Amelia Earhart's long-lost plane likely located

1. The Timeline of the "Drinking" Rumor
The rumor did not exist in public records during Noonan's lifetime. Noonan was celebrated as one of the finest celestial navigators in the world, responsible for pioneering and mapping Pan Am’s transpacific China Clipper routes. [1, 2]
The widespread story of his alcoholism did not appear in print until 1966, nearly 30 years after his disappearance, with the publication of The Search for Amelia Earhart by Frederick Goerner. Goerner’s claims reportedly relied on an alleged 1937 police report that has never been found. Later biographers repeated the claim, with some sensationalized accounts alleging Noonan had to be "poured" onto the plane or dragged out of whorehouses in Manila—claims that are completely without documentary support
Yet, they ended up lost.
 
What, and miss out on a $900k island jaunt funded with other people’s money?

nah, they could have done what other "researchers" do, at the end of the "research" show justification why more "research" is called for...
 
nah, they could have done what other "researchers" do, at the end of the "research" show justification why more "research" is called for...
Well, we didn't find it so of course we have to keep looking! Next time for sure...
 
Like Nungesser and Coli. Both men, both famous pilots, Coli had fame as a navigator, both lost crossing a smaller ocean.

Ron Wanttaja
I got lost today (flying a different airplane than usual). Didn't have a slaved directional. Doh! Luckily there were three TFRs in the vicinity, so I'd have escorts if I really got lost.
 
1. The Timeline of the "Drinking" Rumor
The rumor did not exist in public records during Noonan's lifetime. Noonan was celebrated as one of the finest celestial navigators in the world, responsible for pioneering and mapping Pan Am’s transpacific China Clipper routes. [1, 2]
The widespread story of his alcoholism did not appear in print until 1966, nearly 30 years after his disappearance, with the publication of The Search for Amelia Earhart by Frederick Goerner. Goerner’s claims reportedly relied on an alleged 1937 police report that has never been found. Later biographers repeated the claim, with some sensationalized accounts alleging Noonan had to be "poured" onto the plane or dragged out of whorehouses in Manila—claims that are completely without documentary support
Yeah, that story about him is all lies to blameshift for this disaster from Earhart. You know, because she's a hero.

Kinda like blaming the F14A Tomcat instead of Hultgreen.
 
instead of this big expedition why didn’t they fly a plane over that area and take some low level pictures first. That would have to be much cheaper.

Because the last time a plane flew over the exactly correct spot, it disappeared. Obviously too risky.
 
Reminds me of a certain present-day YouTube pilot who has been more interested in fame and money raising than paying attention to the requirements of safe flight.
You must be referring to the epaulettes wearing/lanyard and hard card sporting/self identifying Captain and expert with the purposely misspelled first name.
 
You must be referring to the epaulettes wearing/lanyard and hard card sporting/self identifying Captain and expert with the purposely misspelled first name.
Who is an actual retired ATP and flight engineer, with big iron type ratings. I think his problem (or is it a feature) is that he "dumbs down" stuff; perhaps better for a larger audience.
 
Who is an actual retired ATP and flight engineer, with big iron type ratings. I think his problem (or is it a feature) is that he "dumbs down" stuff; perhaps better for a larger audience.
Are you familiar with the appeal to authority fallacy?

An appeal to authority becomes a logical fallacy when any of the following occur:

• Irrelevant Expertise: Citing someone who is famous or knowledgeable in one field to prove a point in an unrelated field (e.g., quoting a physicist about macroeconomics).

• Out of Domain: Using a legitimate expert who is speaking outside of their specific discipline.

• Bias or Conflict of Interest: Relying on an expert who has a financial stake, paid endorsement, or personal bias regarding the claim.


I'll break it down.

1.) Irrelevant Expertise: He can fly big airplanes, but I doubt he has documented experience in crash investigation. I can pontificate on why airplanes hit the ground too, using the same media reports and NTSB releases he does, and arrive at the same conclusions.

2.) Out of Domain: See #1 above.

3.) Bias or Conflict of Interest: He uses his presumed position of authority to make money from clicks and views.
 
I'd never heard of Nungesser, that was interesting. But my guess would be maybe not navigation error compared to mechanical or simply running out of fuel. I say that because getting to the destination of "North America" from France requires quite a bit less precision than finding to a 2x1 mile island in the Pacific.
 
