The Training Value of Ice

There was some interesting research done at the University of Wisconsin a couple of years ago that I participated in, based on the theory that we don't train pilots to deal with weather the right way.

There was a scenario presented that involved a lot of pressure on oneself to fly a particular flight. They gave you actual weather data - A full briefing from a real day was available, and you could choose one of two destinations that would accomplish your mission. You were allowed to make your own go/no-go decision, but you were pressured towards a go. Then, you got in a sim and flew the flight you planned (VFR).

Three groups were tested: Student pilots, non-instrument-rated Private pilots, and instrument-rated pilots. About 30 of each went through the scenario, IIRC.

I chose my destination and went, but ended up diverting about halfway there based on some criteria that I determined prior to takeoff for continuing safe flight. The majority of other instrument-rated pilots landed safely as well, though I don't think any were able to make it to the destination VFR.

As for the non-IR Private pilots? They all killed themselves. Every. Last. One.

Point? We tell people to set personal minimums and avoid weather that's anywhere close to not being VFR, but we never take them up in marginal weather, we never show them what it's like and how bad it really is, we never teach them how to make the proper decisions prior to a marginal flight to keep themselves safe, and we never put them in a situation where they have to do an actual diversion. Result? Pilots get into the real world and are pressured to fly in marginal weather, and the crashes that result are still one of the "big three" killers in aviation.

So, there is some validity to the idea of teaching those "situations they will likely face".

Good points. The last time I tried to do instrument training, I had to cancel. I keep my plane at EYE, and my instructor instructs out of TYQ, which 12 miles away-- just a 5-10 minute flight. The weather was predicted to be VFR, with scattered clouds at roughly 1200 feet. As I drove to the airport, I saw some clouds, but nothing too worrisome. I pre-flighted, took off, and turned toward course, and all I could see was a wall of clouds in my direction of flight. I was still under the shelf of the Charlie airspace, and I was not really excited about climbing on top of clouds that I don't where they end anyway, so I turned back to toward the airport, and then headed west to see if I could go around. Out west of the airport, I just found myself in a corridor of clouds. I turned back to the airport and landed. I called my instructor and told him I couldn't make it. We waited 30 minutes. It looked good from the ground. But when I took off again, I saw the same thing. I landed and told the instructor I wasn't going to make and that we were going to have to reschedule. It's disappointing to have to scratch IFR training for such benign clouds, particularly when you have already experienced actual. But despite my disappointment and my disbelief that I was facing IFR conditions where I did not expect them, I had to call it a day.
 
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I don't recall exactly the times, but the driver of why that was supplied during the discussion was to reduce someone dismissing the scenario by saying 'he was an inexperienced pilot'.

The objective was to get everyone to consider their flight planning tool bags and not depend upon a briefer to provide all the necessary information to keep your flight safe.

Scott explained the limitations of the different aspects of each weather product and the sometimes political decisions (think airlines) of why products and Airmets/ Sigments are fashioned the way they are.

I see weather planning in two stages.

Strategic, you do this on the ground, look at charts, Skew-T's, etc. That may give you a go-no go, or a general routing, trends, etc.

Then there is the tactical. Radar, eyes, nexrad, SS, EXPERIENCE, etc. All of which is really what keeps you alive.

So were these scenarios a failure of strategic planning or tactical?
 
I see weather planning in two stages.

Strategic, you do this on the ground, look at charts, Skew-T's, etc. That may give you a go-no go, or a general routing, trends, etc.

Then there is the tactical. Radar, eyes, nexrad, SS, EXPERIENCE, etc. All of which is really what keeps you alive.

So were these scenarios a failure of strategic planning or tactical?

A couple of them involved icing where there "should not" have been. One was a low ceiling where there "should not" have been. The pilot was in a Cirrus SR22 and after 3 attempts with his passenger, he punched the reset button. Yes, we discussed his ADM and there were comments that the flight was well discussed over on COPA. There were other factors at play with that one that was not well known, as the guy who was sitting behind me began to share what was really going on with his personal friend.

IIRC one was a newly minted pilot (don't recall if he had is IA or not for this one) who bought the farm trying to see his girlfriend in an SR-20 and got iced up.

They were all sad. All of them had received standard briefings and were all on filed flight plans.
 
A couple of them involved icing where there "should not" have been. One was a low ceiling where there "should not" have been. The pilot was in a Cirrus SR22 and after 3 attempts with his passenger, he punched the reset button. Yes, we discussed his ADM and there were comments that the flight was well discussed over on COPA. There were other factors at play with that one that was not well known, as the guy who was sitting behind me began to share what was really going on with his personal friend.

IIRC one was a newly minted pilot (don't recall if he had is IA or not for this one) who bought the farm trying to see his girlfriend in an SR-20 and got iced up.

They were all sad. All of them had received standard briefings and were all on filed flight plans.

