PA32 down out of PDK

Irregardless of the reason, fuel or mechanical failure, when you've got a mile of runway left in front of you,
The first post said they took off from 3L which is only 3746' long.
 
Most other reports and tv interviews said they took off from the long runway...

Time will tell on what is accurate...
IFR traffic uses 3R while VFR stuff gets 3L from what I've seen. I've always been given 3R when departing IFR, even amidst all of the jet traffic.

I'm not sure what plan he was on.
 
The first post said they took off from 3L which is only 3746' long.

I heard cleared for t/o 3L (the shorter rwy) on LiveATC. Pilot reported going down 2.5 - 3 mins later. What's strange is that we were on frequency just a few mins later for our own departure and not a single word heard that would clue us in that something had happened during the next 10 mins when we were then cleared for freq change.
 
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It's _way_ easier to sit here and pick apart that decision at our leisure than it is to make that call in the cockpit.

As I mentioned before, I don't want to second guess or speculate what went on in the cockpit. I'm putting some thoughts to electrons as a personal exercise to work through GA mission execution considerations since I'm about to start doing a lot more GA missions.

It's taken me nearly 18 years of military flying (and the desire to return to GA) to arrive at the decisions I've made. YMMV and you may have already come to these conclusions.

My thoughts in the mission planning and execution phases are below if anyone is interested.

... I think all pilots know and accept that fact, that the best we can do is minimize the risks, but the risk inherent in taking a man-made machine up into the air will always be there.

While I accept risk, I am also the individual who is responsible for setting my Acceptable Level of Risk (ALR). In military flying, ALR is about establishing limits while still accomplishing the mission (or, deciding the mission isn't worth doing).

Without knowing much of the facts other than purpose of the trip, my personal ALR would be low (I'm not willing to accept much risk for this trip - probably going commercial)

...Aircraft engines exhibit legendary reliability, it isn't all that likely mine is going to fail out of the blue.... I just don't think it's worth getting steamed about.

I appreciate your confidence. My experience in military flying is that legendary reliability isn't really legendary. I've never landed after a mission, gone to maintenance, and said "No write-ups".

... we surmised a powerplant issue (mechanical or fuel) at the exact wrong time and place. If he had full fuel with the passengers and luggage, he was close to max weight. ...

Again, not to second guess what went on, but the question that I ask as I transition from being paid to fly to paying to fly is will I be able to train to max perform the aircraft? If so, how often can I do it?

As the PIC, going in with an ALR of Low, why should I put myself in a position where I am limiting my escape options while expecting max performance from me, and my aircraft? If I haven't trained to those conditions recently, why should I expect that either me, or my aviation machine can perform to those levels? If I can't expect either of those things, then why am I setting myself up to do them?
 
I appreciate your confidence. My experience in military flying is that legendary reliability isn't really legendary. I've never landed after a mission, gone to maintenance, and said "No write-ups".
Budget cuts are hell, aren't they?

But seriously, writing up a squawk on the aircraft after the flight can mean a whole lot of things and is not what Steingar was talking about.

How many engine failures have you experienced?
 
I appreciate your confidence. My experience in military flying is that legendary reliability isn't really legendary. I've never landed after a mission, gone to maintenance, and said "No write-ups".

Here's a really good case in point. You've flown way way more than I ever will. And you've done it in overworked aircraft. How many engine failures? And how many out of the blue, when you had no prior indication of anything hinky?
 
Irregardless of the reason, fuel or mechanical failure, when you've got a mile of runway left in front of you, the engine instruments are telling you something is wrong, what thought process says to keep the sucker in the air when at the very worst you belly it in onto runway concrete before the gear comes down all the way? What part of the learning process did we fail to convey?

Of the senses, sight of instruments says bad, sound of engine says bad, feel of controls says bad, nothing says good but we plow on anyway. Somewhere along the line a flight instructor(s) ought to be thinking about this.

