Readback correct no longer needed?

ScottM

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Over on the redboard a poster claimed that he was given his clearance, read it back and heard nothing from ATC. He inquired if his readback was correct and the controller replied that it was and that they were no longer required to say "readback correct"

That is all I have on this, hearsay.

But it does beg a couple of questions.

Has anyone else heard of this change in procedure? How will we know if we got our clearences correct if ATC is not going to tell us that we did? Wouldn't the above procedure lead to a potentail that the pilot flies a proceudre different than the one ATC assigned if he mistakenly wrote something down and it was never double checked? Lastly, does this not conflict with the readback requirments palced on pilots? Why bother to readback something if ATC is nto going to acknowledge you or are they only now going to acknowledge if you read it back and it is wrong?
 
The 7110.65S hasn't changed since July 31 08, and I haven't heard of any GENOT's regarding this particular issue, so I don't know how the controller thought he was off the hook from staying to approved phraseology and procedures.
 
The 7110.65S hasn't changed since July 31 08, and I haven't heard of any GENOT's regarding this particular issue, so I don't know how the controller thought he was off the hook from staying to approved phraseology and procedures.

FYI for all to see what Jason is referring to.

JO 7110.65S http://www.faa.gov/airports_airtraff.../media/ATC.pdf,


2-4-3. PILOT ACKNOWLEDGMENT/READBACK

a. When issuing clearances or instructions ensure acknowledgment by the pilot.

NOTE Pilots may acknowledge clearances, instructions, or other information by using “Wilco,” “Roger,” “Affirmative,” or other words or remarks.
REFERENCE AIM, Para 4-2-3, Contact Procedures.

b. If altitude, heading, or other items are read back by the pilot, ensure the read back is correct. If incorrect or incomplete, make corrections as
appropriate.
 
Over on the redboard a poster claimed that he was given his clearance, read it back and heard nothing from ATC. He inquired if his readback was correct and the controller replied that it was and that they were no longer required to say "readback correct"

That is all I have on this, hearsay.

But it does beg a couple of questions.

Has anyone else heard of this change in procedure? How will we know if we got our clearences correct if ATC is not going to tell us that we did? Wouldn't the above procedure lead to a potentail that the pilot flies a proceudre different than the one ATC assigned if he mistakenly wrote something down and it was never double checked?

If you write down and fly what you read back you're covered. ATC is required to ensure the pilot acknowledges the clearance, that's covered by your readback. ATC is also required to ensure that anything read back by the pilot is correct and to make corrections if necessary.

Lastly, does this not conflict with the readback requirments palced on pilots?

What read back requirements placed on pilots? I believe the AIM just says pilots of airborne aircraft should read back those parts of ATC clearances and instructions containing altitude assignments or vectors as a means of mutual verification.


FAA Order JO 7110.65

2-4-3. PILOT ACKNOWLEDGMENT/READ BACK

a. When issuing clearances or instructions ensure acknowledgment by the pilot.

NOTE-
Pilots may acknowledge clearances, instructions, or other information by using "Wilco," "Roger," "Affirmative," or other words or remarks.

REFERENCE-
AIM, Para 4-2-3, Contact Procedures.

b. If altitude, heading, or other items are read back by the pilot, ensure the read back is correct. If incorrect or incomplete, make corrections as appropriate.
 
My understanding is that the only actual required readback is a hold short instruction. Anything else can simply be acknowledged.
 
Over on the redboard a poster claimed that he was given his clearance, read it back and heard nothing from ATC. He inquired if his readback was correct and the controller replied that it was and that they were no longer required to say "readback correct"

That is all I have on this, hearsay.

But it does beg a couple of questions.

Has anyone else heard of this change in procedure? How will we know if we got our clearences correct if ATC is not going to tell us that we did? Wouldn't the above procedure lead to a potentail that the pilot flies a proceudre different than the one ATC assigned if he mistakenly wrote something down and it was never double checked? Lastly, does this not conflict with the readback requirments palced on pilots? Why bother to readback something if ATC is nto going to acknowledge you or are they only now going to acknowledge if you read it back and it is wrong?

Interesting. I wonder if it's some kind of rumor out of control? I've noticed that KDSM ATIS has added a statement to the effect of "all aircraft read back hold-short instructions and assigned altitude" in the last couple of weeks.


Trapper John
 
My understanding is that the only actual required readback is a hold short instruction. Anything else can simply be acknowledged.

Mine too, but it's to your advantage to read back all routes, altitudes and headings.
 
Interesting. I wonder if it's some kind of rumor out of control? I've noticed that KDSM ATIS has added a statement to the effect of "all aircraft read back hold-short instructions and assigned altitude" in the last couple of weeks.

I believe the statement calling for a read back of altitudes is no longer required.
 
