Lear down TEB

You would think that short of the scheduled pilot on the flight being alive somewhere and an unknown person died on the flight that they know who the pilot was. I find it odd that they do not seem to have even released the name of the pilot scheduled to fly. I understand not wanting to upset family members but without evidence to the contrary regarding who was onboard, there is no reason to withhold the name. If the scheduled pilot is nowhere to be found, it is fairly certain that the burned beyond recognition body is him.

Odd indeed.

They may be having trouble locating next of kin. Nobody wants to find out their father/husband/brother died on the evening news . . .

And yes, I'm far too lazy to type all of the possible combinations. The ones I used get the point across.
 
Classic example of zero SOP’s, and almost zero training for the right seater... or left seater for that matter.

Point is that it was a hodge podge mess in the cockpit. No standardization whatsoever. It was like the three (two) stooges.
Truly could have been avoided.
 
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Aside from what seems to be a significant lack of familiarity with local procedures in very busy airspace (I recall looking up that plane after the crash and it mostly flew out west), they apparently decided to use this very short flight as a training flight for the right seater, who didn't seem remotely close to up to the task. Going from PHL to TEB is going to be a very high workload flight, as observed.

The fact that the captain didn't immediately take the controls when the FO said "Your airplane" is also a big problem. That shouldn't be in question in that sort of environment.

That flight shouldn't have been used as a training opportunity the way it was in that airplane, even as a dead head leg.

Some of the banter complaining about ATC, making fun of the Pilatus, etc... that stuff I can more or less ignore as that's fairly common. It's very annoying in that area to be stuck at a bad/low altitude, get vectored all over the place, etc. You want to get where you're going and because of how congested the airspace is, that doesn't happen quickly. It's more frustrating if you don't do it regularly, but even if you fly in that area often it's annoying. The complete lack of CRM and deficiencies by both pilots are blatantly obvious and very concerning.
 
Both of these guys sounded like they were behind the airplane before they even took the runway to depart.


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You now, I’m a sailor and we take pride in our use of expletives. But this PIC used expletives on a whole ‘nother level. There are expletives where it doesn’t even make sense or flow. That must have been a brutal job to transcribe that #

Agree, it just didn't sound like a professional sterile cockpit at all, and it should have been on that flight when you're kept down so low.
 
You now, I’m a sailor and we take pride in our use of expletives. But this PIC used expletives on a whole ‘nother level. There are expletives where it doesn’t even make sense or flow. That must have been a brutal job to transcribe that #
Glad its not just me...I felt like I was reading a Quentin Tarantino script.
 
You now, I’m a sailor and we take pride in our use of expletives. But this PIC used expletives on a whole ‘nother level. There are expletives where it doesn’t even make sense or flow. That must have been a brutal job to transcribe that #

While I've seen similar, I do agree with you. The lack of a sterile cockpit was also a significant issue here.
 
Sadly this accident reminds me of the Hawker in Akron a couple years ago. Substandard captain trying to teach and waiting way too long to intervene.


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stirpot question of the day: would it be more accurate to say that, as it pertains to 91/135, this combination of employment pedigree, day to day cockpit conduct and revenue structure-derived dynamics is the norm, or the exception?

fwiw, my take is that just because more airplanes dont crash doesnt mean such a waterline couldnt be rampant. im also of the opinion that 5 dollars doesnt get my undivided attention, which is another way of saying that on a macro level, you get what you pay for.

and just before people get all umbraged, im not making a veiled endorsement of 121 by asking the question. im genuinely curious in an introspective answer from those who operate in this sector of revenue aviation.
 
One thing that struck me reading this, beyond that the pilot probably got too slow and/or banked too hard thus stalling the wing.

BUT we do not teach or train that it is acceptable to use alternative plans in such situations.

We self-pressure ourselves to 'make it happen' and that could be......to please others (not conflict with adjacent airspace or traffic, not to put a controller out, not to inconvenience pax with a go-round etc etc) or certainly there is some of our own ego involved, in our desire to succeed.

So, in addition to the requirement of recognizing a rapidly deteriorating situation, we need to be 'ok' with overshooting final, and flying off in the wrong direction! Tell ATC what is happening so they can avoid conflicts - but don't push the airplane beyond its limits!

