do. Your statement that other pilots should butt out is the FIRST time I've ever heard that in any safety context.

You seem to have a concern about clogging the frequency. That's a legitimate concern, but you've overextended it. Speaking up cannot make the problem worse. Clogging the frequency and excluding the controller might. NOT speaking up will. But brevity and relevance on busy frequencies is always called for.

Limit your prohibition to what is actually required to solve the problem, or you throw the baby out with the bathwater.

The controller in this instance did nothing wrong. He could have used some help from the peanut gallery, as he clearly didn't recognize the gravity of the situation. Though I doubt many of us would have either, if one did, it was not only permissible to speak up, it was duty. Short of monopolizing the frequency, of course.
 
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From what I have heard, that's pretty standard. As long as you can justify your reasoning later if somebody asks, I don't think anybody is going to give it a second thought. Which makes it even more puzzling as to why pilots don't declare when necessary.

Does anybody know of a declared emergency that DID result in negative consequences, other than a declaration that was a lie?

Three emergencies declared I can recall.

1) Grumman Traveller with strong burning rubber smell (frozen alt/burning belt) - no report.

2) Grumman Tiger with stuck exhaust valve - no report

3) My Sky Arrow running very rough - undetermined but probably gasket goop from the float bowl blocking jets - no report.

I only have one com radio now, and it's usually on 121.5 unless I'm talking to someone else. I am personally primed to say "Emergency" at the drop of the proverbial hat.
 
Sure he did:

"Nine Hundred Kilo November, we need to descend to about 180," the pilot informed the controller, sounding coherent and calm. "We have an indication that’s not correct in the plane."

OK...so the pilot said he has an instrument problem ("an indication that's not correct"), and ATC is supposed to do what with that?

What is ATC supposed to do if the pilot doesn't tell them what's wrong.
 
OK...so the pilot said he has an instrument problem ("an indication that's not correct"), and ATC is supposed to do what with that?

What is ATC supposed to do if the pilot doesn't tell them what's wrong.

I started this thread as an intellectual and aviation exercise. I don't think ATC did anything wrong either.

But, maybe the ATC process should be tweaked a bit? Maybe when a pilot is potentially unable to fully assess his/her situation in regard to a developing emergency due to oxygen deficiency there should be an 'extra' level of anticipation on ATCs part?

This guy wasn't complaining about his aircraft on the ground, or in the pattern, he was at altitude and experiencing disabling Hypoxia. In hindsight all of us can make easy comments about it, but what do we do in the future? Simply ignore this potential issue?

How about ATC clear those at altitude to a lower and safer level out of precaution when they hear someone utter anything at all about the aircraft malfunctioning? Even if they don't hear the word 'emergency' or hear some description of a troubleshooting of a problem?
 
He requested FL180, and said there was an indication that wasn't correct in the plane...he sounded ok at this point, I wonder that the indication was, assuming it was the cabin pressurization, given the plane was new, that it wasn't obvious to him what the problem was.
From the TBM 850 POH:
The “CABIN ALTITUDE” warning message appears in the GDU 1500 MFD
“CAS” window (in display normal conditions) when the cabin altitude is over
10000 ft or when the cabin--atmosphere differential pressure is higher than
6.2 psi (427 mb).

What does it mean by "in display normal conditions"?
 
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Does anybody know of a declared emergency that DID result in negative consequences, other than a declaration that was a lie?

Haven't declared an emergency, but I was on the ramp and witnessed two. Both times the pilots were asked to sign some kind of release form that the supervisor on the crash trucks handed him.
 
The controller in this instance did nothing wrong. He could have used some help from the peanut gallery, as he clearly didn't recognize the gravity of the situation. Though I doubt many of us would have either, if one did, it was not only permissible to speak up, it was duty. Short of monopolizing the frequency, of course.

Again, conjecture.
 
What does it mean by "in display normal conditions"?
Educated guess: The G1000 has display modes where normal indications don't appear. For example, in extreme pitch up or pitch down the PFD is decluttered and you get big red chevrons indicating which way you are supposed to point the nose. Possibly this refers to some similar mode for the TBM MFD. Maybe a TBM driver here can clarify.
 
Does anybody know of a declared emergency that DID result in negative consequences, other than a declaration that was a lie?

I think we have a female poster that hinted at having a problem that she did not declare and was met by an over-aggressive FSDO. Caused her inconvenience and she said that she would think twice before doing the same thing again.
 
ATC did nothing wrong here.

Not sure I agree. Yes, it would have been better if the pilot declared. But the controller probably (or at least arguably) should have picked up the signs. That being said, I quibble with the word "nothing" because it's too absolute. Not because I think the controller bears primary responsibility.
 
