4 questions I am stumped on.

If cowboy is being a little too conservative in his approach, yours sounds a bit too cavalier, perhaps unintentionally.

"It's no big deal; it's still visual" Sounds like a classic VFR into IMC scenario to me.

Exactly.

In over 30 years and 6200+ hours of flying, all of it GA single engine, I've never gotten scared or worried in the air by being too conservative with my judgement/decision-making.

It's whenever I would stupidly let my butt write checks that my face couldn't cash that I had to whip out the proctologist's card upon landing and call him to help me remove the seat cover I sucked up.

Regards.

-JD
 
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...in weather conditions that are marginal at best, may have been unpredicted (not generally a good sign), and, even if they were known in advance, like a 1.2 NM marine haze, have a excellent chance of degrading into IFR very quickly (do they really go up to 3 SM at the edge of the segmented circle?).

If cowboy is being a little too conservative in his approach, yours sounds a bit too cavalier, perhaps unintentionally.

"It's no big deal; it's still visual" Sounds like a classic VFR into IMC scenario to me.

You did not see me write, "It's no big deal." What I wrote was it is an approved minimum, exactly like the Class G minimum. And for a licensed pilot, they can get down to as close to the minimum as their personal flight limitations will allow, and be legal. And that getting down near the minimum is NOT for anyone with a license. That does not sound like "no big deal" to me. On the other hand, where the situation is a common low haze condition that everyone in the LA basin is aware of, and deals with much of the year, and that does not deteriorate rapidly to IMC -- for some pilots that fly in that all the time it probably is, "no big deal" under those expected circumstances.

I think a lot of this dispute is different people are looking at different ends of the scale of situations that could call for an SVFR solution. An airport goes into IMC at the bottom end of VFR minimums, not at the bottom end of SVFR minimums. At vis 3 miles you can land VFR at a controlled airport, but at vis 2.9 miles you can't. But 10 miles away at an uncontolled airport in G airspace you are still good to go down to vis 1 mile if your personal flight limits will allow. I would guess that some of those commenting here are probably flying in or out of uncontrolled airports at vis less than 3 miles themselves occasionally. All I am saying is that just because it is a controlled airport, and you need to ask for an SVFR clearance to do what you could and would do without much fuss if the airport were uncontrolled, does not make SVFR something only for dire circumstances. If that were the case, the rules would certainly not let you takoff under SVFR.

You mix apples and oranges when you combine comments about using SVFR for an unpredicted weather change, and using it as a licensed pilot as part of a planned flight in a known stable inversion haze. No one should object to using SVFR to solve an unexpected weather problem. IT WAS UNEXPECTED! What are the alternatives, once it happens? At that point it is to late to decide not to fly that day. As for the other, the haze exists BECAUSE the inversion is stable and the trapped air is stagnant. Every pilot should realisticly evaluate his ability, and set his own flight limits somewhere above the legal minimums. And in evaluating if the proposed flight is a go or no go, the weather brief and familiarity with the stability of the weather at the specific airport(s) of intended use all fit into that assessment of if it is within your personal limits or not. I have personally never asked for an SVFR clearance. I have landed VFR with what was probably a little less than 3 miles visability at an uncontrolled airport, perhaps twice. They were not memorable events. Nowhere near the seat cover sucking events Cowboy has apparently had. My VFR personal limits have moved a little toward the minimums since I began working on my IR; but they are still well above the bottom end of the scale, and higher for takoff than landing.

My only point is that SVFR does not indicate a mistake. It is a tool to solve problems, to be used when appropriate. Routine use will not be appropriate for everyone with a license. And reminding everyone it is a visual approach and landing is just to address the several misplaced comments about needing a lot of hood time to use it.
 
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Sounds like you think that learning ends after the checkride. . .

A student goes up in to the practice area to learn basic maneuver--flight into IMC not being one of them.

