182 down knoxville

labbadabba said:
Yep, I'd argue if someone is lowering their risk assessment based upon whether or not they have BRS available then they need to evaluate where the macho mentality lies. I say that as one who thinks that the BRS is pretty good idea.
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I agree that a brs can be great ...but if it makes the pilot forget his other options and responsibilities then it does more detriment than good.
 
dennyleeb said:
So the others jumping to the conclusion that the pilot caused this didn't bother you. But somone offering a solution does. Interesting. Macho indeed!!
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One can buy a top end AWD SUV, with multiple air bags, anti-lock brakes, traction control and the best winter tires available on the planet. Doesn't mean it's a wise decision to load it with your family and go out in the middle of a snowstorm.

I'm not arguing against the merits of a chute, but sometimes when objectively weighing all the circumstances it's best to leave the vehicle in the garage/hangar. There's a big difference between using improved safety devices to overcome uncontrolled events, such as an engine failure, and using them to try to overcome the consequences of a lack of good judgement.
 
rtk11 said:
:(

Cajun, I think Tflhndn mentioned that he thought the pilot was on flight following. Wouldn't FF have alerted the pilot to climb to avoid terrain? I'm wondering if ATC radar could follow the flight in that mountainous area or not, especially if flying at 4,000 feet. (Serious question as a low time pilot still learning what FF can/can't do.)
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Not necessarily. It's likely, but not a given. FF is a great tool but certainly not a substitute for a navigational aid or ADM (just like the chute isn't). It's a tool in the bag, not a silver bullet.
 
I wish I understood why people want to jump to conclusions so much.

It's stupid to speculate. You want to know if he got disoriented? The wreckage pattern will tell you, usually rather clearly. There is also a characteristic CFIT pattern. That's not reported, so YOU DON'T KNOW. A radar track will also tell you what was going on at least on initial descent, and perhaps to really low altitudes (yes, even over mountains). So will ATC recordings. None of this is available, and almost all the speculation is KNOWN to be wrong. It was not night. 15 minutes out at 4PM, he was almost certainly descending in daylight. It may or may not have been IMC at that location -- and local METARs will NOT tell you what was going on over the mountains.
 
I flew just north of GKT on our way home to BGF on Monday at that time. For what it's worth, I took this photo as we were passing TYS so I could work out another issue on the ground later. Clouds were present throughout the entire flight. We climbed through around MOR, bases starting around 5,500' MSL and tops at 7,000 MSL. I don't recall hearing Knoxville Approach talking to them, but they couldn't been on another frequency. I don't like to be a Monday-morning quarterback, but looking at this track graph from Flightaware it appears that about 7 minutes or so before radar lost contact the aircraft entered a constant (not extreme) descent <position only flights must be enabled to view this track graph>. Purely a guess (and I will follow this and await the report because I fly through this area frequently), but based on my first hand observations of the weather in the vicinity at the time, it almost looks like he was VFR on top & descended through the cloud layer, probing, hoping to find the bottoms.
 

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BGF_Yankee said:
I flew just north of GKT on our way home to BGF on Monday at that time. For what it's worth, I took this photo as we were passing TYS so I could work out another issue on the ground later. Clouds were present throughout the entire flight. We climbed through around MOR, bases starting around 5,500' MSL and tops at 7,000 MSL. I don't recall hearing Knoxville Approach talking to them, but they couldn't been on another frequency. I don't like to be a Monday-morning quarterback, but looking at this track graph from Flightaware it appears that about 7 minutes or so before radar lost contact the aircraft entered a constant (not extreme) descent <position only flights must be enabled to view this track graph>. Purely a guess (and I will follow this and await the report because I fly through this area frequently), but based on my first hand observations of the weather in the vicinity at the time, it almost looks like he was VFR on top & descended through the cloud layer, probing, hoping to find the bottoms.
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The descent did look pretty normal on the graph and if he had an engine out I'd suspect he would have declared an emergency and/or deviated his course.
 
MAKG1 said:
It's stupid to speculate.
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I disagree.

