5 related adults dead in Cessna 340 crash

And that would be pure speculation on your part. We have no idea if weather was a factor.

I was the first person in this discussion to say that the problem with flying the plane may not have been caused by weather. But the ability to carry out a forced landing surely was caused by the weather.
 
Your statement that one always has 100’ to 200’ real visibility in fog is patently ridiculous for anyone with significant experience with fog,.
Wonder what your “experience” with the ground fog is, mine is clearly different, I am yet to see a true 0-0 conditions, that would mean I could not see my extended palm of hand, never saw anything even close, you get to see 100-200 ft in the worst conditions.




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Meanwhile, I think that your judgement, and attitude about the right of passengers to make informed decisions, is appalling.
You're making quite a few assumptions too. You don't have any idea what the pilot told the passengers or what the passengers' risk tolerance was. The passengers had eyes and could see the fog. I've had passengers ask if flying in certain conditions are safe. I've also had them ask me why we couldn't make an approach at 1/4 mile visibility after telling them our legal minimums were 1/2 mile.
 
Let's bring this back home, on the morning of the accident there was apparently a quarter mile visibility, that works out to 1300 feet. That's not really a 0-0 take off, the Cirrus video I posted like @Velocity173 said has at least 100 foot visibility, imagine 10-13 times that..

@Rory that's awesome that you do some sailing, I grew up sailing on boats as well. I remember navigating some dicey waters in extremely low visibility, such that the front of a 40-foot sailboat was barely visible.. but with a compass, timer, listening and knowing where the buoys are we did it before GPS. Now we have a color chart plotter that makes it much easier, but we still rely on the basics as a backup. Flying is not much different, this stuff can be done safely if you know what you're doing. Is it the safest, no, but I don't think it means that somebody's actions or stupid or appalling if they know what they're doing

PS, why the focus on 00 takeoffs? Commercial airliners do very low visibility landings all the time.. well below a quarter mile (which is apparently what this guy had). A quick search on YouTube will Reveal several
 
By this definition we "compromise safety" the moment we get out of bed in the morning. And if you live in a hurricane, tornado or earthquake zone you probably don't even need to get up some days.
You can die in a plane crash without getting out of bed. It’s even possible to die in a plane crash when you are flying a flight simulator. Life is full of risks. You choose the risks you are willing to take in exchange for the corresponding rewards. That’s all that our species (and every other) has been doing since the beginning. Making those risk-reward choices in a rational way is optional. But making them in the first place is mandatory.
 
You can die in a plane crash without getting out of bed. It’s even possible to die in a plane crash when you are flying a flight simulator. Life is full of risks. You choose the risks you are willing to take in exchange for the corresponding rewards. That’s all that our species (and every other) has been doing since the beginning. Making those risk-reward choices in a rational way is optional. But making them in the first place is mandatory.

Yes, but do your passengers have a right to assess those risks for themselves?
 
Okay. Weak.

He asked a question to another poster about that other poster's comments, presumably as the premise to set up an argument, but he never made one, so what are you calling weak? A question is not a conclusion, therefore you can't assert that his logic is weak, since he didn't use any.
 
Rory said:
Meanwhile, I think that your judgement, and attitude about the right of passengers to make informed decisions, is appalling.
I'm quite sure no one forced them on to the airplane...almost every passenger has the ability to not fly if they so choose.

"Informed" decision? That's a load of crap. I've had passengers who were pilots who complained because i endangered them by taking off with an 8-knot tailwind rather than put myself in the position of having to demonstrate my superior skill by flying under wires in the event of an engine failure.

Besides...giving the passengers all of the information needed to make an informed decision would miss the window of good weather that you claim they should have waited for.

Fact is, as @Velocity173 said, there's absolutely no evidence that weather was a factor. The most credible theory I've seen is the trim issue, which most likely would have had the same effect regardless of weather.
 
do your passengers have a right to assess those risks for themselves?
Not if they're not familiar with the subject matter. When I get on a Delta flight the pilot doesn't consult with us about "well the APU is mel'd and the inbound crew had a low oil press on eng 2 but maintenance checked it. Also, the instrument landing system is out at our destination and we'll be climbing through a moderate icing layer."

There's a reasonable assumption that your pilot is competent. Plus, weren't these his kids? Not like they were complete strangers
 
In James' defense, he jammed my controls before I rotated so I didn't have much choice

LOL. I added the smiley to my comment. Any sim instructor can “kill” anyone.