I'm no meteorologist, but I will say that in my experience it is impossible to perfectly predict the weather in a small airspace, at a specific altitude, at a specific time from the ground. IMO that means we will all face weather where we didn't expect it and that's why we make decisions in flight vs. punching the autopilot and taking a nap.

Your thoughts?
 
Exaclty. This license to learn stuff is a cop out IMO. No they can't know everything (obviously), but why not try and save them from the big killers.
That's why we don't tell trainees it's OK to fly a non-FIKI airplane into known icing conditions as a training exercise in order to show them why it's not OK to do it for real. The point is that even if it's a training flight, it's real.
Maybe a well planned sim exercise would be enough and wouldn't add much cost to a PPL.
That makes a lot more sense, and sims can simulate the effects of icing and other problems too dangerous to demonstrate in flight well enough to show the trainee why you don't want to do it for real.
 
That's why we don't tell trainees it's OK to fly a non-FIKI airplane into known icing conditions as a training exercise in order to show them why it's not OK to do it for real. The point is that even if it's a training flight, it's real.
That makes a lot more sense, and sims can simulate the effects of icing and other problems too dangerous to demonstrate in flight well enough to show the trainee why you don't want to do it for real.

Ron, come on man, no one has suggested it's OK to tell a trainee to fly into icing conditions. This goes back to human nature, some of us will never be able to not do something just because we were told not to, we have to understand why. Ever disobey your parents? Probably not, but many of the rest of us did because we didn't understand why what they were saying was important. That's what I'm talking about here is using various methods to help a new pilot understand the risks vs. just saying don't ever do that, next lesson.
 
Ron, come on man, no one has suggested it's OK to tell a trainee to fly into icing conditions.
No, you just suggested flying into known icing conditions with a trainee in a non-FIKI airplane. That certainly sounds like you're communicating to the trainee by your actions that it's OK to do that no matter what you say with your mouth. My observation after 41 years as an instructor is that when there's a difference between what you do and what you say, once out of your sight trainees tend to do what you did, not what you said.
 
No, you just suggested flying into known icing conditions with a trainee in a non-FIKI airplane. That certainly sounds like you're communicating to the trainee by your actions that it's OK to do that no matter what you say with your mouth. My observation after 41 years as an instructor is that when there's a difference between what you do and what you say, once out of your sight trainees tend to do what you did, not what you said.

What's the difference if you take a PPL trainee into IMC? They are not rated for it and won't be for sometime, but you are telling them it's OK? OH the FAR's, OK so take the student up in a FIKI plane if you feel that way. It isn't about the FAR's for me as much as LIVES and I'm less concerned about the methods and more about the results. We have proven that the current methods are not changing behavior (people are still dying for the same old reasons) , why continue to do that hoping for different results?
 
What's the difference if you take a PPL trainee into IMC? They are not rated for it and won't be for sometime, but you are telling them it's OK?
It's OK to go into IMC if you're properly rated and equipped, just the same as going into icing if you're properly rated and equipped. But I wouldn't take a trainee into the goo in an aircraft not equipped for IFR flight just to show the trainee how dangerous it is or how to handle it if it happens any more than I would take a trainee into icing in a non-FIKI airplane just to show how dangerous that is or how to handle it if it happens.

OH the FAR's, OK so take the student up in a FIKI plane if you feel that way. It isn't about the FAR's for me as much as LIVES and I'm less concerned about the methods and more about the results.
I am, too, hence my strong opposition to intentionally taking a non-FIKI plane into known icing conditions for any reason during training -- it's too risky, and it communicates the wrong message.
 
It's OK to go into IMC if you're properly rated and equipped, just the same as going into icing if you're properly rated and equipped. But I wouldn't take a trainee into the goo in an aircraft not equipped for IFR flight just to show the trainee how dangerous it is or how to handle it if it happens any more than I would take a trainee into icing in a non-FIKI airplane just to show how dangerous that is or how to handle it if it happens.

I am, too, hence my strong opposition to intentionally taking a non-FIKI plane into known icing conditions for any reason during training -- it's too risky, and it communicates the wrong message.

Have you ever had a former student admit to you that they got into ice in a non-FIKI aircraft?
 
Alex,

Dude....seriously?!

You're ether just trying to get a rise out of people.

Or you're not long for this earth if you practice what you preach.
 
I'm no meteorologist, but I will say that in my experience it is impossible to perfectly predict the weather in a small airspace, at a specific altitude, at a specific time from the ground. IMO that means we will all face weather where we didn't expect it and that's why we make decisions in flight vs. punching the autopilot and taking a nap.

Your thoughts?

I had a long XC flight right after taking the class and my Wx confidence was high. I flight planned better than I ever have, knew exactly where to expect conditions (I'm VFR only) and it worked EXACTLY as I planned including vertical profiles, initiating my descent to get under the cloud deck beyond visual range 50 miles to destination, all while considering prevailing winds for best time to destination (I did miss about 2kts by not climbing another 2,000 feet per my plan). I even knew ahead of time which runway they should give me at the Class C I was landing at, and I was all the way on the money.