For me, especially as a new pilot, I find it a useful exercise to think about all of the potential scenarios that could have led to this situation occurring. It helps me think about how I would respond in a similar situation and potentially avoid that same fate down the line. I haven't seen anyone say THIS IS WHAT HAPPENED!!! Rather, I've just seen folks offer various possibilities.

It's normal to wonder and, as pilots, I think it's healthy to try to analyze these things and think about how we can learn from them.

Obviously our knowledge is limited at this time and we will know more later. But I've yet to see a single person criticize or disrespect the pilot, so I'm not sure what there is to get up in arms about here.
 
Cajun_Flyer said:
I disagree.

For me, especially as a new pilot, I find it a useful exercise to think about all of the potential scenarios that could have led to this situation occurring. It helps me think about how I would respond in a similar situation and potentially avoid that same fate down the line. I haven't seen anyone say THIS IS WHAT HAPPENED!!! Rather, I've just seen folks offer various possibilities.

It's normal to wonder and, as pilots, I think it's healthy to try to analyze these things and think about how we can learn from them.

Obviously our knowledge is limited at this time and we will know more later. But I've yet to see a single person criticize or disrespect the pilot, so I'm not sure what there is to get up in arms about here.
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Couldn't agree more. If we all do nothing and wait for the final report to come out and then only discuss the facts of that case we are severely limiting the learning potential. Us noobs like me and Cajun want to learn about all potential scenarios that could have caused an incident like this to expand our safety awareness and knowledge in all situations.
 
tuwood said:
The descent did look pretty normal on the graph and if he had an engine out I'd suspect he would have declared an emergency and/or deviated his course.
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150 knots in a C182 also seems a bit fast if one were trying to maintain best glide speed (in the event of engine out).

Also, here is the last available METAR at GKT just prior to this. If my math for ZULU is incorrect, let me know and I'll pull the correct time.

METAR KGKT 262035Z AUTO 00000KT 10SM BKN050 OVC060 18/13 A3031 RMK=
 
tuwood said:
Couldn't agree more. If we all do nothing and wait for the final report to come out and then only discuss the facts of that case we are severely limiting the learning potential. Us noobs like me and Cajun want to learn about all potential scenarios that could have caused an incident like this to expand our safety awareness and knowledge in all situations.
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Not just noobs. I am definitely not (in powered airplanes), but still follow accident and incident reports closely, ever since I became interested in flying. Speculating is an excellent mechanism to bring forward and discuss various theories and strategies, including possible errors, regardless of whether they apply to the case in point. Anyone waiting for a final report to discuss these things is missing out on an important safety tool.
 
I live in the piedmont of North Carolina. We call that area "North Korea" with the respect to the places to make an emergency landing.
 
Cajun_Flyer said:
I disagree.

For me, especially as a new pilot, I find it a useful exercise to think about all of the potential scenarios that could have led to this situation occurring. It helps me think about how I would respond in a similar situation and potentially avoid that same fate down the line. I haven't seen anyone say THIS IS WHAT HAPPENED!!! Rather, I've just seen folks offer various possibilities.

It's normal to wonder and, as pilots, I think it's healthy to try to analyze these things and think about how we can learn from them.

Obviously our knowledge is limited at this time and we will know more later. But I've yet to see a single person criticize or disrespect the pilot, so I'm not sure what there is to get up in arms about here.
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Until you see the report, you don't know what happened, and could be very easily preparing for the wrong thing.

With the fairly recent Lake Tahoe crash, all the initial speculation was about VFR into IMC. When we found the wreck and analyzed the radar track, it was something entirely different. There was no loss of control, nor was there any evidence the autopilot was in use at the time of the crash (it probably was beforehand, though). It was a strong downdraft. The pilot made a controlled left turn toward lower terrain and didn't make it before the downdraft killed him. The lessons learned are completely different. It's about managing "outs" and wind speeds in the high mountains.

Especially with risk analysis, there is often a very big difference between perception and reality. This is quite important.

So, why can't you learn as much from a year old crash as one that happened last week? The year old crash will have been analyzed and a lot more information about the real risks are available.