A HUGE part of being a student pilot is habit-patterning, and the number one habit a student needs to learn is the "go/no-go" decision.

the number one habit a student needs to learn is the "go/no-go" decision.
the number one habit a student needs to learn is the "go/no-go" decision.
the number one habit a student needs to learn is the "go/no-go" decision.
the number one habit a student needs to learn is the "go/no-go" decision.

Just thought that needed to be repeated a few times to sink in. I can vividly recall several situation where I asked myself "What the f*** have you gotten yourself into..." Where this really gets put to the test though is when you get your first job flying utility and you have to tell a boss who's saying "GO!" NO!
 
With all due respect, if you went up within your 50nm radius and got caught in weather bad enough to force you into a SVFR situation, BOTH you AND your instructor have issues.

There is zero excuse for being that close to home base doing practice maneuvers and getting caught in weather bad enough to genuinely need a SVFR to land. None.

If it's that iffy, then the "go/no-go" decision should be for any student, "no-go."

While I agree with what you say, I have run into exceptional weather situations where I got a briefing that said "VFR for your intended flight, it looks like it's going to be a beautiful day". Then I launch into severe clear only to have the skies close quickly forcing me to 500' under a solid deck with 5 minutes of first cloud developement that sent the entire upper mid west into IFR. Weather can happen quickly with no warning, shockingly so.
 
It's whenever I would stupidly let my butt write checks that my face couldn't cash that I had to whip out the proctologist's card upon landing and call him to help me remove the seat cover I sucked up.

Hey, Cowboy ! Nobody - at least not me - is saying to *de-emphasize* or slack-up on teachin', preachin', and demonstrating in your daily life activities, the very important never-ending honing of the skill and judgement of a "go/no-go" decision.

But your comment indicates, that, in spite of a very carefully planned "go" decision, you might have encounterd some unplanned events. Huh? C'mon, now. We all have.

That's the point. Be prepared for the unexpected.

Do you think we practice forced landings so we can skip the pre-flight?

That's how you sound. If my engine quits, I must have not done a good enough pre-flight, so you don't teach forced landings, cause you teach a good enough pre-flight inspection on the engine to make a valid "go/no-go decision" on the engine.

Weather is the same, my friend. Teach good decision making and what/how to proceed when all planned events don't occur. Students need this information.

Students and low time pilots who are not trained in using all available facilities have had accidents because they were not trained in the practical use of them. That's a fact. Deal with it.
 
the number one habit a student needs to learn is the "go/no-go" decision.
the number one habit a student needs to learn is the "go/no-go" decision.
the number one habit a student needs to learn is the "go/no-go" decision.
the number one habit a student needs to learn is the "go/no-go" decision.
Don't repeat it too many times, since it tends to drown out the number two habit a student needs to learn:

the number two habit a student needs to learn is the "continue/divert" decision.

This is the one that we don't talk nearly enough about and may be the more important one - it's certainly more difficult to stop once on the way than not to go at all.
 
Do you think we practice forced landings so we can skip the pre-flight?

That's how you sound. If my engine quits, I must have not done a good enough pre-flight, so you don't teach forced landings, cause you teach a good enough pre-flight inspection on the engine to make a valid "go/no-go decision" on the engine.
Apples to oranges.

But, if you rent an airplane and there have been numerous squawks listed for engine problems, rough-idling, problems with engaging carb heat, etc and you still take the bird up and do a forced landing, it's your own fault. Same if you own and do not address the problems.

Students and low time pilots who are not trained in using all available facilities have had accidents because they were not trained in the practical use of them. That's a fact. Deal with it.

NTSB lists better than 75% of all fatal accidents involving VFR pilots (including students) are the direct result of continued flight into instrument conditions. No mention of failure to divert to other facilities.

Continued VFR flight into IFR conditions.

Even worse, most fatal accidents happen between 50 hours and 350 hours in the logbook than at any other time.

And what is the biggest cause of fatal accidents?

Continued VFR flight into IFR conditions.