I'd never heard of Nungesser, that was interesting. But my guess would be maybe not navigation error compared to mechanical or simply running out of fuel. I say that because getting to the destination of "North America" from France requires quite a bit less precision than finding to a 2x1 mile island in the Pacific.
We have nothing to exclude believing that Earhart simply ran out of fuel, either. Maybe even had been a mechanical issue...maybe Noonan had dropped his sextant.

Finding a 2x1 mile in the Pacific is obviously a harder job than hitting North America. But looking at a Mercator projection is deceptive. Here's the approximate great-circle route between New York and Paris....
1792709479719.png
When you're flying from Paris to New York, the North American continent looks like a big 'ol barrier, hard to miss. But the great circle route shows it differently. An unexpected wind from the north, a bit of compass error to the south, and the destination shore is trending away from you.

Lindbergh, on the other hand, flew from New York to Paris. In that direction, Europe is a huge barrier in the way...much harder to miss.

And if we're going to inject personalities in here...Nungesser was always a bit of a wild man, and he was a last-minute replacement. Why does Fred Noonan get (apparently unfairly) blamed for being an alcoholic, while Nugesser (known for showing up to fly wartime missions in a tuxedo because he'd been partying so late) get a pass?

Ron Wanttaja
 
When you're flying from Paris to New York, the North American continent looks like a big 'ol barrier, hard to miss. But the great circle route shows it differently. An unexpected wind from the north, a bit of compass error to the south, and the destination shore is trending away from you.

Nungesser may well have reached North America only to go down in the north Canadian wilderness. The north woods have swallowed a lot of planes.
 
Mostly because she was doing what her mentor had told her not to do.
Or
The Official U.S. Army Air Corps Crash Report from the Luke Field disaster includes the highly illuminating, verbatim statements of the military ground crews who serviced the aircraft. [1]
When investigators dug into why the aircraft failed to track straight and why the right landing gear sheared off so abruptly, the testimony of the Hawaiian Air Depot mechanics exposed the exact operational error regarding the pneumatic oleo struts.

The Testimony of Staff Sergeant Frank McKee
Staff Sergeant Frank McKee was one of the lead mechanics assigned to inspect the Electra's fueling and landing gear alignment. During his testimony before the official Army Investigative Board, McKee recounted the pre-flight check when they noticed the heavy list to the right:
  • The Unlevel Discovery: McKee confirmed that with a full load of fuel, the right wingtip was significantly closer to the ground than the left. He testified that the right oleo strut was severely compressed under the tremendous fuel payload.
  • The Erroneous Action: Under pressure to prepare the plane quickly for its historic departure, the crew sought the fastest cosmetic solution. McKee admitted under oath that rather than hoisting the heavily laden aircraft to inject hydraulic fluid and pump high-pressure air back into the collapsed right strut, the crew took the shortcut: they opened the air valve on the high left strut.
  • The Admission: McKee testified that they bled air out of the left strut until the fuselage sat visually level to the eye, actively acknowledging that they were lowering the total system pressure to make the plane look visually balance-correct on the tarmac.

The Core Findings of the Investigative Board
The U.S. Army Board of Officers used this mechanical testimony to map out exactly how the structural physics failed Amelia Earhart on her takeoff roll:
  1. "Bottomed Out" Volatility: The board's engineering assessment concluded that by deflating the left strut to match the damaged right one, the mechanics left both shock absorbers entirely "bottomed out." The internal pistons were already resting hard against the mechanical bottom limits of their travel before the takeoff roll even commenced.
  2. No Structural Buffer: Without any pneumatic air pocket left to compress, the suspension could not act as a shock absorber. When the Electra reached high speed on the runway, any minute ripple, runway seam, or minor puddle sent raw, un-cushioned kinetic energy directly into the rigid metal of the landing gear forks.
  3. The Mechanical Snap: As soon as Earhart made a necessary, high-speed steering correction to stabilize the plane's tracking, the tremendous lateral (sideways) load slammed into a right landing gear assembly that had absolutely zero dynamic "give" or suspension cushion left. The metal instantly reached its ultimate yield strength and snapped at the fork connection. [1]

The official testimony firmly solidified that what appeared to the public as a simple "blown tire" or an "unfortunate overcorrection" was actually a catastrophic structural failure guaranteed the moment the air pressure was bled out of those struts on the hangar floor. [1]
 
Or
The Official U.S. Army Air Corps Crash Report from the Luke Field disaster includes the highly illuminating, verbatim statements of the military ground crews who serviced the aircraft. [1]
When investigators dug into why the aircraft failed to track straight and why the right landing gear sheared off so abruptly, the testimony of the Hawaiian Air Depot mechanics exposed the exact operational error regarding the pneumatic oleo struts.