It's quite possible all the "possibilities" are completely wrong and the aircraft threw a prop in the mountains. It wouldn't be the first time.
 
This is very sad, especially at this time of year. The news says the boy was 8 years old. I agree it is good to discuss what could possibly have happened and maybe help someone else avoid a similar situation. We don't need to shoot at each other, though :).

Based on what the weather here in Memphis was, and the initial shots I saw on the news, I would vote for VFR into IMC, which causes a lot of accidents as we all know. Also, if you have never flown in mountainous areas at lower altitudes when it is windy like Bill said, you would be surprised how it tosses an airplane around. Significant deviations in heading, pitch, roll and yaw sometimes need full control deflection or nearly so to get back level and headed in the right direction, only to immediately start again. If you were from Florida or somewhere else flat, you might not be familiar with how this feels. Further, if you were in IMC or close, it would be horrible, even for someone with an instrument rating. Be careful with winds over mountainous terrain, even if you aren't flying in the Rockies.
 
RotorDude said:
I hate to harp on it, but flying serious cross country without an instrument rating and instrument capable plane is playing Russian Roulette with your pax. :(
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Yep. It seems like all the trips where I am actually flying somewhere I have to file at least 1 way. Most of my trips wouldn't be possible or would be severely delayed if I didn't have my rating.

I know people say just wait out the good weather- but for many people the "get there itis" is just too strong- even more so around the holidays. Having that rating gives you more options and options=safety when it comes it comes to flying.
 
neilw2 said:
I know people say just wait out the good weather- but for many people the "get there itis" is just too strong- even more so around the holidays. Having that rating gives you more options and options=safety when it comes it comes to flying.
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Exactly. Those who say "just wait for good VFR" are either naive, inexperienced, or both. When you have a family who expect their "hero" pilot to fly them to Grandma's for the holidays, there is tremendous pressure to deliver, and the holidays don't wait for VFR weather.
BTW, the same pressure might exist when you are IFR rated but flying non-FIKI, etc. So getting the IR is not a magic cure, but it gives you more options.
 
Cajun_Flyer said:
I disagree.

For me, especially as a new pilot, I find it a useful exercise to think about all of the potential scenarios that could have led to this situation occurring. It helps me think about how I would respond in a similar situation and potentially avoid that same fate down the line. I haven't seen anyone say THIS IS WHAT HAPPENED!!! Rather, I've just seen folks offer various possibilities.

It's normal to wonder and, as pilots, I think it's healthy to try to analyze these things and think about how we can learn from them.

Obviously our knowledge is limited at this time and we will know more later. But I've yet to see a single person criticize or disrespect the pilot, so I'm not sure what there is to get up in arms about here.
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Agree. Folks are just throwing thoughts and opinions MAKG, not trying to do the NTSB's job. You have S&R experience flying in the CAP, good for you. But I don't think trying to tell POAers not to discuss and speculate hurts a damn thing. Besides, no one is going to listen to you anyway, nor me, nor Cajun, and especially that SkyDog character. Oh and Mulligan, wherever he's at.
 
Hank S said:
I've flown in that area VFR and IFR, but mostly in VMC. It's not somewhere you want to have mechanical trouble and a forced landing, chute or not. I would expect that any pilot planning a flight there would pay attention to the terrain and plan a descent rather than starting a "normal" descent based on time or distance to destination. But we don't know what he did, or the circumstances . . . The tapes should reveal something.
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I always try to give myself some options. Last time I flew IMC I flew at 11k there and 12k back. I've considered going around the west side of the smokies to at least stay within gliding distance of something flat. I'll be curious to hear if there was a mechanical failure or if this was strictly pilot error.
 
mscard88 said:
Agree. Folks are just throwing thoughts and opinions MAKG, not trying to do the NTSB's job. You have S&R experience flying in the CAP, good for you. But I don't think trying to tell POAers not to discuss and speculate hurts a damn thing. Besides, no one is going to listen to you anyway, nor me, nor Cajun, and especially that SkyDog character. Oh and Mulligan, wherever he's at.
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There have been several posts along the lines of "I do/have XXXX so I'm immune." Mainly, BRS and instrument ratings.