Jim

Did I miss something yesterday? Has there been new information about what and when something failed? Did they find the flight recorder black box or something?? :confused:

Seems like an awful lot of "He coulda, shoulda..." with "I wouda..." type speculation. How do we know the instruments were telling him something, or that the engine sounded bad, or that the flight controls felt wrong? How in the world do we know that all these indicators where present with lots of runway still ahead?

Airplane engines that suddenly fail without warning are a well known phenomenon in GA.
 
My thoughts in the mission planning and execution phases are below if anyone is interested.



While I accept risk, I am also the individual who is responsible for setting my Acceptable Level of Risk (ALR). In military flying, ALR is about establishing limits while still accomplishing the mission (or, deciding the mission isn't worth doing).....
In military flying, do you have purview over accepting the mission?

Without knowing much of the facts other than purpose of the trip, my personal ALR would be low (I'm not willing to accept much risk for this trip - probably going commercial)

There are some scenarios wherein commercial increases the mission capable rate, but I would argue that the risk is not inversely proportional to mission capability in every case. Your chances of coming out alive at the end of the trip is still 50/50.

Again, not to second guess what went on, but the question that I ask as I transition from being paid to fly to paying to fly is will I be able to train to max perform the aircraft? If so, how often can I do it?

I've flown my airplane in many weight configurations from my personal min fuel (1hr) + (30-60mins) + (pilot only) to max gross. In retrospect, I think I may have also inadvertently been over gross once. May not be a big deal in a Skyhawk, but it's rare that you need to squeeze every ounce of performance out of the airplane. If you are planning that close then you're riskier than you might think. I've heard advice (that I adopt) to calculate takeoff requirement and add 50% minimum for a true requirement. If you have to max perform a GA aircraft in any regime, you're asking for an incident IMHO.

As the PIC, going in with an ALR of Low, why should I put myself in a position where I am limiting my escape options while expecting max performance from me, and my aircraft? If I haven't trained to those conditions recently, why should I expect that either me, or my aviation machine can perform to those levels? If I can't expect either of those things, then why am I setting myself up to do them?

Prudent thoughts here, but please put it in context of what I stated above about staying away from edge of envelope flying. If you disregard, then you may wish to consider staying on the ground.
 
Budget cuts are hell, aren't they?

But seriously, writing up a squawk on the aircraft after the flight can mean a whole lot of things and is not what Steingar was talking about.

How many engine failures have you experienced?


Here's a really good case in point. You've flown way way more than I ever will. And you've done it in overworked aircraft. How many engine failures? And how many out of the blue, when you had no prior indication of anything hinky?

We've done quite a few precautionary shutdowns due to compressor stalls, oil pressure, etc. in the E-3. With four engines, it can be pretty much a non-event all the way up to a heavy weight return to the airfield. I've never full-up lost a motor without warning.

I've been struck on the vertical stab after having a refueling boom separated from the tanker and flew threw the radome supports. Had to fly back for 4 hours not knowing how that was going to work out. It was pure luck there was no structural damage.
 
It's _way_ easier to sit here and pick apart that decision at our leisure than it is to make that call in the cockpit.

Which is the reason to pick apart the decision. Making the call in the cockpit is harder if you've never thought about it before hand. As I've said before, I follow these post-accident threads so I can try to learn what happened, why and how to avoid doing it myself. Especially with flying, I'll never live long enough to make these kinds of mistakes myself.

If I ever do something like this, I give everyone here permission to pick it apart and try out all kinds of weird theories. I won't be insulted, if it helps someone else out, I'll be glad....saving that whole question of whether or not I'll even know anything for the SZ.
 
We've done quite a few precautionary shutdowns due to compressor stalls, oil pressure, etc. in the E-3. With four engines, it can be pretty much a non-event all the way up to a heavy weight return to the airfield. I've never full-up lost a motor without warning.

I've been struck on the vertical stab after having a refueling boom separated from the tanker and flew threw the radome supports. Had to fly back for 4 hours not knowing how that was going to work out. It was pure luck there was no structural damage.


