G150 Runway Overrun, Chicago Executive

ADS-B data shows 146 kts ground speed crossing the threshold of 34 (L5), 139 kts at L3, and 128 kts at L2. 34 does have EMAS at both ends.

Reminds me of the Airplane movie gag, “flight 209, now arriving gate 8…gate 9…gate 10…
 
ADS-B data shows 146 kts ground speed crossing the threshold of 34 (L5), 139 kts at L3, and 128 kts at L2. 34 does have EMAS at both ends.
What's the normal landing speed for the plane?
Anyone has a METAR for the time of the accident?

Reminds me of the Airplane movie gag, “flight 209, now arriving gate 8…gate 9…gate 10…
:rofl: Always a classic.
My CFI did that to me when I messed-up the approach and landed long.
 
KPWK 031652Z 25009KT 10SM -RA OVC100 21/17 A2979 RMK AO2 SLP086 P0000 T02110167

Landed runway 34, which is 5000’ long

139 kts at L3, and 128 kts at L2.
Roughly 2350’ and 3500’ from the AER 34, respectively.
 
Read the headline w/o my glasses and thought it said C150!

Brain tilted since you can almost land a C150 on the width of a runway…

Glasses engaged, brain tilted solved….

Had to share.


Sent from my iPad using Tapatalk
 
Read the headline w/o my glasses and thought it said C150!

Brain tilted since you can almost land a C150 on the width of a runway…

Glasses engaged, brain tilted solved….

Had to share.


Sent from my iPad using Tapatalk
It's ok. I saw the incident onnthe local news last night and I still thought it said C150.

I thought they said there was some mechanical issue.
 
It's ok. I saw the incident onnthe local news last night and I still thought it said C150.

I thought they said there was some mechanical issue
I read that, but if they touched down a few thousand feet down the runway ... it's on them.
 
I read that, but if they touched down a few thousand feet down the runway ... it's on them.
Being honest, I was paying way more attention to the elk burger I was eating than the reporter. Just thought that's what they said. Didn't read anything else.
 
I thought they said there was some mechanical issue.
[sarcasm]Brakes failed due to the low coefficient of friction between tires and air? [/sarcasm]

Could easily have been, at least in part, a hydroplaning issue, which seems a lot like a brake failure in the moment.

And squat switches aren’t as happy to go into ground mode on slippery runways, either, so T/Rs could have been inop.
 
Info from LiveATC, KPWK tower:

Jet arrivals were flying the RNAV 30 circle 34

F2TH arrival immediately prior to G150 (Priester 192)

CL35 departure immediately prior to G150

Runway condition reported to F2TH and G150 as 5/5/5 100% wet

Last tower wind report prior to G150 landing 270 10G18

After overrun, tower called Priester 192 at least 5 times with no response

In response to inaudible query, tower stated G150 touched down on 34 in the vicinity of K3 (opposite L3).
 
Info from LiveATC, KPWK tower:

Jet arrivals were flying the RNAV 30 circle 34

F2TH arrival immediately prior to G150 (Priester 192)

CL35 departure immediately prior to G150

Runway condition reported to F2TH and G150 as 5/5/5 100% wet

Last tower wind report prior to G150 landing 270 10G18

After overrun, tower called Priester 192 at least 5 times with no response

In response to inaudible query, tower stated G150 touched down on 34 in the vicinity of K3 (opposite L3).
So almost halfway down the runway. 2650’ runway remaining from L3/K3
 
That is a very tough landing as the approach mandates staying within 1/2 mile to not enter the OHare B. It's a tight turn so he elected to carry airspeed.
 
That is a very tough landing as the approach mandates staying within 1/2 mile to not enter the OHare B. It's a tight turn so he elected to carry airspeed.
The ORD bravo surface area is over 2nm from the AER rwy 34 and the shelf is good up to 3000 over the field and 2500 elsewhere nearby. I don’t see any notes on the RNAV 30 approach that specify 1/2 mile radius for circling to runway 34. Is this something that is specifically requested by ATC?
 
He mixed-up the brake and gas pedals.
Hmm. Maybe the EMAS did bring him to a stop and then he stepped on the gas and went through the fence. I cannot see how any mention of EMAS even belonged in the article in the first place. I am sofa king confused.