Yes, that does real harm. The real point of this is to try to brush it aside as "that guy was stupid and I'm not so I'm OK." There may be some REAL lessons to learn here. Flying over mountains is not like flying over flats, but maybe that's irrelevant. The wreckage was found fairly quickly, which suggests a good radar track -- or a fire. That's information you really need to discuss this accident close to intelligently.

Speculation is AT BEST a waste of time. You have next to no information. You are not discussing an accident; you are discussing a work of fiction.

If you really want to manage threats, you discuss ACTUAL risks, not whatever you can live with most easily. They are very frequently disparate.
 
Cajun_Flyer said:
I disagree.

For me, especially as a new pilot, I find it a useful exercise to think about all of the potential scenarios that could have led to this situation occurring. It helps me think about how I would respond in a similar situation and potentially avoid that same fate down the line. I haven't seen anyone say THIS IS WHAT HAPPENED!!! Rather, I've just seen folks offer various possibilities.

It's normal to wonder and, as pilots, I think it's healthy to try to analyze these things and think about how we can learn from them.

Obviously our knowledge is limited at this time and we will know more later. But I've yet to see a single person criticize or disrespect the pilot, so I'm not sure what there is to get up in arms about here.
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I completely agree. We're not writing the NTSB report. We're self educating. Nothing wrong with that. In fact, I think it's commendable, and we owe it to our passengers and our families to do so.
 
MAKG1 said:
If you really want to manage threats, you discuss ACTUAL risks, not whatever you can live with most easily. They are very frequently disparate.
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The fallacy in your reasoning is the assumption that the actual risk from this accident (as determined by the NTSB in 2 plus years) will be the actual risk any of us may face in some future encounter, rather than some other potential risk that we might discuss and learn about in the context of a possible explanation of this accident. Maybe this accident actually has nothing to do with winds over mountainous areas. But now some of the less experienced pilots may learn something about that risk and thereby avoid an accident somewhere down the road.
 
PPC1052 said:
The fallacy in your reasoning is the assumption that the actual risk from this accident (as determined by the NTSB in 2 plus years) will be the actual risk any of us may face in some future encounter, rather than some other potential risk that we might discuss and learn about in the context of a possible explanation of this accident. Maybe this accident actually has nothing to do with winds over mountainous areas. But now some of the less experienced pilots may learn something about that risk and thereby avoid an accident somewhere down the road.
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If that's the case, pick a 5 year old accident and go at it.

Why not? Because it doesn't help the "I'm immune" argument. And the resistance to it proves the point. An accident doesn't have to still be warm to the touch to learn something from it. In fact, it's substantially better for this learning argument if it has enough age that people know what actually happened.

What EXACTLY has changed in the last 5 years? Why THIS accident and not, say, one that's understood? Answer that question, and you might understand what's really going on here. Hint: it's not a dispassionate analysis of the facts.

It's not a fallacy that what actually happens in an accident is a real set of risks that some pilot actually faced. Making up your own storyline says what you are afraid of, not what the risks are. Maybe they align, maybe they don't.
 
PPC1052 said:
Just like in this accident: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/art...kills-businessman-Ray-Harris-2-daughters.html
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One of the biggest challenges that the Cirrus Owners Pilots Association (COPA) has found with pilots is getting them to pull the chute sooner rather than later. There have been dozens of fatal Cirrus accidents that would have had a very high likelihood of everyone walking away if the pilot would have just pulled the chute sooner.
The Ray Harris incident isn't so much a CFIT as it is a chain of events with a pilot who had other priorities on his mind throughout that flight. He was more worried about getting socked in at an IFR field then he was about getting down safe.
For those that haven't watched it yet, I can't encourage you enough to take 15 minutes and watch the video about this very incident:

For CFIT's in general I'd tend to think the chute doesn't offer a lot of value because by the time you realize what's going on it's too late. The Cirrus airframe parachute system (CAPS) has to be pulled above 500' or 600' (G5) AGL (900' in a spin) to be fully effective. There have been saves at lower altitudes, but in general if you're flying along in clouds and your windshield suddenly gets green you're likely already toast (chute or not).
I'd argue synthetic vision as a much better solution to avoid CFIT scenarios. Nothing's 100%, but since Cirrus went to synthetic vision on their aircraft CFIT's are virtually unheard of.
 
tuwood said:
I'd argue synthetic vision as a much better solution to avoid CFIT scenarios. Nothing's 100%, but since Cirrus went to synthetic vision on their aircraft CFIT's are virtually unheard of.
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I heartily agree.
 