Sims proving sim instructors can kill you anytime they like, aren’t as useful as sims where there’s still an “out” and you didn’t take it.

In all seriousness, I doubt James’ had an “out”, he was probably airborne. He was probably “dead” as soon as the jam was simulated.

Learning that things can happen in aircraft that will kill you, is one level of that. Learning that you missed an option that would have made a scenario survivable is the next level.

Sims can be great learning tools with the right training plan. It’s actually fairly interesting to figure out how to make a simulator session a learning experience. That’d be a fun job.
 
@Rory that's awesome that you do some sailing, I grew up sailing on boats as well. I remember navigating some dicey waters in extremely low visibility, such that the front of a 40-foot sailboat was barely visible.. but with a compass, timer, listening and knowing where the buoys are we did it before GPS. Now we have a color chart plotter that makes it much easier, but we still rely on the basics as a backup. Flying is not much different, this stuff can be done safely if you know what you're doing. Is it the safest, no, but I don't think it means that somebody's actions or stupid or appalling if they know what they're doing

You can’t possibly know what you are talking about. According to the experts here, there are never conditions in which one can barely see the bow of a 40’ boat. Apparently, one will always see the bow of a boat 100’ to 200’ long, which will come as news to anyone who has spent time on the water.

These people are in for a surprise when they are told that if they drive with that attitude in dense fog in parts of Maine, New Brunswick and Newfoundland, and hit a moose, they stand a good chance of winding up dead.

Interesting that you draw a parallel between boats and planes. The principal difference between a pleasure boat going into heavy fog and a plane is that a boat travels a hell of a lot slower. That said, nobody that I know will go out in a boat in heavy fog knowing that the fog will burn off. This is at least a three day a week issue in the Newfoundland community where I spend my summers. That’s chill out and breakfast/coffee time. To do otherwise is the height of stupidity.

I’ve been in situations in Newfoundland, the English Channel, Brittany and the Caribbean socked in by fog, and not once have I had a shipmate suggest that we sail into it because we shouldn’t wait a couple of hours.

Yet there are “pilots” here trying to justify it on a pleasure flight. As far as I am concerned, they are the same “pilots”, almost exclusively American, who don’t wear an inflatable life jacket but do wear flip flops on a flight like this over the Atlantic Ocean.
 
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I've been trying to stay out of this thread, but like a moth to flame....

Other than the quarter mile of vis, is there any indication of what the actual visibility was for the runway when they took off? And I don't mean the sheriff - I respect law enforcement but most lay people see anything less than a mile as 'fog'. Lots of talk about 0/0 on this thread when I don't see anything that specifies an actual RVR. This matters. When you're used to operating at three digit RVRs, having a full quarter mile can feel damned near like VFR.

Unless I'm missing something, we don't know anything about the pilot's proficiency. I fly a twin for work, and we're sometimes expected to take off at visibilities as low as 500 RVR. My engines are considered to be more reliable than a Cessna 340s, but beyond that the various risks outlined in this thread are the same (spacial disorientation, etc). I don't tell my passengers about the increased risk when we depart in such conditions, and I absolutely feel comfortable putting my family on such a flight. That said, I also feel very proficient and my company makes sure I'm well trained. What's to say the PIC of the accident 340 isn't as well trained as I am? FlightSafety has sims for Twin Cessnas. Seems to me that someone who makes a general comment about poor ADM is either making assumptions about a lack of proficiency from the PIC, or is of the opinion that *any* departure of a quarter mile or less visibility in a twin is straight up dangerous.

Which hey, if that's your argument I'll be more than happy to talk about it. But I'm pretty sure these same guys would step onto my airplane all day long in such conditions and not think a thing about it. Why do I get a pass and not the PIC of the 340? Until we know for sure, I'm willing to give a dead pilot the benefit of the doubt.
 
