737 down off Honolulu

I guess those pilots careers won't remain un-sully-ed.
 
This should become a case study in radio communications (not good) and emergency declarations (needless badgering at a critical time).

One of the pilots sounded like he was wearing an oxygen mask or had a mouthful of oatmeal and numerous transmissions were blocked because ATC couldn't determine when his mic was keyed or unkeyed. I once made a device that sent out an aural beep-tone (middle "C") the instant the mic is keyed to help prevent blocked transmissions and loved it until it broke. Occasionally, I'd get a complaint from ATC, but only in the form of an advisement, since they didn't know my radio was operating exactly as I intended it.

As for "declaring", this is why I hate the thought of it. Right away ATC wants to butt into your mental situation and distract you from what you're trying to figure out with needless questions that can be answered later.

As I listened, the L-1011 out of Ft. Lauderdale (Miami?) came to mind. I can't believe maintenance would make the same mistake. Ok, I can.
 
This should become a case study in radio communications (not good) and emergency declarations (needless badgering at a critical time).
Didn't help there appeared to be only a single controller on duty covering all frequencies. She really needed to put everyone else on hold and deal with the emergency.
 
Didn't help there appeared to be only a single controller on duty covering all frequencies. She really needed to put everyone else on hold and deal with the emergency.

I thought she wasn't doing a very good job, with her staccato delivery that repeatedly stepped on pilot transmissions. She didn't give them a chance for replies and readbacks.
 
I may have misheard the transmission, the whole mouthful of oatmeal thing, but did they say they weren't ready to land just yet??

I would assume if you're close to an airport and you're having an engine issue or failure you would secure that engine and get on the ground as soon as possible..
 
I thought she did fine. I’ve heard far worse under normal circumstances
 
…and you're having an engine issue or failure you would secure that engine and get on the ground as soon as possible..
I haven’t read or seen anything on this accident except what’s in this thread and I haven’t clicked on any links either, so this is totally responsible journalism…

Landing weight comes to mind when I think delaying a landing immediately after takeoff.

Could also be the crew still trying to assess the options. I can imagine with one motor having taken a dump and the remaining one starting to show indications changing the conversation from ‘how overweight are we?’ to ‘well, think we’re gonna take a bath?’ pretty quick. Entirely different decision sets.
 
I may have misheard the transmission, the whole mouthful of oatmeal thing, but did they say they weren't ready to land just yet??
..

sounded to me like they asked for delay vectors so they could run a checklist
 
Hey, I can write like that too! "The driver of a 2018 Ford Explorer lost control of the vehicle Saturday on Highway 27, and struck two trees, a fencepost and a fire hydrant. The driver was arrested for suspected DUI. In 1978 a recall was issued for 1.5 million Ford vehicles because of defective design that caused numerous injuries and fatalities, and resulted in a jury verdict of $2.5 million in compensatory damages and $3.5 million in punitive damages against Ford Motor Company, after the jury found the company had acted in conscious disregard of safety."

How'd I do? Can I get a J-school degree now?


Not bad at all. I suggest that perhaps you might toss in a line or two about Firestone tires and you're all set!
 
I haven’t read or seen anything on this accident except what’s in this thread and I haven’t clicked on any links either, so this is totally responsible journalism…

Landing weight comes to mind when I think delaying a landing immediately after takeoff.

Could also be the crew still trying to assess the options. I can imagine with one motor having taken a dump and the remaining one starting to show indications changing the conversation from ‘how overweight are we?’ to ‘well, think we’re gonna take a bath?’ pretty quick. Entirely different decision sets.
Per regulation, they’re landing “at the nearest suitable airport with respect to time” (or very similar verbiage) in the event of an engine failure. If landing weight is more than a “we’re over landing weight, land gently. Vref is...” consideration, it shouldn’t be.
 
I thought she wasn't doing a very good job, with her staccato delivery that repeatedly stepped on pilot transmissions. She didn't give them a chance for replies and readbacks.

Not saying she did a bad job, but there are things to use for training in that tape for future controllers. In her excitement, she did a lot of stepping on their transmissions and considering she had no backup, probably should have been more aggressive at telling other aircraft to standby,
 
Don't know what initial checklist they would have done. In the NG and MAX 737s, I've never flown the original, we do the following...

One of the following checklists:
  • ENGINE FIRE OR ENGINE SEVERE DAMAGE OR SEPARATION checklist (17 steps)
  • ENGINE LIMIT OR SURGE OR STALL checklist (16 steps)
  • ENGINE FAILURE OR SHUTDOWN (15 steps)
Those all lead to the ONE ENGINE INOPERATIVE LANDING CHECKLIST (7 steps including checking the non-normal landing distance charts)

When the second engine goes there's the LOSS OF THRUST IN BOTH ENGINES checklist (30 steps - obviously assumes you're at cruise altitude)

Finally, there's the DESCENT CHECKLIST and the BEFORE LANDING CHECKLISTS.

