Robert McNamara Dead

For example -- the dirty little secret of Omaha beach was that the Army Air Corps failed to put bombs on the German beach defenses, resulting in landing Infantry being mowed down by defenders at 100% combat effectiveness.

Wasn't that weather-related, bombers not able to get to or see the targets? Or is there something else to the story?


Trapper John
 
I hear ya. Today's neutered, two year conscripts are no match for our professional armed forces. However, they still make some really good stuff.

Now if they were the former Wehrmacht or SS, you'd have your hands full.

:lightning::lightning:

Yeah, but Germany's WW2 soldiers were hindered by an awful logistics system -- every depot-level maintenance issue required a trip back to Germany!
 
I have to run out, but one of the most frustrating parts of the Johnson/McNamara tenure was the rules of engagement they put on the military. Once again, these risked the lives of combat folks. I've only read of the rules the Navy guys followed bombing the North, but they were crazy.
Where I was, along the Cambodian border in an A Camp for several months: the bad guys could fire on us and run across the border where we were prohibited to fire back or pursue them. This later changed a bit and Nixon actually went into Cambodia. But, we were essentially a training base for their mortar and rocket crews. They'd sneak over the border which was about seven miles from our camp, mortar or rocket our camp and sneak back. Once they crossed the border, they were safe from ground attack.

I won't go into the geography of Vietnam, but how does one seal the borders? Then, you tie the hands of the troops on the ground. Some of the rules of engagement were very complex and hurt our troops.

Best,

Dave
 
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Wasn't that weather-related, bombers not able to get to or see the targets? Or is there something else to the story?


Trapper John

The bombs fell harmlessly in the bogs inland, and did not hit any of the intended targets (the German beach defenses).

There are many works that provide a discussion of this, including this one.
 
...
I'll stick to my position that McNamara was the epitome of his time. His contemporaries shared his hubris becasue the shared his worldview -- one where "management" trumped "leadership" -- and perhaps even "freedom."

....

I think that's a pretty fair statement, and an accurate assessment (despite my posts above, I'm no McNamara fan/supporter/apologist, I just wanted to make a bigger point about logistics).

I read a biography of the guy a while ago (it might have been a biography, an autobiography, memoirs, I can't remember anymore), and there was the smallest paragraph that shaped my opinion of McNamara.

I don't remember exactly what McNamara had said, but it was to the effect of: "we didn't win in Vietnam because we [McNamara and the gov't in general] opted never to 'mobilize' the national spirit." Mobilize was the exact word that McNamara himself used.

That told me a few things about him. For starters, I think it goes to exactly what you wrote above about "management" vs. "leadership." It just drips with the attitude of the populace at large (soldiers and civilians) being a statistical resource (i.e., "hey guys, we'll be 20% more effective if we use the 'Uncle Sam Wants You' poster instead of Rosie the Riveter") rather than, well, people. Further, I took it as McNamara making ****-poor excuses for failures in Vietnam, rather than looking at some of the much bigger problems in Vietnam (e.g., far too much political shenanigans involved). And so forth.

So, while I wasn't even alive during Vietnam, I understand - and agree with - where both you and Dave S. are coming from.
 
I have to run out, but one of the most frustrating parts of the Johnson/McNamara tenure was the rules of engagement they put on the military. Once again, these risked the lives of combat folks. I've only read of the rules the Navy guys followed bombing the North, but they were crazy.
Where I was, along the Cambodian border in an A Camp for several months: the bad guys could fire on us and run across the border where we were prohibited to fire back or pursue them. This later changed a bit and Nixon actually went into Cambodia. But, we were essentially a training base for their mortar and rocket crews. They'd sneak over the border which was about seven miles from our camp, mortar or rocket our camp and sneak back. Once they crossed the border, they were safe from ground attack.

I won't go into the geography of Vietnam, but how does one seal the borders? They you tie the hands of the troops on the ground. Some of the rules of engagement were very complex and hurt our troops.

Best,

Dave
Dumbass rules like that survive to this day. When I was in Lebanon in the 80's you could not fire over borders even though they were shooting at you, certain people were considered non-combatants and could not be fired upon, even when they were using the AK47 to shoot at you, etc.
 
Well said.