So maybe this isn't the place to ask but as an instrument student who has never flown in IMC I'm wondering why loss of control on takeoff in fog would be such an issue. I would have thought it would be easier than flying an approach, you'd have all your instruments set up before takeoff, you'd be expecting to enter IMC, and all you'd have to do is hold a climb until you got to your desired/cleared altitude and intercepted/turned into your course.
I agree. This should not be an issue for an IR pilots
 
That said, nobody that I know will go out in a boat in heavy fog knowing that the fog will burn off.
Generally wasn't by choice, but we did pull into York, ME one year after a long cruise up the coast from Rockport, MA. As we approached York visibility got worse and worse, by the time we got there it was crazy thick and starting to get dark. Choice was to anchor somewhere offshore (a crappy option to spend the night unprotected in deep water with a crazy long anchor rode) or to figure a plan out and go for it. We hung out at the large outer marker entrance bell for a bit and plotted a coarse then made our way in. 3 knots, timer, compass, listening, and it worked. Luckily it was slack tide (low water) so there was not much current to contend with. The low water was also a plus, since, heaven forbid we got stuck the tide would lift us off as it came in. Not fun, but can be done safely with a plan and remaining situationally aware

there are never conditions in which one can barely see the bow of a 40’ boat
It is certainly not common, and I've not (yet) seen it on land. I've never *not* seen the front of the boat, but we knew the distance from our mooring in Marbelehead to the town dock.. it would be eerie watching the bright light from the dock slowly fade away.. next thing you knew all you can see is the boat moored next to you.. barely. It can be very claustrophobic. Oddly enough on many of these nights you could still see the stars
 
or is of the opinion that *any* departure of a quarter mile or less visibility in a twin is straight up dangerous
that's the part that is sketchy to me. For the correctly qualified person taking off in quarter mile vis really should not be a problem. sure the transition to instruments can be sudden, but be smooth on the controls, pitch for Vy, keep the ball centered, and fly your headings, and ignore your body. Now, if the you-know-what hits the fan sure your options are different.. but the single engine planes I fly in the area I'm in I'm pretty much screwed anyway if I lose an engine below 1,000 AGL anyway. A twin would alleviate that concern, assuming the pilot knows how to fly a twin with an engine out
 
Generally wasn't by choice, but we did pull into York, ME one year after a long cruise up the coast from Rockport, MA. As we approached York visibility got worse and worse, by the time we got there it was crazy thick and starting to get dark. Choice was to anchor somewhere offshore (a crappy option to spend the night unprotected in deep water with a crazy long anchor rode) or to figure a plan out and go for it. We hung out at the large outer marker entrance bell for a bit and plotted a coarse then made our way in. 3 knots, timer, compass, listening, and it worked. Luckily it was slack tide (low water) so there was not much current to contend with. The low water was also a plus, since, heaven forbid we got stuck the tide would lift us off as it came in. Not fun, but can be done safely with a plan and remaining situationally aware


It is certainly not common, and I've not (yet) seen it on land. I've never *not* seen the front of the boat, but we knew the distance from our mooring in Marbelehead to the town dock.. it would be eerie watching the bright light from the dock slowly fade away.. next thing you knew all you can see is the boat moored next to you.. barely. It can be very claustrophobic. Oddly enough on many of these nights you could still see the stars

Good stories. Can totally relate.
 
For the correctly qualified person taking off in quarter mile vis really should not be a problem.

I agree with this. Thing is, we have no idea how proficient the PIC was. He could range anywhere from 'hasn't seen dual since 1973' to a guy attending FSI every year. I'm not a perfect pilot, and lord knows I screw things up from time to time. If God forbid I screw it up such that I end up the topic of a thread here on PoA, I just hope that people take a step back before they declare I was grossly negligent and killed a bunch of people because of my idiocy. If I want people to give me the benefit of the doubt, how can I not do the same for others? This guy might very well have been flying beyond his proficiency, but perhaps he wasn't? Until I know for sure, I'm going to keep my fingers crossed that he did things the right way but ended up in an unenviable situation.
 
You are the one who needs to read it again since you obviously don't understand it.

I understood a person wholly unqualified to discuss “Spatial D” was not just asking an innocent question about it, which is apparently your new fictional addition.

that's the part that is sketchy to me. For the correctly qualified person taking off in quarter mile vis really should not be a problem. sure the transition to instruments can be sudden, but be smooth on the controls, pitch for Vy, keep the ball centered, and fly your headings, and ignore your body. Now, if the you-know-what hits the fan sure your options are different.. but the single engine planes I fly in the area I'm in I'm pretty much screwed anyway if I lose an engine below 1,000 AGL anyway. A twin would alleviate that concern, assuming the pilot knows how to fly a twin with an engine out

Not only sketchy but against all common sense.