It's much like screwing up an instrument approach; we often have said here to fly the missed, or ask for a vector if you need to. Same applies in vfr conditions, keep the wing flying - and then tell atc you need to try it again. Ain't no big deal!
 
I think somebody is in deep kimchi.

Read 11.3.1 on page 37 and 38. SIC wasn't even authorized to be PF.

https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/60000-60499/60373/611460.pdf
That’s a company limitation. Not one from the FAA. So if the captain was alive the company could discipline him for allowing the right seat guy to fly. Since he’s not my guess is this will just be a good example to the other crews why they should follow sop and not reinvent the wheel on the line.
 
That’s a company limitation. Not one from the FAA. So if the captain was alive the company could discipline him for allowing the right seat guy to fly. Since he’s not my guess is this will just be a good example to the other crews why they should follow sop and not reinvent the wheel on the line.

True. The Captain has already received all the punishment he can.
 
stirpot question of the day: would it be more accurate to say that, as it pertains to 91/135, this combination of employment pedigree, day to day cockpit conduct and revenue structure-derived dynamics is the norm, or the exception?

fwiw, my take is that just because more airplanes dont crash doesnt mean such a waterline couldnt be rampant. im also of the opinion that 5 dollars doesnt get my undivided attention, which is another way of saying that on a macro level, you get what you pay for.

and just before people get all umbraged, im not making a veiled endorsement of 121 by asking the question. im genuinely curious in an introspective answer from those who operate in this sector of revenue aviation.
Companies in the 91 & 135 environment have cultures just like airlines. Some are very professional and squared away, a few are like a pilots version of animal house most are a compromise somewhere in between with a bias towards professionalism and high standards. In my experience ....
 
The Captain was behind the aircraft before they boarded. He seemed to have no sense that this was a very short hop in very dense airspace. They really weren't jerked around at all by ATC, they just never became fully aware of the expected flight profile until they were deep in to the approach. Whew!
 
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The Captain was behind the aircraft before they boarded. He seemed to have no sense that this was a very short hop in very dense airspace. They really weren't jerked around at all by ATC, they just never became fully aware of the expected flight profile until they were deep in to the approach. Whew!
When you read his professional and training history it makes a little more sense.
 
"wow it's # bumpy as #"

I've seen this in just about every aviation video on YouTube. You don't have to say everything that comes to mind. It takes processing power to put those thoughts to speech. Use that energy to stay focused instead of blabbing everywhere.

Not to mention most of these comments are cringe-worthy. I saw a video yesterday of a guy doing IFR training in a Skyhawk. One of his comments "we're hauling ###". I had to turn it off I was so embarrassed. And I was alone.
 
A little reminiscent of the Colgan crash.
That's what I was thinking. Lots of similarities there.

Boy, that was rough. Pilots who treat the cockpit with so little care and neglect are asking for trouble.
 
The Captain was behind the aircraft before they boarded. He seemed to have no sense that this was a very short hop in very dense airspace. They really weren't jerked around at all by ATC, they just never became fully aware of the expected flight profile until they were deep in to the approach. Whew!
Agreed... I know he wasn't from the east coast, but how far apart did he think PHL and TEB were? Hell, you can drive there in the car in 2 hours. Since he didn't take on fuel in PHL, you'd think he'd have figured the distance.

Besides, he starts every transmission with "And..."
 
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Agreed... I know he wasn't from the east coast, but how far apart did he think PHL and TEB were? Hell, you can drive there in the car in 2 hours. Since he didn't take on fuel in PHL, you'd think he'd have figured the distance.

Yeah, I could see them filing for 15k maybe. In a Lear 35, that wouldn't take long to get up to and get back down from. But FL270?

Regardless, 4k is what you're gonna get on that route. Just the way it is. Anyone who's flown there knows that.
 
stirpot question of the day: would it be more accurate to say that, as it pertains to 91/135, this combination of employment pedigree, day to day cockpit conduct and revenue structure-derived dynamics is the norm, or the exception?

