F16 vs Cessna 150 collision

Really? Do you want to actually quote from the accident report or are you just inventing stuff?
Were you privy to the AIB/SIB reports?
He was known as an extremely knowledgeable and precise aviator.
I'm not going to say too much because of releasability issues, but going by the board reports, I would say Faulty Tower's assessment is closer than yours.
 
Were you privy to the AIB/SIB reports?I'm not going to say too much because of releasability issues, but going by the board reports, I would say Faulty Tower's assessment is closer than yours.
I quoted straight from the Air Force report, so uh no.
 
Have never read the C-17 report, know nothing more than what was on the news at the time. However, assuming "extremely knowledgeable and precise aviator" was a direct quote, that original statement could mean various things depending on the context. I believe the guy behind the controls of the Fairchild B-52 mishap was widely known to be "extremely knowledgeable and precise" as well, however, severely lacking in other very important traits of a professional. Not saying the C-17 crew was any of this (again, haven't read the report), but that statement alone doesn't tell me much about the guy in question.
 
Actually, the transponder on the Embraer was off. And ATC was totally negligent/reckless in that case. The point is that with nearly all collisions, someone somewhere is negligent.

I recall that one...they had both planes flying opposite directions at the same altitude. The winglet on the Embraer basically sliced off a chunk of the 737s wing. The Brazilian's were trying to blame the Embraer's pilots (Americans), but in actuality, they were just flying according to the clearance that they were given by Brazilian ATC.
 
I recall that one...they had both planes flying opposite directions at the same altitude. The winglet on the Embraer basically sliced off a chunk of the 737s wing. The Brazilian's were trying to blame the Embraer's pilots (Americans), but in actuality, they were just flying according to the clearance that they were given by Brazilian ATC.
Correct, but that didn't stop Brazilian courts from convicting the Embraer pilots in absentia. The only thing the Embraer pilots did is that they had the transponder off for some reason (and therefore the TCAS on both planes didn't work), but ATC never brought that to their attention.

I doubt you'd get a US jury to agree that this constituted criminal negligence on the part of the pilots, but the laws in Brazil might be different and even here, given the loss of lives, it's possible you'd get a conviction. Civil negligence, probably. But no doubt ATC was way more at fault.
 
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Correct, but that didn't stop Brazilian courts from convicting the Embraer pilots in absentia. The only thing the Embraer pilots did is that they had the transponder off for some reason (and therefore the TCAS on both planes didn't work), but ATC never brought that to their attention.

I doubt you'd get a US jury to agree that this constituted criminal negligence on the part of the pilots, but the laws in Brazil might be different and even here, given the loss of lives, it's possible you'd get a conviction. Civil negligence, probably. But no doubt ATC was way more at fault.
The footrest the captain used was next to the transponder. He put his foot up and accidently clicked it off. The faa released a warning statement about not using it due to the possibility of that happening again.

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The footrest the captain used was next to the transponder. He put his foot up and accidently clicked it off. The faa released a warning statement about not using it due to the possibility of that happening again.

Sent from my LGLS991 using Tapatalk
Thanks. Sounds like a bad design. Surprised there wasn't a noticeable FMC or EFIS message though. Hope Embraer fixed that.
 
Do you seriously think the airplane should only ever leave the ground if the intent is to release ordnance, or are you simply trolling?

One minute its train like you fight, the next...???
Again, what good is a fighter aircraft that's only use is transportation for one?

Before you answer, yes there is value in BFM and handling practice.
 
He was on an instrument proficiency sortie. The radar is not needed to fly an instrument proficiency sortie.

In the F-111 we could do a lot of training without the attack radar, pavetack system, TFRs, ECM etc. We could not take off without a operational TACAN receiver. A significant part of currency training in tactical fighters has nothing to do with weapons employment. An F-16 is an airplane and a F-16 pilot has a number of sorties dedicated to basic and advanced aircraft handling and instrument proficiency.

Thank you for explanation.
 
Thanks. Sounds like a bad design. Surprised there wasn't a noticeable FMC or EFIS message though. Hope Embraer fixed that.
Probably not. They probably spun it to "look how strong our planes are. They sirvivee midair collisions and keep flying to their destination". Not a bad marketing thing. Still a shame that so many people had to die due to poor design.

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I quoted straight from the Air Force report, so uh no.
You took one out of context quote out of a 41 page Executive Summary. The rest of the report is pretty damning if you ask me.