Then on the return trip home, with my family aboard I had repeated incursions of unintentional VFR-IMC. The first one happened right after an ATC handoff on FF and then I experienced a comm failure. Time slowed down, and I didn't have the patience to HOLD the AP button until it activated, I thought that broke on me too. Right about then my wife awoke...

That plan went out the window. We made it home safely, but I had to ad-lib all the way. So yeah, strategic - tactical. But I would have been MUCH safer with in IR....and I think ATC couldn't find my SFRA entry plan either once we were close enough for entry.

The class was still money/ time well spent and I believe that the weather knowledge still put the odds in ones favor.
 
Alex,

Dude....seriously?!

You're ether just trying to get a rise out of people.

Or you're not long for this earth if you practice what you preach.

I think I get what he's trying to say. I think he believes it's a lower risk to do it with a CFI than have the former student experience it on his own. And he's willing to put his life and ticket on the line for that belief. I applaud a man willing to stand by his values. I wish there was a better way.

Can't please all the people all of the time.
 
I think I get what he's trying to say. I think he believes it's a lower risk to do it with a CFI than have the former student experience it on his own. And he's willing to put his life and ticket on the line for that belief. I applaud a man willing to stand by his values. I wish there was a better way.

Can't please all the people all of the time.

I agree 100% that's its good that he'll put it on the line for what he believes, I still think he is misguided, but at least he's passionate
 
I agree 100% that's its good that he'll put it on the line for what he believes, I still think he is misguided, but at least he's passionate
Well, as I tried to say in my last post to this thread, I don't think it's THAT misguided if done properly. I just don't think there is any way to minimize the risk and still be reasonably certain of experiencing a "teachable" icing encounter. 100% probability of trace or light icing and nothing more severe will likely never happen. Typically conditions where the risk is minimal involve a small probability of trace to light icing -- 25% or less. I sure wouldn't support even going up above a layer, in order to dip into the tops, on a day when icing was highly likely, as you stand a chance of finding a solid floor that you'll have to descend through to get safely on the ground.

I suspect that, if done with the proper precautions, the likeliest outcome of the "lesson" will be that you don't pick up any ice at all, and the student learns nothing.
 
A couple of them involved icing where there "should not" have been. One was a low ceiling where there "should not" have been. The pilot was in a Cirrus SR22 and after 3 attempts with his passenger, he punched the reset button. Yes, we discussed his ADM and there were comments that the flight was well discussed over on COPA. There were other factors at play with that one that was not well known, as the guy who was sitting behind me began to share what was really going on with his personal friend.

IIRC one was a newly minted pilot (don't recall if he had is IA or not for this one) who bought the farm trying to see his girlfriend in an SR-20 and got iced up.

They were all sad. All of them had received standard briefings and were all on filed flight plans.

I agree with Scott that standard briefings aren't enough. I haven't gotten a standard briefing in years, I do all my flight planning online.

While all crashes could be prevented with a no-go decision (strategic), the reality is that most crashes I view as a tactical failure. Your description above sounds like inexperience, that's why I asked TT.

When it comes to icing, that whole thing about "icing shouldn't be there" bugs me, because the reality is a very basic look should determine probable places for clouds and below freezing. For me, if I see that, I expect icing might be there. I always have outs figured, even in a de-iced aircraft. then I'm pleasantly surprised when there isn't ice, which is rare in my experience.
 
I'm not even sure what's being debated in this thread. At the end of the day one can expose themselves to conditions that can potentially create icing on a non fiki aircraft and do so without death or panic. Ice is dangerous but every encounter is not created equally and the more you know will make it more manageable. Airplanes aren't falling out of the sky because of icing on any regular basis compared to how often they fall out of the sky as a result of no gas.
 
I think it's the idea of intentionally flying into known icing in a non-protected aircraft that people are upset about due to the potential for it to turn on you.

Otoh, flying in conducive conditions and exiting at the first sign of ice? Alright. Wrangling a fiki aircraft for training exposure to real ice? Awesome!
 
I wish it were easier to get STCs for FIKI (well OK, *everything* for that matter). As a result, many of us fly around slightly afraid of popping through clouds that are below freezing for fear that we'll get a pilot deviation even when we know bloody well there is either a) no ice at all or b) multiple ways out if ice is encountered.

If I could get a reasonably-priced FIKI system that would also make the above situations legal, then great. But to get ice protection and *still* be barred from entering freezing clouds? Stupid.

The FAA lets perfection be the enemy of good.
 
