SR22T down outside Raleigh

He probably was…

Trying, unsuccessfully since it was still pinned.

Would suck if his ‘normal’ process was to always leave it unpinned. Pin removal is part of the preflight checklist, so one can assume he failed to preflight IAW the AFM/POH, encountered an abnormal condition (loss of electrical power), then continued to run the plane out of gas (did he determine if he had enough fuel for the trip during pre-flight?), then had a loss of control/upset while trying to pull the pinned CAPS handle.
 
Running out of fuel at low altitude with no starter should the propeller stop windmilling.

We imagine fuel exhaustion events as unambiguous engine stoppages, but that's not how it usually happens. The fuel sloshes around in the tank, covering and uncovering the intake tubes. Picture the last few sloshes of a drink when sucking through a straw. So the engine doesn't just quit. It stumbles and surges, quits and restarts, sometimes for a prolonged period.

If the pilot is not expecting to run out of fuel, the symptoms do not lead you to immediately recognize that is what is happening. So you waste valuable time and altitude, maybe 15-30 seconds and up to 1000 feet, trying to figure out why your aircraft is stumbling and surging, instead of setting up for an immediate off airport landing. Ask me how I know.

I personally think an underrated issue here is the wisdom of electric trim without a manual backup. If he was fighting control stick forces in slow flight, surely that would make slow flight more difficult.
 
As I expected. Fuel exhaustion. No comms. No nav. No autopilot. Dude hand flew this thing not only NORDO but probably with the only functional instrument being an efb. Adsb track was from center. Altitude was what he reported when he went NORDO.

Spectacularly poor adm to go 400 miles in that configuration with family on board.
 
We imagine fuel exhaustion events as unambiguous engine stoppages, but that's not how it usually happens. The fuel sloshes around in the tank, covering and uncovering the intake tubes. Picture the last few sloshes of a drink when sucking through a straw. So the engine doesn't just quit. It stumbles and surges, quits and restarts, sometimes for a prolonged period.

If the pilot is not expecting to run out of fuel, the symptoms do not lead you to immediately recognize that is what is happening. So you waste valuable time and altitude, maybe 15-30 seconds and up to 1000 feet, trying to figure out why your aircraft is stumbling and surging, instead of setting up for an immediate off airport landing. Ask me how I know.

I personally think an underrated issue here is the wisdom of electric trim without a manual backup. If he was fighting control stick forces in slow flight, surely that would make slow flight more difficult.
According to the preliminary report. Left tank was empty and not breached. Right tank had 3 gal but was breached implying that there could have been more than 3 gallons. But, 3 gallons should have been enough to get the last 5 mi or so. Fuel selector was in the Left position. It seems he ran the left tank dry. Realized it and switched to the right tank.

He lost ALT1 and BAT1. He didn’t have a starter. He probably didn’t have the boost pump either. I don’t know if it will restart even if the prop is still windmilling. 100% agree on electric trim w/o a backup. Seems a silly design choice.

He flew the plane through a number of (unexpected) challenges. I believe he would have made it if the Left tank hadn’t run dry. Maybe the Chute felt like giving up. Certainly there are a number of internet posts belittling the Chute and stupid Cirrus pilots. It’s just as tragic to under-rely on the chute as it is to over rely on the chute. At 500 AGL if you don’t have complete control of the aircraft and a clear mind, pull the chute. Cirrus has been ruthlessly criticized for Pull early, Pull often. I agree it’s a stupid motto, but it was created early on because some pilots either didn’t consider the option or refused to comprehend their situation.
 
As I expected. Fuel exhaustion. No comms. No nav. No autopilot. Dude hand flew this thing not only NORDO but probably with the only functional instrument being an efb. Adsb track was from center. Altitude was what he reported when he went NORDO.

Spectacularly poor adm to go 400 miles in that configuration with family on board.
In the G3 the backup instruments are steam gauges. Still agree with your post. I’d probably rely on an EFB and the Airspeed indicator at that point, he was up to all the challenges that the aircraft threw at him until the engine quit. Maybe a false sense that he had it made being so close to the airport
 
We imagine fuel exhaustion events as unambiguous engine stoppages, but that's not how it usually happens. The fuel sloshes around in the tank, covering and uncovering the intake tubes. Picture the last few sloshes of a drink when sucking through a straw. So the engine doesn't just quit. It stumbles and surges, quits and restarts, sometimes for a prolonged period.