It can be found online with some creative searching. And I believe the Executive Summary is releasable, so I'm not too concerned that it's online.
 
You took one out of context quote out of a 41 page Executive Summary. The rest of the report is pretty damning if you ask me.

It can be found online with some creative searching. And I believe the Executive Summary is releasable, so I'm not too concerned that it's online.
The executive summary is a single page. The entire report is the 41 pages. Something that is 41 pages is, by definition, not an executive summary.
 
The executive summary is a single page. The entire report is the 41 pages. Something that is 41 pages is, by definition, not an executive summary.
You are correct. I saw the Executive Summary title on page 2 and the fact that there were no tabs, and assumed incorrectly.

Either way, here's a link to the entire report:

http://usaf.aib.law.af.mil/ExecSum2010/C-17A_Elmendorf_28 Jul 10.pdf

You can tell me if you think your assessment of the MPs airmanship jives with the entirety of the report.
 
The AF came and talked to our flight school about see and avoid practices. During the talk they showed us a few accident reports that they helped to produce

The bird strike crash in AK was right up there with freak accident.
 
You are correct. I saw the Executive Summary title on page 2 and the fact that there were no tabs, and assumed incorrectly.

Either way, here's a link to the entire report:

http://usaf.aib.law.af.mil/ExecSum2010/C-17A_Elmendorf_28 Jul 10.pdf

You can tell me if you think your assessment of the MPs airmanship jives with the entirety of the report.
Thanks for posting the report.

This is the section I was previously referring to:
(3) PC206 Overconfidence
Overconfidence is a factor when the individual overvalues or overestimates personal capability, the capability of others or the capability of aircraft/vehicles or equipment and this creates an unsafe situation.
During simulator training, the MP taught stall warnings were an “anomaly.” The warnings were considered inaccurate and transitory due to aggressive aerial demonstration maneuvers. The MP “was not concerned” about stalling in the profile. The MP also believed these warnings would cease at completion of the turns and not adversely affect the aircraft. (Tab V-205, V-207) He flew numerous aerial demonstrations in the aircraft with the stall warnings active and without incident. (Tabs V-55, V-68, V-71, V-97, V-188, V-277, EE-9 through EE- 12) The MP’s overconfidence in both his abilities and the C-17 capabilities led to the stall.

Although my memory is hardly perfect, considering the last time I saw the report was when it came out a few years ago, I'd say my statement was not that far off base. The investigation identified the MP had previously shown that he was overconfident in his abilities and the aircraft.
 
Interesting that a "preflight" inspection is good for 72hrs even through multiple crews and sorties.
Yeah, "Preflight" is a little bit of a misnomer in AF maintenance jargon. A maintenance "Preflight" is a little more in depth inspection, like you said, good for 72 hours (generally). Between each flight, maintenance will do a "Thru Flight" to make sure the aircraft is ready for the next sortie.

Aircrew will do their preflight each time they get ready to fly. If the crew is just doing a quick turn, there will be an abbreviated "Thru Flight" that they will do to just check flight critical items.

This mishap crew was doing an Engine Running Crew Change (ERCC), where a new crew will take an airplane from another crew who just landed. In that case, there's an even more abbreviated checklist for the oncoming ERCC crew.
 
I heard about this but thought someone was just pulling my tail. I know mid airs happen but never heard of one between a military jet and a 150
 
I heard about this but thought someone was just pulling my tail. I know mid airs happen but never heard of one between a military jet and a 150
I remember hearing (back in the 80s, I think, in APPROACH magazine) of a collision between a Navy jet trainer (Pinto, I think) and a 150. Both planes landed safely. The 150 had a tire skid mark on its upper fuselage, and the jet had a scuffed nosewheel.

Nauga, any recollection?

Ron Wanttaja
 
You are correct. I saw the Executive Summary title on page 2 and the fact that there were no tabs, and assumed incorrectly.

Either way, here's a link to the entire report:

http://usaf.aib.law.af.mil/ExecSum2010/C-17A_Elmendorf_28 Jul 10.pdf

You can tell me if you think your assessment of the MPs airmanship jives with the entirety of the report.
It has nothing to do with my assessment. I quoted the report. You can be knowledgeable and precise and still be overconfident, and still make mistakes.

