Hawker 900XP on departure from Grand Junction, CO

It's not a test pilot function. It does require however of the proper knowledge to perform the test.
Ok I'll rephrase my sentence:
Maybe should be a requirement for manufacturers pilots to perform this test?
 
My point is people are dying doing this test.
Perhaps you should compare that to the number of people who perform that test and don't die?

Maybe should be a requirement for manufacturers test pilots to perform this test?
No. I think they simply need to follow the existing OEM recommendations and procedures which were not follow here and in the MI crash. You need to remember this is a fairly common flight check for Hawkers vs a one-off event.
 
Fewer, to be sure. Are they crashing because the LE isn't properly installed? There must be a way to measure it in situ, on the ground.
How many crashes would happen on return to service test flights: none… yay

How many crashes would occur on flights with passengers on board: more than none… boooo

Pick your poison.
 
My point is people are dying doing this test.
How many people are dying by not doing this test.

Maybe should be a requirement for manufacturers test pilots to perform this test?
The people dying now are making a choice to assume the risk. If that didn’t happen the risk would be imposed on an unsuspecting crew and passengers. Not ok.

As a professional pilot my highest obligation is to the safe operation of the aircraft to protect my self loading cargo.

Your proposal is unacceptable.
 
The people dying now are making a choice to assume the risk. If that didn’t happen the risk would be imposed on an unsuspecting crew and passengers. Not ok.

As a professional pilot my highest obligation is to the safe operation of the aircraft to protect my self loading cargo.

Your proposal is unacceptable.
My point is maybe the test is arbitrary. Some engineers thought it would enhance safety?
Maybe it does maybe it doesn’t.

Just like spin training is no longer required?
 
My point is maybe the test is arbitrary. Some engineers thought it would enhance safety?
Maybe it does maybe it doesn’t.

Just like spin training is no longer required?

How could verifying a stall warning system to be working correctly be considered "arbitrary'? The stall warning system is a part of the aircraft certification.
 
How many crashes would happen on return to service test flights: none… yay

How many crashes would occur on flights with passengers on board: more than none… boooo

Pick your poison.

Right. Crew dies on post-maintenance return to service test flight... so we just shouldn't do the test flight... ?

That argument is like a dog chasing its own tail. We do the test flight to ensure the aircraft is safe to operate. When the procedures are followed properly, the risk is low.

There's no future path that involves doing away with required post maintenance flight tasks, so we can safely discard that thought process.

We could (and should) take a closer look at the ADM that went into conducting the test flight under these circumstances, as well as pilot proficiency and pre-flight planning/preparation.
 
Ok you’re right. I’ll stay in my lane.
I suspect that you have an incorrect idea of what this test is doing, as I really don’t think you’re advocating that an airplane with an unannounced asymmetric stall at more than 10% above the speed at which the stall should occur is appropriate for day-to-day flight operations.
 
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I suspect that you have an incorrect idea of what this test is doing, as I really don’t think you’re advocating that an airplane with an unannounced asymmetric stall at more than 10% above the speed at which the stall should occur is appropriate for day-to-day flight operations.
I guess I thought removing a TKS leading edge and replacing it right back in the same position would have little effect. I have never heard of stall testing on installing TKS on piston singles hence I will refrain from commenting on jets.
 
We stall tested every Mooney we put TKS on at the factory, even just repairing or replacing some pieces. Yes, fractions of an inch matter on the leading edge. Air is funny that way.
 
I guess I thought removing a TKS leading edge and replacing it right back in the same position would have little effect. I have never heard of stall testing on installing TKS on piston singles hence I will refrain from commenting on jets.
Except its not just the TKS panel that gets affected. Due to the wing design, to remove the TKS panel requires removing the adjustable "stall strips" located near the leading edge. So the stall test is to ensure those stall strips have been reinstalled in the correct positions. This is something not applicable to any piston or turboprop aircraft I'm aware off to include most jets of this class. But keep in mind the Hawker was certified when the FAA CARs were still in effect so designs and maintenance requirements were different then.
 