I got three clearances yesterday, read them all back and got confirmation they were correct except for one clarification. If not required, it's still being done where I fly. I've probably done eight or ten in the last couple weeks. Haven't responded with Wilco; so, I wouldn't know if that's acceptable.

Best,

Dave
 
Considering how intricate some clearances can be, it would seem unwise not to verify you have the correct information.
 
Considering how intricate some clearances can be, it would seem unwise not to verify you have the correct information.
Agree completely.

I would also be concerned if I did read back something complex and the controller refused to verify that I did understand it correctly.
 
If you tried to respond to an IFR clearance with "Wilco" at ADS, you'd be there all day.
 
Given the finding in Administrator v. Merrell that pilots are responsible for complying with the clearance as read by the controller even if the controller doesn't acknowledge the readback, I'll insist on a "readback correct" for a full route clearance or any time I have doubt in my mind. "Tiger 22RL, understand descend and maintain seven thousand, acknowledge" -- puts the monkey back on the controller's back.
 
If you write down and fly what you read back you're covered.
Not necessarily. If the readback is confirmed, I agree, but if not...

Ron mentioned the Merrell decision. That's the case that stands for the overall proposition that the FAA can (1) impose its interpretation of an FAR on the NTSB and (2) the FAA can make up an interpretaton during the endforcement process.

But that specific interpretation that the FAA made up in that case was that an unconfirmed readback does not cover the pilot. In that case, a pilot read back an instruction meant for another pilot and then flew it, resulting in a violation. The readback has been stepped on and was not corrected by ATC.
 
For those that don't know, the 7110.65 S is the current version of the Air Traffic Controller's "Manual". This is what it says....

From: http://www.faa.gov/airports_airtraf...s/atpubs/Atc/Chp2/atc0204.html#atc0204.html.1

2-4-3. PILOT ACKNOWLEDGMENT/READ BACK
a. When issuing clearances or instructions ensure acknowledgment by the pilot.
NOTE-
Pilots may acknowledge clearances, instructions, or other information by using "Wilco," "Roger," "Affirmative," or other words or remarks.

[SIZE=-2]REFERENCE-
AIM, Para 4-2-3, Contact Procedures.[/SIZE]

b. If altitude, heading, or other items are read back by the pilot, ensure the read back is correct. If incorrect or incomplete, make corrections as appropriate.





Also, the Notice that started this rumor was the one that expired in Aug 2008. (This now expired notice added a 2-4-3 C to the 7110.65 Sierra. It dealt only with altitudes.):


From: http://www.faa.gov/airports_airtraffic/air_traffic/publications/at_notices/media/N7110.484.pdf


Technically, IT APPEARS (Key ATC Phraseology here) that the controller must "ensure the read back is correct" "IF altitude, heading, or other items are read back by the pilot". So if the pilot doesn't read these things back....


Let the furball begin....


--Matt Rogers
 
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Out here in the Time Zone No One Remembers (MST) the towers are using the phrase "repeat instructions verbatim". Now, how many people around here use the word "verbatim" in common, colloquial conversation?
 
Here is an element of ATC that continually cycles. I started instrument flying about 35 years ago. At that time you had to read back all instructions. Enroute you normally made position reports to FSS. A few years later traffic and radar coverage increased so did communications, not enough air time to readback instructions so the rules were not enforced. Result was some incidents so ATC again required readback (and FAA added more frequencies and sectors). Then we had the strike resulting in few controllers for the workload, no readbacks. As the system got back to normal the FAA reminded us to readback all instructions. Now we have many new controllers who are having a hard time keeping up with the flow. I think collectively they have not gotten good enough to keep the traffic moving and listen to the readbacks. Not surprisingly, they do not want readbacks. My prediction is we are near the bottom of the cycle and things will soon change again.
 
Here is an element of ATC that continually cycles. I started instrument flying about 35 years ago. At that time you had to read back all instructions. Enroute you normally made position reports to FSS. A few years later traffic and radar coverage increased so did communications, not enough air time to readback instructions so the rules were not enforced. Result was some incidents so ATC again required readback (and FAA added more frequencies and sectors). Then we had the strike resulting in few controllers for the workload, no readbacks. As the system got back to normal the FAA reminded us to readback all instructions. Now we have many new controllers who are having a hard time keeping up with the flow. I think collectively they have not gotten good enough to keep the traffic moving and listen to the readbacks. Not surprisingly, they do not want readbacks. My prediction is we are near the bottom of the cycle and things will soon change again.

Good analogy. :smile:
 
Not necessarily. If the readback is confirmed, I agree, but if not...

Ron mentioned the Merrell decision. That's the case that stands for the overall proposition that the FAA can (1) impose its interpretation of an FAR on the NTSB and (2) the FAA can make up an interpretaton during the endforcement process.