We have seen zero evidence this pilot didn’t meet the minimum performance requirements of the certificate and rating we can reasonably assume were earned to be able to operate the aircraft, plus the additional required training to insure such an aircraft, if insured by one of three or less underwriters who will do so.

There are standards that had to be met, after all.

The unknown is proficiency and as far as I know, the people speculating here who haven’t even met the flight experience requirements the dead guy did, don’t have access to his logbooks.

The assumption the pilot was qualified and current is not only reasonable, but the only morally reasonable statement barring evidence otherwise. Maybe future evidence will indicate a decision making or training deficiency but it hasn’t been posted here yet.

Gets even sillier in that airplane considering his insurer would usually add a mandatory proficiency program.
 
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I understood a person wholly unqualified to discuss “Spatial D” was not just asking an innocent question about it, which is apparently your new fictional addition.

Your understanding is incorrect, and the only person posting fiction here is you. Additionally, your debate technique you've been using lately of laughing at and belittling your opponents is illegitimate and childish.
 
Sure many of you have read it, but Kathryn's report has a lot of extra notes and details in it. The pilot was a Marine Core vet and got his pilot license in 1965 while still in high school. Lay people's opinion will always be "he was a safe pilot" but one of the people interviewed said they'd flown with him in fog before and were impressed with his pilotage. Very curious to see what ends up being the cause here. Definitely the trim in full nose down seems very suspect at this point

http://www.kathrynsreport.com/2017/12/fatal-accident-occurred-december-24.html
 
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Sure many of you have read it, but Kathryn's report has a lot of extra notes and details in it. The pilot was a Marine Core vet and got his pilot license in 1965 while still in high school. Lay people's opinion will always be "he was a safe pilot" but one of the people interviewed said they'd flown with him in fog before and were impressed with his pilotage. Very curious to see what ends up being the cause here. Definitely the rudder in full nose down trim seems very suspect at this point

http://www.kathrynsreport.com/2017/12/fatal-accident-occurred-december-24.html
My rudder trim won’t go full nose down. Should I have it repaired?
 
I also don’t know any CFIIs who spend any considerable time on NDB approaches in aircraft not-equipped with said gear, and the ADF questions have been removed from the written rest question pool by FAA.

So it’s a nice rant and all, but very little reality behind it. I’ve seen a few lazy instructors in my day, one who was downright dangerous, but not a majority. And even that guy wasn’t teaching Instrument stuff.

What’s up with the rant? Did you hit the jackpot and get one of these?

I'm ranting from my personal experience. I've had both ex-Navy and ex-Air Force instructors - no discussion of decision making factors in PPL through IFR training. 2007: lots of training in NDB approaches in WAAS GPS equipped aircraft in 2 different aircraft, 2 different instructors. That's my experience, YMMV
 
A flight instructors’ influence can only go so far. The outcome of this flight had nothing to do with his former CFI’s.

You don't know that - I don't know that. Did any of his previous instructors teach decision making? Mine did not - hence my post. It's a decent bet that because the FAA test databank - at least circa 2007 - had zero questions about historical accidents and their causes that a fair number of instructors do not teach consequences of poor decision making just as mine did not. I'm not attempting to rip instructors here - just looking at ways to mitigate accidents.
 
Does this mean I should tell my A&P “nevermind”?
Maybe, at the very least have him check your blinker fluid.

"Corp" I blame on speech to text

I'm signing off, cheers
 
You don't know that - I don't know that. Did any of his previous instructors teach decision making? Mine did not - hence my post. It's a decent bet that because the FAA test databank - at least circa 2007 - had zero questions about historical accidents and their causes that a fair number of instructors do not teach consequences of poor decision making just as mine did not. I'm not attempting to rip instructors here - just looking at ways to mitigate accidents.

The whole point of the new Airman Certification Standards is to fix this problem. The FAA, at least, acknowledges that there is a serious problem with teaching decision making and risk assessment.
 
Maybe, at the very least have him check your blinker fluid.

"Corp" I blame on speech to text

I'm signing off, cheers
He always sez the propwash is low and the price has gone up again. At least I haven’t had to replace the flight line this year.
 
Ummm. That would be you, repeating yourself.

I’m pretty sure you repeating that I’m wrong is not exactly a strong argument. LOL.

Which ratings do you hold that apply to operating a mid-sized Cessna light twin in instrument conditions?