We stall tested every Mooney we put TKS on at the factory, even just repairing or replacing some pieces. Yes, fractions of an inch matter on the leading edge. Air is funny that way.
That I was not aware.
 
When NWA upgraded our DC9s in the mid 90s hushkiting the engines and totally renewing and modifying the interiors the FAA required that all of them had to go through the same tests that they had to go through when they came out of the factory to be recertified. This flight test included taking the airplane into a fully developed stall. On several occasions the planes went into a fully developed spin and it took over 10,000 feet to recover. Fortunately the pilots selected to fly the tests were highly experienced. After the first couple of spins our pilots contacted the McDonald Douglas test pilots and were told that they had used an ultra sensitive slip skid indicator for their tests. Our guys got the company to acquire a few of these and they had no more spins.
 
As a .mil FCF pilot, upgrade instructor and FCF section chief for two very different performance envelope airframe series, the approach to this validation check is wholly unserious. The recovery attempts were equally predictable of a crew unqualified for the task at hand.

More interesting a topic to me however, is this hubristic handwave of this work as 'light work'. We don't use line pilots for this stuff, for good reason. If highlighting not everyone is qualified/cut out for this kind of work causes umbrage or a sense of inadequacy among a certain cohort of line pilots, put it on my tab. Do kindly remember, I'm not the one morting myself or my crew trying to prove a negative here.
 
My point is maybe the test is arbitrary. Some engineers thought it would enhance safety?
Maybe it does maybe it doesn’t.

Just like spin training is no longer required?
No. The return to service tests only occur after a maintenance procedure has disturbed the wing, specifically leading edges. The tests are required to validate the aerodynamic characteristics of the wing.
 
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Right. Crew dies on post-maintenance return to service test flight... so we just shouldn't do the test flight... ?

That argument is like a dog chasing its own tail. We do the test flight to ensure the aircraft is safe to operate. When the procedures are followed properly, the risk is low.

There's no future path that involves doing away with required post maintenance flight tasks, so we can safely discard that thought process.

We could (and should) take a closer look at the ADM that went into conducting the test flight under these circumstances, as well as pilot proficiency and pre-flight planning/preparation.
I fully agree. There is no doubt the test flights are necessary.
 
I fully agree. There is no doubt the test flights are necessary.
From the available information released so far, it seems the mishap crew undertook the testing in an unserious manner. There was a casualness that belied the importance of strict adherence to established procedures.

Some posters have failed to understand that same importance.
 
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From the available information released so far, it seems the mishap crew undertook the testing in an unserious manner. There was a casualness that belied the importance of strict adherence to established procedures.

Some posters have failed to understand that same importance.
I think so too. My exposure to these types of return to service flight checks has never been casual. Not even at the most budget “git er done” 135 companies I’ve worked. It baffles me how some think they are not necessary at all and others think it’s no big deal. Just stall the jet with potential unknown aerodynamic properties, because I’m a jet pilot. It’s all good. FFS
 
The NTSB makes recommendations (to the FAA). The FAA makes the rules - or doesn't. They regularly ignore NTSB recommendations for years, or forever.

What do people say when somebody sats something they’re not listening?
 
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What do people say when somebody sats something they’re not listening?
Usually nothing. Dont know if this link still works, but it should list all the open aviation safety recommendations in the CAROL database. There are also lists for train, marine, vehicle, etc recommendations that fall under the NSTB responsibilities.
 
Usually nothing. Dont know if this link still works, but it should list all the open aviation safety recommendations in the CAROL database. There are also lists for train, marine, vehicle, etc recommendations that fall under the NSTB responsibilities.

I guess the joke fell flat. Twice. I’m well aware the NTSB is viewed as the boy who cried wolf by the FAA and just about every other regulatory agency.
 
Usually nothing. Dont know if this link still works, but it should list all the open aviation safety recommendations in the CAROL database. There are also lists for train, marine, vehicle, etc recommendations that fall under the NSTB responsibilities.


Does the NTSB make these recommendations in thought of preventing the investigated accident or do they perform a complete risk assessment when making the recommendations?
 
The video details how shocking intentional disregard of the flight conditions required for the test led to the fatal outcome. It's that cut and dried.
 
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