5 Dead In MO SR-22 Crash

According to the Cirrus forum, the pilot's tail number is blocked so that is why there is no flight aware track. ATC tapes show he was on an IFR flight plan.

That would explain it, thanks. We typically see private jets blocking their n-number, not single engine piston aircraft.
 
The Cirrus has become this generation's fork tailed doctor killer...
Affluent, high achieving professionals who are goal oriented, time bound, and very aggressive at accomplishing whatever it is they are doing at that moment...
The favored personal mount at this point in time for these young lions of business and industry is the Cirrus, so we will continue to see a higher incidence of nationally reported crashes involving Cirrus aircraft, than other aircraft...

Most of these crashes are preventable had the pilot used fixed guidelines as the military and air lines do...
The most recent we had in my area of the country is the July 2010 up at St. Ignace, Mackinac County Airport, with a Baron 58 and a load of family members..
NTSB case #CEN10FA394
 
Most of these crashes are preventable had the pilot used fixed guidelines as the military and air lines do...
The most recent we had in my area of the country is the July 2010 up at St. Ignace, Mackinac County Airport, with a Baron 58 and a load of family members..
NTSB case #CEN10FA394
A am SOoooo in agreement, thougn the example wasn't good.

Fixed guidelines wouldn't helped that guy. Two aborts, and so he decided to go on the third try.....
That's almost as bad as the recent pilot in the Stinoson who never aborted toward rising terrain even after two minutes of struggling to get out of ground effect....
There are fixed guidelines, and then there is "that does not compute".
 
Cirri, I understand, need just under 1,000 if upright. Of course, being at 500 AGL on approach is then problemmatic.....

1000 AGL is in the POH as a demonstrated altitude, probably dating back to before production, but there have now been enough successful CAPS pulls down to 400 AGL that Cirrus now tells instructors to teach to pull at 400.
 
1000 AGL is in the POH as a demonstrated altitude, probably dating back to before production, but there have now been enough successful CAPS pulls down to 400 AGL that Cirrus now tells instructors to teach to pull at 400.
...if you are upright (he was in IMC). We'll never know. :(
 
Re: 5 Dead In MO SR-22 Chrash

Sad accident; the kids were pretty small / skinny. The news posted this picture of the family, taken by Robin and posted on Grayson's twitter feed. The picture was taken in KC the night of the crash, at the Royals game they had attended (their reason for the trip).

article-2203861-15092D68000005DC-171_634x691.jpg

That picture makes my heart hurt. RIP.
 
Re: 5 Dead In MO SR-22 Chrash

That picture makes my heart hurt. RIP.

Putting a face to the victims is really tough. Sweet kids. The person taking the picture was probably the 5th victim. It makes me hurt to see the kids.... so young.

Very sad in deed.
 
It's frustrating to all. The handles don't get pulled often enough, and there has been quite a bit of study and discussion about it over the years.

I have no problem understanding why this is the case. Pulling a parachute is tantamount with admission "I screwed up, I am no good, I can't handle IFR, etc" and few pilots are ready to admit that. Pulling the chute is much easier psychologically if engine failed, something else failed but if it is only about the airmanship skills - they think they will ultimately be successful and drastic measures are not needed and would make them look weak.

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Pulling a parachute is tantamount with admission "I screwed up, I am no good, I can't handle IFR, etc" and few pilots are ready to admit that.

I am not so sure this masterful analysis explains the phenomena, although I see it bandied about quite a bit (usually with a note that it comes from an analysyis of military accidents). More likely the pilot thinks he has other options.

Note that it's plain impossible to perform an outcome trade in flight. This is why we set ourselves hard rules such as "3/4 airspeed before 1/2 runway", because that's all we can evaluate on the spot. Pulling the handle is no different. Before it is triggered, there must be 1) an event (determine that unable to maintain altitude with ice, e.g.), 2) evaluation and decision that came out positive to pull.
 
I have no problem understanding why this is the case. Pulling a parachute is tantamount with admission "I screwed up, I am no good, I can't handle IFR, etc" and few pilots are ready to admit that. Pulling the chute is much easier psychologically if engine failed, something else failed but if it is only about the airmanship skills - they think they will ultimately be successful and drastic measures are not needed and would make them look weak.