"The MP had a reputation in both squadrons of being an extremely precise and knowledgeable aviator. His extensive experience as a simulator instructor and his 3,251 total C-17 hours garnered him the utmost respect from squadron leadership and his peers. "

"Because he was an accomplished aviator..."
 
I heard about this but thought someone was just pulling my tail. I know mid airs happen but never heard of one between a military jet and a 150

There was another one a decade or so ago where a flight of 2 F-16's got lost, got in the wrong airspace, and the wingman hit and downed a C-172. It happened in Florida.
 
I bought a Citabria from the estate of a pilot who had been killed in a collision with a military jet in FL in the mid-1970's. I believe it was over or near Lake Okeechobee.

I'll see if I can find a link.
 
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Seventeen months after Colgan 3407 and the same thing happened:
"...the MP moved the control stick full left, applied left rudder, but maintained constant control stick pressure."
The crew did all the preflight hoopla in vogue these days, risk assessment briefings, etc., but still effed up. Maybe they should simply be graded on Stick and Rudder before they get their wings? :dunno:

dtuuri
 
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Quite a few near misses on the you tubes...

 
ATC told the F-16 to turn south to 180°, which he did. And he impacted the Cessna while on that vector.
 
ATC told the F-16 to turn south to 180°, which he did. And he impacted the Cessna while on that vector.

After 26 seconds, and he descended 100' below his altitude restriction from 6000' in that time. He's toast.
 
I'll copy and paste since the NTSB site seems to be unreliable.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

On July 7, 2015, at 1100 eastern daylight time, a Cessna 150M, N3601V, and a Lockheed-Martin F-16CM, operated by the U.S. Air Force (USAF), collided in midair near Moncks Corner, South Carolina. The Cessna was destroyed during the collision, and both the private pilot and passenger were fatally injured. The damaged F-16 continued to fly for an additional 3 minutes until the pilot activated the airplane's ejection system. The F-16 was destroyed following the subsequent collision with terrain and post-impact fire, while the pilot landed safely and was uninjured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the Cessna, while the F-16 was operating on an instrument flight rules flight plan. The Cessna departed from Berkley County Airport (MKS), Moncks Corner, South Carolina, at 1057, and was destined for Grand Strand Airport (CRE), North Myrtle Beach, South Carolina; the personal flight was conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. The F-16 had departed from Shaw Air Force Base (SSC), Sumter, South Carolina about 1020.

According to the USAF, after departing from SSC, the F-16 proceeded to Myrtle Beach International Airport (MYR), Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, where the pilot conducted two practice instrument approaches before continuing the flight to Charleston Air Force Base/International Airport (CHS), Charleston, South Carolina. According to preliminary air traffic control (ATC) radar and voice communication data provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the F-16 pilot contacted the approach controller at CHS about 1052 and requested to perform a practice tactical air navigation system (TACAN) instrument approach to runway 15. The controller subsequently instructed the F-16 pilot to fly a heading of 260 degrees to intercept the final approach course. At 1055, the controller instructed the F-16 pilot to descend from his present altitude of 6,000 feet to 1,600 feet. About that time, the F-16 was located about 34 nautical miles northeast of CHS.

At 1057:41, a radar target displaying a visual flight rules transponder code of 1200, and later correlated to be the accident Cessna, appeared in the vicinity of the departure end of runway 23 at MKS, at an indicated altitude of 200 feet. The Cessna continued its climb, and began tracking generally southeast over the next 3 minutes. For the duration of its flight, the pilot of the Cessna did not contact CHS approach control, nor was he required to do so. At 1100:18, the controller advised the pilot of the F-16, "traffic 12 o'clock, 2 miles, opposite direction, 1,200 [feet altitude] indicated, type unknown." The F-16 pilot responded and advised the controller that he was "looking" for the traffic. At 1100:26, the controller advised the F-16 pilot, "turn left heading 180 if you don't have that traffic in sight." The pilot responded by asking, "confirm 2 miles?" Eight seconds later, the controller stated, "if you don't have that traffic in sight turn left heading 180 immediately." Over the next 18 seconds, the track of the F-16 began turning southerly.