EDIT: Ok, I bit the bullet and read it through. The EMAS probably did slow it down some
 
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That is a very tough landing as the approach mandates staying within 1/2 mile to not enter the OHare B. It's a tight turn so he elected to carry airspeed.
I can’t seem to copy and paste the picture, but if you look up the actual flight track, he wasn’t making any kind of a tight turn that required the excess airspeed.
 
That is a very tough landing as the approach mandates staying within 1/2 mile to not enter the OHare B. It's a tight turn so he elected to carry airspeed.
If he was IFR, why would that matter?
 
NTSB Aviation Investigation Preliminary Report - N1927G

For the return flight to PWK, the pilot monitoring (PM), who was also a company check airman, was in the right seat. The copilot was the pilot flying (PF) in the left seat, and this was to be his first landing in the G150.

A review of the FAA ADS-B data and airport surveillance videos revealed that about 2,100 ft down the runway, the airplane porpoised, then landed about 2,800 ft down the runway. From the touchdown point, there was about 2,200 ft of runway remaining. As the airplane continued down the runway, the video showed the thrust reversers deployed, and the air brakes were stowed.

A preliminary review of the CVR and FDR data revealed that the pilot received the PWK weather about 30 mins before landing and at that time they did not discuss landing speeds, landing zone, or touchdown points. They stated that Vref would be 119 knots and there was no discussion about adding 10 knots for the gusting wind. About 1,000 ft above ground level the PF asked for gear down and the before landing checklist to be completed. The PM told the PF that they needed to slow down for the gear extension, but there was no before landing checklist completed after that. There was no discussion about the air brakes and the FDR data confirmed that the air brakes were not deployed. [The G150 Before Landing checklist contains the item: GROUND A/B Switch - LAND]

A preliminary landing performance calculation was completed based on the accident conditions and airplane’s weight. The wet runway condition minimum landing distance was determined to be 3,600 ft, and the dry condition minimum landing distance was determined to be 2,539 ft. The Vref for the accident conditions should have been 129 knots, with a 10 knot factor for gusting wind (Vref 119 knots + 10).
 
One would think the check airman would be all over this on final, new pilot & all.

I could revert all the way back to the LSO on the aircraft carrier, they could ‘almost’ fly your plane aboard through constant call corrections on the radio.
 
NTSB Aviation Investigation Preliminary Report - N1927G

For the return flight to PWK, the pilot monitoring (PM), who was also a company check airman, was in the right seat. The copilot was the pilot flying (PF) in the left seat, and this was to be his first landing in the G150.

A review of the FAA ADS-B data and airport surveillance videos revealed that about 2,100 ft down the runway, the airplane porpoised, then landed about 2,800 ft down the runway. From the touchdown point, there was about 2,200 ft of runway remaining. As the airplane continued down the runway, the video showed the thrust reversers deployed, and the air brakes were stowed.

A preliminary review of the CVR and FDR data revealed that the pilot received the PWK weather about 30 mins before landing and at that time they did not discuss landing speeds, landing zone, or touchdown points. They stated that Vref would be 119 knots and there was no discussion about adding 10 knots for the gusting wind. About 1,000 ft above ground level the PF asked for gear down and the before landing checklist to be completed. The PM told the PF that they needed to slow down for the gear extension, but there was no before landing checklist completed after that. There was no discussion about the air brakes and the FDR data confirmed that the air brakes were not deployed. [The G150 Before Landing checklist contains the item: GROUND A/B Switch - LAND]

A preliminary landing performance calculation was completed based on the accident conditions and airplane’s weight. The wet runway condition minimum landing distance was determined to be 3,600 ft, and the dry condition minimum landing distance was determined to be 2,539 ft. The Vref for the accident conditions should have been 129 knots, with a 10 knot factor for gusting wind (Vref 119 knots + 10).
The one checkride I refused to take in my career was with a check airman who didn’t use checklists or follow SOPs.
 
Thanks all. They removed ILS 34 (of which I was not aware) whcih had the tight turn!
 
If he was IFR, why would that matter?
Not sure about present day, but some years back the protocol was to do the approach to 16, then cancel IFR and make a VFR pattern to 34.
It was actually on the ATIS.
Again, not sure if they still use that procedure.

If you refused this procedure they would threaten you with an hour of holding.
 
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