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Agreed. Now that we have increasing Avionics, terrain and trending technology, I forecast that within a decade we could have airplanes smart enough to pull the chute for us... Or at least audibly and urgently encourage us to do so. Would you ignore that vocal prompt, if your passengers could all hear it too? Automatic deployment inside a tight set of limits could save an incapacitated pilot's life (not necessarily unconscious), and of those who are with him.
 
Pete's comment is what I was trying to do. Set some hard rules in your head when the handle must be pulled, and follow them. It needs to be culturally right to set those rules. That starts in training. Set that tone if you've got a BRS or teach in aircraft that do.
 
This seems to be whether related. Why not stay out of the soup with 5 souls on board? :dunno:

Get a rental car and call it a day. Been there done that.
 
I am continually reminded that every pilot needs "Lord, don't let me screw up today" stenciled inside his eyeglasses.

You got that right, Dr. Bruce. We all screw up. It is just a matter of degree and circumstances.
 
This seems to be whether related. Why not stay out of the soup with 5 souls on board? :dunno:

Get a rental car and call it a day. Been there done that.

Utility. People don't get instrument ratings and fly capable aircraft so they can rent cars instead of fly in non-convective IMC.
 
This seems to be whether related. Why not stay out of the soup with 5 souls on board? :dunno:

Get a rental car and call it a day. Been there done that.

But, then again, you're not instrument rated... :)

I'm with Troy. In non-convective IMC with no ice present...there would be no reason for a current IA pilot to avoid this flight.

Disclaimer: I'm not making a comment on this pilot or his qualifications. I'm just answering the quoted question.
 
What bothers me with these IMC accidents is the plane is very well equipped... Even if the pilot got uncomfortable, George is more than capable of flying an approach.

I'm assuming here that it was a loss of control in IMC situation, because I can't imagine someone NOT pulling the chute quickly and without hesitation if a flight control or engine failure occurred IMC.

Hopefully enough survived the wreckage the investigators may be able to pull some flight data from the avionics memory cards.
 
But, then again, you're not instrument rated... :)

I'm with Troy. In non-convective IMC with no ice present...there would be no reason for a current IA pilot to avoid this flight.

Disclaimer: I'm not making a comment on this pilot or his qualifications. I'm just answering the quoted question.

Take a look at the picture again, take a look at your kids and wife. I'm just sayin. :dunno:

By yourself? Knock yourself out, been there done that. ;)
 
Take a look at the picture again, take a look at your kids and wife. I'm just sayin. :dunno:

By yourself? Knock yourself out, been there done that. ;)

I make that decision every time that I fly with them. IMC or not.
 
Re: 5 Dead In MO SR-22 Chrash

I am continually reminded that every pilot needs "Lord, don't let me screw up today" stenciled inside his eyeglasses.

Shepard's prayer - Alan Shepard. . . "Don't **** up, Shepard..." . . . translated as "don't let me **** up today. . ."
 
So the girl and the boy together weighed less than 170#??? Or was the young boy and Mom under 170?

The thing about these accidents is that the SR22 has a very capable AP to fly a coupled approach to decision height / MDA. I know I can fly an instrument approach more accurately than the AP most days - but the AP is a really one on the SR22 and probably better integrated than my Stec 60-2.

I still don't get descending to the ground . . . failure to set proper altimeter setting? You only get told them about 12000 times by ATC. I don't get these - unless the CG was so far back and when it was configured for landing that when he hit the throttle to go around he got a monster pitch up and could not control it and stalled it on . . . can any of the SR22 drivers here give us a CG point for the estimated weights in that photo - 170 plus 185 in the rear seat and 180 and perhaps 130 or 140 in the front with say 90 min of gas?
 
When I look at that family picture, I think of several times in the last 230 hours that I changed my mind on our destination. My kids are 12 & 9 and go with us on every trip. Even solo I would have made the same no-go decisions.

It was probably a very long day for Dad and the kids were asleep in the back. He probably just wanted to get them all home. Maybe ball practice early the next morning.

After doing a few fly-ins this summer and visiting several online forums almost every day, I am starting to see why the accident/fatality rates are so high. Safe pilots are not talked about and glamorized like the risk takers.