Train for it, yes. But until you're instrument rated, don't rely on it. And sure as hell don't make it part of your routine-use toolbox.

Regards.

-JD
 
I've used special VFR only once and that was to depart an airport where clear weather was a bit west of the airport. I had saw this clear weather with my own eyes as I drove to the airport and had someone else over there that I talked to on the phone before I launched. The clear weather was moving towards the airport but was just taking too long.

There was never a moment where I was concerned about the flight because I was *fully* aware of what things would look like in that situation. I do think that some people have no idea what less than ideal weather looks like and get taken by surprise. I also set a hard limit on my altimeter--If the clouds pushed me below that I would declare an emergency with ATC with a climb into the clouds. I'm completely comfortable with flying in actual. This was not likely to happen as the entire region was very stable with the ceiling. It was also pretty thin--I could see sunlight through it.

I've found as I build more experience that there is some weather I will not fly in that I probably would have a year ago. There is weather a year ago that I wouldn't have flown in that I wouldn't hesitate about now. It just takes time to become comfortable with the weather in your region combined with your own limits.

I'm still a major wimp when it comes to anything convective and won't get near it. I don't really see this ever changing either. I do think it is fun to run into weather during cross countries and divert to unknown airports to find something odd to do while the weather settles down... I love adventure in aviation.
 
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NTSB lists better than 75% of all fatal accidents involving VFR pilots (including students) are the direct result of continued flight into instrument conditions. No mention of failure to divert to other facilities. -JD
I think his point was the alternative to continued flight into IMC, once you are on an XC and see or get reports of weather, is to divert. Different issue that the go/no go which is before you launch. Some people have a hard time changing plans, pehaps again because they see it as admitting a mistake. And then you have the other pressures to get where you were going, expecially if a passenger really wants to get somewhere that they think is important and you have already invested an hour or two into trying to get there.
 
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Students and low time pilots who are not trained in using all available facilities have had accidents because they were not trained in the practical use of them. That's a fact. Deal with it.

Here is one for you. I read about an accident that happened when a pilot (I think it was a student) ran out of fuel and went down. Walked away, but the accident was caused by fuel starvation, not fuel exhaustion. She had fuel in the other tank. In the review of the events, the pilot had gone through the flow check on engine failure, and "touched" the fuel tank selector as she had done in training simulations, but DID NOT actually switch to the other tank. Something for the CFI's on this forum to think about.
 
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well it certainly isnt the students fault. The CFI failed the student by not teaching her how to actually deal with the situation. Its called realistic training and it works!
 
well it certainly isnt the students fault. The CFI failed the student by not teaching her how to actually deal with the situation. Its called realistic training and it works!

I'm not so sure about that. If the student knew the flow, but didn't understand why she was touching the fuel selector, she should have asked. That's her responsibility.
 
I'm not so sure about that. If the student knew the flow, but didn't understand why she was touching the fuel selector, she should have asked. That's her responsibility.
In emergency situations we revert to trained behavior without thinking about it. That's why the military is so hardover on boldface training and emergency procedures in the sim. She was trained by repeated exercise to touch, not move, the selector, and when it really happened, that's just what she did (no surprise to me).

This is similar to an F-111 accident many years ago. In the beginning, the boldface for engine fire was, "Throttle-OFF, Fire Pushbutton-DEPRESS, Agent Discharge Switch-ACTUATE." However, the fire extinguishing agent discharge switch doubles as the fire warning lights test switch -- up for discharge, down for test. Pilots test the lights during pre-start checks every flight, and often test them periodically during flight (usually with a warning to the WSO so the right seater doesn't have a heart attack seeing all three lights come on at once). Thus, they get a lot of practice pushing the switch down, and virtually none pushing it up.