Forgive me, but I'm going to count this as zero unless the shutdowns would have happened had it been your only engine and you were prepared to put down in whatever. I'd worry more were I receiving aerial refueling, but I'd have a few new things to worry about. Jim said he had two in 5500 hours. One every 2200 hours, i.e. one in more time than I'm ever likely to fly in my whole life. Not going to get too chuffed about it.

I hope I am not out of place in thanking you for your service.
 
Which is the reason to pick apart the decision. Making the call in the cockpit is harder if you've never thought about it before hand. As I've said before, I follow these post-accident threads so I can try to learn what happened, why and how to avoid doing it myself. Especially with flying, I'll never live long enough to make these kinds of mistakes myself.

If I ever do something like this, I give everyone here permission to pick it apart and try out all kinds of weird theories. I won't be insulted, if it helps someone else out, I'll be glad....saving that whole question of whether or not I'll even know anything for the SZ.
Excellent point. I don't think anyone participating here in the discussion is doing so in an effort to criticize the pilot, but rather doing the basic what can I learn from this situation that appears to be something that could happen to any of us.
 
Excellent point. I don't think anyone participating here in the discussion is doing so in an effort to criticize the pilot, but rather doing the basic what can I learn from this situation that appears to be something that could happen to any of us.

I agree. I am a fairly new PP, hadn't flown in a while so I went up yesterday with my instructor just to be safe and work the rust off. We touched on this as I was taxiing to RWY 27. Wind was 240@4. Ok, here is the set up of this thought. When you take off to the west, you have climbing terrain and zero options till TPA, to the east, there are a few options. So, my instructor tells me, "personally, I would take off to the east today because @4 doesn't trump having options". I did take off to the west, but I learned something yesterday because of this tragedy. I will consider this from now on.
 
I agree. I am a fairly new PP, hadn't flown in a while so I went up yesterday with my instructor just to be safe and work the rust off. We touched on this as I was taxiing to RWY 27. Wind was 240@4. Ok, here is the set up of this thought. When you take off to the west, you have climbing terrain and zero options till TPA, to the east, there are a few options. So, my instructor tells me, "personally, I would take off to the east today because @4 doesn't trump having options". I did take off to the west, but I learned something yesterday because of this tragedy. I will consider this from now on.
He has a point, but don't get into the habit of disregarding the wind altogether.
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by mikeinbama
I agree. I am a fairly new PP, hadn't flown in a while so I went up yesterday with my instructor just to be safe and work the rust off. We touched on this as I was taxiing to RWY 27. Wind was 240@4. Ok, here is the set up of this thought. When you take off to the west, you have climbing terrain and zero options till TPA, to the east, there are a few options. So, my instructor tells me, "personally, I would take off to the east today because @4 doesn't trump having options". I did take off to the west, but I learned something yesterday because of this tragedy. I will consider this from now on.





He has a point, but don't get into the habit of disregarding the wind altogether.

Agreed...

Also, rising terrain should not be a disqualifying factor... There could be open space , golf courses and others spots to crash land into in that direction.... The other way could be flat, but forested, full of BIG trees and not a good option....

A good pilot looks at the big picture and formulates a game plan. IMHO..
 
Excellent point. I don't think anyone participating here in the discussion is doing so in an effort to criticize the pilot, but rather doing the basic what can I learn from this situation that appears to be something that could happen to any of us.

For a lot of folks it's more about back slapping and self reassurance. More- "I would never do that, so flying is still super safe for me." There isn't a lot to be learned from these threads really other than, it can happen to any of us on any flight. That means you too! (Meaning here is everyone reading the thread)

In this crash, I hate to say it, but I think it was really just this guy's number was up and he happened to have a bunch of passengers who's numbers were up. All this talk of heroically diving for the remaining concrete and sliding into the over run gear up because he should have eagle eyed a drop in oil pressure on the gauges, or heard a funny sound, or felt a disturbance in the Force that he hasn't felt for a very, very long time is BS. 99.999% of us would have done the same as him.