Not sure if I'd call it the norm, but it's definitely not uncommon. The thing I've always said about 91/135 flight departments is that the internal culture ends up being everything because there's not a lot of oversight otherwise. A 91/135 operation can have a full-on SMS program, can satisfy a Wyvern or ARG/US audit, IS-BAO, or whatever else - but none of it means squat if they don't actually *do* what they say they're gonna do. Unfortunately, I feel like a lot of 135 joints love to tout their safety culture and various certifications on the website, while doing nothing behind the scenes to promote the culture they're bragging about. So it all ends up falling on the capabilities and ADM of the crew, which you can get away with if you employ solid crews, or inviting disaster if you don't.

We have our share of marginal (or just plain dumbass) pilots in 121, but our dogged insistence of sticking to the SOPs and being 'standard' keeps just about all of them in the center of the lane. They have to cluster**** their way through many more layers in the 121 environment before it gets to be a genuine problem.

But you said it yourself - you get what you pay for. And with upward pressure on pay from the airline side, I think a lot of shadier 135 outfits aren't going to have the luxury of being too choosy when it comes to staffing their jets. Not everyone wants to be an airline pilot of course, but the better 91/135 operators are upping the ante to attract better pilots, leaving the shadier ones to hire whomever is left.
 
stirpot question of the day: would it be more accurate to say that, as it pertains to 91/135, this combination of employment pedigree, day to day cockpit conduct and revenue structure-derived dynamics is the norm, or the exception?

fwiw, my take is that just because more airplanes dont crash doesnt mean such a waterline couldnt be rampant. im also of the opinion that 5 dollars doesnt get my undivided attention, which is another way of saying that on a macro level, you get what you pay for.

and just before people get all umbraged, im not making a veiled endorsement of 121 by asking the question. im genuinely curious in an introspective answer from those who operate in this sector of revenue aviation.
It’s hit or miss. I haves worked for 135 outfits that have zero SOP’s (like this outfit), also places have have SOP’s but do not have any system of compliance (possibly like this joint), and upstanding places that you can’t tell the difference between them and a 121 carrier.

The thing is, you are pretty much guaranteed you wouldn’t have this mess in a 121 cockpit. Not impossible, but highly unlikely.
 
Ok people, put yourself in the captain's seat, what's done is done, you are there, so answers like "I would never get myself in this situation" won't fly. Let's say from 1 minute up to 5 minutes before the stall, what would you do differently?
 
Ok people, put yourself in the captain's seat, what's done is done, you are there, so answers like "I would never get myself in this situation" won't fly. Let's say from 1 minute up to 5 minutes before the stall, what would you do differently?

Tell ATC what is happening so they can avoid conflicts - but don't push the airplane beyond its limits!
Agreed. I pulled the radar plot the day this happened after hearing about it. There was no way (in my opinion) to safely circle the plane from the position they started the circle. They were too tight. They should have just told ATC and got vectored out for another more stabilized approach. I wouldn't have tried circling at that point in my 310 much less a LJ.
 
Ok people, put yourself in the captain's seat, what's done is done, you are there, so answers like "I would never get myself in this situation" won't fly. Let's say from 1 minute up to 5 minutes before the stall, what would you do differently?
Defecate myself and say that I've never flown anything faster than a cherokee. Thankyouferasking.

edit: can zone 5 be selected and depart the pattern vertically?
 
Ok people, put yourself in the captain's seat, what's done is done, you are there, so answers like "I would never get myself in this situation" won't fly. Let's say from 1 minute up to 5 minutes before the stall, what would you do differently?
I believe the Capt was at the controls for the stall, but not certain. Regardless, the FO asked to relinquish the controls twice(?) before the Capt took them. Even so, Capt should should have recognized incompetence when the FO couldn’t hold speed. That’s all still irrelevant if the Capt was at the controls BEFORE the stall.
I don’t know the Lear, but I am intimately familiar with Teterboro.
IMO the “tell all” if the situation is the lack of ability/training of the FO. Clearly the Capt wasn’t much better. SOP’s non existent (company issue).
Plus if the crew wasn’t ready they could have slowed it down by getting out of sequence (requesting vectors because they weren’t ready). That would have gummed everything up for certain, but possibly a different outcome.

But that still doesn’t answer your question. Point is to try and rectify the situation from a transcript... you’re a better man than I if you can do that. At minimum I would need an automated recreation. Maybe that’s not even enough.
 
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