He was more than likely near the aft CG limit which made it very unstable and easy to over control.
 
but the AP is a really one on the SR22 and probably better integrated than
Lets not forget it was a 2002 Cirrus, I believe they came at that time with Stec-55X, I ain't saying it is bad, just not in the same league of accuracy and system integration as you get today with Garmin's GFC700.
 
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But, then again, you're not instrument rated... :)

I'm with Troy. In non-convective IMC with no ice present...there would be no reason for a current IA pilot to avoid this flight.

Disclaimer: I'm not making a comment on this pilot or his qualifications. I'm just answering the quoted question.

I am not instrument rated yet, either. But looking at SGF they have a couple of ILS approaches that should have made even OVC003 doable, if not advisable. Good approach lights, too. Sure, with a zero dew point spread visibility could go to nothing any moment.

I don't want to speculate, but the plane, pilot and destination seemed equipped to handle the weather conditions that have been discussed thus far. Help a newbie find the "smoking no-go" parameter.
 
I am not instrument rated yet, either. But looking at SGF they have a couple of ILS approaches that should have made even OVC003 doable, if not advisable. Good approach lights, too. Sure, with a zero dew point spread visibility could go to nothing any moment.

I don't want to speculate, but the plane, pilot and destination seemed equipped to handle the weather conditions that have been discussed thus far. Help a newbie find the "smoking no-go" parameter.

Fatigue, after a long day.
 
I am not instrument rated yet, either. But looking at SGF they have a couple of ILS approaches that should have made even OVC003 doable, if not advisable. Good approach lights, too. Sure, with a zero dew point spread visibility could go to nothing any moment.

I don't want to speculate, but the plane, pilot and destination seemed equipped to handle the weather conditions that have been discussed thus far. Help a newbie find the "smoking no-go" parameter.


All 3 of your kids on the same plane. ;)
 
I am not instrument rated yet, either. But looking at SGF they have a couple of ILS approaches that should have made even OVC003 doable, if not advisable. Good approach lights, too. Sure, with a zero dew point spread visibility could go to nothing any moment.

I don't want to speculate, but the plane, pilot and destination seemed equipped to handle the weather conditions that have been discussed thus far. Help a newbie find the "smoking no-go" parameter.

To me the biggest factor would be the currency and comfort level of the pilot. If he's fresh off of an IPC and has flown approaches to minimums in the last month...nothing stopping him. If he hasn't hand flown in several months...I wouldn't want to be in the air with him.

OVC003 isn't something that all instrument pilots will do. As a matter of fact, I might know more that won't than will. Many set their personal minimums somewhere between OVC005 and OVC010 on precision approaches.
 
Many set their personal minimums somewhere between OVC005 and OVC010 on precision approaches.
So, you set your "personal minimum" at OVC005 and the weather was forecast to be OVC007 but when you arrive it's really OVC003. The airport has an ILS. Do you shoot it or do you fly 30 minutes to another airport That also has an ILS and that's currently reporting OVC005? (and hope it stays there).

Me...

I shoot the ILS at my destination airport and I think most others would too.

This is why I think that---when it really comes down to it---there are no "personal minimums" and one should always be prepared to shoot the approach to the published minimums because the forecast is rarely right. If one isn't comfortable and/or proficient enough to consider doing that then one may want to consider driving that day.

If I'm rusty enough to question my ability to shoot an approach to minimums on a day that I might need to...I drive.
 
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I agree. If you want to fly in these conditions then you need to be able to do it to minimums. That being said everyone seems to be speculating that he made the mistake. Maybe he did i don't know and we may never know, but there is plenty of things that could have happened outside of his control, just so happened that the weather was crappy also. Engine/prop/flight control failures. Heart attack. I know these things are reaching a bit, but stuff happens sometimes. One could draw a many conclusions and maybe we can find out and learn something from this.. "Praying for the family."
 
Anyone know how to look up what the forecasted weather at the destination airport was when they might have been checking it before their launch? (hopefully that question makes sense!)
 
Nate,

I think that analysis is colored by your location. Here in the Midwest (and in many other locations, I'm sure), even if you don't know precisely where you are, as long as you're above about 800' - 1,500' (yes, these altitudes are location specific), add power and climb! Is there a possibility of a tower out there that'll smite you? Sure!