The Testimony of Staff Sergeant Frank McKee
Staff Sergeant Frank McKee was one of the lead mechanics assigned to inspect the Electra's fueling and landing gear alignment. During his testimony before the official Army Investigative Board, McKee recounted the pre-flight check when they noticed the heavy list to the right:
  • The Unlevel Discovery: McKee confirmed that with a full load of fuel, the right wingtip was significantly closer to the ground than the left. He testified that the right oleo strut was severely compressed under the tremendous fuel payload.
  • The Erroneous Action: Under pressure to prepare the plane quickly for its historic departure, the crew sought the fastest cosmetic solution. McKee admitted under oath that rather than hoisting the heavily laden aircraft to inject hydraulic fluid and pump high-pressure air back into the collapsed right strut, the crew took the shortcut: they opened the air valve on the high left strut.
  • The Admission: McKee testified that they bled air out of the left strut until the fuselage sat visually level to the eye, actively acknowledging that they were lowering the total system pressure to make the plane look visually balance-correct on the tarmac.

The Core Findings of the Investigative Board
The U.S. Army Board of Officers used this mechanical testimony to map out exactly how the structural physics failed Amelia Earhart on her takeoff roll:
  1. "Bottomed Out" Volatility: The board's engineering assessment concluded that by deflating the left strut to match the damaged right one, the mechanics left both shock absorbers entirely "bottomed out." The internal pistons were already resting hard against the mechanical bottom limits of their travel before the takeoff roll even commenced.
  2. No Structural Buffer: Without any pneumatic air pocket left to compress, the suspension could not act as a shock absorber. When the Electra reached high speed on the runway, any minute ripple, runway seam, or minor puddle sent raw, un-cushioned kinetic energy directly into the rigid metal of the landing gear forks.
  3. The Mechanical Snap: As soon as Earhart made a necessary, high-speed steering correction to stabilize the plane's tracking, the tremendous lateral (sideways) load slammed into a right landing gear assembly that had absolutely zero dynamic "give" or suspension cushion left. The metal instantly reached its ultimate yield strength and snapped at the fork connection. [1]
The official testimony firmly solidified that what appeared to the public as a simple "blown tire" or an "unfortunate overcorrection" was actually a catastrophic structural failure guaranteed the moment the air pressure was bled out of those struts on the hangar floor. [1]
Followed up with
When the severely damaged Lockheed Electra 10E (NR16020) was crated and shipped via the SS Lurline back from Hawaii, Kelly Johnson and the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation team treated the rebuild as a vital engineering diagnostic session. They realized that the standard airliner landing gear was wholly inadequate for an aircraft being flown at roughly 17,000 lbs—65% over its original 10,500 lb design limit. [1, 2]
During the extensive April–May 1937 factory rebuild in Burbank, the team implemented several critical metallurgical and structural re-engineering steps:

1. Structural X-Ray Profiling
Before altering the design, Lockheed brought in engineers Tom Triplett and Victor Barton to use industrial X-ray equipment. They scanned the main landing gear attachment points, wing center section, and aluminum fuselage skin for hidden microscopic stress fractures. This marked one of the earliest uses of non-destructive X-ray testing on a civilian aircraft to understand exactly where the metal had fatigued under the intense lateral forces of the Hawaii ground loop. [1]

2. Heavy-Duty Heavy-Gross Castings
The standard Electra used a "worm gear" retraction mechanism that operated much like a heavy concrete mixer drive—inherently bulky but prone to immense stress at high weights. Lockheed replaced the standard landing gear trusses and knuckles with heavy-duty structural castings designed for higher yield strengths. They beefed up the weld clusters and trunnions where the landing gear attached to the main wing spars to ensure that future ground stress would be distributed deeper into the center section of the aircraft rather than snapping a single bottleneck component. [1]

3. Re-valved and Extended Oleo Struts
Recognizing the exact issue you pointed out—that a lack of oleo travel under full compression left zero margin for error—the hydraulic shock struts were entirely rebuilt. Lockheed engineers:
  • Tightened the internal tolerances and replaced the fluid seals to prevent the rapid pressure loss that originally caused the right strut to sag in Hawaii.
  • Altered the pressure/inflation specifications to ensure that even when loaded with over 1,100 gallons of fuel, the struts retained a firmer resistance profile. This guaranteed the aircraft would maintain its crucial suspension stroke and prevent the gear from bottoming out early in the takeoff roll. [1]