As a result, many of us fly around slightly afraid of popping through clouds that are below freezing for fear that we'll get a pilot deviation even when we know bloody well there is either a) no ice at all or b) multiple ways out if ice is encountered.
There has to be more than just clouds below freezing to be considered "known icing" conditions. Airmet Zulu? Forecast of freezing rain? PIREPs of icing? And I don't understand approaching possible icing with the main concern in one's mind being getting a PD. A pilot friend tells a story of riding as a passenger in a light non-FIKI single, picking up ice, while the PIC was afraid to ask for an altitude change because he thought he would be busted for getting into that situation. I think that's totally insane, both because my main objective if I'm picking up ice is to get the hell out of it, not avoiding a PD, and because I'm fairly certain that you are FAR (no pun intended) likelier to get in trouble with the FAA by NOT actively looking to extricate yourself from icing once you've encountered it.
 
Not according to the FAA.:mad:
Reference? As I recall, the FAA criteria for what constitutes known icing changed more than once in the past 3-4 years. At one point, it was as you say. Then it became more of an ambiguous "what would a reasonable person expect?" standard. That was sometime in 2012. Has it changed again?
 
There has to be more than just clouds below freezing to be considered "known icing" conditions. Airmet Zulu? Forecast of freezing rain? PIREPs of icing? And I don't understand approaching possible icing with the main concern in one's mind being getting a PD. A pilot friend tells a story of riding as a passenger in a light non-FIKI single, picking up ice, while the PIC was afraid to ask for an altitude change because he thought he would be busted for getting into that situation. I think that's totally insane, both because my main objective if I'm picking up ice is to get the hell out of it, not avoiding a PD, and because I'm fairly certain that you are FAR (no pun intended) likelier to get in trouble with the FAA by NOT actively looking to extricate yourself from icing once you've encountered it.

Yes, actually the FAA recently used that exact definition - visible moisture below freezing. And they still do. Whether it results in a PD is a matter of judgement - the FAA's judgement.

http://www.aopa.org/News-and-Video/All-News/2009/January/28/FAA-letter-offers-new-known-icing-definition


"In the past, the FAA considered any situation where temperatures were below freezing and there was visible moisture to constitute known icing conditions. A 2006 interpretation from the FAA also included relative humidity as a factor, grounding many GA pilots even when no visible moisture was present."


But they issued a pretty hazy redefinition that really isn't a redefinition in 2009. I say hazy because all they did was promise to take the pilot's full decision-making into account. The definitions of "icing conditions" did not change one iota but they will look more at the prudence of the pilot. That sure gives me a warm feeling.

So you may think that as long as you have an escape plan you're OK. But that is just your opinion. As I read the FAA's 'clarification' letter it seems you'd be 'telling it to the judge' so to speak. Good luck with that.

Of course getting out of ice supercedes concerns of a PD. No one said otherwise. But fear of a PD comes to mind when penetrating freezing moisture. Only natural.

My main point is that the FAA has created a perverse disincentive. If I fly into below-freezing moisture (still the definition of "icing conditions"), there is a real good chance someone could say it should have been "known" since winds aloft forecasts contain temps and I do have an OAT. (Any one of a hundred know-it-all super pilots on this board, for example.)

So why should I get ice protection when I still can't tread into even possible ice legally? So that creates a perverse disincentive to safety in my opinion. I'd love to put on ice protection but it doesn't even offer me any *legal* protection so it makes me less likely to bother.
 
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So why should I get ice protection when I still can't tread into even possible ice legally? So that creates a perverse disincentive to safety in my opinion. I'd love to put on ice protection but it doesn't even offer me any *legal* protection so it makes me less likely to bother.

You know that you CAN fly into KI in a FIKI ship, right? You cannot fly into SLD (and I think FZ) in ANY ship.
 
You know that you CAN fly into KI in a FIKI ship, right? You cannot fly into SLD (and I think FZ) in ANY ship.

I took that to mean that there is an ice protections system available, but it isn't FIKI. On my bird I can get TKS, supposed to work great, but it isn't FIKI so legally it is valueless. Plenty of otherwise capable birds are like that, a booted B55 with 600 HP isn't FIKI, but a booted 285HP 210 is. You can put TKS on an A36 and have it be FIKI, but if you add a turbo normalizer then it loses the FIKI, although the aircraft is now much better suited for ice. The whole thing is a little nuts.
 