I'll stick to my position that McNamara was the epitome of his time. His contemporaries shared his hubris becasue the shared his worldview -- one where "management" trumped "leadership" -- and perhaps even "freedom."

I meant to point out that yours was an excellent observation: McNamara wouldn't have ascended like he did in virtually any other time period. But I don't think that at all reduces his culpability for the many catastrophes and near-catastrophes he and his ideology were responsible for.

Robert Moses is the most glaring example of a McNamara contemporary -- read this swell early essay about Moses from The Atlantic: http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/39feb/0239rodgers.htm and then contrast with Robert Caro's magisterial work, The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York.

Moses often said, "If the ends don't justify the means, what does?"

I'm significantly less familiar with Moses than I am McNamara; other than hearing his name get dropped with regard to preferences for car-based transportation solutions over mass transit, I don't know much about him. But I'll check it out.
 
The bombs fell harmlessly in the bogs inland, and did not hit any of the intended targets (the German beach defenses).

There are many works that provide a discussion of this, including this one.

On top of that, a lot of the naval bombardment beforehand was suppose to be on the beach itself - most importantly, to create cover (Normandy isn't what it looks like in Saving Private Ryan - it's a couple hundred yards wide, rather than <100). But, for some reason (I think fog or clouds - major storm on June 5), the bombardment all landed inland. So, there weren't any craters to take cover in, and it missed the fortifications as well.
 
...

Then add on Vietnam. McNamara made a simple, fundamental, and ultimately catastrophic mistake -- and one that pretty much only he or the other Whiz Kids who subscribed to his dogma could have: He assumed that the pace and escalation of war in general could be "rationally" dictated through a series of carefully-executed stimuli, irrespective of the culture, political goals, and tactics of whatever enemy was being faced. The application of that theory in Vietnam was a tremendous failure, and by mid-1966 even he knew that. But rather than adapting or adjusting his approach and offering methods of continuing the campaign by means other than escalation and/or advocating ending it altogether, it seems to me he got almost paralyzed, hampered by the crippling realization that the entire intellectual foundation of his whole strategy had crumbled. Instead of reacting honestly and productively, he got defensive and angry (and probably began re-writing his history right then.) These things are not what you want in the face of a growing mess.

....

See above post.
 
Also true of variants of existing aircraft converted to interceptor duty, i.e., F-86D & L, where they took out the machine guns to make room for radar and fire control systems.

Which made them dedicated interceptors.
 
See above post.

I think this is what you were referring to:

That told me a few things about him. For starters, I think it goes to exactly what you wrote above about "management" vs. "leadership." It just drips with the attitude of the populace at large (soldiers and civilians) being a statistical resource (i.e., "hey guys, we'll be 20% more effective if we use the 'Uncle Sam Wants You' poster instead of Rosie the Riveter") rather than, well, people. Further, I took it as McNamara making ****-poor excuses for failures in Vietnam, rather than looking at some of the much bigger problems in Vietnam (e.g., far too much political shenanigans involved). And so forth.

Well-put. And that's the big flaw in that kind of ideology: It takes all the fuzzy human factors out of it. You can get away with such an approach in almost-exclusively quantitative arenas like defense procurement and appropriations and logistics and so on -- it might even be the best intellectual approach in such kinds of situations. It'll also wind up working in broad (maybe "coarse" is a better word) applications like "Okay, let's firebomb the hell out of Japan. What's the best way to do that to achieve the most effect?" But for anything more nuanced or complex or human, at some point someday it just ain't gonna work. And worse, subscribing so dogmatically to such an ideology doesn't leave one with any Plan B when the ideology gets a hole the size of Southeast Asia blown through it.

So, while I wasn't even alive during Vietnam, I understand - and agree with - where both you and Dave S. are coming from.

Same here.
 
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There are / were several countries that will not allow a nuke powered ship to dock in their ports. This may have been a factor.
Perhaps, but I don't think so. I saw as many ports-of-call from the Nimitz as I did from Connie and Ranger. The only difference was the Nimitz had to anchor out in the harbor and run liberty launches into a number of ports. However, not sure if that was berthing/harbor/draft issues, or nuke propulsion issues. There were more issues around carrying nuke weapons than there was about nuke propulsion. I don't recall world opinion weighing too heavily on military procurement decisions in that era.
 