FAA says I can not only operate that aircraft, I can teach someone how to. (And I’ve already stated the pilot took risks I wouldn’t take, but I would be required to discuss that with the trainee. Once they’re PIC, they can do as they please.)

Insurance company won’t allow me to exercise those FAA privileges. (Big hint for your reason to study the insurance requirements, is hiding in that factual statement.)

Looked up those insurance requirements on one yet? The lightbulb may come on, when you do.

I’ve tried hard to restrain myself, but you sound like an absolute idiot. You have mischaracterized my position and my posts, repeatedly. You haven’t shown one single piece of evidence that my position is what you are actually arguing against. Now, you’re going on about insurance requirements. Honestly, what is wrong with you? Are you just trying to obscure and cover up for what a fool you’ve made of yourself? If so, you have my sympathy. Please let it go.

BTW, @dmspilot (and I’m sure others as well) was able to pick up on what you’ve missed the entire time. But then, you go on offense against him for pointing it out. Have you never heard of a rhetorical question? Are you so dim-witted that you can’t follow a simple discussion? These are honest questions. I have no intention of being insulting, but I can’t think of any other way to express it. This back and forth with you is blowing my mind. I have no idea what goes through a mind like yours that posts again and again ignoring all evidence and ignoring all responses. You seem to see only what you want to see.

Here’s one last Hail Mary with the hope that you will get it this time. The record of the thread will show the following to be true:

I have not criticized the pilot.
I have not speculated on a cause for the accident.

And additionally, I have more flight time in actual conditions than you will probably ever have. And I have most likely instructed in actual conditions more than you ever will. So your false representation of my views about spatial D and avoiding IMC hold no water.

What issue can you take with the statements posted directly above? If you can’t disagree with that, then you have no disagreement. Any other representation of my views has no merit.
 
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Your understanding is incorrect, and the only person posting fiction here is you. Additionally, your debate technique you've been using lately of laughing at and belittling your opponents is illegitimate and childish.

Who said I was debating him? I was laughing at how wrong his direction of his assertions was headed and offered him a way to go figure it out.

Zero interest in “debating” him about his fictional stories of how this accident happened. Like none whatsoever.

Getting him to think harder about his fictional story and where all the holes in it are? Sure. Willing to attempt. It doesn’t appear to be working.

You don't know that - I don't know that. Did any of his previous instructors teach decision making? Mine did not - hence my post. It's a decent bet that because the FAA test databank - at least circa 2007 - had zero questions about historical accidents and their causes that a fair number of instructors do not teach consequences of poor decision making just as mine did not. I'm not attempting to rip instructors here - just looking at ways to mitigate accidents.

So, honest question. Where did you first learn about formal ADM or informal?

AC 60-22 was published in December of 1991, and references FAA studying ADM and publishing various documents on it “twelve years” before 1987 which they claim was the end date of their initial study on ADM.

I can’t think of an instructor who didn’t mention ADM (whether cursing it or praising it, but mostly the latter) from when I started flying in the same year that AC came out, until the present.

To say I wasn’t aware of the fact that FAA had boatloads of material available on the topic would be quite disingenuous, even if instructors didn’t push it too hard back then in the formal terms, but instead referred to it by terms like “common sense” and “don’t be stupid”. Ha. Maybe not the most formal of teaching methodology but no instructor I’ve ever had didn’t discuss what a good decision vs a bad decision as PIC was, with plenty of examples.

I haven’t looked to see when the formal requirement to TEST the formal ADM terminology started but I believe that was in the early 90s rewrites of the PTS before 2007. That would take some more digging.

You mentioned your instructors were ex-military I think? How far back? Military has been teaching formal ADM and even formal scoring systems for risk analysis for a very long time.

I’m mostly just curious. I find it odd that you found multiple instructors who weren’t up to speed on things that have been published since the end of 1991.

I mean seriously, I remember seeing John King videos on the topic back when he had brown hair.

It’s not like instructors OR students can really claim formal ADM wasn’t a common topic in FAA pubs, commercially sold training materials, and even all the popular aviation magazines of the day, or even the airport lounge discussion topics, before the Internet took over being the airport lounge.

I even remember FAA flyers about the topic hanging on the nowadays long forgotten airport bulletin boards of old. Some instructor must have received them in the mail back then and stuck a push pin through them the next time they were at the airport. Multiple airports.
 