Yes, actually the FAA recently used that exact definition - visible moisture below freezing. And they still do. Whether it results in a PD is a matter of judgement - the FAA's judgement.

http://www.aopa.org/News-and-Video/All-News/2009/January/28/FAA-letter-offers-new-known-icing-definition
Are you sure that's the reference you're looking for? Although it's 3 years older than I thought, that is the exact "reasonable and prudent pilot" standard that I was talking about. Nowhere does it say that visible moisture below freezing is sufficient condition for "known icing". Quite the contrary, as your quote shows, it says that it was at one time, then the definition was made even more broad, then it was changed to the hazy, "reasonable and prudent pilot" standard.
But they issued a pretty hazy redefinition that really isn't a redefinition in 2009. I say hazy because all they did was promise to take the pilot's full decision-making into account. The definitions of "icing conditions" did not change one iota but they will look more at the prudence of the pilot. That sure gives me a warm feeling.
You've yet to show where the current definition says that penetration of visible moisture below freezing constitutes sufficient evidence to warrant a violation on the basis of "known icing". Nothing the FAA does gives me a "warm feeling", I think we all know that if they want to violate you they will find a FAR on which to make the charge stick. And if you get into bad enough trouble due to ice, and they think you should have known better, they probably will use known icing. But I've yet to hear of a recent case where a pilot in a non-FIKI aircraft was violated for picking up ice in a situation where the ONLY reason to think ice was possible was being in a below-freezing cloud (i.e. no airmet, no icing pireps, low probability of icing according to the CIP/FIP, etc.). Do you know of one?
 
There has to be more than just clouds below freezing to be considered "known icing" conditions. Airmet Zulu? Forecast of freezing rain? PIREPs of icing? And I don't understand approaching possible icing with the main concern in one's mind being getting a PD. A pilot friend tells a story of riding as a passenger in a light non-FIKI single, picking up ice, while the PIC was afraid to ask for an altitude change because he thought he would be busted for getting into that situation. I think that's totally insane, both because my main objective if I'm picking up ice is to get the hell out of it, not avoiding a PD, and because I'm fairly certain that you are FAR (no pun intended) likelier to get in trouble with the FAA by NOT actively looking to extricate yourself from icing once you've encountered it.
Yes. I was on a short IFR flight in a Warrior from FRG to SWF in December and they gave me 6000 ft for a final altitude. When I got closer to the White Plains area I noticed an overcast layer above while still climbing and knew temperatures were below freezing and I would be in the clouds at 6000. I asked Approach to stay at 4000 to avoid possible icing conditions and they gave it to me. There is no harm in asking and the flight was a non issue. Turns out there was PIREP near me by a King Air (I think) who reported negative icing at 8000, so 6000 might have been fine. I was PIC and didn't feel like taking a risk when I could just stay at 4000 and clear of all clouds
 
Reference? As I recall, the FAA criteria for what constitutes known icing changed more than once in the past 3-4 years. At one point, it was as you say. Then it became more of an ambiguous "what would a reasonable person expect?" standard. That was sometime in 2012. Has it changed again?

Iirc, the de-clarification of the definition of known ice you're referring to occurred sometime in 2010. Though it's now more ambiguous, it's allows for some much needed flexibility. The old definition was far too restrictive for some operations.
 
Yes. I was on a short IFR flight in a Warrior from FRG to SWF in December and they gave me 6000 ft for a final altitude. When I got closer to the White Plains area I noticed an overcast layer above while still climbing and knew temperatures were below freezing and I would be in the clouds at 6000. I asked Approach to stay at 4000 to avoid possible icing conditions and they gave it to me. There is no harm in asking and the flight was a non issue. Turns out there was PIREP near me by a King Air (I think) who reported negative icing at 8000, so 6000 might have been fine. I was PIC and didn't feel like taking a risk when I could just stay at 4000 and clear of all clouds

6000 might have been fine, but you still made the right call by staying at 4. A King Air cruises quite a bit faster than a Warrior, so that negative icing report doesn't necessarily mean there weren't some localized areas you could have picked up some ice that the King Air didn't because it simply wasn't there for as long as you would've been. When it comes to ice, 9 times out of 10 everything will be just fine if you just wait it out since icing is typically a localized condition, which is why there have been so many accidents related to icing. People get comfortable and complacent and get burned when things turn for the worst, so in other words, don't mess around with icing in ANY airplane. Even FIKI certification isn't an invitation to hang out in ice, it's merely a tool for you to use while you're working a plan to get out of it.
 
Iirc, the de-clarification of the definition of known ice you're referring to occurred sometime in 2010. Though it's now more ambiguous, it's allows for some much needed flexibility. The old definition was far too restrictive for some operations.
Yes, as usual I thought it happened more recently than it did. I tend to forget that my IR training stretched out over more than 3 years. The point I was getting at, though, was that unless something has changed quite recently, the ambiguous definition is the one that holds at present. The FAA doesn't still say, enter a sub-freezing cloud without FIKI and you've violated the FARs. Of course, if you ignore information that says icing is actually or very likely to be there, then if you get into trouble you may have some answering to do.

If anything, I'd expect you are much less likely to get into trouble if you get into icing you didn't expect (even if that happens due to your own faulty pre-flight planning) if you immediately take steps to get out of it, than if you try to wait it out out of fear of getting busted, and get into real trouble as a result.
 