I was thinking the same thing
 
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All 3 of your kids on the same plane. ;)

Really? I assume then you never transport your family in anything less than a fleet of automobiles taking separate routes. :dunno: We will probably never know the exact chain of events in this tragedy, but the same could be said for many auto accidents where entire families perish. I have routinely flown to minimums in non-convective IMC with my entire family on board. Life is all about choices. People who fly make the choice to engage in this activity. Accidents happen.
 
David and Krista Guy of Walnut Grove were at home when they heard what sounded like the plane's engine cutting in and out before the crash."The house shook," Krista Guy said. "It was just unbelievable."

Looks to me that this could be related to an engine failure. Not rare since most engine failures happens at high power settings, like on take off and climb. They may have survived the crash if it was daytime. Sad indeed for a young family.

José
 
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All 3 of your kids on the same plane. ;)

IMHO (and also not IR) I think this is a poor parameter to making a go/ no-go decision.

Yes, my risk limits are different when my family is aboard, but not by much; I'm strictly point A to B, nothing in between.
 
To me the biggest factor would be the currency and comfort level of the pilot. If he's fresh off of an IPC and has flown approaches to minimums in the last month...nothing stopping him. If he hasn't hand flown in several months...I wouldn't want to be in the air with him.

OVC003 isn't something that all instrument pilots will do. As a matter of fact, I might know more that won't than will. Many set their personal minimums somewhere between OVC005 and OVC010 on precision approaches.

Currency is huge. I didn't look at the location of the crash but now is the time of year that most pilots are really not seeing much actual and are not very instrument current, myself included. October will be nice but also a time to get the foggles out and re-read some richard collins and robert buck publications...
 
David and Krista Guy of Walnut Grove were at home when they heard what sounded like the plane's engine cutting in and out before the crash."The house shook," Krista Guy said. "It was just unbelievable."

Observers always hear weird engine settings. It's public perception: engine sounds weird then airplane comes plummeting out of the sky; thank Hollywood for that

Looks to me that this could be related to an engine failure. Not rare since most engine failures happens at high power settings, like on take off and climb. They may have survived the crash if it was daytime. Sad indeed for a young family.

Sorry, sir. That's been debunked too. OWT.
 
Currency is huge. I didn't look at the location of the crash but now is the time of year that most pilots are really not seeing much actual and are not very instrument current, myself included. October will be nice but also a time to get the foggles out and re-read some richard collins and robert buck publications...

On point. There is no such thing as "good enough" in flying instruments. These are my rules:

1.) Find an instructor/safety pilot to practice with whose hobby is kicking kittens. (They will cut you no slack)

2.) Keep the equipment in your plane in top condition.

3.) Create and stick to your personal minimums 100% of the time.
 
I have no problem understanding why this is the case. Pulling a parachute is tantamount with admission "I screwed up, I am no good, I can't handle IFR, etc" and few pilots are ready to admit that. Pulling the chute is much easier psychologically if engine failed, something else failed but if it is only about the airmanship skills - they think they will ultimately be successful and drastic measures are not needed and would make them look weak.

Some pilots can't find their way to declare an emergency on the radio, either, when conditions warrant. Pulling the red handle involves more expense and (assured) property damage, while declaring does not (necessarily). There are plenty of evidence that the factors you mention are factors in declaring, too.

To me the biggest factor would be the currency and comfort level of the pilot. If he's fresh off of an IPC and has flown approaches to minimums in the last month...nothing stopping him. If he hasn't hand flown in several months...I wouldn't want to be in the air with him.

OVC003 isn't something that all instrument pilots will do. As a matter of fact, I might know more that won't than will. Many set their personal minimums somewhere between OVC005 and OVC010 on precision approaches.

Back when I was flying hard IFR more often than I do now (Gulf Coast), I would have no hesitation in flying into 300/2 on an ILS (see my comments elsewhere about flying into KNEW and Brazoria County), but I'd want a GOOD alternate. Although I do IPCs regularly, I currently set my personal mins between OVC005 and OVC010 depending on specific circumstances.
 
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