If the pilot is not expecting to run out of fuel, the symptoms do not lead you to immediately recognize that is what is happening. So you waste valuable time and altitude, maybe 15-30 seconds and up to 1000 feet, trying to figure out why your aircraft is stumbling and surging, instead of setting up for an immediate off airport landing. Ask me how I know.

I personally think an underrated issue here is the wisdom of electric trim without a manual backup. If he was fighting control stick forces in slow flight, surely that would make slow flight more difficult.
Yep. First flight back after avionics upgrade. Flying fat dumb and happy on autopilot. Messing with avionics. Suddenly autopopilot disconnects. Engine starts surging. Ahh dammit. Fuel. If it was 500' altitude loss it was alot. But I had plenty in the tanks. Engine never went full windmill.
 
…at that point, he was up to all the challenges that the aircraft threw at him until the engine quit.…

Except the preflight.

Taking off with CAPS pinned, to me, is indicative of a pilot with one or more hazardous attitudes. So does not calculating fuel requirements and confirming you have enough fuel to make the trip with necessary reserve fuel.

Continuing the flight with an electrical system failure reinforces that belief for me.
 
In the G3 the backup instruments are steam gauges. Still agree with your post. I’d probably rely on an EFB and the Airspeed indicator at that point, he was up to all the challenges that the aircraft threw at him until the engine quit. Maybe a false sense that he had it made being so close to the airport
Hard disagree. He didn't handle ANY of the challenges well. Continuing this flight in a crippled aircraft was exceptionally poor judgment.
 
We imagine fuel exhaustion events as unambiguous engine stoppages, but that's not how it usually happens. The fuel sloshes around in the tank, covering and uncovering the intake tubes. Picture the last few sloshes of a drink when sucking through a straw. So the engine doesn't just quit. It stumbles and surges, quits and restarts, sometimes for a prolonged period.

When getting very low on fuel in level flight in a Mooney, the fuel pressure indicator gauge will begin to fluctuate before what you describe above begins. However, just lower the nose and start a descent at that point and the engine just quits cold. Bam. The first time (and probably the last time) that happens it really gets your attention.
 
Except the preflight.

Taking off with CAPS pinned, to me, is indicative of a pilot with one or more hazardous attitudes. So does not calculating fuel requirements and confirming you have enough fuel to make the trip with necessary reserve fuel.

Continuing the flight with an electrical system failure reinforces that belief for me.
I agree with everything except there is a possibility that he could have correctly calculated the fuel requirements. The final report should shed light on that. When he lost electricity he lost fuel gauges and tank switch timers. Even with the 3 gallons left in the ruptured tank he would have made it. Depending on how much (if any) fuel he lost with the ruptured tBut you are correct, there were plenty of opportunities to break the chain that lead to this ending.
Hard disagree. He didn't handle ANY of the challenges well. Continuing this flight in a crippled aircraft was exceptionally poor judgment.
Knowing the outcome of the flight you are of course correct. For reference (and I am not arguing that he SHOULD have continued):
 

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Cirrus only has electric trim? Wow, something happens and you’re way out of trim that could be disastrous.
 
I hope this does not come across as I support leaving the Pin in the Chute handle. I don't. Mine comes out so I can start the airplane. However, if for some reason the pin was left in the handle it really wouldn't slow me down if I had to deploy.
 

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What's the relevance of this checklist?
It says to continue flight. I'm not sure I would continue. Cirrus says it's ok. Now, what I would like to see more clearly stated is what do they recommend if you lose ALT1 AND ALT2.
 
I hope this does not come across as I support leaving the Pin in the Chute handle. I don't. Mine comes out so I can start the airplane. However, if for some reason the pin was left in the handle it really wouldn't slow me down if I had to deploy.

I dunno ... leaving the pin in seems akin to having a weapon for self defense and carrying the magazine for it in your hip pocket. Under pressure time is precious especially when the brain is clogged with mental overload and melting down because the end of this world's existence for you and your family just got real.
 
So does not calculating fuel requirements and confirming you have enough fuel to make the trip with necessary reserve fuel.

I wonder if the loss of avionics due to electrical failure affected that outcome. IE inable to lean to planned fuel burn due to lack of fuel monitor.
 