Are you sure that's the reference you're looking for? Although it's 3 years older than I thought, that is the exact "reasonable and prudent pilot" standard that I was talking about. Nowhere does it say that visible moisture below freezing is sufficient condition for "known icing". Quite the contrary, as your quote shows, it says that it was at one time, then the definition was made even more broad, then it was changed to the hazy, "reasonable and prudent pilot" standard.

You've yet to show where the current definition says that penetration of visible moisture below freezing constitutes sufficient evidence to warrant a violation on the basis of "known icing". Nothing the FAA does gives me a "warm feeling", I think we all know that if they want to violate you they will find a FAR on which to make the charge stick. And if you get into bad enough trouble due to ice, and they think you should have known better, they probably will use known icing. But I've yet to hear of a recent case where a pilot in a non-FIKI aircraft was violated for picking up ice in a situation where the ONLY reason to think ice was possible was being in a below-freezing cloud (i.e. no airmet, no icing pireps, low probability of icing according to the CIP/FIP, etc.). Do you know of one?

Have you checked for such cases? I haven't. But that doesn't mean it couldn't happen. I'm just going by what the FAA says is the standards.

In any case, I didn't say that freezing visible moisture = "known ice" but that document does say that freezing visible moisture is "Icing conditions." Whether they were "known" or not depends on info available and whether that results in a PD depends on the "reasonable and prudent pilot" standard.

That standard is open to interpretation and is something that would be determined during the enforcement action which a) I'd like to avoid, and b) it is hard to argue that the aforementioned "icing conditions" couldn't have been known given all the data available to us.

It seems you are arguing about "known ice" and I'm arguing about "known icing conditions." Two very different things but the FAA has long held that flight into known icing conditions is a no-no regardless of whether you actually a) pick up ice or whether b) anyone else has reported ice or lack thereof.

So they could take action against you even if you didn't pick up any ice. Would they? And what would be the outcome after applying their hazy "reasonable and prudent pilot" standard? Don't want to find out.

You roll the dice all you want. I'm not. And I'm not wasting money on anti-ice gear since it provides me no protection legally. I just have to stay the heck out of those conditions or else I take a big legal risk.
 
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Have you checked for such cases? I haven't. But that doesn't mean it couldn't happen. I'm just going by what the FAA says is the standards.

In any case, I didn't say that freezing visible moisture = "known ice" but that document does say that freezing visible moisture is "Icing conditions." Whether they were "known" or not depends on info available and whether that results in a PD depends on the "reasonable and prudent pilot" standard.

That standard is open to interpretation and is something that would be determined during the enforcement action which a) I'd like to avoid, and b) it is hard to argue that the aforementioned "icing conditions" couldn't have been known given all the data available to us.

It seems you are arguing about "known ice" and I'm arguing about "known icing conditions." Two very different things but the FAA has long held that flight into known icing conditions is a no-no regardless of whether you actually a) pick up ice or whether b) anyone else has reported ice or lack thereof.

So they could take action against you even if you didn't pick up any ice. Would they? And what would be the outcome after applying their hazy "reasonable and prudent pilot" standard? Don't want to find out.

You roll the dice all you want. I'm not. And I'm not wasting money on anti-ice gear since it provides me no protection legally. I just have to stay the heck out of those conditions or else I take a big legal risk.

If your craft simply has "ice protection systems" installed then yes, you incur the same legal risk. If your system is "certified" (AKA FIKI) then the legal risk is handled as long as the craft is operated IAW the POH/AFM/Supplement as applicable.
 
Have you checked for such cases? I haven't. But that doesn't mean it couldn't happen. I'm just going by what the FAA says is the standards.
Actually I haven't. But until I'm aware of such a case, I'm not going to waste time worrying about the possibility.
In any case, I didn't say that freezing visible moisture = "known ice" but that document does say that freezing visible moisture is "Icing conditions." Whether they were "known" or not depends on info available and whether that results in a PD depends on the "reasonable and prudent pilot" standard.
No, it doesn't. It goes to great lengths to make clear that visible moisture below freezing is NOT sufficient for conditions under which icing will take place. I can't copy and paste from a PDF document and I'm not going to bother to type in the entire paragraph by hand when you can just as easily read it for yourself. The paragraph begins with the words "The formation of structural ice" and is on page 2 of the letter from the Chief Counsel to Bell.
It seems you are arguing about "known ice" and I'm arguing about "known icing conditions." Two very different things but the FAA has long held that flight into known icing conditions is a no-no regardless of whether you actually a) pick up ice or whether b) anyone else has reported ice or lack thereof.
No, I'm arguing about "known icing conditions". I just disagree with your interpretation of the FAA's definition. As I read it, their definition is basically, conditions under which a "reasonable pilot" would conclude, from all the available information, that structural icing was likely. That's more than just visible moisture below freezing. If there were no icing PIREPs, no icing AIRMETs, and the CIP/FIP indicated a low or negligible probability of icing even though there were clouds below freezing, would you consider that "known icing conditions"? I sure wouldn't.