Myself included. I make no illusions of how "safe" flying single engine piston singles is. Particularly over hostile environment like urban areas. Nor do I make illusions of my heroic saves that I would make with my superior skills and training. I'm a regular guy with average skills and likely would be just as dead as this guy.

R.I.P. fellow aviator, I feel your family's pain. :(
 
For a lot of folks it's more about back slapping and self reassurance. More- "I would never do that, so flying is still super safe for me." There isn't a lot to be learned from these threads really other than, it can happen to any of us on any flight. That means you too! (Meaning here is everyone reading the thread)

In this crash, I hate to say it, but I think it was really just this guy's number was up and he happened to have a bunch of passengers who's numbers were up. All this talk of heroically diving for the remaining concrete and sliding into the over run gear up because he should have eagle eyed a drop in oil pressure on the gauges, or heard a funny sound, or felt a disturbance in the Force that he hasn't felt for a very, very long time is BS. 99.999% of us would have done the same as him.

Myself included. I make no illusions of how "safe" flying single engine piston singles is. Particularly over hostile environment like urban areas. Nor do I make illusions of my heroic saves that I would make with my superior skills and training. I'm a regular guy with average skills and likely would be just as dead as this guy.

R.I.P. fellow aviator, I feel your family's pain. :(

Sadly after reading several crash threads I believe I agree with you. Let's hope for mundane average flights.
 
For a lot of folks it's more about back slapping and self reassurance. More- "I would never do that, so flying is still super safe for me." There isn't a lot to be learned from these threads really other than, it can happen to any of us on any flight. That means you too! (Meaning here is everyone reading the thread)

In this crash, I hate to say it, but I think it was really just this guy's number was up and he happened to have a bunch of passengers who's numbers were up. All this talk of heroically diving for the remaining concrete and sliding into the over run gear up because he should have eagle eyed a drop in oil pressure on the gauges, or heard a funny sound, or felt a disturbance in the Force that he hasn't felt for a very, very long time is BS. 99.999% of us would have done the same as him.
While that is common in accident threads, I don't see quite the level of back-slapping that you do. I think most here recognize that his number was up, but since that isn't going to stop the rest of us from flying, we naturally want to discuss and evaluate the scenario to see what if anything we could have done. I certainly learned about the paper test for Jet-A through this thread.

Let's use your example of aborting a takeoff. IF you never think about it, you are correct - the odds of you doing the right thing are pretty damn low as you point out. But planning for it ahead of time CAN make a difference in future flights. Doesn't mean it WILL, but it improves your chances.

My personal input in this thread is that if you don't do a pre-departure briefing in a single engine airplane (even if it is just running through it silently in your head) I strongly recommend you adopt it. Would it have changed the outcome in this case? Maybe, maybe not. But if the crap hit the fan, you just might have a fighting chance.
 
Can't return to what I saw but I did not see any 120 degree angle.

Here's the photo...

635666884262099481-plane6.jpg
 
While that is common in accident threads, I don't see quite the level of back-slapping that you do. I think most here recognize that his number was up, but since that isn't going to stop the rest of us from flying, we naturally want to discuss and evaluate the scenario to see what if anything we could have done. I certainly learned about the paper test for Jet-A through this thread.

I agree. Although I see a lot of "I wouldn't be that dumb" sentiment in crash threads, I'm not feeling it here. I really feel like people are empathizing with this pilot b/c nothing obvious seems to be jumping out at us.
 
What is happening in these threads is that there seems to be two very broad categories of crashes.

1. The oh crap something went wrong with the plane, there is nothing you can do about it. There was no indication, nothing you could do to prevent it or anticipate it, but you need to deal with it. All any of us can hope for in this situation is we can do what is needed to hopefully get down safely. On occasion his could be adverse weather or wind shear, but usually it is a sudden mechanical failure. In these cases it may just be our time. Which looks like what happened here.