But that specific interpretation that the FAA made up in that case was that an unconfirmed readback does not cover the pilot. In that case, a pilot read back an instruction meant for another pilot and then flew it, resulting in a violation. The readback has been stepped on and was not corrected by ATC.

If you write down a clearance meant for you and fly what you read back you are indeed covered. If, like Merrell, you write down a clearance meant for someone else and your readback is not received by ATC because it was blocked by the readback of the correct aircraft and you then fly what you read back you're probably going to have problems.

The Merrell case is largely misunderstood because it was widely misreported. Pilots were led to believe they were now solely responsible to hear and understand clearances. That wasn't correct. ATC is still required to ensure acknowledgment by the pilot when issuing clearances or instructions and is still required to ensure that anything read back is correct.
 
Given the finding in Administrator v. Merrell that pilots are responsible for complying with the clearance as read by the controller even if the controller doesn't acknowledge the readback, I'll insist on a "readback correct" for a full route clearance or any time I have doubt in my mind. "Tiger 22RL, understand descend and maintain seven thousand, acknowledge" -- puts the monkey back on the controller's back.

The controller must ensure the pilot acknowledges the clearance. If the pilot chooses to acknowledge the clearance with a readback the controller must ensure the readback is correct and make corrections if it isn't. If the readback is correct the controller doesn't have to do anything, but I think most will respond "readback correct", the exchange just doesn't seem complete without it. That's true now and it was true before Merrell, Merrell changed nothing.
 
If you write down a clearance meant for you and fly what you read back you are indeed covered. If, like Merrell, you write down a clearance meant for someone else and your readback is not received by ATC because it was blocked by the readback of the correct aircraft and you then fly what you read back you're probably going to have problems.
I don't think you can read Merrell as a "not meant for you" case.

As I read Merrell, if all of the facts were exactly the same except (1) the clearance was meant for the pilot and (2) the pilot got the heading wrong, IMO the result in Merrell wold have been exactly the same.

Wrong about who the instruction was for vs. wrong about the contents of the instruction is, as the law profs like to say, a disticntion without a difference. IMO the operative holding is that the pilot was strictly liable for following the correct instruction if the readback was not confirmed or corrected.
Pilots were led to believe they were now solely responsible to hear and understand clearances. That wasn't correct.
If that's what pilots were led to believe, you are absolutely right. Pilots are not ="solely" responsibible - just responsible enough to be violated.
 
I think most will respond "readback correct", the exchange just doesn't seem complete without it.
I don't think that's correct.

For a full route clearance o the ground, yes. For a full route clearance in the air, probably. But for the typical instruction like a vector, altitude assignment or an approach clearance, I don't believe I've ever heard those words used.
 
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As I read Merrell, if all of the facts were exactly the same except (1) the clearance was meant for the pilot and (2) the pilot got the heading wrong, IMO the result in Merrell wold have been exactly the same.

If all of the facts were exactly the same as in the Merrell case except (1) the clearance was meant for the pilot and (2) the pilot got the heading wrong, read it back wrong, and ATC failed to correct it, ATC would have failed to comply with FAA Order 2-4.3.b.

Do you still think the result would be the same?
 
If all of the facts were exactly the same as in the Merrell case except (1) the clearance was meant for the pilot and (2) the pilot got the heading wrong, read it back wrong, and ATC failed to correct it, ATC would have failed to comply with FAA Order 2-4.3.b.

Do you still think the result would be the same?

I do. In this case, even though the controller screwed up, I bet the pilot would still fry anyway.
 
If all of the facts were exactly the same as in the Merrell case except (1) the clearance was meant for the pilot and (2) the pilot got the heading wrong, read it back wrong, and ATC failed to correct it, ATC would have failed to comply with FAA Order 2-4.3.b.

Do you still think the result would be the same?
Yes. I thought that's what I said.

I agree with you that the controller would have violated the read-back requirement. But if the FAA pressed the view that the controller's error does not excuse the pilot's it would have succeeded.

I think the point is that in both scenarios, the conduct of the pilot is identical. The pilot hears an instruction. The pilot reads it back. The pilot hears nothing in response. There's no reason for the result to be different based on the reason for ATC's silence.

I think that's what bothered the NTSB about the FAA's position - it made a factual finding that the pilot acted reasonably, better yet, "responsibly and prudently."

==============================
human beings make mistakes and there is no regulatory action, remedial or otherwise, that can eliminate all mistakes. Our precedent does not attempt to excuse mistakes due to proven carelessness or demonstrated inattention, but it does attempt to recognize that where an inevitable error of perception does occur, the pilot should not face sanction if he has acted responsibly and prudently thereafter
==============================

Nevertheless, the FAA took a legal position in which that didn't matter and it was upheld.
 

Mark's pretty much got it... Heavy hackage to emphasize the point in a concise manner:

But if the FAA pressed the view that the controller's error does not excuse the pilot's it would have succeeded.