Who said I was debating him? I was laughing at how wrong his direction of his assertions was headed and offered him a way to go figure it out.

Zero interest in “debating” him about his fictional stories of how this accident happened. Like none whatsoever.

Getting him to think harder about his fictional story and where all the holes in it are? Sure. Willing to attempt. It doesn’t appear to be working.

Discussing, debating, doesn't matter. Belittling and laughing at someone (as you admit you were doing) does not help you make a point nor does it add anything to the discussion.

And I am sorry that you are still confused. Those fictional stories are figments of your imagination, not his.
 
Let's recap and see where I felt @Cooter went off the rails.

One thing I will not contribute to is the notion is that it is perfectly ok to take-off in near zero vis, on a morning when the only cost is likely a few hour delay. No we don’t know the full story yet. But the statistics are there, and my own experience informs me of the risks this guy took in deciding to takeoff in these conditions.

Right here is the start of it. The assumption that the conditions were "near zero-vis" has STILL not been established by anything other than a Sheriff blathering on the news. Anyone posted the ACTUAL visibility conditions yet, even now? This still wasn't all that bad, but it's clear @Cooter has made up his mind about the pilot at this point, especially back at this post, when NOBODY had ANYTHING other than Sheriff Dumb***'s press conference to go on.

I don’t know what played into his decision making or what his attitude was. I only know that he attempted to launch into very challenging conditions that were temporary, and he is no longer alive.

Sketchy... since we still don't have an accurate description of these "conditions" there's a huge assumption here. But I wasn't even mildly interested yet at this point... I could just see the assumption clearly.

Trying to sort through ideas and discussion becomes argumentative and the assumption is that the other guy is being a j@ck@ss.

We'll just save this one for later. I'm pretty sure you think I'm a j@ck@ss. But we'll move on...

If no one is immune, regardless of experience, how is it a “good” idea to enter Spatial D inducing conditions unnecessarily? That sounds like a roll of the dice.

And here's where I decided you had decided to put your assumption about the pilot surreptitiously into your leading question. EVERY flight is "unnecessary", but you made sure that word was in there whether consciously or perhaps even subconsciously were saying the pilot did something wrong. You're basing the question posed or the snarky "roll of the dice" portion of the question from ANY evidence, of which we have NONE on this accident. Zero. We know absolutely nothing about this pilot, his aircraft, or even a freaking official weather report in this thread yet. Does the damned airport have an AWOS when the Tower is closed? What did it say?

So... I pointed out the obvious, seeing if you'd notice your assumptions were leaking into your question: ALL INSTRUMENT FLIGHT is "Spacial D inducing".

The rest of the responses since then have been to see if you'll even admit that the pilot flying the airplane...

a) Certainly met the standards for his certificates, including at least a few Flight Reviews where mmm... CFIs have been mandated to discuss ADM for a long time...
b) That he also doesn't deserve any of your speculation that he made a poor decision. (Just because you like discussing ADM, doesn't mean it was the problem here.)
c) That in the aircraft type being discussed, not only would he have to meet FAA standards, his insurer almost certainly had even higher proficiency and training standards.

I get it that you LIKE FORMAL ADM, and wanted to apply it to this flight, but you have no solid verifiable evidence to hang your assumption of BAD ADM on.

I too, suspect the ceiling was VERY low/visibility was VERY poor, but it's a SUSPICION. I have heard there's a VIDEO being reviewed of the takeoff, where the aircraft CAN BE SEEN...
Hmm. That's not "0/0".

I haven't found the video in public yet. Information is from a photog I know personally who works for one of the news networks on-scene. Hasn't been mentioned in press conferences, but that's not uncommon. May not hear anything about it until the final report if someone who isn't a money-grubber or who doesn't think the press needs a copy of it for anything, shot the thing. I'm sure my photog's employer would love a copy of it, thus... why the info that it probably exists has spread to him.

I also, like you, disagree with the pilot's choice of acceptable risk FOR ME, but his risks are his to take as PIC. You may not like that, I may not like that, but they are. "Safety" for his passengers is a wonderful goal, but they got on board willingly. (Well, we'll assume the investigators don't find anyone chained to their seats, if that's a reasonable assumption.) And also, we all know, if he was the sort to take risks, I seriously doubt anyone on board, especially family, was unaware of that. Usually by now, if he was some sort of daredevil, some goody-two-shoes who didn't like him would already have begged to tell that story to a TV camera. They can't help themselves.