At 1100:49, the radar target of the F-16 was located 1/2 nautical mile northeast of the Cessna, at an indicated altitude of 1,500 feet, and was on an approximate track of 215 degrees. At that time, the Cessna reported an indicated altitude of 1,400 feet, and was established on an approximate track of 110 degrees. At 1100:52 the controller advised the F-16 pilot, "traffic passing below you 1,400 feet." At 1100:54, the radar reported altitude of the F-16 remained at 1,500 feet and no valid altitude information was returned for the radar target associated with the Cessna. At that point the targets were laterally separated by about 1,000 feet. No further radar targets were received from the Cessna, and the next radar target for the F-16 was not received until 1101:13. At 1101:19, the F-16 pilot transmitted a distress call, and no subsequent transmissions were received. Air traffic control radar continued to track the F-16 as it proceeded on a roughly southerly track, and after descending to an indicated altitude of 300 feet, radar contact was lost at 1103:17 in the vicinity of the F-16 crash site.

The wreckage of the Cessna was recovered in the vicinity of its last observed radar target, over the west branch of the Cooper River. Components from both airplanes were spread over an area to the north and west of that point, extending for approximately 1,200 feet. The largest portions of the Cessna's airframe included a relatively intact portion of the fuselage aft of the main landing gear, and the separate left and right wings, all of which were within 500 feet northwest of the airplane's final radar-observed position. Portions of the cabin interior, instrument panel, fuel system, and engine firewall were found distributed throughout the site. The engine, propeller, and nose landing gear assembly were not recovered. The lower aft engine cowling of the F-16 was also recovered in the immediate vicinity of the Cessna's aft fuselage, while the F-16's engine augmenter was recovered about 1,500 feet southwest. Small pieces of the F-16's airframe were also distributed throughout the accident site.

Both of the Cessna's wings displayed uniform leading edge crush damage throughout their spans that was oriented aft and upward. Paint transfer and rub markings oriented in a direction from the airplane's left to right were observed on the upper forward surfaces of both wings. Both fuel tanks were ruptured, and evidence of heat damage and paint blistering were observed on the upper surface of the right wing. Flight control continuity was traced through overload-type cable separations from the cabin area to each flight control surface. Measurement of the pitch trim actuator showed a position consistent with a 3 to 4-degree deflection of the tab in the nose down direction, and measurement of the flap actuator showed a position consistent with the flaps having been in the retracted position.

The F-16 wreckage site was located about 6 nautical miles south of the Cessna wreckage site. The F-16 wreckage path was about 700 feet long and oriented roughly 215 degrees, with portions of the airframe distributed along the wreckage path. The wreckage displayed significant ground impact and post-impact fire-related damage. A crash-survivable memory unit (CSMU) was recovered from the wreckage, and the digital flight control system seat data recorder (DFLCS SDR) was recovered from the airplane's ejection seat. Both memory units were forwarded to the airframe manufacturer for data extraction under the supervision of an NTSB Vehicle Recorder Specialist.

The weather conditions reported at MKS at 1055 included calm winds, 10 statute miles visibility, scattered clouds at 2,600 feet agl, a temperature of 30 degrees C, a dew point of 22 degrees C, and an altimeter setting of 30.15 inches of mercury
 
After 26 seconds, and he descended 100' below his altitude restriction from 6000' in that time. He's toast.
Well actually that was just indicated altitude. 100 ft is not far off (especially since ATC returns only return in hundreds of feet), could easily be caused by simple pressure altitude error on any side. ATC should have given more aggressive instruction to the F16 to climb. The Cessna was obviously climbing and the ATC instruction seemed as though the Cessna would remain at 1400 -- that wasn't the case. On the other hand, not sure why it would take so long for the F16 pilot to turn from 260 to 180 -- says over the next 18 seconds, the F16 "began" to turn in a southerly direction.
 
Well actually that was just indicated altitude. 100 ft is not far off (especially since ATC returns only return in hundreds of feet), could easily be caused by simple pressure altitude error on any side. ATC should have given more aggressive instruction to the F16 to climb. The Cessna was obviously climbing and the ATC instruction seemed as though the Cessna would remain at 1400 -- that wasn't the case. On the other hand, not sure why it would take so long for the F16 pilot to turn from 260 to 180 -- says over the next 18 seconds, the F16 "began" to turn in a southerly direction.

Man, I agree.......not at all trying to say ATC is to blame, but a "climbing through one thousand four hundred" might have put some urgency in the transmission. But I don't think the comms per the report were ambiguous......"if traffic not in sight, immediate turn 180" sounds like a pretty time sensitive and urgent call.
 
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