4. Upgraded Wheels, Tires, and Brakes
Because the massive weight had pulverized the tires during the initial accident, the rebuilt aircraft was fitted with high-ply, heavy-duty tires capable of withstanding the immense friction and heat generated by a prolonged, heavily overloaded takeoff roll on primitive runways.
By May 19, 1937, the rebuilt "Flying Laboratory" rolled out of the Burbank hangar completely restored and fortified. A Bureau of Air Commerce inspector signed off on its renewed airworthiness certification that very day, setting Earhart up to fly to Oakland and begin her second attempt—this time heading east to minimize the risks of heavy-load takeoffs on unpredictable Pacific island runways. [1, 2, 3, 4]
 
We have nothing to exclude believing that Earhart simply ran out of fuel, either. Maybe even had been a mechanical issue...maybe Noonan had dropped his sextant.

Finding a 2x1 mile in the Pacific is obviously a harder job than hitting North America. But looking at a Mercator projection is deceptive. Here's the approximate great-circle route between New York and Paris....

Oh I'm willing to bet that Earhart ran out of fuel....while looking for the island. From my read of all the links on here, my take is that between the two of them they didn't understand the radio navigation systems they were trying to use well, and that was the real problem.

Yep, the great circle angles are narrower than someone might expect, but still not approaching the roughly 1.5 MOA for what was supposed to be Earhart's last leg. Also possible that Nungesser could have miscalculated and ended up flying that great circle course parallel to the east coast of NA, but after X hours you'd think that would occur to him as a possibility, and he'd just head magnetic west.

Maybe Nungesser did crash in Canada, hit his head in the crash, walked into a bar in Montreal, and when he heard everyone speak just a different dialect of French he figured he never left the continent...or that he was really a Canadian! Much better story than Earhart being a spy. If I were younger I'd see if I could get support from one of the colleges to fund a field trip to some of the bars up there to start looking for evidence.
 
Oh I'm willing to bet that Earhart ran out of fuel....while looking for the island. From my read of all the links on here, my take is that between the two of them they didn't understand the radio navigation systems they were trying to use well, and that was the real problem.

Yep, the great circle angles are narrower than someone might expect, but still not approaching the roughly 1.5 MOA for what was supposed to be Earhart's last leg. Also possible that Nungesser could have miscalculated and ended up flying that great circle course parallel to the east coast of NA, but after X hours you'd think that would occur to him as a possibility, and he'd just head magnetic west.

Maybe Nungesser did crash in Canada, hit his head in the crash, walked into a bar in Montreal, and when he heard everyone speak just a different dialect of French he figured he never left the continent...or that he was really a Canadian! Much better story than Earhart being a spy. If I were younger I'd see if I could get support from one of the colleges to fund a field trip to some of the bars up there to start looking for evidence.
The Switching Device and Its Mechanism
On Earhart’s Lockheed Electra, the fixed antenna was utilized for both transmitting and receiving radio signals. To toggle between these two states, the system relied on an automated "send-receive" relay located inside the transmitter unit. [1, 2]
    • Transmitting: When Earhart depressed the "push-to-talk" button on her microphone, the relay would instantly switch the fixed antenna to the transmitter. [1, 2]
    • Receiving: When she released the button, the relay was designed to spring back and reconnect the antenna to the receiver so she could hear incoming transmissions. [1, 2]
Separately, the cockpit contained a manual three-position antenna selector switch. When set to the "FA" (Fixed Antenna) position, incoming radio waves could only reach her receiver if they successfully passed through the contacts of that internal "send-receive" relay. [1, 2]