That's not to say that I'd go fly in those conditions, because I usually wouldn't either. But that's not because I'm afraid of the FAA, it's because I don't know enough yet about icing to judge for myself the likelihood of getting structural ice. I'd much rather be in that position, though, than to be grounded for 9 months of the year (likely the case in VT where I'll be moving).
 
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Actually I haven't. But until I'm aware of such a case, I'm not going to waste time worrying about the possibility.

No, it doesn't. It goes to great lengths to make clear that visible moisture below freezing is NOT sufficient for conditions under which icing will take place. I can't copy and paste from a PDF document and I'm not going to bother to type in the entire paragraph by hand when you can just as easily read it for yourself. The paragraph begins with the words "The formation of structural ice" and is on page 2 of the letter from the Chief Counsel to Bell.

No, I'm arguing about "known icing conditions". I just disagree with your interpretation of the FAA's definition. As I read it, their definition is basically, conditions under which a "reasonable pilot" would conclude, from all the available information, that structural icing was likely. That's more than just visible moisture below freezing. If there were no icing PIREPs, no icing AIRMETs, and the CIP/FIP indicated a low or negligible probability of icing even though there were clouds below freezing, would you consider that "known icing conditions"? I sure wouldn't.

That's not to say that I'd go fly in those conditions, because I usually wouldn't either. But that's not because I'm afraid of the FAA, it's because I don't know enough yet about icing to judge for myself the likelihood of getting structural ice. I'd much rather be in that position, though, than to be grounded for 9 months of the year (likely the case in VT where I'll be moving).

It says this, and to me this is the bottom line.

FAA Icing Clarification Letter to AOPA from Jan. 16 2009 said:
"If the pilot operates the aircraft in known icing conditions contrary to the requirements of FAR 91.9(a), the FAA may take enforcement action."

That reference to 91.1 means we operate in accordance with our AFM. AFMs, as they state in the letter, mostly refer to "known icing conditions." Freezing moisture is a necessary but not sufficient for the formation of ice accretion on an aircraft. But a reasonable pilot could assume that freezing moisture might produce ice - as you and I both avoid freezing clouds on those grounds.


FAA Icing Clarification Letter to AOPA from Jan. 16 2009 said:
"The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has held on a number of occasions that known icing conditions exist when a pilot knows or reasonably should know about weather reports in which icing conditions are reported or forecast. In those cases the pilots chose to continue their flights without implementing an icing or an alternative course of action and the aircraft experienced heavy ice formation that validated the forecasted danger to the aircraft. The Board's decisions are consistent with the FAA's long-held position in enforcement actions that a pilot must consider the reasonable likelihood of encountering ice when operating the aircraft."

So is there a "reasonable likelihood of encountering ice" when operating in freezing clouds? Of course. But is that enough for a PD?

The regs allow them to initiate enforcement actions if you enter known icing conditions. Period. Whether that results in punitive judgement depends on a review of the reasonableness of the pilot's overall decision. That's where the interpretation part comes in. And I don't want to get to that point.

Is it reasonable to fly in clouds below freezing if the freezing level or cloud base is way above MEA and the pilot planned the route with a way to get to certain non-icing conditions? I would say yes, that is reasonable. But I don't want my ticket to depend on some FAA FSDO agreeing with me.

In the above scenario I would almost be more afraid of the FAA than the ice. One follows the immutable laws of nature and the other is the government. :D
 
It says this, and to me this is the bottom line.



That reference to 91.1 means we operate in accordance with our AFM. AFMs, as they state in the letter, mostly refer to "known icing conditions." Freezing moisture is a necessary but not sufficient for the formation of ice accretion on an aircraft. But a reasonable pilot could assume that freezing moisture might produce ice - as you and I both avoid freezing clouds on those grounds.




So is there a "reasonable likelihood of encountering ice" when operating in freezing clouds? Of course. But is that enough for a PD?

The regs allow them to initiate enforcement actions if you enter known icing conditions. Period. Whether that results in punitive judgement depends on a review of the reasonableness of the pilot's overall decision. That's where the interpretation part comes in. And I don't want to get to that point.

Is it reasonable to fly in clouds below freezing if the freezing level or cloud base is way above MEA and the pilot planned the route with a way to get to certain non-icing conditions? I would say yes, that is reasonable. But I don't want my ticket to depend on some FAA FSDO agreeing with me.

In the above scenario I would almost be more afraid of the FAA than the ice. One follows the immutable laws of nature and the other is the government. :D

I couldn't take off in the Rockies 6 months out of the year if freezing temps in clouds equaled known icing conditions. So I choose to believe that's not what was intended.:wink2: We're all a day from humity, until then I keep trying to build the experience that will save me vs. staying on the ground for any odd reason and becoming a 30 hour a year hero.
 