So, very unlike your assumption... my assumption, is that without evidence to the contrary, the pilot was quite likely, current, qualified, perhaps even proficient, and made a decision to do something that exceeds MY risk acceptance criteria, but he may have done a thousand times before and performed flawlessly. It's Florida after all. Wet place, absolutely lousy with afternoon t-storms for much of the year. Soggy fog isn't all that uncommon either. Dodging water in the sky is a permanent Florida passtime (unlike here).

Your assumption this pilot had bad ADM without even so much as a hint of any sort of official weather report or qualified weather posted, even NOW... and we're days into this... is just unfounded. You did say you "have statistics"... so feel free to post one of THOSE accidents (where the investigation is actually COMPLETE, you know?) and rip on THAT dead pilot... you don't have the facts yet on THIS one, and the bodies are barely cold.

@Velocity177 (I think it was, I'll scroll back and check) made a nice list of all the little passive-aggressive "#metoo" commentary in the thread that was and is ridiculous less than a week after the accident. Those comments aren't helping my mood about the thread, overall... little ankle-bites at the dead guy are so childish without evidence.

Your statement, paraphrased, that "judging is good" only applies to cases where you actually have facts. If you have them, post them up. Let's see how you KNOW this pilot exercised poor ADM, since you've insinuated it numerous times in the thread. The "Spatial D" question with little ankle-bites attached for the dead guy, was just over my line... "Spatial D", every single damn Instrument pilot EVER has experienced that... and trained against it... and sure, challenging, but not necessarily a cause for a no-go decision on this flight... a flight we don't even know the true weather conditions of.

I'm happy to discuss (and even judge dead pilots, to some extent) any NTSB reports that are completed.

*** You can't and don't have all of the facts in this case. Taking off into a low ceiling or even fog, isn't necessarily poor ADM. Doing it in a twin (arguably if done properly to the standards his certificate requires) mitigated one of the problems of doing so, even. And we have ZERO evidence the accident was caused by "Spatial D" either. ***

You following now? Want to "judge" dead pilots in a thread about a completed accident report? Fine by me. Judging one on absolutely nothing for evidence, while the family is still burying them, and not a shred of official evidence has been published... is unbelievably low. One might even say, "poor aeronautical message board decision making". Might crash into your own assumptions while lecturing others about not making any, and not admitting you have made any. (Which is why MY assumptions are documented above for your "judgement", from this j@ac@ss... enjoy.)
 
I also, like you, disagree with the pilot's choice of acceptable risk FOR ME, but his risks are his to take as PIC. You may not like that, I may not like that, but they are. "Safety" for his passengers is a wonderful goal, but they got on board willingly.

This is the elephant in the room that none of you want to address. Did they get on board knowing the risk? The risk that you acknowledge existed and that exceeded what you would tolerate? Or were they not entitled to know the risk?

Because the fact is, four ordinary, reasonably intelligent people knowing the risk would have gone for breakfast while the fog burned off instead of getting on that plane. This is beyond obvious.

This is not about FAA rules and legality and all of the cute stuff that you all want to talk about ad nauseam on what can and can't be done in adverse conditions.

It's about common sense, and what people are entitled to know about the risks that some trumped up "Private Pilot in Command" can impose on them, which on the available information got lost in the fog, and in this discussion is also getting lost in a fog.

By the way, the Pilot in Command of an airplane is not the Pilot in Command of anything before people get on the airplane. Think about what that means, and think about the concept of informed consent.
 
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You don't know that - I don't know that. Did any of his previous instructors teach decision making? Mine did not - hence my post. It's a decent bet that because the FAA test databank - at least circa 2007 - had zero questions about historical accidents and their causes that a fair number of instructors do not teach consequences of poor decision making just as mine did not. I'm not attempting to rip instructors here - just looking at ways to mitigate accidents.
Point is, I think just about every accident in the NTSB database involved poor decision making of some kind. Instructors can teach it all they want, but as I said, it only goes so far. Somebody can get tested on it, but that doesn’t mean a whole lot.
 
The whole point of the new Airman Certification Standards is to fix this problem. The FAA, at least, acknowledges that there is a serious problem with teaching decision making and risk assessment.
It won’t fix the problem, unfortunately. There’s a big difference between being tested over something and facing the situation in a practical sense.
 
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