Did you LISTEN (or read a transcript). We know in retrospect that there was a pressurization problem but there's no direct indication of that. Here's the one transmission about the problem:

we need to desend down to about 180...we have an indication that's not correct in the plane.

He repeated "have to get down" and made a nondescript comment about "reserve fuel."

He got FL 200 in four minutes. That is "about 180" absent knowing what the "incorrect indication" is.
 
In hindsight, which is what we all have at this point, he SHOULD have said, I need to decend immediately to FL180 to resolve a pressurization issue. Actually he should have requested/informed ATC that he WAS decending to 10,000 feet for a pressurization issue.
I had a winshield crack at 16K in my 414A, no pressure leak, but a big scary looking crack. I didn't declare an emergency, but told the controller I needed lower NOW, that we had a cracked windshield. I decended to 6,000 feet and flew the rest of the way to New Orleans. ;)
By using the phase "an indication that isn't correct" I suspect he was already in trouble. He may have felt great, even though his brain was starving for oxygen.:mad2:
After all, it's a brand new airplane, you expect some slight bugs, in this case, he may have thought it was the indicator or warning light that was the failure. :dunno:
Did you LISTEN (or read a transcript). We know in retrospect that there was a pressurization problem but there's no direct indication of that. Here's the one transmission about the problem:

we need to desend down to about 180...we have an indication that's not correct in the plane.

He repeated "have to get down" and made a nondescript comment about "reserve fuel."

He got FL 200 in four minutes. That is "about 180" absent knowing what the "incorrect indication" is.
 
Again, conjecture.

If you say so. The transcripts have been published. We know what was said.

The controller clearly did not respond to an emergency. Therefore, he did not understand the gravity of the situation. Are you accusing the controller of murder? THAT would be conjecture; there is no evidence whatsoever that the controller understood the situation and chose not to act anyway.
 
§91.3 Responsibility and authority of the pilot in command.
(a) The pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsible for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of that aircraft.

(b) In an in-flight emergency requiring immediate action, the pilot in command may deviate from any rule of this part to the extent required to meet that emergency.

(c) Each pilot in command who deviates from a rule under paragraph (b) of this section shall, upon the request of the Administrator, send a written report of that deviation to the Administrator.

(Approved by the Office of Management and Budget under control number 2120–0005)


He did not need to ask ATC to descend and ATC has no control over the plane or the pilot. I think what killed the pilot and his wife was EGO not hypoxia. He became hypoxic as a result of his EGO and not descending and declaring an emergency...I am a xxxhr pilot with xxxhrs in type and this is a TBM900 so this is not an emergency and I got this.... Goodnight

I think all pilots should own one of these. It's wireless and compatible with your iPhone or iPad.
http://www.bestbuy.com/site/ihealth...617&skuId=8607053&st=pulse oximeter&cp=1&lp=1
 
It may be EGO, or it may be, "this can't be happening to me" flying along on A/P all fat dumb and happy, when you notice the cabin altitude light on. Hmmm, that's odd??
Since this is a new plane, it's probably a faulty light, yeah, let's figure it out. (looks for checklist)
After looking at checklist for a couple minutes, he finally decides "this may be happening to me" I better ask for lower. Not too much lower, this thing burns a ton of fuel down low and I'll have to climb all the way back up here once I figure it out.
By the time he gets to FL250, he's hypoxic, feels great, but can't really control his motor functions.
Entire incident takes 3 minutes.
It's all speculation, an oxygen mask, with oxygen flowing to the pilot, would have likely been a non-event. :dunno:
§91.3 Responsibility and authority of the pilot in command.
(a) The pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsible for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of that aircraft.

(b) In an in-flight emergency requiring immediate action, the pilot in command may deviate from any rule of this part to the extent required to meet that emergency.

(c) Each pilot in command who deviates from a rule under paragraph (b) of this section shall, upon the request of the Administrator, send a written report of that deviation to the Administrator.

(Approved by the Office of Management and Budget under control number 2120–0005)


He did not need to ask ATC to descend and ATC has no control over the plane or the pilot. I think what killed the pilot and his wife was EGO not hypoxia. He became hypoxic as a result of his EGO and not descending and declaring an emergency...I am a xxxhr pilot with xxxhrs in type and this is a TBM900 so this is not an emergency and I got this.... Goodnight

I think all pilots should own one of these. It's wireless and compatible with your iPhone or iPad.
http://www.bestbuy.com/site/ihealth...617&skuId=8607053&st=pulse oximeter&cp=1&lp=1
 
I'm glad it worked.