I couldn't take off in the Rockies 6 months out of the year if freezing temps in clouds equaled known icing conditions. So I choose to believe that's not what was intended.:wink2: We're all a day from humity, until then I keep trying to build the experience that will save me vs. staying on the ground for any odd reason and becoming a 30 hour a year hero.
And the Bell letter pretty clearly says that that was not what was intended. I really didn't want to have to type it in by hand, but here are some salient excerpts (my emphasis in bold face):
FAA Chief Counsel said:
The formation of structural ice requires two elements: 1) the presence of visible moisture, and 2) an aircraft surface temperature at or below zero degrees Celsius. The FAA does not necessarily consider the mere presence of clouds (which may contain only ice crystals) or other forms of visible moisture at or below freezing to be conducive to the formation of known ice or to constitute known icing conditions. There are many variables that influence whether ice will actually be detected or observed, or will form on or adhere to an aircraft. The size of the water droplets, the shape of the airfoil, and the speed of the aircraft, among other factors, can make a critical difference in the initiation and growth of structural ice.

Known icing conditions involve [...] circumstances where a reasonable pilot would expect a substantial likelihood of ice formation on the aircraft based upon all information available to that pilot. [The NTSB] has held on a number of occasions that known icing conditions exist when a pilot knows or reasonably should know about weather reports in which icing conditions are reported or forecast. In those cases the pilots chose to continue their flights without implementing an icing exit strategy or an alternative course of action and the aircraft experienced heavy ice formation that validated the forecasted danger to the aircraft. [...] The forecasts in the cited decisions involved very specific information that alerted pilots to a substantial danger of severe icing.

[...] flight which results in the formation of ice on an aircraft is not the sole factor the FAA will use in determining whether enforcement action is warranted in any particular case. [...] the FAA will evaluate those actions taken by the pilot (including pre-flight actions and those taken during the flight) to determine if the pilot's actions were, in fact, reasonable in light of 91.9(a), 91.13(a), and 91.103. The FAA will specifically evaluate all weather information available to the pilot and determine whether the pilot's pre-flight planning took into account the possibility of ice formation, alternative courses of action to avoid known icing conditions and, if ice actually formed on the aircraft, what steps were taken by the pilot to exit those conditions.
 
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And the Bell letter pretty clearly says that that was not what was intended. I really didn't want to have to type it in by hand, but here are some salient excerpts (my emphasis in bold face):

I agree with you. I have been in ice many times and reported it to ATC. I have never been called by the FAA, or given a number, or anything else. They were just happy to get the report, altitude, temp, etc. They have also given me whatever I needed to get out immediately. We really make to much of all this, but I guess that's par for the course.
 
I agree with you. I have been in ice many times and reported it to ATC. I have never been called by the FAA, or given a number, or anything else. They were just happy to get the report, altitude, temp, etc. They have also given me whatever I needed to get out immediately. We really make to much of all this, but I guess that's par for the course.

Merely picking up ice in a non-FIKI airplane isn't a violation. The FAA realizes that stuff changes while enroute, so they're not going to be knocking down doors every time a non-FIKI airplane reports ice to ATC. Plus, I doubt ATC knows every airplane that is FIKI vs not FIKI. For instance there are some FIKI piston, non-pressurized 210's out there, but most are not, so how is ATC going to know exactly what kind of 210 you are in that case?
 
Y'all can quibble about this all you want. If you declare an emergency because you're picking up ice in your 172, and it spoils the controller's day, you're going to be given (whether you want it or not) the opportunity to explain it all to the FSDO. If they look at the AIRMETS, FD, FA, freezing levels, and FIP/CIP, and the sum total of that look is that icing appears likely to the Inspector handing the case, your goose will be cooked. So, don't rely on the idea that the mere presence of visible moisture and freezing temps is not a guarantee of icing to be a viable defense if those conditions exist and the sum total of the weather forecasts and reports suggests that there is a significant likelihood of icing (and in a 172, it doesn't take much likelihood to be significant).

Bottom line: If you want to stay out of trouble (both aerodynamic and legal), use all the tools available, think carefully about the capabilities of the plane you're flying, and make your decision as though an FAA Inspector were looking over your shoulder. Kinda like when someone asked 27 TFW Deputy Commander for Operations Colonel Howard Nixon about what he looked for in a flight lead in the wing, he said, "I want someone who'll fly as though I were on his wing even when I'm not."
 
I agree with you. I have been in ice many times and reported it to ATC. I have never been called by the FAA, or given a number, or anything else. They were just happy to get the report, altitude, temp, etc. They have also given me whatever I needed to get out immediately. We really make to much of all this, but I guess that's par for the course.
Oh I know. I wasn't reacting to your post, just using it as a springboard to post the parts of the letter that Petrolero seemed to be overlooking.
 
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