Somedudeintn said:
I always try to give myself some options. Last time I flew IMC I flew at 11k there and 12k back. I've considered going around the west side of the smokies to at least stay within gliding distance of something flat. I'll be curious to hear if there was a mechanical failure or if this was strictly pilot error.
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Early in my piloting I was over that area at 9k (3k above the tallest peaks) on a day I shouldn't have been flying. I forgot to check air/sigmets, and there was a tango out for moderate turb. I got into an area of sink (whilst being tossed about), and even though I was pitched for Vy[1], I lost 1500ft before I got out of the sink. Luckily I still had 1500ft over the peaks, but it was a real eye opener.

[1] So, that day I pitched for Vy, but I know in the soaring world one flies fast thru sink, slow in thermals. What say all of you? Fly fast in sink to get out sooner, or fly Vy to preserve what altitude you have? Maybe the plane plays a part in the decision, that day I was in a 160hp skyhawk and is slow, the Mooney is fast and slick, I'd probably run in the Mooney.
 
MAKG1 said:
If that's the case, pick a 5 year old accident and go at it.

Why not? Because it doesn't help the "I'm immune" argument. And the resistance to it proves the point. An accident doesn't have to still be warm to the touch to learn something from it. In fact, it's substantially better for this learning argument if it has enough age that people know what actually happened.

What EXACTLY has changed in the last 5 years? Why THIS accident and not, say, one that's understood? Answer that question, and you might understand what's really going on here. Hint: it's not a dispassionate analysis of the facts.

It's not a fallacy that what actually happens in an accident is a real set of risks that some pilot actually faced. Making up your own storyline says what you are afraid of, not what the risks are. Maybe they align, maybe they don't.
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It's all about what's in the news. I do go back and read historical factual reports and am pretty sure I've read every fatal report for Cirrus since they came to be. However, I'd say I'm in the minority.
Many pilots see what's going on today via the news and whatever and glean what they can from it. I know you're concerned with safety and people knowing the facts, but that's irrelevant when it comes to Joe pilot flying his family next weekend. What's relevant is that Joe six pack might have caught a little nugget about winds in the mountains from a discussion about a crash like this and read up a little more on it and thought twice about the flight he's planning.

I'm fairly sure that almost all incidents like this are either VFR into IMC resulting in Spatial Disorientation, or CFIT but it doesn't mean those are the only things we should be studying.
 
Bill Jennings said:
Early in my piloting I was over that area at 9k (3k above the tallest peaks) on a day I shouldn't have been flying. I forgot to check air/sigmets, and there was a tango out for moderate turb. .......
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if I didn't fly every time there was a mod turb warning I'd have very few flying days, I reckon. over the mtns, that's another story.
 
MAKG1 said:
If that's the case, pick a 5 year old accident and go at it.

.
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There are two primary ways to study for a test/learn a subject matter. You can start with a bank of questions and use your critical thinking skills to work towards figuring out the solutions, or you can look at the questions, flip to the back of the study guide for the answers and then try to work out how those answers were achieved.

Neither method is necessarily more right or wrong than the other, and each method works better for some than others. I employ both methods, but, ultimately, I learn a lot more when I work forward from a set of questions than I do working backward from the answers.

Different people learn and process subjects differently. Reading old accident reports is definitely a great learning tool - I do it often. But so is analyzing newer incidents for which the cause has yet to be determined.

I can definitely say that some lessons I have taken away from recent incidents, such as the Cirrus incident in Houston over the summer, have already made me a much better pilot.
 