Expert Testimony on the High Probability of Failure
The primary testimony supporting a high probability of failure for this specific switching device comes from Captain Almon A. Gray, a retired U.S. Navy Reserve captain and former Pan American Airways flight radio officer. Gray flew the Pacific Clipper routes during the 1930s, worked closely with Earhart's navigator Fred Noonan, and authored the authoritative analysis "Amelia Didn't Know Radio". [1, 2]
According to Gray's expert technical testimony: [1, 2]
    • The 95-to-5 Odds: Gray concluded that the odds were roughly 95 to 5 that a defect in this internal relay (or its immediate feed line) was responsible for crippling her receiving system. He called it the "one single thing most responsible" for her communication failure. [1]
    • The Nature of the Malfunction: Gray argued that the relay likely suffered catastrophic internal damage from lightning or severe atmospheric static discharge during the flight. This damage prevented the internal contacts from closing properly on the "receive" side. As a result, the switching mechanism essentially left her receiver permanently disconnected from her external antenna. [1, 2]
    • The Proof of "One-Way" Failure: Historical logs confirm that the Coast Guard Cutter Itasca could hear Earhart's voice loud and clear, yet Earhart repeatedly radioed that she could not hear any voice transmissions from the ship. Gray pointed out a crucial technical detail to prove the relay failed: Earhart was temporarily able to hear the Itasca's high-frequency carrier signal on 7500 kHz, but only when she manually switched her antenna selector to the "Loop/DF" position. Signals from the directional loop antenna went directly into the receiver, entirely bypassing the broken "send-receive" relay. When she switched back to the fixed antenna ("FA") to listen for normal voice contact, she heard nothing but static because the damaged relay blocked the signal path. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]
Because of this hidden relay failure, Earhart flew the final hours of her journey effectively deaf to the ground teams attempting to guide her to Howland Island, despite her own transmitter working perfectly. [1, 2]
 
Or
The Official U.S. Army Air Corps Crash Report from the Luke Field disaster includes the highly illuminating, verbatim statements of the military ground crews who serviced the aircraft. [1]
When investigators dug into why the aircraft failed to track straight and why the right landing gear sheared off so abruptly, the testimony of the Hawaiian Air Depot mechanics exposed the exact operational error regarding the pneumatic oleo struts.

The Testimony of Staff Sergeant Frank McKee
Staff Sergeant Frank McKee was one of the lead mechanics assigned to inspect the Electra's fueling and landing gear alignment. During his testimony before the official Army Investigative Board, McKee recounted the pre-flight check when they noticed the heavy list to the right:
  • The Unlevel Discovery: McKee confirmed that with a full load of fuel, the right wingtip was significantly closer to the ground than the left. He testified that the right oleo strut was severely compressed under the tremendous fuel payload.
  • The Erroneous Action: Under pressure to prepare the plane quickly for its historic departure, the crew sought the fastest cosmetic solution. McKee admitted under oath that rather than hoisting the heavily laden aircraft to inject hydraulic fluid and pump high-pressure air back into the collapsed right strut, the crew took the shortcut: they opened the air valve on the high left strut.
  • The Admission: McKee testified that they bled air out of the left strut until the fuselage sat visually level to the eye, actively acknowledging that they were lowering the total system pressure to make the plane look visually balance-correct on the tarmac.

The Core Findings of the Investigative Board
The U.S. Army Board of Officers used this mechanical testimony to map out exactly how the structural physics failed Amelia Earhart on her takeoff roll:
  1. "Bottomed Out" Volatility: The board's engineering assessment concluded that by deflating the left strut to match the damaged right one, the mechanics left both shock absorbers entirely "bottomed out." The internal pistons were already resting hard against the mechanical bottom limits of their travel before the takeoff roll even commenced.
  2. No Structural Buffer: Without any pneumatic air pocket left to compress, the suspension could not act as a shock absorber. When the Electra reached high speed on the runway, any minute ripple, runway seam, or minor puddle sent raw, un-cushioned kinetic energy directly into the rigid metal of the landing gear forks.
  3. The Mechanical Snap: As soon as Earhart made a necessary, high-speed steering correction to stabilize the plane's tracking, the tremendous lateral (sideways) load slammed into a right landing gear assembly that had absolutely zero dynamic "give" or suspension cushion left. The metal instantly reached its ultimate yield strength and snapped at the fork connection. [1]
The official testimony firmly solidified that what appeared to the public as a simple "blown tire" or an "unfortunate overcorrection" was actually a catastrophic structural failure guaranteed the moment the air pressure was bled out of those struts on the hangar floor. [1]
All obviously part of the conspiracy to make people believe that women can be competent pilots.
 
The Switching Device and Its Mechanism

Because of this hidden relay failure, Earhart flew the final hours of her journey effectively deaf to the ground teams attempting to guide her to Howland Island, despite her own transmitter working perfectly. [1, 2]

I don't know if I have the source anymore, but believe it was more complicated than that, and likely not a failed part. It might have been a Proceedings article? And I think there was a link from one of the posts here. Anyway, it was along the lines that she was asking for people to get a bearing on her on frequencies where it was not possible, and she may have been trying to transmit and ask for a bearing where it was equally impossible. Along the lines of, a loop HF antenna can't transmit, and there was no DF available on the ships on that island on some frequencies, and you can't DF a signal that doesn't have a carrier - SSB with no modulation, for example.
 