2. The category that gets pilots angry, defensive, and sometimes judgmental. The PIC made some sort of decision (hindsight is always 20/20 for us) looks like it could have been avoided. These are your classic VFR into IMC, hitting terrain, fuel starvation, etc. The true pilot error stuff. These are when the back slapping I would never do that stuff starts. These are no less tragic then the above situation, but get pilots defensive because it is the stuff that makes the general public afraid to fly. I truly hope all of us learn and are smart enough to avoid these errors, but for whatever reason good people and pilots keep making them. So rather than be overly critical, we need to learn and stay vigilant.

Until all of use prove that we can make flying safer, better to learn than be critical, we can lesson pilot error. We can not eliminate unforeseen mechanical failure. Flying can be and is generally safe, but has inherent risks that we all willingly accept, but hopefully can learn to mitigate.
 
Is it possible to load the wrong product into the fuel truck?

I don't know. Not sure about the loading process. I would say, however, that if a whole truck was loaded with the wrong fuel there would have been more planes with problems (UNLESS that truck had just been refueled, and as soon as the plane crashed they immediately stopped fueling planes).

So, unlikely, IMHO, in this instance.
 
I don't know. Not sure about the loading process. I would say, however, that if a whole truck was loaded with the wrong fuel there would have been more planes with problems (UNLESS that truck had just been refueled, and as soon as the plane crashed they immediately stopped fueling planes).

So, unlikely, IMHO, in this instance.

At SNL, we load the trucks with the same nozzles pilots use for refueling. I get to camp out up top and wait for about 30-45 mins for a refuel of the truck. Not sure how other places refuel their trucks, but we have to switch the ticker off for JetA or 100LL and take that nozzle so at least there's a couple places it would be easily caught.
 
It wasn't misfueling. If it had been, that would be known by now. With the records that any FBO keeps, fueling, or mis-fueling, is easily verified.
 
It wasn't misfueling. If it had been, that would be known by now. With the records that any FBO keeps, fueling, or mis-fueling, is easily verified.

It would be known by now, but not necessarily released to the public.

This isn't a 121 accident. They don't hold press conferences and release snippets like they do in high profile air carrier accidents.
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by mikeinbama
I agree. I am a fairly new PP, hadn't flown in a while so I went up yesterday with my instructor just to be safe and work the rust off. We touched on this as I was taxiing to RWY 27. Wind was 240@4. Ok, here is the set up of this thought. When you take off to the west, you have climbing terrain and zero options till TPA, to the east, there are a few options. So, my instructor tells me, "personally, I would take off to the east today because @4 doesn't trump having options". I did take off to the west, but I learned something yesterday because of this tragedy. I will consider this from now on.







Agreed...

Also, rising terrain should not be a disqualifying factor... There could be open space , golf courses and others spots to crash land into in that direction.... The other way could be flat, but forested, full of BIG trees and not a good option....

A good pilot looks at the big picture and formulates a game plan. IMHO..

Absolutely agree! In this particular case, this is the home drome and he has thousands of TO/landings here. He was speaking about, and I took it as just this airport. I am a percentages guy for the most part, I will probably take the wind 99.9% of the time. But, all things considered, if the wind is negligible, go where you have the most/best options.
 
I agree. Although I see a lot of "I wouldn't be that dumb" sentiment in crash threads, I'm not feeling it here. I really feel like people are empathizing with this pilot b/c nothing obvious seems to be jumping out at us.

Along these lines, what I'm hoping to see come out of the investigation is:

Was there a stall/spin into the crash or was it just the worst possible crash landing site(into the immovable retaining wall). Seems like it is the latter based on the contact with the truck and then where the plane ended up, like it had forward momentum still. I don't know at what angle a stall/spin typically makes contact though. Seems to me he may have been trying to clear that overpass and ran out of room at the worst possible spot. Had he cleared that 4-5ft wall, or had it not been there, could've seen better odds.
 
Along these lines, what I'm hoping to see come out of the investigation is:

Was there a stall/spin into the crash or was it just the worst possible crash landing site(into the immovable retaining wall). Seems like it is the latter based on the contact with the truck and then where the plane ended up, like it had forward momentum still. I don't know at what angle a stall/spin typically makes contact though. Seems to me he may have been trying to clear that overpass and ran out of room at the worst possible spot. Had he cleared that 4-5ft wall, or had it not been there, could've seen better odds.