Obviously, in their situation you reach a point when you have to abandon all that and land. I guess you'd then do the DITCHING CHECKLIST (7 steps)

That's why you'll always here airliners tell ATC that they need time to run checklists before returning to land.
 
Larry is absolutely correct. An engine failure is a BOAT LOAD of checklists. It’s kinda ridiculous, purposely delaying getting on the ground. It all stems from the FAA (goaded by airlines cutting costs?) going on the assumption that multiple failures CANNOT occur. As evidenced by them disallowing multiple emergencies on check rides and training. That happened about 15 years or more ago.

Proper checklist management being more important than enough aviation acumen to just land... THAT is what stuck that jet in the clink.

Will be very interesting to know what happened to those engines... Running hot is odd. These things can take A LOT of over temp abuse before they FAIL. I’ve ALWAYS been a screw the temp, use what ya need to NOT crash philosophy. I hope they didn’t lose it trying to avoid over temps, I’ve seen that about take down a turbo prop.

Not enough info to really surmise anything.
 
Larry is absolutely correct. An engine failure is a BOAT LOAD of checklists. It’s kinda ridiculous, purposely delaying getting on the ground. It all stems from the FAA (goaded by airlines cutting costs?) going on the assumption that multiple failures CANNOT occur. As evidenced by them disallowing multiple emergencies on check rides and training. That happened about 15 years or more ago.

Proper checklist management being more important than enough aviation acumen to just land... THAT is what stuck that jet in the clink.

Will be very interesting to know what happened to those engines... Running hot is odd. These things can take A LOT of over temp abuse before they FAIL. I’ve ALWAYS been a screw the temp, use what ya need to NOT crash philosophy. I hope they didn’t lose it trying to avoid over temps, I’ve seen that about take down a turbo prop.

Not enough info to really surmise anything.

Shades of Air Florida 90. Ain’t climbing, push the throttles forward, screw the gauges. Anyway, way I remember the tape on this one, when they noticed the overheat on the second engine they turned toward the airport then. They didn’t continue away from it while ‘check listing’ and trouble shooting.
 
Larry is absolutely correct. An engine failure is a BOAT LOAD of checklists. It’s kinda ridiculous, purposely delaying getting on the ground. It all stems from the FAA (goaded by airlines cutting costs?) going on the assumption that multiple failures CANNOT occur. As evidenced by them disallowing multiple emergencies on check rides and training. That happened about 15 years or more ago.

Proper checklist management being more important than enough aviation acumen to just land... THAT is what stuck that jet in the clink.

Will be very interesting to know what happened to those engines... Running hot is odd. These things can take A LOT of over temp abuse before they FAIL. I’ve ALWAYS been a screw the temp, use what ya need to NOT crash philosophy. I hope they didn’t lose it trying to avoid over temps, I’ve seen that about take down a turbo prop.

Not enough info to really surmise anything.
I have had more than one instructor chuff at my willingness to dump the checklist on the other guy while I landed. Sometimes the outcome is in doubt and it’s just time to put the plane on the ground in a controlled manner rather than an uncontrolled manner.
 
Faa good. Any criticism of Faa bad. Feel better?

swing-and-miss-gif-4.gif
 
My money is on fuel contaminated with DEF.

Have to wonder if they hit birds after takeoff.

That would explain the first engine out, and would give credence to the second engine “over heating” as it was disintegrating after the bird ingestion.

The engines are slung low, and for sake of argument they could have ingested several birds into the intakes and not hit them with the nose cone or windshields.
 
Those all lead to the ONE ENGINE INOPERATIVE LANDING CHECKLIST (7 steps including checking the non-normal landing distance charts)
...

Finally, there's the DESCENT CHECKLIST and the BEFORE LANDING CHECKLISTS.
...
That's why you'll always here airliners tell ATC that they need time to run checklists before returning to land.
They could save some time if the "One Engine Inoperative Landing" checklist and "Before Landing" checklist were combined, don't you think?
 
They could save some time if the "One Engine Inoperative Landing" checklist and "Before Landing" checklist were combined, don't you think?

The airplane I fly has a OEI landing checklist, and you do not have to refer to the normal before landing checklist. But that may vary between airplanes and operators.
 
They could save some time if the "One Engine Inoperative Landing" checklist and "Before Landing" checklist were combined, don't you think?
They are, in the QRH. The DESCENT and BEFORE LANDING checklists are re-printed at the end of the ONE ENGINE INOPERATVE LANDING checklist as DEFERRED ITEMS.

They are modified to the extent that procedures on them are changed due to the non-normal situation. In this case, setting landing speeds for Vref15 or Vref ICE, as applicable, configuring for a bleeds-off landing, reviewing the single-engine go-around procedure, and the different final flap setting.