I don't know if I have the source anymore, but believe it was more complicated than that, and likely not a failed part. It might have been a Proceedings article? And I think there was a link from one of the posts here. Anyway, it was along the lines that she was asking for people to get a bearing on her on frequencies where it was not possible, and she may have been trying to transmit and ask for a bearing where it was equally impossible. Along the lines of, a loop HF antenna can't transmit, and there was no DF available on the ships on that island on some frequencies, and you can't DF a signal that doesn't have a carrier - SSB with no modulation, for example.
I understand that I have fallen closely in the past and from this thread I'm just kind of refreshing but I've learned a bunch more from grinding away at it.
the basis of the failure at the front end when things weren't so desperate appeared to me to be a mechanical failure whereas as it got closer and things became more frantic we saw the misconfigurations.
part of what I learned in this thread and further research was the amount of time that was spent by her to try and resolve these radio issues prior to the expedition.
 
I don't know if I have the source anymore, but believe it was more complicated than that, and likely not a failed part. It might have been a Proceedings article? And I think there was a link from one of the posts here. Anyway, it was along the lines that she was asking for people to get a bearing on her on frequencies where it was not possible, and she may have been trying to transmit and ask for a bearing where it was equally impossible. Along the lines of, a loop HF antenna can't transmit, and there was no DF available on the ships on that island on some frequencies, and you can't DF a signal that doesn't have a carrier - SSB with no modulation, for example.
Gray pointed out a crucial technical detail to prove the relay failed: Earhart was temporarily able to hear the Itasca's high-frequency carrier signal on 7500 kHz, but only when she manually switched her antenna selector to the "Loop/DF" position. Signals from the directional loop antenna went directly into the receiver, entirely bypassing the broken "send-receive" relay. When she switched back to the fixed antenna ("FA") to listen for normal voice contact, she heard nothing but static because the damaged relay blocked the signal path
 
I understand that I have fallen closely in the past and from this thread I'm just kind of refreshing but I've learned a bunch more from grinding away at it.
the basis of the failure at the front end when things weren't so desperate appeared to me to be a mechanical failure whereas as it got closer and things became more frantic we saw the misconfigurations.
part of what I learned in this thread and further research was the amount of time that was spent by her to try and resolve these radio issues prior to the expedition.
sorry about that voice typing on the phone
should say something like I've researched deeply in the past
"have fallen closely in the past"
 
Are you familiar with the appeal to authority fallacy?

An appeal to authority becomes a logical fallacy when any of the following occur:

• Irrelevant Expertise: Citing someone who is famous or knowledgeable in one field to prove a point in an unrelated field (e.g., quoting a physicist about macroeconomics).

• Out of Domain: Using a legitimate expert who is speaking outside of their specific discipline.

• Bias or Conflict of Interest: Relying on an expert who has a financial stake, paid endorsement, or personal bias regarding the claim.


I'll break it down.

1.) Irrelevant Expertise: He can fly big airplanes, but I doubt he has documented experience in crash investigation. I can pontificate on why airplanes hit the ground too, using the same media reports and NTSB releases he does, and arrive at the same conclusions.

2.) Out of Domain: See #1 above.

3.) Bias or Conflict of Interest: He uses his presumed position of authority to make money from clicks and views.
When I was a junior enlisted GI transiting Germany to Ft Hood, I ended up eating in a cafe in Atlanta, dressed in my greens. Big black guy wearing a suit and a badge sitting next to me at the counter tells me he's a detective, looks at my uniform and asks, "What kind of marksman are you?"

"Expert."

"I got a question to aks of you. Let's say the defendant claims his bullet ricochets off a wall and kills the victim, is that possible?"

"Uh, well, detective, anything is possible I guess, but I'm not a forensic ballistician."
 
Technological efforts to determine the location of the aircraft by a very impressive man and his team.