Question about the FAA altitude chamber: Do they do this so each individual can experience it, or do they do this so each individual can actually learn something? I'm wondering - just because you experience something that affects your mental capabilities, doesn't necessarily mean you learn from it. Do they videotape the experience so you can look at it afterward, with a clear mind, and see how it affected you? If the experience is such that you get mush-brained but because of that you can't even remember what happened, have you really learned anything?

Or does it come on in such a way that you actually remember later what happened?


We each left with a DVD of the entire chamber ride.
I still have the worksheet they gave me.

They have you sign your name, and work math problems, and some other excercizes. After the chamber ride, you go back to the room and they play it back. People are surprised by what they see themselves doing.

They really teach you before and after what is going to happen and what each person's experience was like.
 
If you say so. The transcripts have been published. We know what was said.

The controller clearly did not respond to an emergency.

Read the transcript, please show us at what point the PIC declared an emergency.

Therefore, he did not understand the gravity of the situation.

If the PIC did not declare an emergency, how is a busy controller suppose to understand what the PIC is attempting to do?

Are you accusing the controller of murder? THAT would be conjecture; there is no evidence whatsoever that the controller understood the situation and chose not to act anyway.

:rolleyes2: :nonod:
 
Read the transcript, please show us at what point the PIC declared an emergency.



If the PIC did not declare an emergency, how is a busy controller suppose to understand what the PIC is attempting to do?



:rolleyes2: :nonod:

Dude. Read. You said it.

There was an emergency. Declared or not. The pilot died as a result; this makes it certain that there was indeed an emergency. Are you going to dispute that?

The controller, through no fault of his own, did not understand what was going on. As a result, he did the wrong thing. Yes, there is an assumption there that he wasn't a murderer. No, it's not an assumption it was wrong. Someone died.

Because he didn't understand -- and I think most of us would have similar trouble -- he could have used some help.

Now, which part of this are you having trouble with?
 
If you say so. The transcripts have been published. We know what was said.

The controller clearly did not respond to an emergency.

That's crazy. How was the controller supposed to know it was an emergency? As far as he knew that "incorrect indication" was something trivial. In fact I would argue that because that pilot only asked for 18,000 feet that this implies to the controller that it was NOT a oxygen issue/pressurization issue. Because we all know he should have asked for 12,000 or 10,000 not 18,000.
 
When I did it, you learn in 3 ways. First, the whole morning is a lecture covering a lot of aeromedical information besides hypoxia. Second, when you put your mask back on after some minutes at 25,000' cabin altitude, you do remember your "recovery - things like color and peripheral vision returning. Third, you have a partner in the chamber and alternate the mask removal, so you observe your partner's deterioration.

As a totally separate item, the issue of "paperwork" post emergency declaration always comes up. Question: has anyone reading this ever declared an emergency and had to do any "paperwork" afterwards??? I've declared twice, and there was no followup at all.

4 times, ended safely on a runway each time, settled with a phone call and 'Thanks, that's all I need for my report."
 
I see no evidence whatsoever that the pilot ever said why he wanted lower. For all the controller knew, he wanted lower for favourable winds, and when he has other conflicting traffic, a "standby" is an entirely appropriate response to such a request.

If the pilot had, instead, said "I need lower due to pressurization failure", now the controller has a reason to give priority handling, even absent the dreaded e-word.

At that point, the pilot may have been too mush-brained to really know what his problem was. In the Kalitta Lear, the pilot declared an emergency because he thought that he had a control system malfunction because nothing made sense to him. The controller when communicating with another sector mentioned that the guy was hypoxic, I dont think the pilot ever said something to that effect. Only when the lights in his and his copilots head came back on they could put things together.
 
Dude. Read. You said it.

There was an emergency. Declared or not. The pilot died as a result; this makes it certain that there was indeed an emergency. Are you going to dispute that?

The controller, through no fault of his own, did not understand what was going on. As a result, he did the wrong thing. Yes, there is an assumption there that he wasn't a murderer. No, it's not an assumption it was wrong. Someone died.

Because he didn't understand -- and I think most of us would have similar trouble -- he could have used some help.

Now, which part of this are you having trouble with?

Your whole inane diatribe? :rolleyes2:
 
As for the 'paperwork'. Declared once, made a phonecall to the tower supervisor after I was safely on the ground. Never got a request for a written report from 'the administrator'.
 
Your whole inane diatribe? :rolleyes2:
You only think it's a "diatribe" because you're having trouble understanding it.

Read it for what it is. An emergency occurred. No one recognized it. Someone died as a result. You called that conjecture. You were wrong.
 
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