It says to continue flight. I'm not sure I would continue. Cirrus says it's ok. Now, what I would like to see more clearly stated is what do they recommend if you lose ALT1 AND ALT2.
Is a failure of ALT1 what happened in this case? If so, was that the only failure? The loss of GPS and radios suggests something else, doesn't it?
 
I wonder if the loss of avionics due to electrical failure affected that outcome. IE inable to lean to planned fuel burn due to lack of fuel monitor.
My guess is that with all the other stuff going on he forgot to switch tanks. He would not have Fuel QTY or switch tank timer/reminder. It wasn't reported if or how much fuel leaked from the breached tank. He may have had legal VFR reserves. The RDM they recovered and sent for analysis should answer that question, or maybe not because of loss of electrical power. They will know fuel flow and fuel remaining up until the time the power went out and should be able to determine if he had legal reserves.
 
It says to continue flight. I'm not sure I would continue. Cirrus says it's ok. Now, what I would like to see more clearly stated is what do they recommend if you lose ALT1 AND ALT2.

I would continue in my airplane. But knowing what I know now, I would surely not continue in a Cirri.
 
IE inable to lean to planned fuel burn due to lack of fuel monitor.

Certainly possible, especially if that was the only way he knew how to lean. Better full margin combined with knowing how to lean to roughness and then enrich might have been sufficient.
 
Hard disagree. He didn't handle ANY of the challenges well. Continuing this flight in a crippled aircraft was exceptionally poor judgment.
It's also a violation of the regs. I just went over this with two flight review clients.

91.7 Civil aircraft airworthiness.​

(a) No person may operate a civil aircraft unless it is in an airworthy condition.
(b) The pilot in command of a civil aircraft is responsible for determining whether that aircraft is in condition for safe flight. The pilot in command shall discontinue the flight when unairworthy mechanical, electrical, or structural conditions occur.

Of course, if you have a failure over a forest, there's no reason to hit a tree, if you can make it to a road some miles away, but passing multiple airfields, is a no-no.
 
Certainly possible, especially if that was the only way he knew how to lean. Better full margin combined with knowing how to lean to roughness and then enrich might have been sufficient.

Also, what kind of engine indications did he have once he started losing systems? MAP and RPM? Flow meter?
 
Is a failure of ALT1 what happened in this case? If so, was that the only failure? The loss of GPS and radios suggests something else, doesn't it?
They will be able to tell from the RDM (remote Data Module) they recovered from the tail the sequence of events, but if he lost all comms my belief is he had NO power. That would suggest he lost ALT2 as well. COM1 is on the essential bus. If you lose the essential bus you got the windscreen and the backup instruments which are steam gauges in the G3.
 
They will be able to tell from the RDM (remote Data Module) they recovered from the tail the sequence of events, but if he lost all comms my belief is he had NO power. That would suggest he lost ALT2 as well. COM1 is on the essential bus. If you lose the essential bus you got the windscreen and the backup instruments which are steam gauges in the G3.

Which backup steam gauges are available?
 
My guess is that with all the other stuff going on he forgot to switch tanks. He would not have Fuel QTY or switch tank timer/reminder. It wasn't reported if or how much fuel leaked from the breached tank. He may have had legal VFR reserves. The RDM they recovered and sent for analysis should answer that question, or maybe not because of loss of electrical power. They will know fuel flow and fuel remaining up until the time the power went out and should be able to determine if he had legal reserves.
The beached tank was the only one with any fuel in it. The unbreached tank was empty. So either he ran it dry and switched (perhaps more than once) or took off with one empty tank.
 
They will be able to tell from the RDM (remote Data Module) they recovered from the tail the sequence of events, but if he lost all comms my belief is he had NO power. That would suggest he lost ALT2 as well. COM1 is on the essential bus. If you lose the essential bus you got the windscreen and the backup instruments which are steam gauges in the G3.
So refer back to my question about the relevance of that checklist, and the pilot's fatally poor judgment.
 
Also, what kind of engine indications did he have once he started losing systems? MAP and RPM? Flow meter?
He will have engine instruments until the essential bus goes away. The essential bus goes away when both BAT1 and BAT2 deplete. The BATs deplete at some point when the ALTs go away.
 
I would continue in my airplane. But knowing what I know now, I would surely not continue in a Cirri.

:yeahthat:
This thread is making me appreciate my very simple 1969 steam-gauge airplane. If I lost all electrical power, dead alternator and battery, I would still have trim, flaps, tank switching, AI, ASI, VSI, altimeter, directional gyro, and compass. Add to that my handheld radio and EFB, and the situation isn't even particularly worrisome, much less dire.
 