One day, an F-111 had an engine fire, and the pilot pulled the throttle off, depressed the fire pushbutton, and actuated the agent discharge switch -- down, the way his arm was used to doing it every single time. Needless to say, this did not put the fire out, but rather lit up the other two fire lights, convincing the crew that the fire was spreading and aircraft disintigration was imminent, resulting in prompt ejection. On the ground, the mishap board figured it out. After that, the boldface was changed to "Agent Discharge Switch - UP." The situation never recurred.
 
These are good examples of why we used to do reality training in my earlier days, when we were not so liability scared.

By 'reality', I mean pulling the mixture to idle cut-off or fuel selector to 'off' during flight to more accurately simulate engine failure. We made dead-stick landings to runways, and sometimes, actual landings in the fields, if it was a good one, but certainly we went down to within 10 or 15 feet - into the flare over the field to 'get it right'.

When students actually 'turn' the fuel selector valve, or 'push' the mixture rich, or make the final moment maneuvering for that one good spot on the field, they are much better trained to respond in emergencies. These examples show how just 'touching and/or pointing' does not always mean that the simulated action is being hardwired into our nervous system.
In fact, it can have a negative effect.
 
Here is one for you. I read about an accident that happened when a pilot (I think it was a student) ran out of fuel and went down. Walked away, but the accident was caused by fuel starvation, not fuel exhaustion. She had fuel in the other tank. In the review of the events, the pilot had gone through the flow check on engine failure, and "touched" the fuel tank selector as she had done in training simulations, but DID NOT actually switch to the other tank. Something for the CFI's on this forum to think about.

Which is why I don't like to teach a GUMPS check in a fixed gear or a fixed prop.

FMS in fixed/fixed singles.

Fuel Mixture Switches/Seats
 
Which is why I don't like to teach a GUMPS check in a fixed gear or a fixed prop. FMS in fixed/fixed singles. Fuel Mixture Switches/Seats

Which would not have solved this particular problem. Calling it "fuel" instead of "gas" (and leaving out the items that don't apply) does not mean the student will have actually learned to throw the selector lever.
 
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I don't have them touch the fuel selector. I have them verify if the tank they are on has enough fuel to land safely. Sometimes it gets changed, sometimes it doesn't. There needs to be a point in the rote memorization process where a decision is made, and doesn't just become a habit. Don't just touch the fuel selector, but verify and decide, then go on to the next step.

Teaching "lower gear" in a fixed can develop bad habits since there's no gear to lower. Then when the transition to complex happens, the gear doesn't get lowered.
 
Teaching "lower gear" in a fixed can develop bad habits since there's no gear to lower. Then when the transition to complex happens, the gear doesn't get lowered.

Not sure I agree with that.

It seems to me that if you cannot remember to lower the gear as you verbally say "gear down". There is no way you are going to remember to use the correct verbal checklist for each different airplane.

The human mind is funny though--who knows.
 
How do you "verify" the tank you are on has fuel? The indicator could be wrong. Unless you ran the other tank dry you are pretty sure it still has something in it, and since the engine quit you are not that sure of the one you are on - whatever you think it ought to have in it. Why not just switch?
 
Not sure I agree with that.

It seems to me that if you cannot remember to lower the gear as you verbally say "gear down". There is no way you are going to remember to use the correct verbal checklist for each different airplane.

The human mind is funny though--who knows.

And what exactly do the students do when they say gear down in a fixed? they just say gear down. They don't have 3 green to verify. They don't have a switch/handle/etc to operate. So, after a couple hundred hours of saying gear down, and doing nothing, what might happen in a high workload situation when they get in a retract.

"Gear down."

Sccccccccccccccccccrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrraaaaaaaaaaaaaaapppppppppppe



How do you "verify" the tank you are on has fuel? The indicator could be wrong. Unless you ran the other tank dry you are pretty sure it still has something in it, and since the engine quit you are not that sure of the one you are on - whatever you think it ought to have in it. Why not just switch?

You don't keep a fuel log for the flight?
If the tanks are full when I depart:
1/2 hour on the left tank
1 hour on the right
1 hour on the left
1 hour on the right
1 hour on the left
1/2 hour on the right.