NTSB said:
the pilot should not face sanction if he has acted responsibly and prudently thereafter

Nevertheless, the FAA took a legal position in which that didn't matter and it was upheld.

There ya go.

It seems that the FAA will fry the pilot almost regardless of what happens, which pretty much fits in with the responsibility and authority of the PIC. If you are the supreme authority with regards to the flight, you bear supreme responsibility as well. That may not sound fair, but it does mean that the PIC knows they won't be able to play the blame game. That may keep them on their toes a bit more.
 
I agree with you that the controller would have violated the read-back requirement. But if the FAA pressed the view that the controller's error does not excuse the pilot's it would have succeeded.

The FAA hasn't posited that view and there's no reason to believe it would.

I think the point is that in both scenarios, the conduct of the pilot is identical. The pilot hears an instruction. The pilot reads it back. The pilot hears nothing in response. There's no reason for the result to be different based on the reason for ATC's silence.

I doubt ATC was silent after Merrel's readback. I'd wager ATC said something like, "American 94 say again, your transmission was blocked."
 
It seems that the FAA will fry the pilot almost regardless of what happens, which pretty much fits in with the responsibility and authority of the PIC.

Do you know of an instance where the FAA fried a pilot when a controller received an incorrect readback but neglected to correct it?
 
The FAA's position is pretty clear in Merrell. The problem with Steve's position is that if for whatever reason the controller doesn't hear the incorrect readback (the situation in Merrell), the pilot is screwed. How can that happen? Imagine the following:

ATC: "Cessna 123, descend and maintain five thousand."
Cessna 123: "Cessna 123, descend and maintain five thousand."

...but at the same time, Cessna 223 also rogers, and the controller hears only the first. If the controller doesn't have to respond, both planes could descend, there could be a loss of separation, and Cessna 223 gets busted. If the controller has to say "123, roger," there's a chance to stop the error. If not, there isn't, unless someone else on the freq hears the double acknowledgement (since both affected planes are transmitting at the same time, neither can hear it) and steps in.
 
The FAA's position is pretty clear in Merrell. The problem with Steve's position is that if for whatever reason the controller doesn't hear the incorrect readback (the situation in Merrell), the pilot is screwed. How can that happen? Imagine the following:

ATC: "Cessna 123, descend and maintain five thousand."
Cessna 123: "Cessna 123, descend and maintain five thousand."

...but at the same time, Cessna 223 also rogers, and the controller hears only the first. If the controller doesn't have to respond, both planes could descend, there could be a loss of separation, and Cessna 223 gets busted. If the controller has to say "123, roger," there's a chance to stop the error. If not, there isn't, unless someone else on the freq hears the double acknowledgement (since both affected planes are transmitting at the same time, neither can hear it) and steps in.

You've rewritten Merrell.

The controller does have to respond. Since he didn't receive an acknowledgement of the clearance from Cessna 123, just an irritating noise due to the simultaneous transmissions, he'll have to say something like, "Cessna 123 say again, your transmission was stepped on." That should serve as a clue to Cessna 223 as well.
 
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The FAA hasn't posited that view and there's no reason to believe it would.
Maybe yes, maybe no. Taking Merrell at face value, the NTSB found that the pilot did nothing wrong. Somebody looking at the facts of Merrell without the benefit of knowing the case might very well respond to someone's correct speculation as to the result with
The FAA hasn't posited that view and there's no reason to believe it would.
btw, I don't buy into the view that the FAA is always out to fry pilots.
 
I wouldn't say that the NTSB said Merrell did nothing wrong, just that he was not responsible for the error. The FAA disagreed, and eventually prevailed.
 
The controller does have to respond. Since he didn't receive an acknowledgement of the clearance from Cessna 123, just an irritating noise due to the simultaneous transmissions, he'll have to say something like, "Cessna 123 say again, your transmission was stepped on." That should serve as a clue to Cessna 223 as well.
You're assuming facts not in evidence, specifically, that the controller heard what you say s/he did. 123 may well have been enough closer to the antenna, or had a more powerful transmitter, and thus totally buried 223's transmission, allowing the controller to hear only 123's acknowledgement. And yes, it can and does happen. In fact, that's exactly what happened in Merrell's case.
 
I wouldn't say that the NTSB said Merrell did nothing wrong, just that he was not responsible for the error. The FAA disagreed, and eventually prevailed.

Do you feel some other party was responsible for the error?
 
You're assuming facts not in evidence, specifically, that the controller heard what you say s/he did. 123 may well have been enough closer to the antenna, or had a more powerful transmitter, and thus totally buried 223's transmission, allowing the controller to hear only 123's acknowledgement. And yes, it can and does happen. In fact, that's exactly what happened in Merrell's case.

Have you listened to the ATC tapes in the Merrell case or are you assuming facts not in evidence?
 
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