Yeah, if I wasn't explicit in my comment about the Russkies, my point was that they never developed their next-gen tank to match/exceed the M1. They did, however, develop reactive armor which was more effective than the Chobham armor we went with. All the experts said the Russkies didn't have it. Then they did. Took us a while to catch up.

No matter now. We rule the roost.

Of course, we're wearing out the M1A1s and the lines are shut down IIRC. What do we do to replace them???

I worked for General Dynamics Land Systems in the 80s and you're right, the M1 production lines were shut down a long time ago when the 7,000 tanks that the military contracted for were finished. While I was working there I spent some time in Anniston Alabama with a few of our folks to setup and certify a turret test stand and bore sight target board in the Army depot facility that was to become the refurb center for the M1 tanks and it's variants.

I have since seen a special program on Discovery or the History Channel about that facility. So we are no longer producing them but we just keep rebuilding and upgrading them over and over.

Jean
 
I meant to point out that yours was an excellent observation: McNamara wouldn't have ascended like he did in virtually any other time period. But I don't think that at all reduces his culpability for the many catastrophes and near-catastrophes he and his ideology were responsible for.

Precisely -- he is doubly culpable: for not being critical, and for absorbing the worldview whole when in a position of power.
 
It'll also wind up working in broad (maybe "coarse" is a better word) applications like "Okay, let's firebomb the hell out of Japan. What's the best way to do that to achieve the most effect?" But for anything more nuanced or complex or human, at some point someday it just ain't gonna work. And worse, subscribing so dogmatically to such an ideology doesn't leave one with any Plan B when the ideology gets a hole the size of Southeast Asia blown through it.

Exactly. Which is why propoganda is required to dehumanize the enemy.

One of the sad realities of WW2 is the Infantry soldier on the line was the least likely to de-humanize his enemy.

The further away from the front, the easier it was to swallow the propaganda.

Paul Fussel's book The Boys’ Crusade : The American Infantry in Northwestern Europe, 1944-1945 is required reading.
 
Ten years in the Air Force: Not one Nuke launched.

Eleven years in the Army: More rounds fired in one day than most gun people fire in a lifetime.

BTW: "Ground pounder" is an appellation exclusively for Infantry.
In Armor we referred to anyone on the ground as "crunchies."

Nah...

Infantry called tankers "treadheads," ............ but we couldn't hear them.

:smilewinkgrin:


Bill Mauldin addressed this in one of his "Up Front" cartoons during WWII. Willie and Joe are digging a foxhole as a Sherman tank drives by. One says to the other, "I'd ruther dig. A moving foxhole tends to attract the eye."
 
Bill Mauldin addressed this in one of his "Up Front" cartoons during WWII. Willie and Joe are digging a foxhole as a Sherman tank drives by. One says to the other, "I'd ruther dig. A moving foxhole tends to attract the eye."
My dad was in armored in N. Africa and then Europe. He had nothing but praise for German armored and was very happy that he did not earn a purple heart in the Sherman. He did tell me that guys would often used captured Nazi bazooka's as the US ones were none to reliable. He used a different shorter word that would not get through PoA's filters. ;)

Dad had an interesting career. He actually started before the war broke out and was trained to ride horses in the Calvary. Later he entered armor. Just before the battle of the bulge borke out he was accepted for pilot training and shipped to Texas where he proceeded to drink himself blind and flunk out. He was then shipped to the Pacific where he was assigned a unit that was about to take over the PI. I know a little of what he did there as I have one of the souveniers. It is a box that was carved for him by a group of 12 Japanese POWs that he was responsible for. I knew little of the battle until a few years ago. It was fierce. I also foud out that the Japanese fought to the death and the there were only 12 prisoners taken. Hmmmm.

That is where the war ended for him. He returned to the US after the surrender. He served a few more years after the war but had grown weary of it and decided to resign in 1948.

When he was dying of Alzhiemers and no longer talked or knew who I was I took him out one day to a WW2 museum. There he saw WW2 armor. His face lite up and he crawled all over it. It was abvious that there was a connection. His mind could still remember the war a little. After an hour or so we went to McDonald's to get a hamburger. There we saw two cute young girls. Dad locked on target and stared at them. When they went out of sight he looked at me, got a glean in his eye and spoke his last word, "yeah!". It would seem another part of his brain was still working. He would die a few months later at the young age of 65.
 