Although if I get near the end of that third burn on the left, I'm probably already doing the pee-pee dance in my seat.

If the tanks aren't full, determine what you have in the tanks visually before departure and adjust the switching as necessary.
What time is it when you get in the airport environment?
Where are you with fuel burn?
 
Oh I get all that. I am just saying that things happen in flight, and you can not be certain the tank that ought to have 5 gallons left actually does. What about a tank drain that started leaking, or a split in the fuel line from one tank, and you lost some over the last 3 hours? Or what if you happended to do a lot of climbing while on one tank and most of the descent on the other? On my plane I had a gasket seal (for the fuel level indicator) that we found leaked only when the tank was filled above tabs, so not something you would necessarilly notice until you were filled for a long XC. And that tank would have a little less than planned toward the end of the flight.
 
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Oh I get all that. I am just saying that things happen in flight, and you can not be certain the tank that ought to have 5 gallons left actually does. What about a tank drain that started leaking, or a split in the fuel line from one tank, and you lost some over the last 3 hours? Or what if you happended to do a lot of climbing while on one tank and most of the descent on the other? On my plane I had a gasket seal (for the fuel level indicator) that we found leaked only when the tank was filled above tabs, so not something you would necessarilly notice until you were filled for a long XC. And that tank would have a little less than planned toward the end of the flight.

Well a checklist isn't going to solve that problem anyway. You'll either cough and dry tank, or wonder why your fuel burn is 14gph in cruise on a Cherokee.
 
I was not talking about the checklist as a solution to the leak itself. Only that IF the engine quits, you ought to doubt the fuel level in a tank even if the indicator (or your switch schedule) says you have fuel in that tank. And if you doubt the fuel level of the tank you are on, why not just switch to one that had fuel in it an hour ago?
 
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I was not talking about the checklist as a solution to the leak itself. Only that IF the engine quits, you ought to doubt the fuel level in a tank even if the indicator (or your switch schedule) says you have fuel in that tank. And if you doubt the fuel level of the tank you are on, why not just switch to one that had fuel in it an hour ago?

Makes sense to me. Something is wrong or the engine wouldn't have stopped. One of the most common things to be wrong is your fuel supply. It might be that you messed up your calculations or you got distracted and forgot to fill that side, or there's a leak, or there's a blockage in the fuel system. Whatever it is, giving the other tank a try seems like a really good idea, especially if you've run off that tank successfully earlier in the flight. Since you didn't run it dry, you know there must be at least a little bit of fuel in it.

Chris
 
My Engine out procedure:

Switch Tanks
Check Mags
Check Mixture
Turn on the Electric Fuel Pump

It's a nice left to right flow in the Cherokee. If the engine still doesn't start, now I go back and really start looking to see what it might be. Yeah, my first flow is a brainless reaction, but if it comes back to life that's a lot better than looking for my emergency checklist while I lose altitude.
 
I add check primer second, to be sure it is still in - since I am passing right by it anyway. Fuel/air and spark, and it ought to run. Along with actually switching tanks, I would cycle through the Mag selection. If you started on the left (common procedure) and forgot to switch to both, and then did not do a proper mag drop check or somehow ended on one mag (hey, you have a problem because SOMETHING went wrong, right?), then a problem with the one mag could leave you with no spark but an easy solution. Also, my elec fuel pump switch would come earlier than mixture in the left to right flow of things. You have a Chrokee too? Year and model?
 
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My Engine out procedure:

Switch Tanks
Check Mags
Check Mixture
Turn on the Electric Fuel Pump

It's a nice left to right flow in the Cherokee. If the engine still doesn't start, now I go back and really start looking to see what it might be. Yeah, my first flow is a brainless reaction, but if it comes back to life that's a lot better than looking for my emergency checklist while I lose altitude.

