Need Another Shuttle Also
After Columbia it became:
Need
Another
Shuttle
Again . . . .
Going back to the KTVU event - The names were funny, they reflected on the nature of the tragedy and exactly why it happened. They reflected certainly the reactions of the pilots whether they admit it to themselves or not.
The over-reaction, once again, has resulted from an utter lack of people wanting to actually address the reality of an ATP hamburgering an approach. It is much easier to make a big deal about Ho Lee Fuk or Sum Ting Wong and carry-on about racism or law suits etc etc etc.
It does not matter that:
a) the ILS was off
b) the glideslope was missing
c) the computer was off
d) the autothrottle was misprogrammed
e) any one of 1000 excuses we have heard -
The fact remains that a pilot type-rated in multiple heavy transport aircraft screwed up an approach for whatever reason. Multiple rated pilots failed to notice and speak up about an airplane too low and too slow and headed for certain doom. It seems like the explanation is that they started out high and he intentionally created a high sink rate low speed condition in order to adjust the approach and for some reason
forgot about it - and came up short.
You want to know a key reason for this accident? One that will get missed completely by the press and only looked at with a pale eye by everyone else?
Proficiency.
Lets say you get 1100 hours a year as a pilot for an Trans Pac, Trans-Atlantic or do NYC/DC/MIA to South America - You have 10 hours legs. You get 4 trips a month about. That is 8 take offs and landings for that crew per month. Thus - you get 4 take offs and 4 landings a month.
You take off using A/T and once you get the gear up you go to AP. You stay in AP, changing headings and courses using the AP because you HAVE TO, and then program the approach to hit the STAR altitudes and speeds and arrive at the FAF solely in relation to the autopilot. Period.
You may, in
one of those monthly approaches, actually do a visual approach to landing and not merely click off the AP when you reach the threshold and 'land' the airplane with the autobrakes on and the spoilers on auto deploy . . . .
Sorry - you get 100 hours a month and you get ZERO real proficiency in anything except button pushing and knob turning. I dare say that the average airline pilot flying transoceanic routes probably feels anxiety at the thought of a true visual approach. Not the Southwest guy, or the pilot who gets 16 days of flying in a month with 6 legs a day, or the freight dog who flies 22 days a month in all sorts of weather - I'm talking the aviator who last did that type of flying before the GPS satellites were even launched.
Now I know I'm gonna get 100 flames from guys who will disagree with that - but - explain to us then how you maintain proficiency? You might have 10,000 landings but when 9500 of them were 6 years or more ago . . . . explain to us how you have maintained proficiency in the visual approach and energy management of a 250,000# airplane to a 9000' runway . . . .
..