Thanks for sharing that with us Scott!

My Dad served in WWII and also applied to be an enlisted pilot. Passed all the tests and was culled out on a physical at the end for being 1/4 short. Later, all they guys that were accepted were taken out to form replacement units after the Battle of the Bulge.

Dad made Tech Sergeant and among other things was a Bazooka and flame thrower instructor.

Seems the war helped define his generation. He was 21 when he enlisted in 1941 and got out at the end of the war. Settled down and married my Mom. I was lucky and had more time with my Dad than you did. Still miss him.

Best,

Dave
 
Seems the war helped define his generation. He was 21 when he enlisted in 1941 and got out at the end of the war. Settled down and married my Mom. I was lucky and had more time with my Dad than you did. Still miss him.

I was 19 when my dad was killed in a single car crash. He died before the Greatest Generation told us anything, but I learned that he was in submarines and Destroyer Escorts in the Pacific.

I spoke to my uncle (his younger brother) a few years later. He was in the Infantry in Korea. He loosened up a bit and old me a few of his experiences.

Of all the veterans, I think the Korean Vets raw deals ranks right up there. Vietnam had bigger numbers and was more recent, but I think every Korea vet had the untenable comparison to WW2 to live up to. The war ended with a whimper, after plenty of stupid political moves and even dumber military decisions (Task Force Smith).
 
I was 19 when my dad was killed in a single car crash. He died before the Greatest Generation told us anything, but I learned that he was in submarines and Destroyer Escorts in the Pacific.

I spoke to my uncle (his younger brother) a few years later. He was in the Infantry in Korea. He loosened up a bit and old me a few of his experiences.

Of all the veterans, I think the Korean Vets raw deals ranks right up there. Vietnam had bigger numbers and was more recent, but I think every Korea vet had the untenable comparison to WW2 to live up to. The war ended with a whimper, after plenty of stupid political moves and even dumber military decisions (Task Force Smith).

I agree Dan. Forgotten war. Cold wasteland up north. Engagement rules that hurt us, and mass attacks.

When I first got to SF as a young butter bar, there were a lot of Korean vets recounting tales of what had happened. Units that lost their colors. Being pushed all the way back to the Pusan perimeter. The bitter cold and a war that no one really identified with; a lot of supply shortages and equipment that didn't function in the cold.

I read several years ago where some of the Chinese military generals were interviewed and they discussed how our mass fire power devastated their units. Too bad we didn't know how badly at the time. Fighters protected in Chinese territory that would fly into Korea and attack, then, retreat to a safe harbor.

Glad I didn't have to serve there. My hat is off to those that did.

Best,

Dave
 
The Korean War will stand forever as an example of the failure of politicians and top brass to respect the lower echelons. What an absolutely disgraceful period of our history. Terrible.

Scott, thanks for that story. I lost my father-in-law at age 65 to Alzheimers. He had his own unique experiences as a Greek peasant (goat herder) during the war and the subsequent Communist civil war. Lost two brothers to the Nazis (executed in a reprisal).
 
My dad was in armored in N. Africa and then Europe. ....
Thanks Scott, that's a very good story. My father also served in WWII. He joined the Marines just after Pearl Harbor when he was 16 years old. His only campaign was Guadalcanal. He was sick with malaria on his 17th birthday. He was among the Marines watching from the beach as the Battle of Savo Island was being fought. After being evacuated, he spend several months in hospitals in New Zealand and Australia before being sent home. He was given a medical discharge after serving 3 1/2 years.
 
McNamara was also responsible for the word, "commonality". He invented it.
 
My dad was a corpman in the Navy during WWII. Served in hospitals in the Bay Area and then finished his time working in a research unit at UC Berkeley. He was in pre-med at UC Berkeley before enlisting in the Navy. His Navy service cured him of wanting to be a doctor and he went on to a distiniguished career as a veterinarian and college professor.

My mother-in-law was an Army nurse and came ashore on Omaha Beach on D+1. Father-in-law was an amorer in 3rd Army. At least, that's what I think he was. The story changed a few times over the years.

An uncle was flying B-17s out of England at the end of the war in Europe.

They're all gone now, Dad the most recent one this May. The greatest generation is fading fast.
 
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