Ed I did not read all the posts, but since I had a Six yours kinda stuck out for me. What ever works for you, but I would think that Turn on the pump is #1, switch tanks, Mixture, Mags. If it is something you can do something about it will be fuel, get more fuel fast, that's the pump. If there is no fuel to pump, That's switch tanks, Pushing the mixture in may help also. Unless you turned the mags off what can you do there. Now your in the diag mode. look at fuses.

Dan
 
Originally Posted by tonycondon
well it certainly isnt the students fault. The CFI failed the student by not teaching her how to actually deal with the situation. Its called realistic training and it works!

I'm not so sure about that. If the student knew the flow, but didn't understand why she was touching the fuel selector, she should have asked. That's her responsibility.

Yeah, I'm with you on that, and I would even take it a step further. What was that girl using for a brain? I know that sounds mean, but really, it's a selector valve. By the time you are of that age, you wouldn't think that that would be something you have to point out that you have to move the handle to make it work. It makes me question the persons basic competence.
 
Ed I did not read all the posts, but since I had a Six yours kinda stuck out for me. What ever works for you, but I would think that Turn on the pump is #1, switch tanks, Mixture, Mags. If it is something you can do something about it will be fuel, get more fuel fast, that's the pump. If there is no fuel to pump, That's switch tanks, Pushing the mixture in may help also. Unless you turned the mags off what can you do there. Now your in the diag mode. look at fuses.

Dan

Left to right, right to left. Takes about 1.75 seconds either way.
 
In emergency situations we revert to trained behavior without thinking about it. That's why the military is so hardover on boldface training and emergency procedures in the sim. She was trained by repeated exercise to touch, not move, the selector, and when it really happened, that's just what she did (no surprise to me).

This is similar to an F-111 accident many years ago. In the beginning, the boldface for engine fire was, "Throttle-OFF, Fire Pushbutton-DEPRESS, Agent Discharge Switch-ACTUATE." However, the fire extinguishing agent discharge switch doubles as the fire warning lights test switch -- up for discharge, down for test. Pilots test the lights during pre-start checks every flight, and often test them periodically during flight (usually with a warning to the WSO so the right seater doesn't have a heart attack seeing all three lights come on at once). Thus, they get a lot of practice pushing the switch down, and virtually none pushing it up.

One day, an F-111 had an engine fire, and the pilot pulled the throttle off, depressed the fire pushbutton, and actuated the agent discharge switch -- down, the way his arm was used to doing it every single time. Needless to say, this did not put the fire out, but rather lit up the other two fire lights, convincing the crew that the fire was spreading and aircraft disintigration was imminent, resulting in prompt ejection. On the ground, the mishap board figured it out. After that, the boldface was changed to "Agent Discharge Switch - UP." The situation never recurred.

Hmmm interesting. I was always taught, and therefore taught, to actually use the valve as well in training (train em like you fly em), hadn't really considered that aspect.
 
Left to right, right to left. Takes about 1.75 seconds either way.

I realize you only have two tanks I had 4 so I had a few more options. on fuel I went left main takeoff, to half tank then switched to right main till empty, then back to left main left tip land on right tip. This way I was always going left, if I could not go any farther I went all the way to the other side. It took a lot of thinking out of the equation in an emerg. I learned to flip the switch first.

Dan
 
Hmmm interesting. I was always taught, and therefore taught, to actually use the valve as well in training (train em like you fly em), hadn't really considered that aspect.
Back almost 40 years ago in C-150's, I was taught to grab the fuel selector valve and ensure it was fully selected to the "ON" position by trying to move it in that direction, not just touching it. That paid off in 1972 when, on my Commercial practical test, a really stupid FAA Inspector turned the valve off to "simulate" an engine failure (not exactly "simulation" in my book). Within half a second, the engine was running again, because without even thinking, the first thing I did was reach down and grab the fuel valve handle and move it where it belonged. The inspector then retarded the throttle and we completed the task.

