MauleSkinner
Touchdown! Greaser!
Yup. If you’re willing to fly when those are the only non-GPS options you’ve got, it’s probably a good idea to be willing to use them.Ah, just like the old days...
Yup. If you’re willing to fly when those are the only non-GPS options you’ve got, it’s probably a good idea to be willing to use them.Ah, just like the old days...
Just yesterday I did a scene (car crash) where we didn’t copy GPS coordinates. I just used pilotage. Most guys use GPS as a crutch. Little different for fixed wing IFR though. I’m sure they rely heavily on GPS for nav.Ah, just like the old days...
The military really needs to stop playing around constantly. Can’t they do this over the ocean or something?
Just yesterday I did a scene (car crash) where we didn’t copy GPS coordinates. I just used pilotage. Most guys use GPS as a crutch. Little different for fixed wing IFR though. I’m sure they rely heavily on GPS for nav.
I don't think they're decommissioning VOR's by way of any grand plan, except to stop maintenance on most of them and let them fail, and building a plan around that. And that they don't care much as long as the air carriers can fly. Perhaps just my cynicism and minor history of working with a different federal agency in the past.The GPS system is fragile, easily jammed, spoofed, and can even be turned off. Seems like a bad time for the FAA to be decommissioning VOR's left and right. These modern planes (and their pilots) are becoming very GPS dependent.
You know this stuff way better than I ever will, but I'd be willing to bet that they jam/disable GPS in an area way more than they need to for testing. Along the lines that for much of it, they could simply disable the GPS receiver in the system under test and see what it does. My singular data point is that my next door neighbor as a kid worked on first gen ALCM, and if I remember that system correctly, it didn't use GPS at all. It was 100% autonomous after launch, relying on radar image comparison to stored maps in the guidance system. Also IIRC, they worked pretty well in Gulf 1, and we should be able to do the same thing or better today. (For humor, the story I heard was that when that system was first announced as "operational" it was only in the sense that it would safely separate from the aircraft, and then fly about 600 yards before diving into the ground.)For certain weapons and tests, no, they can't.
Perhaps some tech details that maybe shouldn’t find it’s way into social media even though we’re retired,For certain weapons and tests, no, they can't.
When I was with LockMart, we did lots of missile testing at White Sands Missile Range (WSMR), and we did some testing at Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division (NAWCWD) Point Mugu. Some tests can be done over the ocean, but many types of tests, particularly short-range tactical missiles, can't. WSMR is equipped with tracking and telemetry and camera systems that cannot be duplicated on an ocean range. Also, there are certain launch vehicles (trailers, tanks, etc.) and targets (moving trucks, buildings, roads, etc.) which cannot be duplicated on an ocean range.
It is sometimes required to test certain missiles in a GPS-denied environment. Some missiles use ground-based imagery for navigation when GPS is unavailable, and some cruise missiles fly courses using imaged waypoints. That type of navigation is nearly impossible on an ocean range.
Bottom line - military testing over land with GPS denial isn't going away.
The crew was warned of the potential loss of GPS. They had an opportunity at that point to prepare for the eventuality by changing course or altitude. Don't blame the military for this one.
Turning off the GPS chip in the missile seems like a much better way to test it…Perhaps some tech details that maybe shouldn’t find it’s way into social media even though we’re retired,
I don’t know what the exact situation was in this specific case, but it GPS was working; and you start an approach down a valley with no other navaids being received, you’re going to be in a world of hurt when the military decides they’re going to screw around with GPS yet again.I must be missing something from the posts.
If this crew of professional pilots, flying a capable plane equipped to navigate using non-GPS navaids, crashed due to GPS outage, help me understand how keeping the non-GPS navaids helps a PP who barely maintains currency/proficiency?
I don't think they're decommissioning VOR's by way of any grand plan, except to stop maintenance on most of them and let them fail, and building a plan around that. And that they don't care much as long as the air carriers can fly. Perhaps just my cynicism and minor history of working with a different federal agency in the past.
There is a plan. It's called MON and it's been out for 10 years.The GPS system is fragile, easily jammed, spoofed, and can even be turned off. Seems like a bad time for the FAA to be decommissioning VOR's left and right. These modern planes (and their pilots) are becoming very GPS dependent.
Or current days, if you are bored because your medical is deferred.Ah, just like the old days...
I'd be willing to bet that they jam/disable GPS in an area way more than they need to for testing. Along the lines that for much of it, they could simply disable the GPS receiver in the system under test and see what it does.
Turning off the GPS chip in the missile seems like a much better way to test it…
Oh I know they've had a plan published for years. It's the causation that I don't believe. I believe the plan is the solution to the lack of planning of maintenance of VOR's, not a vision of the future. Maybe my natural cynicism, but over the years I've seen a lot of failures and problems labeled as features by the marketing department.There is a plan. It's called MON and it's been out for 10 years.
Turning off GPS doesn't test a failure mode at all, to me. It tests the functionality of the systems without GPS. The mistake, in my view, aligns with your accurate premise that you can't test all the failure modes - because they're not failure modes, they're jamming and spoofing modes. If we try to test all of those, we're really - in my view - doing two things: 1 - kinda kidding ourselves that those are the only methods and 2 - letting anyone in the area with signal monitoring gear know exactly what we test against.Except that only tests one failure mode, and probably doesn't accurately represent real-life field conditions the missile system might be exposed to. There can be a huge difference between "GPS receiver completely fails" vs. "GPS receiver goes 12 seconds without a valid solution, then starts getting solutions again" or "GPS gets 1 erroneous solution out of every 3" or "GPS solution doesn't agree with what the inertial nav is reporting / visual sensors are seeing" or 1,000 other variations on that theme. The guidance and flight control software can be tested in the lab, and I'm sure there's a huge amount of that testing performed...but eventually, for at least some of those situations you're going to want to Fire Zee Missiles! and see what they really do in actual flight, and you probably don't want that to happen for the first time when you need them to work in combat.