The beached tank was the only one with any fuel in it. The unbreached tank was empty. So either he ran it dry and switched (perhaps more than once) or took off with one empty tank.
Yes. And the preliminary report says:

The fuel inlet line to the fuel metering unit was removed and a small quantity of fluid was present. The fuel
manifold remained secured to the top of the engine and there was no fuel or debris present.

Left tank empty. To me that says he ran out of fuel on the left and switched to the right and was unable to restart.
 
I hope this does not come across as I support leaving the Pin in the Chute handle. I don't. Mine comes out so I can start the airplane. However, if for some reason the pin was left in the handle it really wouldn't slow me down if I had to deploy.

I’ve flown Cirri before and am familiar. It’s less about time to deploy and the cognitive load during a potential upset condition if someone goes to deploy and it doesn’t. Just another hole pre-aligned in this cheese wheel.
 
....he was up to all the challenges that the aircraft threw at him until the engine quit.

Uh, no.

The correct response to those "challenges" should have been to land.

He exhibted very poor ADM, likely beginning with the preflight, and killed his wife and kids as a result.
 
So refer back to my question about the relevance of that checklist, and the pilot's fatally poor judgment.
If he took off with ALT1 issues the aircraft was not airworthy at that point. I don't know what he did or did not know or decide. Once in the air the Cirrus approved checklist says continue flight but try to avoid Night or IMC.

Some checklist items say Land As Soon As Possible. This one does not. I'm not smart enough to know whether it should or should not say land immediately. I do agree with you that landing would be prudent. I don't know exactly when or what order he started losing electrics. For me at least, when doing my Cirrus training, for simulated emergencies I initially forgot the chute was there. Busy pitching for best glide and looking for a place to land. I still hear the instructors voice as I was doing the drill I learned from all my previous training. "you just lost your chute". Meaning I lost enough altitude during my engine out drill that I would be landing somewhere because we got too low.
 
Uh, no.

The correct response to those "challenges" should have been to land.

He exhibted very poor ADM, likely beginning with the preflight, and killed his wife and kids as a result.
I'm not trying to argue, but that's not what the Cirrus approved document say.
 
If he took off with ALT1 issues the aircraft was not airworthy at that point. I don't know what he did or did not know or decide. Once in the air the Cirrus approved checklist says continue flight but try to avoid Night or IMC.
If all you have is an ALT1 failure, which is an assumption you're making that's inconsistent with the known facts.
 
Cirrus has been ruthlessly criticized for Pull early, Pull often. I agree it’s a stupid motto, but it was created early on because some pilots either didn’t consider the option or refused to comprehend their situation.

I recall that mantra was replaced with "Consider CAPS" a long time ago. IOW, put the option front and center in emergencies, not as a last resort.

I managed to spin in a Cirrus where a wing had departed and did not consider CAPS until too late and died. In a simulator, fortunately.
 
Cirrus only has electric trim? Wow, something happens and you’re way out of trim that could be disastrous.

I didn't think that was uncommon. My Sky Arrow only has electric trim.

I thought that certification standards required that a pilot had to be able to overpower a runaway or inop trim using reasonable force. But I may be misremembering.
 
If all you have is an ALT1 failure, which is an assumption you're making that's inconsistent with the known facts.
I read the preliminary report. What facts are known? I'm not trying to be confrontational. I have my own set of guesses. Loosing ADSB is a pretty good indication that you lost the Avionics relay due to low bus voltage. Losing Nav/Com and PFD means you lost the essential bus and are flying a plane without electrics. The Remote Data Module (RDM) which was recovered should provide some facts and a timeline.
 
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I recall that mantra was replaced with "Consider CAPS" a long time ago. IOW, put the option front and center in emergencies, not as a last resort.

I managed to spin in a Cirrus where a wing had departed and did not consider CAPS until too late and died. In a simulator, fortunately.
For me it was like my first experience in IMC. I read all the stuff. I flew with Foggles. All the preparation did not prepare me for the leans.

It seems impossible to forget the Chute. When you are trained and spent years practicing simulated emergency situations it amazed me how the Chute is nowhere in my muscle memory. I spend a lot of time practicing in my head. Including altitudes, acceptable landing surfaces and how the wind will dictate where to send the emergency vehicles when the chute deploys.
 
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