He flew over a a good sized grass cloverleaf just a second or two before the straight ahead stall... My guess is he was fixated on putting it down on the interstate. was at a bad angle, saw all the traffic and ran out of time and options......

Sad deal...:sad::sad::sad::sad::sad:
 
He flew over a a good sized grass cloverleaf just a second or two before the straight ahead stall... My guess is he was fixated on putting it down on the interstate. was at a bad angle, saw all the traffic and ran out of time and options......

Sad deal...:sad::sad::sad::sad::sad:

I was thinking he was shooting for highway 141 on the other side as he was likely perpendicular to 285.
 
We've done quite a few precautionary shutdowns due to compressor stalls, oil pressure, etc. in the E-3. With four engines, it can be pretty much a non-event all the way up to a heavy weight return to the airfield. I've never full-up lost a motor without warning.

I've been struck on the vertical stab after having a refueling boom separated from the tanker and flew threw the radome supports. Had to fly back for 4 hours not knowing how that was going to work out. It was pure luck there was no structural damage.

Were you the PIC making flying decisions in these incidents? Or were you an ABM riding in the back?

The level of acceptable risk for a military sortie is determined by the mission, pure and simple. It isn't something each pilot gets to decide on his/her own. Pilots can assess risks and make them known, but ultimately a commander can still assume responsibility for those risks and order the mission to continue. That's what makes it the military.

Risk mitigation in GA is a different beast. No one can order me to get in my GA airplane and fly. In the case of this accident, we simply don't have enough information yet to have any idea whether the pilot took appropriate risk mitigation steps. He may have been the most careful guy in GA. I do hope the preliminary NTSB report (which should just be facts, no analysis) gives some clue. I own the same airplane and I'm anxious for more facts.
 
Were you the PIC making flying decisions in these incidents? Or were you an ABM riding in the back?

The level of acceptable risk for a military sortie is determined by the mission, pure and simple. It isn't something each pilot gets to decide on his/her own. Pilots can assess risks and make them known, but ultimately a commander can still assume responsibility for those risks and order the mission to continue. That's what makes it the military.

Risk mitigation in GA is a different beast. No one can order me to get in my GA airplane and fly. In the case of this accident, we simply don't have enough information yet to have any idea whether the pilot took appropriate risk mitigation steps. He may have been the most careful guy in GA. I do hope the preliminary NTSB report (which should just be facts, no analysis) gives some clue. I own the same airplane and I'm anxious for more facts.

I always found it funny filling out an RA form in combat. What's the point? Mission dictates we're going. Only way to mitigate the risk is eliminate the enemy. That ain't gonna happen.

Welcome to POA.
 
Anyone see the Cirrus go off the end of the runway today? Just about totaled it, I think. Injuries? Probably, but no deaths.
 
PDK again?

Yeah, 3L. Winds were pretty funky today. Wasn't sure if he was departing or arriving but most likely over controlled, lost elevator authority in a nose down position, and rammed into the runway. Crunched the nose wheel and bent all three props.

I'll post pics after removing identifying features.
 
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Were you the PIC making flying decisions in these incidents? Or were you an ABM riding in the back?

The level of acceptable risk for a military sortie is determined by the mission, pure and simple. It isn't something each pilot gets to decide on his/her own. Pilots can assess risks and make them known, but ultimately a commander can still assume responsibility for those risks and order the mission to continue. That's what makes it the military.

Risk mitigation in GA is a different beast. No one can order me to get in my GA airplane and fly. In the case of this accident, we simply don't have enough information yet to have any idea whether the pilot took appropriate risk mitigation steps. He may have been the most careful guy in GA. I do hope the preliminary NTSB report (which should just be facts, no analysis) gives some clue. I own the same airplane and I'm anxious for more facts.


First post......

Welcome to POA....

:cheers::cheers::cheers:
 
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