In this case, the DESCENT CHECKLIST is significantly longer than the normal DESCENT CHECKLIST due to all of those added items. The LANDING checklist is changed only in have "______, Green Light" response changed to "15, Green Light".

Then there's also an ABBREVIATED AFTER TAKEOFF CHECKLIST for use if the engine-out approach ends in a go-around.
 
While some guys still elect to use the paper QRH, this is a time where the iPad version is a big help - being able to tap a link to a new spot in the checklist really saves time over flipping around.
 
While some guys still elect to use the paper QRH, this is a time where the iPad version is a big help - being able to tap a link to a new spot in the checklist really saves time over flipping around.
I agree. Going from a plane with a paper checklist to now one with an Electronic Checklist (ECL), it’s amazing how much easier and more organized everything becomes with the ECL rather than the paper QRH. Sometimes technology is a good thing.
 
I agree. Going from a plane with a paper checklist to now one with an Electronic Checklist (ECL), it’s amazing how much easier and more organized everything becomes with the ECL rather than the paper QRH. Sometimes technology is a good thing.
I'll take your word for it. I got my first taste of a turbojet 47 years ago, a Lear 23, flying essentially at the same altitudes and airspeeds as today's jets. ALL the Normal and Emergency checklists resided on just one 8 and1/2 X 11 laminated sheet, Normals on one side, Emergencies on the other. Later, at another Learjet employer, the before takeoff checklist could be written on the inside cover of a matchbook, a checklist handed down by John "Dutch" Deutschendorf Sr., John Denver's father.
 
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I'll take your word for it. I got my first taste of a turbojet 47 years ago, a Lear 23, flying essentially at the same altitudes and airspeeds as today's jets. ALL the Normal and Emergency checklists resided on just one 8 and1/2 X 11 laminated sheet, Normals on one side, Emergencies on the other. Later, at another employer, the before takeoff checklist could be written on the inside cover of a matchbook, a checklist handed down by John "Dutch" Deutschendorf Sr., John Denver's father.

Lots of things have changed in 57 years, mostly good. Perhaps some bad.
 
I'll take your word for it. I got my first taste of a turbojet 47 years ago, a Lear 23, flying essentially at the same altitudes and airspeeds as today's jets. ALL the Normal and Emergency checklists resided on just one 8 and1/2 X 11 laminated sheet, Normals on one side, Emergencies on the other. Later, at another Learjet employer, the before takeoff checklist could be written on the inside cover of a matchbook, a checklist handed down by John "Dutch" Deutschendorf Sr., John Denver's father.
One of the not so awesome trends of modern aviation is the development of procedures and checklists that are written for people that have no idea what’s going on with the aircraft. A myth has perpetuated that newer aircraft are to complex for pilots to manage without procedures written for a monkey.

I think it’s even worse in aircraft like the airbus that have emergency and abnormal checklists integrated into the annunciation system. It gives the impression that the aircraft is smart when it’s nothing more than a fancy annunciation light that recalls a checklist along with the annunciation.

It doesn’t matter though… we are on a trajectory to remove crew from the flight deck and I see all of these changes as small steps towards the goal of removing pilots from the process entirely.
 
One of the not so awesome trends of modern aviation is the development of procedures and checklists that are written for people that have no idea what’s going on with the aircraft. A myth has perpetuated that newer aircraft are to complex for pilots to manage without procedures written for a monkey.

I think it’s even worse in aircraft like the airbus that have emergency and abnormal checklists integrated into the annunciation system. It gives the impression that the aircraft is smart when it’s nothing more than a fancy annunciation light that recalls a checklist along with the annunciation.

It doesn’t matter though… we are on a trajectory to remove crew from the flight deck and I see all of these changes as small steps towards the goal of removing pilots from the process entirely.

So what are you proposing? Go back to paper checklist and procedures? Remove automation such as EICAS and ECAM?
 
So what are you proposing? Go back to paper checklist and procedures? Remove automation such as EICAS and ECAM?
ECAM and EICAS are not automation. They are annunciation systems. My comments were directed towards training/SOP and apply to paper checklists the same as electronic checklists.
 
ECAM and EICAS are not automation. They are annunciation systems. My comments were directed towards training/SOP and apply to paper checklists the same as electronic checklists.

Still don’t get what you are trying to accomplish.

On the Airbus we would pull up the QRH when we had an ECAM alert, and follow the steps as written, and verify against the ECAM. The ECAM was useful in that if you skipped a step, the ECAM would still show what was missed.

Pretty much the same technique on the Boeing with the EICAS. (Disclaimer: I haven’t been on the Boeing in almost a decade)

Not sure how you determine the ECAM or EICAS are not part of automation.

BTW, what equipment are you currently on?
 
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