MAKG1 said:
There have been several posts along the lines of "I do/have XXXX so I'm immune." Mainly, BRS and instrument ratings.

Yes, that does real harm. The real point of this is to try to brush it aside as "that guy was stupid and I'm not so I'm OK." There may be some REAL lessons to learn here. Flying over mountains is not like flying over flats, but maybe that's irrelevant. The wreckage was found fairly quickly, which suggests a good radar track -- or a fire. That's information you really need to discuss this accident close to intelligently.

Speculation is AT BEST a waste of time. You have next to no information. You are not discussing an accident; you are discussing a work of fiction.

If you really want to manage threats, you discuss ACTUAL risks, not whatever you can live with most easily. They are very frequently disparate.
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:sigh: ...you can say all you want, ain't gonna change pilots discussing this accident on POA or at the local FBO in TYS.
 
eman1200 said:
if I didn't fly every time there was a mod turb warning I'd have very few flying days, I reckon. over the mtns, that's another story.
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The worst turbulence I've ever felt was downwind of a mountain when the winds aloft were about 50kts. Fortunately I avoided the big mountains and thought being downwind of the little mountain wouldn't matter much. Man I got bounced around pretty good. It was a good lesson.
 
MAKG1 said:
There have been several posts along the lines of "I do/have XXXX so I'm immune." Mainly, BRS and instrument ratings.

Yes, that does real harm. The real point of this is to try to brush it aside as "that guy was stupid and I'm not so I'm OK." There may be some REAL lessons to learn here. Flying over mountains is not like flying over flats, but maybe that's irrelevant...
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Flying over mountains may or may not prove relevant in this specific instance, as you note. But as someone who lives on the lee side of the Rockies I couldn't agree more with your statement.

Airframe chutes, moving maps, synthetic vision and the other "purchase-for-money" safety enhancing equipment can be used to further mitigate the same risks & consequences others who don't have them face. Or one can use their presence to take greater risks than others in less well equipped airplanes might not. That nuance seems to be missing in much of the generalized discussion with the undertone "You are an idiot if you fly without...".

I look upon all this stuff as somewhat analogous to PPE in the high risk industrial environments I have spent much of my career in. PPE is (and should be) the last line of defence to protect after everything else - including training, hazard assessments, procedures and any backup redundancy - has failed.
 
James331 said:
With how long it takes the average guy who gets in over his head in the soup to toss in the towl

Plus impact time to a random CFIT

Is that enough time to pull?
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Yes, there is time for the average guy who gets in over his head in the soup with proper training. "Pull early; pull often."

No, there is not time to say the first word of a prayer in CFIT. So pray before you take-off. :rolleyes:
 
MAKG1 said:
If that's the case, pick a 5 year old accident and go at it.

Why not? Because it doesn't help the "I'm immune" argument. And the resistance to it proves the point.
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Proves nothing. People do the same "I'm immune" argument with NTSB reports, or any other accident that has been well vetted. It's a common human defense mechanism that we all must strive against. Your "speculation" boogey man is just a red herring.
 
ntinkle said:
Yes, there is time for the average guy who gets in over his head in the soup with proper training. "Pull early; pull often."
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Man, I sure hope that I'm not putting myself in positions that I need to "pull often." If so, I think I need to re-evaluate my decision making process. Not a slam on the BRS at all. I know what you're saying though, and I don't disagree. As pilots, we are hard wired not to pull if we can rationalize some chance of success without it and to not accept the full significance of the conditions we find ourselves in. This training is obviously pretty beneficial to break pilots of that so the BRS can do what it was intended to do and save some lives.
 
In the 80's a good friend of my dad and his pregnant girlfriend went from Rome, GA up to Gatlinburg for a long weekend. They took an IFR equipped C172. The pilot was not IFR certified. The wx deteriorated very quickly as those who have frequented the smoky mountains know much about. For whatever reason instead of executing the 180 and getting out of there he continued. Resulted in CFIT killing them all. The family used 3 caskets for the burial. It was a good burned in lesson for me as a young-in bound for a life in aviation. Condolences
 
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