Alan Eustace funded the third phase under the Nauticos banner in 2017. Following the conclusion of Purdue University’s island expedition on October 19, 2026, Nauticos officially announced plans to move forward with their fourth ocean floor expedition. [1, 2, 3, 4]

The Strategy for the Next Phase
  • Refined Search Grid: Nauticos President Dave Jourdan stated that new mathematical data and a fresh re-analysis of radio signals have "narrowed the search area dramatically". The new phase will target a tight grid close to Howland Island where they believe Earhart was located less than an hour before her final radio transmission. [1]
  • Deep-Sea Technology: The follow-up will continue using deep-ocean sonar mapping, building directly on the 1,800 square miles of seafloor mapped during Eustace's 2017 deployment of the REMUS 6000 autonomous underwater vehicle.


    [1]
  • Current Status: Nauticos is currently raising the necessary capital and coordinating logistics for this next maritime deployment. [1]
 
Technological efforts to determine the location of the aircraft by a very impressive man and his team.

Alan Eustace funded the third phase under the Nauticos banner in 2017. Following the conclusion of Purdue University’s island expedition on October 19, 2026, Nauticos officially announced plans to move forward with their fourth ocean floor expedition. [1, 2, 3, 4]

The Strategy for the Next Phase
  • Refined Search Grid: Nauticos President Dave Jourdan stated that new mathematical data and a fresh re-analysis of radio signals have "narrowed the search area dramatically". The new phase will target a tight grid close to Howland Island where they believe Earhart was located less than an hour before her final radio transmission. [1]
  • Deep-Sea Technology: The follow-up will continue using deep-ocean sonar mapping, building directly on the 1,800 square miles of seafloor mapped during Eustace's 2017 deployment of the REMUS 6000 autonomous underwater vehicle.


    [1]
  • Current Status: Nauticos is currently raising the necessary capital and coordinating logistics for this next maritime deployment. [1]
Now that they know what a tree looks like probably have a better chance of finding a twin engine aircraft. I'm betting find her inside of 5 years now. :rolleyes:
 
A short note on the enormity of aviator + Alan Eustace
Highest jump in history
He also owns and flys a Lear.

His deep aviation background heavily influenced his methodical approach to the extreme engineering challenges of his stratospheric space dive and the Amelia Earhart search project: [1, 2]

His Aviation Background
  • Credentials: Eustace holds an Airline Transport Pilot (ATP) certificate—the highest level of aircraft pilot license issued by the FAA. He is rated for both fixed-wing aircraft (like jets) and rotary-wing aircraft (helicopters). [1]
  • Flight Time: He has logged over 3,000 hours of flight time. His experience spans a vast variety of aircraft types, including multi-engine jets, turboprops, piston aircraft, taildraggers, helicopters, and multi-engine seaplanes.


    [1]
  • The "Pilot Mindset": Unlike his world-record predecessor Felix Baumgartner—who was heavily publicized as an extreme thrill-seeker—Eustace approached his supersonic stratospheric jump purely from a precise test-pilot and engineer mindset. He worked quietly with a specialized crew for years to build a compact life-support system rather than relying on a heavy, commercialized capsule. [1, 2, 3, 4]
 
When I was a child in grade school, when the disappearance was closer in time to us than Operation Desert Storm is to us today, we were taught that they got lost, ran out of fuel, and ditched in the ocean.
Everyone believed it.
And is the 60+ years since being taught that, I've seen zero evidence to sway my mind.
 
When I was a child in grade school, when the disappearance was closer in time to us than Operation Desert Storm is to us today, we were taught that they got lost, ran out of fuel, and ditched in the ocean.
Everyone believed it.
And is the 60+ years since being taught that, I've seen zero evidence to sway my mind.
Verifying the facts may take place but no doubt very difficult searching 18,000 ft below the surface.

Best case scenario in my book to find the aircraft with the bodies inside.
What does a ditching the Lockheed look like with engine failure?do they exit the plane to a life raft or are they incapacitated with impact with the water. Perhaps a violent rotation on impact? if they exit the aircraft to a life raft or if they can access a life raft are they just the worst case scenario - shark bait?
 
Ran out of fuel, dead stick landing attempt.

Probably killed or incapacitated on impact.

The Electra Probably glides a tiny bit better than a brick and Earhart was good at crashing planes.

She was the PIC so this disaster was 100% on her. Placing blame on Fred is wrong. I bet she ignored him during the last hours that day.
 
So…..
Airplanes even to this day disappear over land and are never heard from again, let alone over the ocean. Malaysian airliner disappeared and only a small piece of debris washed up a long time later on an African beach. No one knows where it went down, where main wreckage is, etc.

Some things just are never going to be known.
 
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