"You fight like you train." BGen (then-Maj) Steve Richie, USAF's only pilot ace in Viet Nam.
"...so train the way you want to fight." Capt (then-LCDR) "Duke" Cunningham, USN's only pilot ace in Viet Nam.
 
"You fight like you train." BGen (then-Maj) Steve Richie, USAF's only pilot ace in Viet Nam.
"...so train the way you want to fight." Capt (then-LCDR) "Duke" Cunningham, USN's only pilot ace in Viet Nam.

"Train, Train, Train so that you will React, React, React--because if you have to Think, Think, Think, you will Die, Die, Die." CMSgt. M. Sanderson, senior NCOIC, USAF Pararescue School senior combat instructor, Kirtland AFB, 1968-69.

-JD
 
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Which is why I don't like to teach a GUMPS check in a fixed gear or a fixed prop.
Me neither. Pretty much the same reason. It teaches that it doesn't matter.

I don't know if they still sell it, but a couple of years ago I saw a retractable gear "trainer" that was being sold in the Sprotys catalog. You could stick it on your 172 panel and "practice" raising and lowering the gear. It taught you that when you put the "gear" down, nothing happened. No sound of the mechanism working. No increased drag. No lowering airspeed. And best of all, if you forgot to put it down there were no consequences. Yep, a great training aid - for gear-up landings that is
 
I don't know if they still sell it, but a couple of years ago I saw a retractable gear "trainer" that was being sold in the Sprotys catalog. You could stick it on your 172 panel and "practice" raising and lowering the gear. It taught you that when you put the "gear" down, nothing happened. No sound of the mechanism working. No increased drag. No lowering airspeed. And best of all, if you forgot to put it down there were no consequences. Yep, a great training aid - for gear-up landings that is
Diamond Aircraft is working with the FAA to obtain approval for use as a complex trainer a modified version of the CS-prop version of the DA40. It still has fixed gear, but it adds little speed brakes selected by a gear handle to simulate the effects/sensations of gear extension/retraction. The package includes "gear" up/down indications, a "gear up warning" system, and a very big indication of landing with "gear" up. The big difference from a flight school perspective is that it is still insured as a fixed gear airplane because the real gear can't be retracted. The FAA is chewing on the idea of permitting folks to use this for initial commercial and initial CFI-A training as well as the complex airplane endorsement.
 
Diamond Aircraft is working with the FAA to obtain approval for use as a complex trainer a modified version of the CS-prop version of the DA40. It still has fixed gear, but it adds little speed brakes selected by a gear handle to simulate the effects/sensations of gear extension/retraction. The package includes "gear" up/down indications, a "gear up warning" system, and a very big indication of landing with "gear" up. The big difference from a flight school perspective is that it is still insured as a fixed gear airplane because the real gear can't be retracted. The FAA is chewing on the idea of permitting folks to use this for initial commercial and initial CFI-A training as well as the complex airplane endorsement.

Wow... That's really interesting.

It's also a very smart idea on Diamond's part. I can see the insurance companies not insuring Arrows at flight schools any more once there's another option for commercial training.
 
Here is one for you. I read about an accident that happened when a pilot (I think it was a student) ran out of fuel and went down. Walked away, but the accident was caused by fuel starvation, not fuel exhaustion. She had fuel in the other tank. In the review of the events, the pilot had gone through the flow check on engine failure, and "touched" the fuel tank selector as she had done in training simulations, but DID NOT actually switch to the other tank. Something for the CFI's on this forum to think about.

The drill has never been, "touch fuel selector." The drill is, "check fuel selector/s for desired setting/s..." which may involve touching and/or visually inspecting the selector/s.

Reminds me of the self defense student that pulled her punches as she had done in training ,but while actually being assaulted.
 
Wow... That's really interesting.

It's also a very smart idea on Diamond's part. I can see the insurance companies not insuring Arrows at flight schools any more once there's another option for commercial training.

Personally, I wish they would make a DA-40-R. The 42 is a retract correct?
 
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