Seems completely reasonable for the military to screw around with their own stuff.you’re going to be in a world of hurt when the military decides they’re going to screw around with GPS yet again.
These interference notams just aren’t for new weapons testing though. Almost every large scale military exercise (NTC, JRTC, etc) these days incorporates GPS denial in the training plan. Can’t do that stuff over the ocean.I flew through NM a couple weeks ago, at night, me and a bunch of other aircraft on frequency “lost GPS”.
The military really needs to stop playing around constantly. Can’t they do this over the ocean or something?
With today’s modern avionics, you lose quite a bit of function when GPS goes.
Perhaps someone in this position should consider it.When you have 2 Nav's and 2 GPS's, ATC, who plans to use a clock and a compass?
For the most part you only have a compass, VORs, and may not even have DME since GPS serves as DME in most modern aircraft. So all approaches needing DME are no longer available, all GPS approaches are no longer available so you’re kind of stuck with VOR or ILS approaches that have radar available. These are few and far between in the mountains. Many airports in mountain areas out west are non-radar due to terrain. Can be very lonely. Very dark, limited nav options. Sounds like they were inbound. No TAWS, no NAV. So you climb and hope you don’t climb into a mountain. Without TAWS not gonna hear terrain pull up terrain pull up.
Bring back LORAN. Loved my Northstar M1.
i'm the same way, never really had a strong pref for day/night/mornings/evenings shrug.I've never understood how people can operate like this regularly. Sister's boyfriend is C90 atc and he seemingly never keeps the same schedule.
The GPS system is fragile, easily jammed, spoofed, and can even be turned off. Seems like a bad time for the FAA to be decommissioning VOR's left and right. These modern planes (and their pilots) are becoming very GPS dependent.
We need to do this. We’re the wealthiest large nation on the planet. Inexcusable that we’re not building the infrastructure which would improve our livesBring back LORAN. Loved my Northstar M1.

The flight crew again reported they “[have] a visual on Ruidoso” at 0008:30 and that they could “go visual.” The ARTCC controller subsequently cleared the flight to SRR, cleared the flight for a visual approach, and informed them they could cancel IFR in the air above 9,000 ft msl or they could cancel their clearance via the flight service station after landing. The flight crew acknowledged the clearance and responded that they would cancel IFR “in just a couple of minutes.” There were no additional radio transmissions received from the flight crew. The airplane then began a left turn southwest toward SRR. The Capitan Mountains, extending to 10,201 ft, were located about 14 miles northeast of SRR between the airplane and the airport.
The NOTAMs informed pilots that the SRR automated weather observation system (AWOS) was out of service and that military GPS jamming was scheduled at the time of the accident flight that encompassed the area and altitudes of the accident flight.
SRR is serviced by two instrument approaches, the ILS or LOC RWY 24 and the RNAV (GPS) RWY 24. Both instrument approach plate notes section contain the following statement: “When local altimeter setting not received, procedure NA (Not Authorized).”
Unless they used their Emergency Authority... But that brings up the question, as far as the Approach goes, was it an emergency and did they HAVE to land there?so they could not legally fly the approach.
Is that correct?
Once you're on the Visual, who cares if the military is jamming the GPS.
My watch has a spring inside it that stores energy to run the watch. Amazing piece of engineering. It has to be wound occasionally to keep it running.Sure, we get that. But it mattered here insofar as they were basing their impatient choice, that of going present position via left turn over the mountains, on having got the GPS reception back. Presumably to make use of GPS terrain alerting to stagger step down. Unfortunately, they weren't counting on White Sands proceeding to immediately turn the music back on, once ABQ called them back to inform White Sands that all/last ABQ customer traffic was now "on visual".
That isn't meant to imply the GPS signal is causal here. The causal was their impatience in not wanting to take the more circuituous right turning vectors that ABQ was gonna set them up for, to swing them back to the flatter/safer ILS ground track.
And before the pedants get stuck on it: the fact it may be "illegal" to follow that localizer beam because of some altimeter setting potato, isn't causal either. Besides, all they had to do was merely align with it while on vectors, call visual once established, and use it as advisory guidance to the runway and bob's your uncle, everybody goes home. No "bUh thE ruLz saY" pearl clutching needed.
It was just bad luck White Sands turned the music back on so quick, ABQ certainly didn't mean to screw them. Ultimately it was a decisional error, borne out of impatience. A seemingly shallow reason to die over. The rest of us still alive ought to take these narratives to heart to remind ourselves there's no need for that rush. If your employer is that hard up for cutting corners off a 20 minute sortie, that ain't a job worth taking. Not saying that's the position of the employer either; just making the macro point about making impulsive corner-cutting decisions when in a non-emergent situation.
All that said, I sympathize with the argument about folks being upset with White Sands messing with local GPS signal, especially at night.
Reading reports of controller advising possible GPS disruption in the area and pilot reporting they lost GPS and were climbing.
I flew through NM a couple weeks ago, at night, me and a bunch of other aircraft on frequency “lost GPS”.
Turning off the GPS chip in the missile seems like a much better way to test it…
Yep. Smarter units will do an aural "Be alert. Terrain INOP." message.Without GPS, I suppose this and the Terrain imagery offered on many Garmin nav units would show only "Fail".
I’m not seeing any new, relevant information in the Wired article that was not included in the preliminary report. What am I missing?![]()
A Civilian Plane Crashed in New Mexico. Was the Military’s Tech to Blame?
Drone warfare is making the skies more dangerous, even for airplanes far from the battlefield.www.wired.com
Ok they dumbed down some of this and who knows if completely accurate but it is a plausible story.